Russian On-Map Guns

[YankeeDog]

I know it's far too late for any changes to CMBB, and I know this has been brought up before, but I want to get this out one more time in hopes that the issue will be re-examined someday when CMX2 revisits the East Front (which I'm pretty confident it will do someday, if not necessarily the initial release):

IMHO, the regimental-level cutoff for on-map guns is arbitrary and unrealistic. While I'm sure there was no intentional bias, it ends up unrealistically favoring the Germans due to the fact they're the only ones who have a really big caliber gun available at the regimental level (i.e., the 150mm sIG). The Russians are stuck with nothing bigger than 76mm as DF HE (unless you count the 85mm AA & 100mm AT, but these aren't really designed for HE fire, and in any event the 100mm AT is a very late-war weapon only)

Ever since CMBB came out, I've been reading more and more East Front tactical accounts, and it's clear to me that the Red Army used 122mm howitzers quite frequently in direct-fire mode. It's not that uncommon to read of even 122mm and 152mm guns being used DF. This includes uses against fortified positions, and also deployment as an ad hoc AT weapon -- at Kursk, in particular, considerable numbers of artillery pieces were deployed in the DF mode against tanks.

But it really took the cake last week when I was watching the History Channel and caught a clip of what was clearly a Russian 203mm howitzer being used in DF mode -- it was sitting in the middle of some wrecked German city (possibly Berlin), barrel fully depressed, clearly firing at an enemy-occupied building a little ways down the street!

Anyway, I'm NOT suggesting that 203mm howitzers actually be available as on-map assets. But at the very least I would like to see Russian 122mm howitzers available as DF assets the next time BFC visits the East Front. I think a strong case can be made for having Russian 122m guns and 152mm gun/howizers available DF as well.

Cheers,

YD

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

...it's clear to me that the Red Army used 122mm howitzers quite frequently in direct-fire mode. It's not that uncommon to read of even 122mm and 152mm guns being used DF. This includes uses against fortified positions...

And you are quite confident that these are towed versions? I am aware that the SU-122, SU-152, and JSU-152 were used for this purpose.

Michael

[Bone_Vulture]

I have heard of ad hoc solutions during WW2, usually during the first half of operation Barbarossa, when the German advance was so fast that Soviet artillery units in the rear were suddenly in front, facing spearheading German armor.

Whether field artillery pieces were used for DF after the tide of the war had turned, I'm not certain. Purposely attempting to haul heavy artillery to the enemy's line of fire sounds rather risky.

[YankeeDog]

Yes, I am certain I am talking about towed guns, not tracked assault guns.

When I have more time, I'll do a more proper job of it and post some references.

[Paco QNS]

FWIW:

The Soviets had a hard time training good observers and fire control specialists. Those who could usually ended up in Artillery Divisions. In most wartames, this is reflected by the fact that all Soviet artillery except mortars and direct fire must be pre-plotted. However, the Soviets on the attack should frequently receive a large volume of artillery at their disposal.

Artillery is deployed strongly and in great volume. In fact, Soviet doctrine states, "the speed of deployment by artillery units decides the outcome of the battle." In repeated offensive operations, density reached 300-480 pieces per mile of front.

Originally, about 80% of artillery was organic to rifle divisions or corps. After the major defeats of 1941, the remaining pieces were centralized and production became a top priority, resulting in the formation of artillery brigades, divisions, and corps, some of the highly specialized, employed at Stalingrad and thereafter.

Mortars and rockets play a greater role in the Soviet army than any other. Mortars are massed and used (and observed for) like conventional artillery; while rockets are under corps control and are added to key breakthrough attacks. In the attack, self-propelled artillery such as the SU-122 and SU-152 are used heavily for direct-fire artillery support. 120mm and 82mm mortars have roughly the same effects and burst radii as 122mm howitzers and 76mm guns, respectively.

76mm guns are widely used for direct-fire support of infantry and tanks. Less commonly, they're used as conventional artillery. 122mm howitzers are the backbone of conventional Soviet artillery, and 152's are used to supplement or against tougher targets. 122mm guns and 152mm gun-howitzers tend to show up in corps artillery. Antitank guns see heavy use.

