Russian Infantry Anti-Tank Weapons?

[pad152]

Why didn't the Russians develop/deploy better infantry anit-tank weapons later in the war? By early 43 all of the ATR's other infantry anti-tank weapons are useless. They sure kept up in all other areas of weapons.

[offtaskagain]

Originally posted by pad152:

Why didn't the Russians develop/deploy better infantry anit-tank weapons later in the war? By early 43 all of the ATR's other infantry anti-tank weapons are useless. They sure kept up in all other areas of weapons.

They had enough tanks around to go around by then.

[Stalin's Organ]

Like he said - there were so few German tanks to fight against and so many Russian ones to fight against them to bother!!

[Gutshot]

You'd have thought the U.S.would have thrown in a few hundred thousand bazookas along with all the tank shipments they were supplying to ther Russians.Hey don't the Russkis get zooks in ASL?

[Stalin's Organ]

The Americans did send bazookas - the Sov's didn't like them.

Indeed post war the Russian infantry AT systems were based on German designs!!

[Col Deadmarsh]

So if they got them, why aren't they modeled in CMBB?

[Grey Hunter]

Oddly Enough, the PanzerShrecks were based on captured Bazookas. talk about reality being stranger than fiction.

[Joques]

Originally posted by Gutshot:

Hey don't the Russkis get zooks in ASL?

Not in the rules they don't. And not in a single SSR I've ever come across. Though in J1 Urban Guerillas the "Russian" partisans get Panzerfausts...

[Stalin's Organ]

Originally posted by Colonel_Deadmarsh:

So if they got them, why aren't they modeled in CMBB?

Getting is not the same as using! They got lots of things that never made it to the front lines - bazookas appear to have been one of them.

[ January 26, 2003, 03:28 AM: Message edited by: Stalin's Organ ]

[ichadwick]

Originally posted by pad152:

Why didn't the Russians develop/deploy better infantry anit-tank weapons later in the war?

In part I believe it's because the Soviets were late coming to the realization of the effect and uses of armour that they did not develop an in-depth strategic response to it. The Red Army really didn't manage to integrate infantry and armour tactics efficiently during the war.

Infantry and armour tended to be used independently in many late-war offensives, rather than supportively an cooperatively. The jealousy and rivalry between the various generals and marshalls also contributed significantly to the lack of cooperation.

During the 1930s' purges of the Red Army, Stalin removed all of the original military leaders who promoted armoured activity and replaced them with a group that did not believe armour was a critical weapon in war (Stalin's belief). They still believed strongly in WWI tactics when barbarossa began: massed infantry and even cavalry charges. The human wave in CMBB is one example. Carell writes about German machine guns mowing down cavalry early in the war.

Early Soviet doctrine was to use armour in small units, piecemeal as attachments to infantry units rather than as a cohesive stike force. That's why superior tanks like the T34 were beaten in 41-42: they were thrown into battle in small numbers, and without any doctrinal training as how to use them. Tanks were treated like soldiers with big guns or as mobile artillery.

Poor communications in the Red Army meant that a lot of tanks operated independently, rather than as a unit, so they did not coordinate well with each other, let alone infantry. And, of course, the Red Army soldier was not trained to act or think independently. Even much later, independent action by marshalls could result in a reprimand from Stalin - or even a change of command (including prison).

There was no significant manufacturing effort to make widespread AT weapons for infantry, except for a mass-produced Molotov cocktail. Since Soviet soldiers were notoriously poorly educated, even illiterate, there was an emphasis on easy-to-use and easy-to-repair equipment. The Soviets didn't really develop good, simple AT weapons for mass production until much later.

The Germans, on the other hand, had developed both armour tactics and infantry tactics (and hence weapons) to counter it. They were manufacturing hand-held AT weapons early on.

The Red Army didn't really reorganize itself to use (and defeat) armour advantageously until the fall of Stalingrad, and even then they continued to use it as a massive strike weapon, rather than develop a comprehensive strategy for armour as an integrated arm. That would come after WW2.

