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William amos

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  1. Hmmm in this pic cant make out what that is in background ? Doesnt seem to be dust trails and if its smoke is layed out in a line. Thought originally it was a dust storm.
  2. Here is a bunch of link sites for italian Militaria http://www.geocities.com/Athens/4795/Italy.htm
  3. Try here http://www.geocities.com/Athens/4795/Germany.htm That just the German Part of the Site. ITs a Links page for alot of medal sites. Has many different nations in the list at top. [ May 19, 2003, 03:20 PM: Message edited by: William amos ]
  4. If add greeks then can get The Italian Invasion of Greece with mods.
  5. So it needs Zampolit units and Mud and snow and Soldiers sitting in foxholes starving to death in Stalingrad ?
  6. The Single Biggest contribution that the Dutch gave to the allied caused happened AFTER they surrendered to Germany. And while the Dutch Resistance was good dont mean them either. The Dutch Merchant Marine was the 4th Largest in the world in 1940. Most escaped NOT to England but overseas to Canada and the US. It was alot of Dutch Merchant Captains that crossed the Atlantic to bring suppies to the War. [ May 13, 2003, 10:15 PM: Message edited by: William amos ]
  7. I dont think the point was that the Italians were cowards. I think the point was that they were poorly led, poorly equipted and badly motivated to fight for a regime they didnt like. I think with a few changes the Italians would have been more victorious. WWII was just not the right time or the right cause.
  8. Beginning with the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, Italy raised a number of divisions, using men from the CCNN (Camicie Nere = Black shirts (In Italian abbrevations, the initials are doubled if the name is in the plural)) the fascist militia. [ May 08, 2003, 10:21 PM: Message edited by: William amos ]
  9. Now see I was right about Scottish Bagpipes in the Desert.. North Africa [ May 08, 2003, 03:44 PM: Message edited by: William amos ]
  10. Well I wasnt trying to give a seminar on Western desert battles but rather just share a story I found interesting on the net. Was meant to be colorful NOT history lesson. Btw here is an Italian OOB site and info.. North African High Command (Marshal Rodolfo Graziani) - HQ at Cirene 3rd Medium Tank Battalion (M13s arriving) 2 X Paratrooper battalions - Tolemaide Superior Artillery Command X Corps Artillery - Soluch XX Corps Artillery - Bengasi XXI Army Corps (Gen. Lorenzo Dalmazzo) - HQ at Beda Littoria 61st Infantry Division "Sirte" (Gen. Vincenzo della Mura) - HQ at Beda Littoria 2nd CCNN Division "28 Ottobre" (Luogotente Gen. Francesco Argentino) - at Barta Colonial Blackshirt Militia Volunteer Battalion - Barce 5th Army (Gen. Italo Gariboldi) - HQ in Tripoli X Army Corps (General Alberto Barbieri) - SW of Tripoli, HQ Garian 25th Infantry Division "Bologna" (Gen. Mario Marghinotti) 55th Infantry Division "Savona" (Gen. Pietro Maggiani) XX Army Corps (Gen. Ferdinando Cona) - SW of Tripoli at the coast, HQ Tagiura 17th Infantry Division "Pavia" (Gen. Pietro Zaglio) 27th Infantry Division "Brescia" (Gen. Giuseppe Cremascoli) 60th Infantry Division "Sabratha" (Gen. Guido della Bona) 10th Army (Gen. Mario Berti) - HQ at Bardia 1st Tank Group (Col. Pitassi Aresca) - Buq Buq 1 X medium tank battalion 3 X light tank battalion 2nd Tank Group (Col. Antonio Trivioli) - Bardia 1 X medium tank battalion 1 X light tank battalion Frontier Guards - Buq Buq 1 X MG battalion of the "LAnciero Vittorio Emanuele II" Cavalry Regiment 18th Libyan Battalion XXII Army Corps (Gen. Pitassi Mannella) - HQ at Tobruk 4th CCNN Division "3 Gennaio" (Gen. Fabio Merzari) - at El Adem 64th Infantry Division "Cantanzaro" (Gen. Lorenzo Mugnai) - at Gambut XXIII Army Corps (Gen. Annibale Bergonzoli) - HQ at Sollum 62nd Infantry Division "Marmarica" (Gen. Ruggero Tracchia) - at Sidi Omar - Halfaya Pass - Sollum and along escarpment 63rd Infantry Division "Cirene" (Gen. Allessandro de Guidi) - at Rabit and Sofafi 1st CCNN Division "23 Marzo" (Console Gen. Francesco Antonelli) - between Buq Buq and Sidi el Barrani. Libyan Divisional Group (Gen. Sebastiano Gallina) - HQ at Sidi el Barrani 1st Libyan Division "Sibelle" (Gen. Giovanni Serio) 2nd Libyan Division "Pescatori" (Gen. Armando Pescatori) "Maletti" Libyan Group (Gen. Pietro Maletti). Italian [ May 08, 2003, 02:47 PM: Message edited by: William amos ]
  11. Baptism of Fire - Dieppe Allied operations on the sea and in the air were making major contributions to winning the war. However, once the Allied leaders had made the decision to concentrate on defeating Hitler's forces before turning their full attention to those of Japan, it was clear that ultimate victory could only be achieved on land by driving the Nazi forces from the countries they occupied and finally invading Germany itself. That meant an invasion of western Europe, but it would take time to amass the necessary manpower and material. Moreover, the plans and equipment for amphibious operations had first to be tested and German defences probed to determine the chances of success. The need to relieve the pressure on the beleaguered Soviet Union demanded action as well. Finally, Canadian generals, politicians, and public were insisting that their bored and frustrated troops see action. For all these reasons, Combined Operations