T-34 Lifespan

[A.E.B]

Hi all

What was the spare part situation for the Russians and the Western Allies when it came to tanks?

I have read in a number of sources that increased German production of whole AFVs in 1943 on lead to a lack of spare parts. This lack of spare parts resulted in canibalisation at field repair depots that in turn stopped battlefield recoveries being returned to service (I have a picture of a German tank repair depot captured by the Russians in late 1943. The depot contained almost 100 PzIII tanks, most with no road wheels).

Was increased Russian tank production at the fatory level offset by a lack of spare parts at the operations level that kept the number of runners down? I have kept my eyes open for this info for years but have never seen anything definitive.

Did the Western Allies produce adequate spares, or were their casualty rates sufficient to allow cannibalisation?

I simply don't know?

Regards

A.E.B

[Mr. Tittles]

The soviets produced more T34/76 in 1943 than 42. Most anyone would agree with this.

Tank plants are assembly plants. The major sub components are made in other plants. Engines, main guns, etc.

The soviets made another gun plant, just for the T34/76 gun. It was factory #13. Why? So they could meet demand at the assembly plants.

The added production from the ceasing of production of KV1 (in 1942), also was put into (you guessed it) more T34/76 guns. This is a major criteria put forth by Andreas. It is, unfortunately for him, the truth.

I sense a drift in thought in the thread. I never said heavy tanks were given up on, just that 1943 was a 'building-year' and the Germans picked a wrong time to make changes.

I also see the AGs and SPs and what-not throwing into the mix.

[Mr. Tittles]

One good thing about cannabilism is that common types supply common parts.

If I can take guns, engines, ammo, sights, wiring harnesses (these burn in small fires), wheels, treads, carbs, filters, plugs, turrets, hydraulics, electrical motors, starters, fuel tanks, etc , etc , etc...

And share these amongst the majarity of my main battle tanks AND supporting assault guns, then a lack of spare parts is less significant concern.

The Panzer IV and Panther did not share guns, engines, ammo, etc.

The Germans would have been better off with lt. panzer divisions having one battalion of Panzer IV and two small battalions of PanzerIV/L70 vehicles. The heavy Panzer division would just have two Panther battalions and no panzerjaeger/AT company.

[Mr. Tittles]

I can't believe that JasonC and Andreas are so naive about tank building.

I imagine them on a hill, overlooking a tank 'plant', watching raw materials (iron, rubber, etc) coming in one end and completed tanks coming out the other end. "I feel I know a lot about factories now" says JasonC to Andreas.

Anyway, Heres a quote..

From June to September 1942, the Stalingrad Tractor Factory was the main supplier of T-34s. The Kharkov Locomotive Factory were moved to the Uralmashzavod (Ural Machine Building Plant) in the Urals and merged with the Nishni Tagil auto factory. During 1942 the Ural Heavy Machinery Company in Sverdlovsk started to produce T-34s. The Ural-Kirov Tank Factory in Chelyabinsk was setup by the People's Commissariat for the Tank Industry to produce T-34s. It was later known as Tankograd. There were a total of 8 large tank factories, 6 factories produced hulls and turrets, and 3 produced engines.

So kind of sounds like concentrating on T34/76. But, I don't know, you tell me.

[ December 29, 2003, 11:42 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[JasonC]

There isn't a drift in the thread, there is a hole in your theory and a bigger one in the theory of your main debate opponent earlier in the thread. You were right that attrition mattered and the Russian decision to press in 1943, take their losses, and keep the Germans off balance was correct and important. You are not however correct that this decision was tied to Russian AFV fleet composition decisions or trade offs. Andreas is right about that.

There were two critical decisions involved and neither was primarily about AFV fleet composition issues. The first critical decision was the German one, not to mobilize their economy for a long war of attrition until very late. The second critical decision was the Russian one, to go balls out on the attack despite their own high loss rates and superior German AFV types in the field by mid 1943. The second, Russian decision was the right way to exploit the weakness created by the first, German decision.

Delay in German mobilization gave the Germans extra development time to field improved AFV types, while the economy still had flexibility. But that was a poor booby prize in return for low levels of AFV production in 1942 and only modestly improved ones in 1943. The decision was not made for tank mix reasons, however. It was a political-strategic gamble that Russia would fall without the effort involved.

The Russian decision to attack was made mostly for operational reasons (exploiting the mispositioning of German armor for Kursk offensive by hitting where it wasn't, while it was away), partially for the political-economy one of wanting to recover territory if at all possible (getting more manpower from a liberated Ukraine etc).