As it has been pointed out above, from mid-43 on, the Red Army had amassed such a huge superiority in numbers of units - particularly artillery - that they didn't need finesse. By 1945, some Soviet tank columns were moving 60-70 kms a day, leaving their infantry well behind.

Their tanks and mobile guns became all the AT weapons they needed.

In The Fall of Berlin 1945, Anthony Beevor tells of Soviet artillery creating a "fire storm" in preparation for an attack. They had 300 guns per kilometer - about one every 3 or 4 meters! At Kursk, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had almost 20,000 guns - almost 2:1 against the Germans' artillery.

And as for lend-lease, the Soviets had a mixed reaction to what they got. They liked the trucks and jeeps, but were often hostile to the tanks and many other weapons. There was a suspicion of foreign goods, and a patriotic zeal for Soviet-made weaponry.

[Andreas]

Ian, I think your conclusions about the integrated use of Soviet armour do not quite stand up to historical examination

From TM30-430 'Handbook of USSR Forces 1946' based on Fremde Heere Ost data collected during the war:

Note that on the assault battalion level, there appears to be no armour. But:

At the assault regiment level, we already see 3 Coys of tanks, and one Coy of SP guns. Plus one platoon mine-clearing tanks.

On the assault division level, this increases to a regiment of heavies, a brigade of mediums, a regiment of SP and a company of mine-clearing tanks.

Now this may not sound like a lot, but you have to remember that the breakthrough sector of this division is a zone about 1.5-2km wide, and 3-5km deep. I.e. it is a CM battle map. On it you would have about 4-6,000 men in either a 2-echelon or all-up formation, supported by 80-90 AFVs.

I think your misconception springs from the use of tank armies, tank corps and mech corps, as relatively un-combined instruments. These were used for exploitation, where speed was more of the essence than having a nicely balanced force. The last time that was a serious drawback was during the Winter 42/43 Manstein Donbas counter-offensive. Thereafter, Soviet armour would generally just run wild in the German rear, and tear up the rear-areas.

For the integrated, combined arms work though, independent formations were used, and heavily.

Here is the relevant text from the book:

Regarding LL equipment. The Soviets liked the Sherman, and the Valentine. They loved the trucks

[ January 26, 2003, 09:48 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Andreas]

Oh, and I would argue that any army that can organise its tank armies in such a way that it can undertake such operations as Vistula-Oder, Bagration, L'vov-Sandomierz, or Iassy-Kishinyev, must be doing something very right.

One of the maxims of the Soviet use of extremely mobile and fast moving exploitation forces was to reach the river crossing before the defeated army in front of you. Almost invariably from 1944 onwards, they did. With catastrophic consequences for the German forces.

The assertion that the Red Army did not learn how to use true combined arms throughout ww2 is one that has often been made by German generals, and is still repeated a lot today. Unfortunately it is simply not true.

[Hannibal]

Andreas

Where did you get the book TM30-430 .

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Hannibal:

Andreas

Where did you get the book TM30-430 .

Borrowed it from Kip

I know that is not the answer you are looking for. I don't think you can get it anywhere at the moment, except through 2nd hand sources. These are scans I made a long time back for the beta-testing/scenario design of CMBB.

[JasonC]

Infantry AT is more useful in less open terrain, and to defenders. Guns are the main AT defense. But it is still useful and later the Russians certainly recognized this, so I think the original question does remain something of a puzzle. Part of the answer might be that late in the war (from Bagration on, certainly, perhaps sooner) the Russians captured large amounts of German equipment, presumably including fausts. I know they used them some - the question would be how widespread the use of captured fausts was, by when.

[ichadwick]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Ian, I think your conclusions about the integrated use of Soviet armour do not quite stand up to historical examination...

<snip>

Regarding LL equipment. The Soviets liked the Sherman, and the Valentine. They loved the trucks

Which part? I wrote a whole thesis there... check the dates. Soviet tank armies were not created until spring 42 but held back from the front until the summer of 42 (if I recall my history, they were first used as complete units in the fall of 42 at Stalingrad in Operation Little Saturn...).

