T-34 Lifespan

[Mr. Tittles]

Well I will leave bastables to his own devices. He's well on his way.

Somebody please email me and let me know if the Soviets win the war or not.

[Mr. Tittles]

Offensive Operations into Belorussia in Fall 1943 and Winter 1944 (mud and all!)

German and Soviet historians cover in detail the dramatic series of Soviet offensives which followed the Kursk defense in July 1943 and the subsequent Soviet advance to the Dnepr River from August through October 1943. Volumes have been written on Operations "Suvorov," "Rumiantsev," and "Kutuzov" at Orel, Belgorod-Khar'kov, and Smolensk. Equal attention has been devoted to the various phases of the Chernigov-Poltava operation, operations designed to breech the Dnepr River line (the Chernigov-Pripiat, Kiev, Gomel'-Rechitsa, Krivoi Rog, and Nikopol' operations), and operations on the flanks, such as the Nevel' and Melitopol' operations. The Germans, quite naturally, focus on Soviet failures, such as the unsuccessful multiple attempts to crush their Nikopol' bridgehead. Thereafter, Soviet accounts focus on their successful and spectacular advance into the Ukraine, commencing with the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation in December 1943 and culminating with their encirclement of German First Panzer Army in the Proskurov-Chernovtsy operation and the arrival of Soviet forces along the borders of Rumania and southern Poland in April 1944. Lost in this coverage are important and repeated Soviet attempts to conquer Belorussia in late fall 1943 and early winter 1944.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

Well I will leave bastables to his own devices. He's well on his way.

Somebody please email me and let me know if the Soviets win the war or not.

Utterly clueless

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

Offensive Operations into Belorussia in Fall 1943 and Winter 1944 (mud and all!)

German and Soviet historians cover in detail the dramatic series of Soviet offensives which followed the Kursk defense in July 1943 and the subsequent Soviet advance to the Dnepr River from August through October 1943. Volumes have been written on Operations "Suvorov," "Rumiantsev," and "Kutuzov" at Orel, Belgorod-Khar'kov, and Smolensk. Equal attention has been devoted to the various phases of the Chernigov-Poltava operation, operations designed to breech the Dnepr River line (the Chernigov-Pripiat, Kiev, Gomel'-Rechitsa, Krivoi Rog, and Nikopol' operations), and operations on the flanks, such as the Nevel' and Melitopol' operations. The Germans, quite naturally, focus on Soviet failures, such as the unsuccessful multiple attempts to crush their Nikopol' bridgehead. Thereafter, Soviet accounts focus on their successful and spectacular advance into the Ukraine, commencing with the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation in December 1943 and culminating with their encirclement of German First Panzer Army in the Proskurov-Chernovtsy operation and the arrival of Soviet forces along the borders of Rumania and southern Poland in April 1944. Lost in this coverage are important and repeated Soviet attempts to conquer Belorussia in late fall 1943 and early winter 1944.

Of course the focusing of German Panzer strength in the west played no role in this at all Also the number of destroyed Soviets versus German tanks is ignored as is the wider fact of contracted Russian tank fleet versus a net gain in the German tank fleet.

[30ot6]

Lands, you two sound like a couple of 6 year olds. You should both shut up before you make fools of yourselves in public any further.

How about this: set up a nice little scenario in CMBB sometime in 1943. Mr. Tittles play as Russians, and Bastables you can be Germans. Both of you take lots of tanks, T34/76s for you Mr. Tittles and MkIVs, Tigers, and Panthers for you Bastables. Then you can both let out your frustration on the battlefield. Then, let bygones be bygones, and you can live forever more in peaceful harmony...

[GenSplatton]

You two need to get a room. See what you started Spitfire? Get to many geeknards, err, grognards in the same room and bad things happen.

[Sgt AA]

Just s comment to the original question. The russians produced 98 300 tanks an SP-guns during 1941-45 and they lost 96 500 (D.Glatz). So it gives a rate of 386 losses per week. Of course, it's not discribe the ratio for T-34s.