Nobody was focused primarily on AFV quality issues because AFV quality did not matter nearly as much as most tactical wargamers seem to imagine it did. The Germans outscored the Russians when they had only Pz IIIs against T-34s. The Russians cleared the Ukraine when they basically had only T-34/76s and the Germans had Tigers and Panthers numbering in the hundreds and scads of long 75 AFVs. Tactical and doctrinal differences fought with operational and numerical ones. Technical ones were a bit player in this. They mattered, but not more than the other issues.

Certainly not more than the strategic decision to delay economic mobilization, on the German side, and the Russian operational decisions, first to horde T-34s in the second half of 1942, then to use them in the winter vs. the Axis minors, then to stand on the defensive in front of Kursk, then to grab the initiative after Kursk defensive.

The Russians were deciding how and when to spend their armor; the Germans were racing to recover from their "own goal" decision not to have any replacement stream to speak of. The interaction of those two in 1943 was that ramping German production collided with rampaging Russian armor "spending". Out of which the Russians got the Ukraine and no growth (to speak of) in the German tank fleet over the year. They won the war largely as a result - though the actual mortal blows it set up were delivered in the summer (center) and fall (south) of 1944.

What did not happen is, the Russians were cleverly committed to standardization and only made T-34s, while the Germans wasted their efforts of scads of upgrades and thereby had no numbers and an unservicable zoo of types. The Russians were not committed to standardization. They made a lot more than T-34s.

The Germans wasted their efforts on long term investment and leisured housewifes and schnapps by not mobilizing their economy until after Stalingrad, not on Panthers, which weren't a waste. The standardization vs. high tech trade off simply was not the strategically important one. Timing of mobilization and operational saving or spending of armor were the important ones.

You rightly emphasized the second, contra Bastables - the Russians pressed to attrite the Germans to exploit their slow mobilization (whether intending that or not - their actual motivations were operational and territorial). You wrongly seem to conflate it with the standardization issue, contra Andreas, who is not Bastables and is making a different point, about which he happens to be right.

The Russians made marginally more T-34s in 1943 than 42, and the same number again in 1944 despite the changeover to T-34/85s. But the big jump in T-34 production had already happened - it was the 1942 level "on" position vs. 1941 and pre-war that mattered. 1941 levels of 250 per month turned into 1942 levels of 1000 per month. The critical determinate of total tank production was not what other types were made, but when that jump was made. The Russians did it early and rapidly while the Germans did it late and slowly.

[Mr. Tittles]

25% more is marginal?

[JasonC]

Compared to 400% more in 6 months, yes. Which is what mobilization does.

[Mr. Tittles]

25% more T34/76 is actually more than the total 1943 production of panzer IV longs... its 3248 turreted tanks (like 125 more than the panzer IVlong 1943 production).

I hate to do this but the SU122 and SU85s went from 25 in 1942 to 1371.

T34/76 production in 1942 jumped? So did the number of kill rings on german tanks and antitank guns on the eastern front.

[Mr. Tittles]

http://www.battlefield.ru/library/bookshelf/stats/stat3.html

Cause its all about sharing. Notice that the Soviets also made new factorys for the new 122mm tank guns.

[Mr. Tittles]

General Rotmistrov said at proposal of the situation of the Soviet armored formations in 1942: "The difficulty is that while there is not much difference between the light [T-60] and medium [T-34] tanks on the roads, when moving cross-country the light tanks are quickly left behind. The heavy tank [KV] is already behind and often crushed local bridges which cut off units following after. Under battlefield conditions, that too often meant that the T34 alone arrived.; the light tanks had difficulty fighting the German tanks and the KVs were still delayed in the rear. It was also difficult to command these companies as they sometimes were equipped with different types of radios or none at all". Rotmistrov concluded that it would be more prudent concentrate industrial resources upon a single 'universal tank', instead of wasting them between different light, medium and heavy types.

In Summer 1942 trials on the new vehicle ended and the production begun on August 20th 1942. In the meanwhile the war experience took other bad news for the heavy tanks in the Red Army as they were proving unsuccesfull. Gen. Katukov said: "The T-34 fulfillsall our hopes and has proven itself in combat. But the KV heavy tank ... the soldiers don't like it ... It is very heavy and clumsy and not very agile. It surmounts obstacles with great difficulty. It often damages bridges and becomes involved in other accidents. More to the point, it is equipped with the same 76 mm gun as the T-34. This raises a question, to what extent is it superior to the T-34? If the KV had a more potent gun or one of greater calibre, then it might be possible to excuse its shortcomings".