"In 1941 all those small and significant defects of RKKA were the result of the pre-war ideas about the tanks' places on the battle field. Initially, the idea that the tanks were only the instrument that was held by infantry, prevailed. The infantry divisions strengthen by the tanks had to run the front. After that the ordinary infantry divisions formed the new front line. In other words tanks worked to support the infantry. But even in 1942 the Soviet tank armies started to act in a different way. The first fiddle started to play tanks and infantry only supported the actions of the tank units. The tanks started to act with the support by the self-propelled artillery, motorized infantry and motorized heavy artillery. The infantry divisions obtained the tank units, many of them had the companies the self-propelled destroyers of tanks on track chassis. Those tank destroyers supported the infantry actions during offensive." and...

"In 1943 the tactics of the Soviet tank troops was changed one more time. At the first time the battle was driven by the strong army groups but the constant front line was absent. The Soviet and German mobile units tried to turn each other while the infantry played only the auxiliary role. Only the caterpillar vehicles were in the shock troops. The infantry was too slow and weak and the wheeled transportation was too defenceless and not too mobile. The military actions took place in a very complicated environment, the spring and autumn seasons of bad roads, the winter snowdrifts, the summer heat and dust forced both parties to act in a modern way."

From http://www.aviapress.com/viewonekit.htm?TRN-138 Poor translation, but the intent is fairly clear. And there's an interesting item on the development of Soviet pre-war doctrine at http://www.wargamer.com/articles/std1_v4.asp

And in a review of Glantz's Don to Donbas, the reviewer comments... "This operation set the pattern for the subsequent offensives for the remainder of the war. By the summer of 1943, the Soviets had developed the force structure and doctrine which, with minor modifications, would endure until war's end. Mobile groups of armies (tank and mechanized corps) and fronts (tank armies, cavalry-mechanized groups) would develop tactical success into operational success. The operation also epitomized the 1943-44 battles in Russia, with worn German panzer divisions thrusting hither and yon as they vainly strove to halt the relentless offensives. That German strategy might have worked in the post-Stalingrad battles, but the Soviet ability to adapt made it a futile proposition. / From http://www.themilitarybookreview.com/html/glantz.shtml

There's an interesting article on Soviet tank development at http://www.combatmission.com/articles/soviet/sov_part4.asp The author says, "...enabled the Soviet High Command to determine new principles for utilising the corps in future battles and operations, and these were set out in NKO Order No 325, dated October 16 1942. According to this, separate tank brigades and regiments were to be used for the direct support of infantry, and tank and mechanised corps were to be made available to fronts."

And as for Stalin's control...

Until the summer of 1942 Stalin and the Party closely controlled the Red Army. Political commissars worked directly alongside senior officers and reported straight back to the Kremlin. Stalin came to realise that political control was a dead hand on the army and cut it back sharply in the autumn of 1942. He created a deputy supreme commander under him, the talented Marshal Zhukov, and began to step back more from the day-to- day conduct of the war. Given the freedom to work out their own salvation, the Soviet General Staff demonstrated that they could match the Germans on the battlefield. Not until the later stages of the war did Stalin begin to reimpose control, when victory was at last in sight. From http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/how_the_allies_won_2.shtml

And a little bit about Soviet tank radios: http://www.wlhoward.com/sovrad.html

Post-war Soviet doctrine: http://www.sovietarmy.com/documents/evolution.html

Soviet self propelled gun development: http://members.aol.com/sturmpnzr/SovietSU.html

[Andreas]

Originally posted by ichadwick:

Infantry and armour tended to be used independently in many late-war offensives, rather than supportively an cooperatively.