Planning, coordination, and timing are key to Soviet doctrine. Detailed plans are layed out hours or days in advance, with plans to effectively neutralize all probable threats and to use surprise concentrations, false transfers, rolling barrages, etc. Fire plans can get quite detailed. [i think that in your average scenario the Soviets should be given more artillery than the Germans, but most of its use will have to be preplanned before the game begins.] Point targets are destroyed more often with direct fire than with precision indirect fire. In defense, phase lines are computed so that a barrage at a particular range can be set up quickly when enemy forces move to that range.

I don't think the Soviets had VT fuze, but they did have quick, delay, and mechanical timed. Open, parallel, and converged sheafs were used.

Barrages were layed down no closer than 220 yards with cover, and 440 without, to friendly forces (110 if flanking fire). Calls for antipersonnel defensive fire were always highest priority. Rolling barrages were set up to lead infantry attacks by roughly 200 yards and tanks by 300-800 yards. Fire transfer could be accomplished by up to 1650 yards via K-transfer (an expensive method, though not as bad as full recomputation), or direct transfer from a checkpoint or previous concentration by up to 330 yards.

National Doctrine WWII Artillery notes

[Redwolf]

The sheer number of guns the Russians had guarantees that German pushes will face Russian guns never intended for direct fire much more often than Russian pushes face any kind of German gun.

Simple matter of statistics.

There were so many guns for the Russians that any situation, intended historical use or not, for them is more probable than any historical use of German guns.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

Yes, I am certain I am talking about towed guns, not tracked assault guns.

When I have more time, I'll do a more proper job of it and post some references.

I'd like to see those, but, while we're waiting, by way of confirmation:

WO 231/88, “Combat Tactics of the Red Army” cites a US document on Soviet tactics published by the Intelligence Section, Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 21 Feb 1949. This gives direct fire support ranges for 45mm guns as 400-800m, for 76mm guns 1000-1200m, and for 122 and 152mm pieces (the latter mistakenly written 145mm), 1500-200m.

Michael Foedrowitz' "Soviet Field Artillery in World War II" (Schiffer, Atglen, 1996) makes no real comments on artillery doctrine, but includes photographs of 122mm howitzers (pp. 25 and 28), a 152mm ML-20 (p. 39) and a 203mm howitzer (p. 47) in action and laid at such shallow angles that it is hard to believe they are doing anything other than direct fire. The latter three photos are all from Berlin; film clips exist of a 203mm howitzer firing direct in that battle.

All the best,

John.

[flamingknives]

There's a section in the "Combat Lessons" pamphlets entitled 'Sniping with an 8" howitzer" Granted that this is the US army and in Italy, but it describes use, over a number of days if not weeks, of an 8" howitzer in a direct fire role.

There's also an oft shown film clip of a large Russian gun firing down a street. The gun has tracks, but no engine or driving gear, so it must be towed.

[YankeeDog]

fk -- the film clip you're talking about is doubtless the same one I saw. The gun in the clip is definitely a towed 203mm howitzer.

[Panzer76]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

fk -- the film clip you're talking about is doubtless the same one I saw. The gun in the clip is definitely a towed 203mm howitzer.

I always thought it was mounted on a tractor, and thats why it had tracks instead of wheels. If it was towed, why use tracks?!

[dieseltaylor]

Possibly to deal with Russian mud?

[Krautman]

I'd love to see russian heavy on-map arty too.

Did the russian 122mm gun have an armored shield to protect the gun crew from small arms fire? If not, then it would be quite dangerous to use this weapon i a direct-fire-mode, and the commanders wouldn't employ the gun this way. Such a large gun could easily be spotted and the crew killed by riflemen. The german Infanteriegeschütze, on the other hand, offer some protection to the crew.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Krautman:

I'd love to see russian heavy on-map arty too.

Did the russian 122mm gun have an armored shield to protect the gun crew from small arms fire? If not, then it would be quite dangerous to use this weapon i a direct-fire-mode, and the commanders wouldn't employ the gun this way. Such a large gun could easily be spotted and the crew killed by riflemen. The german Infanteriegeschütze, on the other hand, offer some protection to the crew.