New KV-1s being delivered to the Red Army

Effectively the KV has spent its best time of 1941 and early 1942, when Soviet tankers requested him as king of the battlefield. As a temporary measure the KV heavy tanks were removed from the mixed brigades and concentrated in separate heavy tank regiments for use in infantry support role. The situation led to a radically new project for a 'universal' tank retaining the armor protection of an heavy tank and the weight of a medium one.

The design team of the KV proposed the KV-13 while the T-34's design team proposed the T-43. KV-13 weighted about 31 tons, had 120mm front hull and 90mm turret armor; gun was the usual 76,2 mm L41. As for the KV-1s the appearance of the heavy German Tigers and Panthers made clear that the ideas were going in the wrong direction.

[ December 30, 2003, 01:53 AM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[M1A1TC]

Plus T-34 kicked some german behind.

[Andreas]

My word - Jason and I agree on something. Quick, bring out the champagne.

MT - if you still don't accept what has clearly been laid out to you, I am at a loss how to go any further. So I will just recap.

1943 was not a year of standardisation of the Soviet tank force. It was a year in which roles were more clearly assigned to specific vehicles, and a whole new class of AFVs was introduced.

Increased production of T34 came from increased production efficiency and new plant, not from abandoning the KV or T60/70 series of plant. The plants for the former were retooled and produced stop-gap vehicles, the plants for the latter switched to SU76. The plants for the former could have been switched to T34 production but were not. That blows a whole in your theory. The plants for the latter could not be switched to T34 production.

Rotmistrov's statement did not lead to an abandoning of the heavy tank per se despite the grievous shortcomings of the KV he notes (some of which would apply to the IS series too). It lead to a much clearer role assignment to it. What changed was how they used the heavy tank, i.e. as a breakthrough tank, not as a pursuit tank.

Your point about the tank guns is obvious. The successor vehicles to the T70 and KV did not use the T34 tank gun (I think the T70 used the divisional gun, but could be mistaken). So it is logical that the gun production will find its way into the T34, since there is no other taker for it.

In what way am I being naive about factories? In stating that the automotive plants could not handle T34 production? In stating that retooling takes time, and will lead to decreased production? Please enlighten me.

[JasonC]

"T34/76 production in 1942 jumped?"

Yes, from a pre-war "off" position to a fully mobilized "on" position - over 12000 tanks.

"So did the number of kill rings on german tanks"

Since they didn't erase them, this is the same as saying "time passed". That is, it says nothing.

But 1942 was the year the Russians rebuilt their huge AFV fleet. Not 1943. They started the war in mid 1941 with 20k AFVs, mostly pre-war lights (T-26 and BT). By the start of 1942, they were down to 7k AFVs. During 1941 production was rising but from an initially low level, with disruptions as factories were moved. Loss rates were astronomical. The bulk of the prewar light tank fleet was in fact destroyed by the end of the summer, let alone the end of the year.

In 1942, the fleet size rebounded to 20k again. Because production was so high. Losses were around 15k - high absolutely but lower than either 1941 or 1943 - and the fleet size still grew by more than 10k. Production jumping mattered, and mattered more than the high absolute loss rate. 1942 was the loss rate lull, and largest gain in production. The combination rebuilt the Russian AFV fleet. That was what made possible the Stalingrad counterattack and subsequent follow on offensives.

It was in 1943 that the increase in production - a modest additional 5k or so - was fully matched by an increase in losses compared to 1942. Losses were 7400 higher in 1943 than 1942 - up 50%, more than the increase in T-34 production. The fleet still grew (marginally) but not at the rate it did in 1942, and only because of additions like lend lease imports - losses and domestic production were running about even.

1942 was the year the Russians saved up a tank fleet. In 1943 they spent as fast as they built - it was not a year of saving but of spending. They already had the fleet. They proceeded to use it. Using it meant losing tanks at a very high rate. But they caliberated their aggressiveness to what the replacement stream could handle, so the fleet size did not decline.

The Russian fleet was relatively homogeneous in the field, compared to the German one, at mid war. But not because they hadn't used many types. It was relatively homogeneous because the lights died disproportionately and the heavies were not numerous in production terms, compared to the huge number of T-34s being turned out.