(Emphasis by me)

This one in particular, a number of others as well

[ January 26, 2003, 01:21 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[xerxes]

I have read numerous accounts of the Soviet armor become separated from their infantry during the attack. This occured during all phases of the Eastern front repeatedly. In none of the accounts did it really appear that this was planned, more that when the infantry was stripped off the armor continued. Of course this also happened very frequently to the Germans in 1941.

[Leit]

Zis-3 gun was very cheep. This gun was krafted on convoyers. It's cost and maintanse was lower then Bazukas need(very expensive ammo), no problems to loose it, standart ammo.

What could be better?

[Leit]

Originally posted by JasonC:

...the Russians captured large amounts of German equipment, presumably including fausts. I know they used them some - the question would be how widespread the use of captured fausts was, by when.

My grand father told that his engereer batalion use pansercheks and fausts at late 1944 and to the end of the war. Ammo was everywhere.

But that was in engener batalions wich are accustomed to risk with explozives

Other infrantery units afraid to experiment on themselves to get e knolage how to use them.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by ichadwick:

In part I believe it's because the Soviets were late coming to the realization of the effect and uses of armour that they did not develop an in-depth strategic response to it. The Red Army really didn't manage to integrate infantry and armour tactics efficiently during the war.

Deep battle was thoroughly developed in the late 1920s, deep operations was developed, but untested in the 1930s. The Soviets had a very good understanding of armor actually, and quite early, too. That the purges of 1937 occurred has no real relevance from this perspective.

Infantry and armour tended to be used independently in many late-war offensives, rather than supportively an cooperatively. The jealousy and rivalry between the various generals and marshalls also contributed significantly to the lack of cooperation.

Simply not true! Andreas has already pointed out the use of combined arms during the breakthrough phase of a Soviet offensive operation. Have you looked in detail at the TOE of a tank or mech corps of 1944-45, and the tank army of the same period? What you see is an operational formation built for speed and sustainability in independent operations. Incidently, by late war it was typical for tank armies to operate with very loose formation boundaries, so what you have is an independent formation, built to survive in the German operational depths. 'Combined arms' was its middle name.

During the 1930s' purges of the Red Army, Stalin removed all of the original military leaders who promoted armoured activity and replaced them with a group that did not believe armour was a critical weapon in war (Stalin's belief). They still believed strongly in WWI tactics when barbarossa began: massed infantry and even cavalry charges. The human wave in CMBB is one example. Carell writes about German machine guns mowing down cavalry early in the war.

Not quite correct. While Stalin did end up with a bunch of 'yes' men after the purges in 1939-40, along with a doctrine that returned to the rifle-artillery-cavalry formula, by the end of the Winter War, serious questions were being raised regarding all this. And when the Germans defeated France in May 1940, the Soviets were jolted out of their politically-induced dementia, returning to a mechanized doctrine that year. Of course, it was too late, but that's not the point.

Early Soviet doctrine was to use armour in small units, piecemeal as attachments to infantry units rather than as a cohesive stike force. That's why superior tanks like the T34 were beaten in 41-42: they were thrown into battle in small numbers, and without any doctrinal training as how to use them. Tanks were treated like soldiers with big guns or as mobile artillery.

This was more the result of inexperience on the part of corps and army commanders, than on Soviet doctrine. The result of playing musical chairs with their military art in so short a period. And culling the cream of the Soviet officer corps too.

Poor communications in the Red Army meant that a lot of tanks operated independently, rather than as a unit, so they did not coordinate well with each other, let alone infantry. And, of course, the Red Army soldier was not trained to act or think independently. Even much later, independent action by marshalls could result in a reprimand from Stalin - or even a change of command (including prison).

Again, drawing the wrong conclusions. Poor communication was quite probably due to Triandafillov's opinion of radios back in the late 1920s, so radio technology given bad press among the Soviet military. As for the Red Army Man, lack of training and experience had more to do with poor performance than Soviet doctrine per se. By 1943, basic officer training lasted for 18 months, and basic training for enlisted was 2-3 months. And, while Soviet commanders could be punished for disobeying orders, success had a virtue all its own. Even as early as July 1941, commanders were 'modifying' their orders to reap effective success, and they were not punished - they were promoted.