A gunshield is not absolutely necessary for employment in the direct-fire role. On the one hand, the doctrinal ranges for direct-fire support from 122mm and 152mm weapons I listed above are beyond the effective range of small-arms. On the other, weapons without gunshields have historically been used for direct fire; I'm thinking especially of the 5.5" gun the RA set up in the "battering-ram" role outside Fort Dufferin, but there are doubtless plenty of others. On the third hand, most Soviet Division and Corps pieces had gunshields of some kind.

A further few snippets of evidence for Soviet division and corps artillery firing direct come from TM 30-430, "Handbook on USSR Military Forces", US War Department, Nov. 1945.

On pages V-50 and V-51, we read:

"Division artillery

[...]

122mm HOWITZERS.

[...]

Secondary missions include [...] destruction of tanks, ordnance, embrasures, antitank escarpments, and dragon's teeth by direct fire.

[...]

152mm HOWITZERS.

[...]

Secondary missions are direct fire against very strong earth and timber fortifications...

[...]

Exceptional missions are destruction of tanks and motor vehicles by direct fire...

[...]

Organic artillery of armored formations and cavalry corps

[...]

Thier artillery is employed particularly for close support of infantry and tank elements, making large use of direct fire in the attack of organized positions.

[...]

Corps artillery

[...]

122mm GUNS.

[...]

Secondary missions are destruction of tanks and vehicles by direct fire...

[...]

152mm GUN-HOWITZERS.

Secondary missions include... destruction of tanks, vehicles, armor, and concrete by direct fire."

Nobody objects when CM includes such rarities as King Tigers, Jagdtigers and Sturmtigers; I see no reason for objecting the the doctrinally-standard use of extremely common Russian weapons in the direct fire role.

All the best,

John.

[YankeeDog]

And in any event, the most common types Russian howitzers used during WWII in both the 122mm and 152mm caliber had gunshields.

Here's a pic:

Probably not quite as protective as the shield on the German sIG, but certainly better than nothing. . .

Cheers,

YD

[murphus]

I'm overawed by the level of scholarship going on here. You guys are researchers of the highest calibre (excuse the pun!). My take on the artillery issue is not so much the inclusion of higher-powered guns in the DF role (which I'm sure was exceptional), but rather the way that scenario designers tend to skimp on Soviet artillery. With a few exceptions ("The Bitter End" comes immediately to mind), the USSR is stuck with inadequate arty resources in almost every scenario, leaving the Soviet grunts almost unsupported. I would like to appeal to all scenario designers to take heed of the historical literature and pack the Soviet ranks with spotters of every kind, even at the cost of infantry, particularly late war. This implies a more detailed approach to the scenario briefing, and/or the beautiful and elegant hint I picked up from The Mad Russian in TPG, which is to place the enemy trenches and wires as "friendly" trenches and wires, so that they are seen in the setup screen. This simulates the kind of detailed knowledge of enemy lines (though not troop positions) which you would get from detailed recon.

To sum up: more Soviet artillery, fewer grunts, try the enemy trenches and wires as "friendly placements", to allow a certain amount of transparency.

[murphus]

I'm overawed by the level of scholarship going on here. You guys are researchers of the highest calibre (excuse the pun!). My take on the artillery issue is not so much the inclusion of higher-powered guns in the DF role (which I'm sure was exceptional), but rather the way that scenario designers tend to skimp on Soviet artillery. With a few exceptions ("The Bitter End" comes immediately to mind), the USSR is stuck with inadequate arty resources in almost every scenario, leaving the Soviet grunts almost unsupported. I would like to appeal to all scenario designers to take heed of the historical literature and pack the Soviet ranks with spotters of every kind, even at the cost of infantry, particularly late war. This implies a more detailed approach to the scenario briefing, and/or the beautiful and elegant hint I picked up from The Mad Russian in TPG, which is to place the enemy trenches and wires as "friendly" trenches and wires, so that they are seen in the setup screen. This simulates the kind of detailed knowledge of enemy lines (though not troop positions) which you would get from detailed recon.