Russian heavy production was still high compared to that of most German types, in absolute terms. In the lowest year, 1943, they made more heavy varieties than the Germans made Tiger Is over the entire war. The Russians made about as many IS-2s and ISUs as the Germans made Panthers and heavy TDs.

The homogeneousness of the fleet can also be overstated. At the time of Kursk, only around half of the Russian fleet were T-34s. Around a third were lights, the remainder was composed of modest numbers of lend lease, heavies, and SUs - each an order of magnitude smaller than T-34s or lights, combined still smaller but the same order of magnitude.

Mobilization timing and operational use decisions dominated. Fleet mix ones did not. One might argue that the German could potentially have ramped faster had they focused on StuGs and long Pz IVs exclusively, from an earlier date. Probably true, but they could have ramped faster entirely voluntarily even with the fleet mix they actually used.

The decision not to ramp rapidly was not determined by fleet mix imposed production constraints. It was not determined by production constraints of any kind. It was entirely voluntary. Yes, I repeat, it was entirely voluntary.

The Germans just didn't think they needed to run the economy flat out for immediate armaments production to win a war against the Soviet Union. Their strategy was not based on a long attrition struggle - as actually occurred. It was overconfidently based on avoiding the need for one. They only abandoned that overconfidence after seeing entire German armies destroyed by superior numbers.

[Mr. Tittles]

There may be no enlightening you Andreas. You refuse to face that resources were devoted to T34/76 production. An additional factory was devoted to T34/76 guns. You can't get around that.

Your claim that T34 production must be moved KV plants is silly. They actually relocated T34 production to new areas.

The KV program devolved into another medium tank. The KV1S was actually stopped (I believe early 43) with less numbers produced than the KV1.

I havent time to go through all of JasonC's 'production' now (its like a horde of T34/76 coming out of a factory) but his claim about a marginal increase in numbers of T34/76 being produced in 1943 (25% or 3248 turreted tanks!) boggles my mind. Thats more than the total of KV1 tanks produced in 3 years! Its close to triple! the number of KV1S!!!!

Eh, maybe when I get time I can bother fending off the drift (I really don't know what my initial point has been twisted into by JasonC). But since I am a trooper, I will return.

In the meantime, Andreas, address the facts presented and stop with your demanding of silly criteria.

[ December 30, 2003, 06:32 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[JasonC]

Marginal *increase* in the number of T-34s produced, in 1943. Not marginal *number* of T-34s produced in 1943. The change was modest compared to the base number - a quarter its size. In 1942, the change was 3 times as large as the base number, not 1/4 as large. 4x or 1.25x? The latter is a marginal change, the former is not. (Does the number of digits change? Does the leading digit change?)

[ December 30, 2003, 02:29 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

In the meantime, Andreas, address the facts presented and stop with your demanding of silly criteria.

No. Your theory is BS. There is a fact right there for you. Since you are reality-resistant, I have no more time to waste on you.

[Mr. Tittles]

I guess I just like to analyze policy from data and not your opinions.

[Mr. Tittles]

http://www.battlefield.ru/is2_1.html

This webpage discusses the decree in 1942 to minimize the consumption of armor materials.

I wish there was a qualified policy analyst here who could explain to me what that means...

[dugfromthearth]

I get the impression that there are 3 different monologues being posted on the same thread.

I know nothing about Russian tank production outside of what I have read in this thread. But this is what it seems the argument comes down to:

MT says that the Russians concentrated on producing T-34's in 1943. His argument is that they increased production of T-34's in 1943, and decreased production in everything else.

The counter to this seems to be saying "yes they increased production in T-34's but they held steady in producing all other types combined, just not other specific types." Which seems to me to ignore the fact that they increased T-34 production.

So far no one has claimed that in any situation where they could produce T-34's they did not. Instead the claims seem to be that they produced other things in factories that could not produce T-34's and then produced T-34's in any factories that could produce them plus all of the new factories that they built. Which would seem to me to indicate a concentration on T-34's. Not a concentration to the exclusion of all else, but a concentration nonetheless.

Then there is the debate about switching over factories to produce other types of tanks - which MT claims the Germans did and the Russians did not do - giving the Russians an edge in tank production.

There is the counter claim that the non T-34 production did in fact get retooled. The light and heavy tanks got retooled. This makes MT wrong.

However, MT is only concerned with medium tanks. Per his argument the Germans are converting to Panther production, reducing their medium tank production whereas the Russians are continuing their T-34 production unchanged so they get more medium tanks.