There was no significant manufacturing effort to make widespread AT weapons for infantry, except for a mass-produced Molotov cocktail. Since Soviet soldiers were notoriously poorly educated, even illiterate, there was an emphasis on easy-to-use and easy-to-repair equipment. The Soviets didn't really develop good, simple AT weapons for mass production until much later.

Personal AT weapons were a shortcoming, but the presence of 45mm and 57mm AT guns alleviated this to a degree. Also, by the time the Soviets were capable of developing effective infantry AT weapons it no longer mattered as much - the Soviets had the initiative and trophy Panzerfaust were fairly easy to come by.

The Red Army didn't really reorganize itself to use (and defeat) armour advantageously until the fall of Stalingrad, and even then they continued to use it as a massive strike weapon, rather than develop a comprehensive strategy for armour as an integrated arm. That would come after WW2.

While the first part of your statement is more or less correct, the latter part is false. See above for the answer. By the end of the war, the Red Army had the most developed military art for land-based operations in the world.

As it has been pointed out above, from mid-43 on, the Red Army had amassed such a huge superiority in numbers of units - particularly artillery - that they didn't need finesse. By 1945, some Soviet tank columns were moving 60-70 kms a day, leaving their infantry well behind.

Their tanks and mobile guns became all the AT weapons they needed.

Actually, the Soviets were displaying battlefield finesse by late 1943 - the Kiev operation is a fine example of this. Add their numerical advantage and you have a very bad ending for Germany. As for leaving their rifle forces behind, the Germans were more guilty of this than the Soviets. By 1944, the Soviets limited this shortcoming by creating many small pockets rather than a few huge ones, reducing the time necessary for rifle forces to eliminate these pockets. Also, rifle armies had their own forward detachments filling the gaps between them and the tank armies up ahead, keeping contact with each other as well as German forces on the retreat.

[Andreas]

Kip makes a couple of good points about what happened when the Panzers stirred later in the war, and how the Red Army defeated them:

The fate of Übertanks

[ichadwick]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by ichadwick:

Infantry and armour tended to be used independently in many late-war offensives, rather than supportively an cooperatively.

(Emphasis by me)

This one in particular, a number of others as well </font>

[Andreas]

Ian, that does clear it up. I would agree on the failure to integrate armour and infantry, but one could argue that was not a bug, it was a feature. By ditching the infantry and artillery, the Soviets later in the war (from the Kiev operation onwards) achieved extremely high breakthrough speeds that the Germans were simply unable to counter. Combined arms teams as forward detachments were usually quite balanced and extremely successful though.

BTW - the same criticism could be applied to Patton's break-out and rush through France. Or the 21st Army Group advance across northern France. In the latter the infantry divisions were grounded to provide trucks and supply for the fast-moving armour. Does that mean the Allies in the west also did not understand combined arms warfare? When you have your enemy on the run, you don't want to bother with niceties like combined arms. You want to run riot in his retreat, and drive him before you, hear the lamentations of his women, and all that . Of course, at some point he may reorganise and your forward detachment gets a bloody nose. That is to be expected, but it is no big deal, because by then you are a couple of hundred kilometers closer to his heartland. There is a place and time for finely balanced combined arms, but it is not the fast-moving exploitation phase of an operation.

Originally posted by ichadwick:

In fact, Beevor mentions the rising number of Soviet causalties in 45 caused by T34 drivers falling asleep while driving their tanks chasing Germans.

Rising casualties? Well, another instance where the words 'fact' and 'Beevor' really don't go together very well. I would be hesitant to use him as a source on any operational/tactical questions relating to the war.

[SgtMuhammed]

Well when you go from 1 or 2 incidents to 3 or 4 I guess you could call that a rising trend. This has to be one of the stupidest statements I have ever heard from a professional historian. Maybe we should mention the rising incidents of American soldiers killed by drunk driving as they pushed into Germany during the final months of the war.