Headquarters decided to launch a raid-in-force on the French port of Dieppe on August 19, 1942, with the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division providing most of the assaulting troops. It turned out to be a massacre. Surprise was only partly achieved and only a minimal preliminary bombardment preceded the attack. German positions remained intact, the defenders uninjured and ready. What followed were "ten hours of unadulterated hell". Entire battalions suffered virtual annihilation. Those Canadians who managed to escape their landing craft and scramble to shore were swept by incessant fire from unassailable enemy positions on the adjacent cliffs. If their tanks did not sink in the water, they found it almost impossible to manoeuvre on the baseball-sized pebbles that littered the beaches. Poor communications led to additional troops being dispatched unnecessarily. It was a tribute to the spirit and fortitude of the Canadian soldiers that some of them managed to get off the beaches and into the town. Their losses were catastrophic. Of the almost 5,000 Canadians who formed the assault force, 3,367 became casualties including 907 killed in action and 1,946 made prisoners of war. Hitler's "Fortress Europe" seemed impregnable. However, the sacrifice was not wholly in vain. D-Day's success two years later was in some measure purchased by the lives of those Canadians who died at Dieppe. WWII Video of dieppe Survivors http://www.archives.ca/05/0534/053403_e.html Canadian tanks got bogged down on the pebbled beaches at Dieppe and very few ever made their objective of getting up the cliffs and into the town. German soldiers round up Allied prisoners following the Dieppe Raid.. 1, 874 Canadians were captured during and after the assault Canadian and Allied soldiers take care of their own after being taken prisoner during the Dieppe Raid One of the few tanks that actually made it up off the beach and into the Dieppe area and was later destroyed Victoria Cross Winners Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Cecil Ingersoll Merritt The South Saskatchewan Regiment Dieppe, France, August 19, 1942 Honorary Captain John Foote Canadian Chaplain Service Dieppe, France, August 19, 1942
  12. Found these parts in story about Italian Armor [ May 07, 2003, 03:38 PM: Message edited by: William amos ]
  13. And the Official Site for Nothern France for US Army. Seems to read very similar Ever since Bradley's order of 13 August, the Allied failure to close the Argentan-Falaise gap has been the source of controversy. Bradley's later account of the action, taking full responsibility for the decision to halt XV Corps but criticizing Montgomery for not doing more to seal the gap, indicates the passions aroused by the affair. Yet despite the presence of an obsolete boundary, Bradley was under no real restriction which prevented him from sending XV Corps north toward Falaise. Of the reasons which he gave for halting Haislip, the only one that rings true was his concern that an advance toward Falaise would leave XV Corps' flank exposed to a massive thrust by German troops within the pocket. This vulnerability may well have been reported by ULTRA and was decreasing by the hour with VII Corps' advance northeast from Mayenne. While one can be understanding of Bradley's decision, given the "fog of war" in the rapidly evolving situation, the attractive option of a long envelopment toward the Seine, and the fact that it was the Canadians who were supposed to meet the Americans at Argentan, he can be chided for overcaution. Bradley himself later indicated his true feelings on the subject when, facing another opportunity for an envelopment later in the war, he indicated to an aide that he would not make the same mistake twice. At least in part, the failure to close the Argentan-Falaise gap can be blamed on lack of communication that resulted from growing jealousies within the coalition. In Normandy, the Montgomery-Bradley relationship had been characterized by mutual respect and deference, but friction between the two staffs had increased with Bradley's rise to army group command and the corresponding growth in stature of the American effort within the Allied command structure. Given their successes, the Americans were less willing to accept a role subordinate to a British officer, especially one they viewed as arrogant and overly cautious. Montgomery had to defer to this growing independence while continuing to exercise responsibility for coordinating Allied movements until Eisenhower formally assumed command on the Continent. To complicate matters further, the French were already showing a dismaying tendency to go their own way on matters they considered vital to their national interest. In the cases of the Falaise gap, the liberation of Paris, the long envelopment to the Seine, establishment of boundaries, and debate over the single versus broad front, it is not surprising that coalition politics hampered the efficient exercise of command. Eisenhower's political skills as supreme commander have often been taken for granted, but they were certainly tested during the campaign for northern France. For all the recent interest in the ULTRA secret, it does not appear that Allied access to high-level German radio traffic played a decisive role in the Northern France Campaign. When British Group Capt. F. W. Winterbotham first revealed to an astonished world in 1974 that the British