In essence both sides are right because they are arguing different points. MT only cares about medium tanks, the others care about all tanks. Given that the subject of this entire thread is "T-34 Lifespan" a fixation on the T-34 doesn't seem all that out of line.

And then we have the comment made that the technical quality and quantity of the tanks didn’t really determine who was winning. The Russians strategic and operational abilities determined the result (since the Germans were about the same throughout the war). Early in the war the Russians sucked, and so they lost. Later they got to be competent enough to realize they weren’t as good as the Germans and started attacking the non-German axis divisions. And the Russians started to win.

This is correct of course. The war didn’t end with the Germans down to 0 tanks and the Russians at 3. It wasn’t purely a war of attrition. The German campaigns to conquer Poland, France, and Russia were not based on superior tanks or tactics, but on superior strategy and operations.

So in conclusion, the Russians won, the Germans lost, the Americans showed up at the end and declared victory.

[Mr. Tittles]

Very nice.

[Mr. Tittles]

I hope JasonC comments on your post.

My main point is that the T34/76 numbers in 1943 were used in a way that would win a war of attrition. The numbers were also there in 1942 but the Soviets were not using them wisely. Once they learned that 'bullying' non-panzer and non-German units had nice results, German Generals started getting a pucker factor.

I never said that heavy tanks as a program were abandoned (just certain light tanks were and eventually all light tanks). I just think that the Soviets knew they needed time to get a heavy tank with adequate speed, low weight, etc. The KV1 was not a great mechanical tank. The soviets were lucky enough to get to know the Tiger and Panther as soon as they made adebut on the eastern front. I believe they captured one of the first Tigers and the Panthers were quickly encountered and probably dragged off after Kursk. The Soviets JS2 was actually a mystery tank to the Germans for a while.

So whether by Bureau design or just freaking serendipity, the Soviets pushed with the T34/76 in 1943 while the Germans were changing boats. It was a good time to do it as panzerfaust were not really available for the infantry in great numbers.

Quantity has a Qualitity of its own but they must be used right.

[ December 30, 2003, 09:19 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

The counter to this seems to be saying "yes they increased production in T-34's but they held steady in producing all other types combined, just not other specific types." Which seems to me to ignore the fact that they increased T-34 production.

Not only ignoring fact that they increased T34 production, but that the statement is wrong-headed! They held about steady in ALL (including T34)types combined. Around 24500 approx.

But..

Even if counting things like SU76 as a 'Lt. tank', numbers went from 9614 to 5391 from 42 to 43.

Even if counting ALL KV and 'heavy tanks' like the SU152, the numbers went from 2547 to 1645 from 42 to 43.

Since we are playing the chassis game, T34 chassis vehicles went from 12597 to 17191. An increase of 4594 T34 chassis vehicles! 36% more.

Then there is the debate about switching over factories to produce other types of tanks - which MT claims the Germans did and the Russians did not do - giving the Russians an edge in tank production.

There is the counter claim that the non T-34 production did in fact get retooled. The light and heavy tanks got retooled. This makes MT wrong.

Actually I do not know exactly the German tank plant/supplier situation. My point was that they were switching over models. The Panther was not an upgraded anything, it was a whole new ball of wax. The T34/76 to T34/85 transition was not so radical.

No one has shown any proof about T34 or other factories being retooled. If anything, I have shown that a major sub-component (the gun) was switched from KV guns to T34 guns AND a new factory ALSO started producing T34/76 guns in ADDITION to two other factories.

[ December 30, 2003, 10:42 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

Other realities:

1. T34 production ramped up in 42. That is, more were made at the end of the year not at the begining of the year. data shows this.

2. The soviets made about 550 less AFV in 43 than 42!

3. SU85 were NOT introduced as T34/76 were phased out. They were designed and built concurrently. That is, the T34/76 not only increased in production numbers but the SU85 AND SU122 also increased in numbers!

4. The T34 was tank of the year in 1943!

[dugfromthearth]

um, MT you are now simply beating a dead horse and looking foolish by doing so.

Make your statement and move on.

No one wins message board arguments.

The one who won't let go of the thread is ultimately the loser.

sorry

[Mr. Tittles]

Just clarifying some final issues.

I think there might be another interesting side topic ot two. I certainly think JasonC should respond. Don't be so hasty in adopting a traffic cop attitude just so quick.

[ December 31, 2003, 12:50 AM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]