To sum up: more Soviet artillery, fewer grunts, try the enemy trenches and wires as "friendly placements", to allow a certain amount of transparency.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by murphus:

...the beautiful and elegant hint I picked up from The Mad Russian in TPG, which is to place the enemy trenches and wires as "friendly" trenches and wires, so that they are seen in the setup screen. This simulates the kind of detailed knowledge of enemy lines (though not troop positions) which you would get from detailed recon.

Now that's an interesting idea.

:cool:

Michael

[37mm]

The proving ground is great for such tips

[Bone_Vulture]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

Possibly to deal with Russian mud?

Bingo.

[YankeeDog]

Diesel and Bone have it right. The Russian 203mm howitzer was mounted on an unpowered, tracked chassis to give it better floatation and make it easier to move over less than ideal roads.

As a side note, the film clip mention also demonstrates just how stable such a chassis is; even though the 203mm is firing at about 0 deg. elevation, there is virtually no chassis movement.

Cheers,

YD

[murphus]

I've just seen the film you refer to, but I would say, despite the tracks, there is plenty of recoil, when fired it jumps back about three feet. It would sure be nice to have a beast like that in the game, so I second the call to include these guns as on-map pieces in the next version of the game.

[MikeyD]

"...rather the way that scenario designers tend to skimp on Soviet artillery ...stuck with inadequate arty resources in almost every scenario, leaving the Soviet grunts almost unsupported."

I believe 'opening barrage' in CMBB was introduced specifically to model Soviet artillery superiority. This feature isn't in CMBO. This is good for simulating the big corps-level artillery strikes that preceed set-piece battles (a typical scenario map would of course only recieve a fraction of a mammoth front-wide artillery barrage). I do agree that the scenarios could use more random Katyusha barrages, especially from mid-43 on.

I'm not entirely sure how easily a Russian soldier on the ground -even an officer - would be able to call in CM-style pinpoint artillery strikes on two minute's notice during the battle. Someone more familiar with the Artillery corps chain of command with have to comment on that.

[YankeeDog]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

I'm not entirely sure how easily a Russian soldier on the ground -even an officer - would be able to call in CM-style pinpoint artillery strikes on two minute's notice during the battle. Someone more familiar with the Artillery corps chain of command with have to comment on that.

Rarely, especially on the attack. Even late war when radio equipment and vehicles were somewhat more available due to Lend-Lease, the Red Army had a shortage of personnel with the necessary training and education to plot artillery solutions. This is probably one of the major reasons why they stuck with such a rigid artillery command system -- pre-planned barrages allowed one trained soldier to plot solutions for multiple guns ahead of time.

So it's not really an issue of command structure; even if a forward Company commander had the communications equipment necessary to communicate with an artillery battery, there wouldn't necessarily be anyone immediately available on the other end of the line with the traing to be able to quickly plot a firing solution.

OTOH, it's probably still harder to use direct fire, and near-indirect fire support assets in CM than it was IRL. For example, as Soviets attacking a town, you can't buy a whole battery of 82mm or even 120mm mortars, place them in defilade behind a crest about 1km from the village, and then allow the spotter to communicate with the battery by visual signal or runner, and adjust the fire by rule of thumb. The same is true to a lesser extent for howitzers.

Of course, such a close deployment of indirect fire support assets does have its disadvantages. Obviously, it makes the battery much more vulnerable to counterbattery fire, or even overrun in the event of an enemy counterattack. But this is one way that the Soviets IRL compensated for their lack of rapid, flexible artillery response.

In short, CMBB's artillery system probably allows more flexibility for the Soviets with off-map artillery support than in RL, but OTOH, CM's modeling of on-map direct and indirect fire support is extremely limited, so it kind of washes out.

As far as lack of sufficent artillery support for the Soviets in the game, that's obviously a scenario design issue, not a game engine issue. I think many designers choose to avoid representing battles where large amounts of artillery fall during the actual CM scenario because it tends to make for a rather arbitrary and unsatifying scenario -- if the Soviet player guesses right and gets a bit lucky with this Arty strikes, the games is basically over just as it's beginning.