had broken the German ENIGMA code early in the war and that Allied commanders had regular access to deciphered German radio intercepts, many observers called for a revision of the history of World War II. At least with regard to the campaign in northern France, this does not appear to be necessary. In the case of the German attack at Mortain, Winterbotham and Ronald Lewin have claimed that ULTRA alerted Bradley four days prior to the attack. However, in a more recent work which cites directly from the documents, Ralph Bennett argues convincingly that the Allies did not receive word from ULTRA until practically the eve of the attack. The evidence on ULTRA'S role during the action at the Falaise gap is more inconclusive, but it does appear that ULTRA, at the least, provided much useful data and at the most, may well have caused Bradley to halt XV Corps near Argentan. In general, ULTRA appears now to have been a valuable tool, particularly in confirming data from other sources, but it did not win the campaign in northern France. For the U.S. Army, the campaign represented one of its most memorable moments during World War II. The pursuit across France showed the Army at its slashing, driving best, using its mobility to the fullest to encircle German formations and precluding any German defensive stand short of their own frontier. American troops would long cherish memories of triumphant passages through towns, basking in the cheers of a grateful, adoring populace. More informed observers would point to D-day as the point at which German defeat became inevitable, but the Northern France Campaign drove home to almost all that Germany had lost the war. While Hitler could still hope that secret weapons or a surprise counteroffensive would retrieve his fortunes, and while destruction of the Nazi regime would in the end take a longer, harder fight than seemed likely to jubilant Allied troops in mid-September, the Allies in northern France had taken a giant step toward ultimate victory. Site [ May 07, 2003, 02:42 PM: Message edited by: William amos ]
  14. From the US Army's official WWII Website about Sicily. As the Eighth Army's drive toward Catania and Gerbini bogged down in heavy fighting, Montgomery persuaded Alexander to shift the boundary line between the American Seventh and British Eighth Armies west, thereby permitting him to advance on a broader front into central Sicily and sidestep the main centers of Axis resistance. The boundary change, which Alexander communicated to Patton just before midnight on 13 July, stripped Highway 124 away from Seventh Army and assigned it instead to the Eighth Army. Under the new instructions, a portion of the Eighth Army would advance up Highway 124 to Enna, the key road junction in central Sicily, before turning northeast toward Messina. In essence, Alexander was interposing British forces between the Americans and the Germans, allowing the Eighth Army to monopolize the primary approaches to Messina and giving it complete responsibility for the Allied main effort. With its original line of advance blocked, Seventh Army was thus relegated to protecting the Eighth Army's flank and rear from possible attack by Axis forces in western Sicily—a distinctly secondary mission. The change in front was one of the most important and controversial operational decisions of the campaign. It clearly reflected the British belief that the veteran Eighth Army was better qualified to carry the main burden of the campaign than its junior partner from across the Atlantic. Indeed, the decision did little more than make explicit the priorities and assumptions that had been implicit in the campaign plan all along. On the other hand, by ordering the Seventh Army to stop short of Highway 124 and redirecting its advance, Alexander lost momentum and provided the Axis valuable time to withdraw to a new defensive line between Catania and Enna. The loss of momentum was best illustrated by the repositioning of the 45th Division, which had to return almost to the shoreline before it could sidestep around the 1st Division and take up its new position for a northwestward advance. Given the circumstances, Alexander might have been better served by reinforcing success and shifting the main emphasis of the campaign to the Seventh Army. This was not his choice, however, and his decision stirred up a storm of controversy in the American camp. Patton and his generals were furious. They had always assumed that the Seventh Army would be permitted to push beyond its initial Yellow and Blue objectives and into central and northern Sicily in order to accompany the Eighth Army on its drive toward Messina. After all, Alexander's vague preinvasion plans had never expressly ruled this out. Now that option had been eliminated and they felt slighted. Not content to accept a secondary role, Patton immediately cast about for an opportunity to have his army play a more decisive part in the campaign. The object which caught his eye was Palermo, Sicily's capital. Capture of this well-known city would not only be a publicity coup, but it would also give his army a major port from which to base further operations along the northern coast. Patton's first move was to coax Alexander into sanctioning a "reconnaissance" toward the town of Agrigento, several miles west of the 3d Division's current front line. That authorization was all General Truscott needed to seize the city on 15 July. With Agrigento in hand, Patton was in a position to drive into northwestern Sicily, and on the 17th he traveled to Alexander's headquarters to argue for just such a course. Patton wanted to cut loose from the Eighth Army and launch his own, independent drive on Palermo while simultaneously sending Bradley's II Corps north to cut the island in two. Alexander reluctantly agreed, but later had second thoughts and sent Patton a revised set of orders instructing him to strike due north to protect Montgomery's flank rather than west. Seventh Army headquarters ignored Alexander's message claiming that it had been "garbled" in transmission, and by the time Alexander's instructions could be "clarified," Patton was already at Palermo's gates. The Seventh Army met little opposition during its sweep through western Sicily. Guzzoni had recalled the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division to central Sicily soon after the invasion, and the only troops left in the western portion of the island were Italians who, for the most part, showed little inclination to fight. While General Bradley's II Corps pushed north to cut the island in two east of Palermo, Patton organized the 2d Armored, 82d Airborne, and 3d Infantry Divisions into a provisional corps under Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes and sent it on a 100-mile dash to the Sicilian capital. Palermo fell in only seventy-two hours, and by 24 July the Seventh Army had taken control of the entire western half of the island, capturing 53,000 dispirited Italian soldiers and 400 vehicles at the loss of 272 men. Yet for all its achievements, the Sicily Campaign also demonstrated some weaknesses in Allied capabilities, particularly in the realm of joint operations. None of the Allied commanders had much experience in joint air-land-sea operations, and consequently the three services did not always work together as well as they might have. Ground commanders complained about the lack of close air support and the inaccuracy of airborne drops, air commanders complained of their aircraft's being fired upon by Allied ground and naval forces, and naval officers chided the land commanders for not fully exploiting the fleet's amphibious capabilities to outflank the enemy once the campaign had begun. Similarly, General Alexander's unfortunate decision to broaden the Eighth Army's front at the expense of the Seventh Army can be attributed to the newness of combined operations, for the decision reflected the British Army's proclivity to underestimate American military capabilities—an attitude that American G.I.s proved unjustified during the Sicily Campaign. One consequence of this lack of integration within the Allied camp was that the Axis was able to evacuate over 100,000 men and 10,000 vehicles from Sicily during the first seventeen days in August. The failure of Allied air and naval forces to interdict the Strait of Messina was due in large part to the fact that neither Eisenhower nor his principal air, land, and sea commanders had formulated a coordinated plan to prevent the withdrawal of Axis forces from the island. The escape of Axis forces from Sicily is also attributable to the conservative attitude of Allied commanders. They had opted for the most cautious invasion plan, massing their forces at the most predictable landing site. They never seriously considered the bolder option of launching simultaneous attacks on Messina and Calabria, the "toe" of Italy, to trap all Axis forces in Sicily in one blow. Their conservativeness was somewhat justified, for multinational amphibious operations of this magnitude had never been attempted before, and the initial landings would have been outside of the range of Allied fighter cover. Nevertheless, the advantages to be gained by taking the enemy by surprise and destroying an entire Axis army would seem to have merited greater attention by Allied strategists than it received. The fundamental reason why the Messina-Calabria option was not seriously considered had to do with grand strategy, not operational considerations. At Casablanca the Allies had agreed only to invade Sicily, not Italy, and U.S. leaders had clearly stated their opposition to anything that might further delay a cross-Channel attack. A landing in Italy, even a local one intended purely to assist the Sicily Campaign, threatened to open the very Pandora's box Marshall wanted to avoid. Of course in the end, the Allies invaded Italy anyway, only to be confronted by the same German troops who had made good their escape from Sicily. But in the spring of 1943, coalition politics ruled out a Calabrian envelopment, and Allied planners confined themselves to a narrow, frontal assault in southeastern Sicily. Sicily was thus an important victory for the Allies, but not a decisive one. Coalition politics and the innate conservativeness of men who were still learning how to work the intricate machinery of joint, multinational operations tied Allied armies to a strategy which achieved the physical objective while letting the quarry escape. Nevertheless, Axis forces did not escape unscathed, and the experience Allied commanders gained in orchestrating airborne, amphibious, and ground combat operations during the campaign would serve them well in the months ahead, first in Italy and then at Normandy. Site [ May 07, 2003, 02:38 PM: Message edited by: William amos ]
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