The scenario designer also has the option of representing Soviet pre-attack barrages by adjusting the casualties, morale state and deployment of the German defending forces -- that is, as if the barrage has just lifted at the start of the scenario. Much of the time, this probably makes for a more playable game.

It is fun to watch 4 spotters worth of Katushyas come crashing down on the map, tho. . .

Cheers,

YD

[MikeyD]

"...has the option of representing Soviet pre-attack barrages by adjusting the casualties..."

That very point came to mind after my last post. If you open a scenario and find half your German forces already supressed and half the buildings burning rubble you can assume a Soviet-style barrage had recently lifted.

[Paco QNS]

"Ejército" nº 92 Sep 47

(( Spanish Army official Review ))

"La compañía de cañones de infantería"

(( The infantry-gun Company ))

Col Manuel Sagrado Marchena

CO of Mountain Agrupment

(( He was the CO of the 262 Regiment, and Commander of Krasny Bor subsector on February, 10th 1943)) ((outskirts of Leningrad)).

"".., in the battle of Krasny-Bor, February, 1943, for six days of feverish night activity, the russians constructed approximately eighty gun-emplacements for pieces of the calibers among 4,5 and 7,62 centimeters , in first line and between their first and the second; distant their first line from ours approximately 40 meters counted on the terrace of the railroad Moscow - Leningrad, approximately 300 meters in most of the front of contact and 500 meters in the more remote place. They entered the pieces in position in the night 9-10 of February, and at dawn, approximately a hundred Batteries of all the calibers initiated an intense preparation of two hours of duration. About 20 per 100 of pieces, those placed in the first line, with direct shot aiming individually and observing from the piece, demolished covers, shieldings, nests of automatic weapons and emplaced light antitank guns, preparing the assault of the siberians; but an exiguous number of machine guns 'revived' among the rubbles of so conscientious demolition, drowning in pools of blood three consecutive assaults. In the ostentation of material probably there was absent a ' powerful complement ' of the Infantry: the Infantry gun. As a fact, against the machine guns ghosts, having been foreseen, an infantry gun could not have fired over the waves of assault, because of its tense trayectory in a completely horizontal plain. So, said better, it was missed the Infantry howitzer.-

-------------------------------------------

Revista "Ejército" nº 92 Sep 47

"La compañía de cañones de infantería"

Cnel Manuel Sagrado Marchena

Jefe de Agrupación de Montaña

((era Cnel Jefe del Regto 262 y Jefe del subsector de Krasny Bor el 10-02-1943)).

"Y fiel a tal doctrina respondió su conducta. Así, en la batalla de Krassny-Bor, febrero de 1943, durante seis días de febril actividad nocturna, construyeron los rusos unos ochenta asentamientos a barbeta para piezas de los calibres entre 4,5 y 7,62 centímetros, en primera línea y entre la primera y segunda, distante aquélla de la línea contraria unos 40 metros, contados sobre el terraplen del ferrocarril Moscú-Leningrado, unos 300 metros en la mayor parte del frente de contacto y 500 metros en los sitios más alejados. Entraron las piezas en posición en la noche 9-10 de febrero, y al amanecer, unas cien Baterías de todos los calibres iniciaron una preparación intensa de dos horas de duración. El 20 por 100 de las piezas, las situadas en primera línea, con tiro directo sobre objetivo individual y observación desde la pieza, demolieron cubiertas, blindajes, nidos de armas automáticas y asentamientos avanzados de anticarros ligeros condición previa para el asalto de los siberianos; pero un exiguo número de ametralladoras "resucitadas" de entre los escombros de tan concienzuda demolición ahogó en riada de sangre tres asaltos consecutivos. En el alarde de material quizá faltó un "complemento potente" de la Infantería: el cañón de Infantería contra las ametralladoras fantasmas, de haber estado previsto, no hubiera podido tirar por encima de las olas de asalto, a causa de su trayectoria rasante en una llanura completamente horizontal. Faltó quizá el obús de Infantería.-