In this thred we have been giving the number of production of T-34's an if we knew how many that where left, then it would be possible to calculate the average lifetime for a T-34.

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by Sgt AA:

Just s comment to the original question. The russians produced 98 300 tanks an SP-guns during 1941-45 and they lost 96 500 (D.Glatz). So it gives a rate of 386 losses per week. Of course, it's not discribe the ratio for T-34s.

In this thred we have been giving the number of production of T-34's an if we knew how many that where left, then it would be possible to calculate the average lifetime for a T-34.

Yes I remarked about that earlier.

Ideal info for a unit (battalion/regiment/etc) shows available (working and non-working), operational (working), replacements and write-offs. If this information is given in time units, then the smaller the time unit, the better.

Production can be decieving. Production numbers are sent to the front as replacements, to strategic depots and to training units. Panther tanks were shipped to the front initially as units. They were new vehicle types and training had to be completed before they could be fielded. T34/85 were actually delivered to T34/76 units (less training needed) and familiarization done in the field. The Germans liked to raise new units with new vehicles. Old units had to make the most of what they had.

In any case, more information is needed to determine if the Soviets gains (they did win didn't they?) were 'losing the war of attrition'. It is not easy information to find online. An interesting stat would be operational ssoviet vehicles at the end of the war.

[Mr. Tittles]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_tank_production_during_World_War_II

Heres a breakdown of soviet tanks by number and type.

[zukkov]

Originally posted by Sgt AA:

Just s comment to the original question. The russians produced 98 300 tanks an SP-guns during 1941-45 and they lost 96 500 (D.Glatz). So it gives a rate of 386 losses per week. Of course, it's not discribe the ratio for T-34s.

wow, i find that amazing! i knew the soviet tank loss was high, but that's 98%! i used to think the allied landings at normandy was a side show, but i'm not sure the russians could've taken berlin without us now. makes me feel a whole lot better!

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by zukkov:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Sgt AA:

Just s comment to the original question. The russians produced 98 300 tanks an SP-guns during 1941-45 and they lost 96 500 (D.Glatz). So it gives a rate of 386 losses per week. Of course, it's not discribe the ratio for T-34s.

wow, i find that amazing! i knew the soviet tank loss was high, but that's 98%! i used to think the allied landings at normandy was a side show, but i'm not sure the russians could've taken berlin without us now. makes me feel a whole lot better! </font>

[Mr. Tittles]

http://www.battlefield.ru/library/bookshelf/losses/losses2.html

Heres another case of data that has to be read carefully. At first, I was confused about the columns. But it appears that July 11-14 during the battles at Prokhorovka, these units left a majority of their vehicles on the battlefield. Total KOs (fully destroyed) typically being a lesser cause than abandonment (left on battlefield).

But I could be wrong about what exactly the data represents. Its clear what fully destroyed means (KO) and evacuated (dragged to a workshop), but the first two columns are vague. do they mean (should have) and (had)? That is, authorized strength, actual strength?

[JasonC]

Um, the Russian tank fleet did not contract by 62% in 1943. The statistic cited is that 62% of the newly produced T-34s were knocked out by the end of their first year. Production and losses basically ran even with each other, and the overall fleet strength probably rose modestly when lend lease is taken into account.

Russian AFV losses for calendar 1943 are usually given as 22-23k. Production was 20k for tanks alone, plus 3-4k SP guns and around 4k lend lease tanks received. The Russian AFV fleet strengthened before Kursk, declined during it and the immediate offensives afterward, and climbed back by the end of the year. The fleet strength was on the order of 20-25k AFVs, over 3 times the German figure for all fronts.

The Russians did not view tanks as a stock but as a flow. It was not an accident that fleet strength held about even or climbed slightly, because the loss rate determined how hard they pushed and vice versa. You can dial down the loss rate (when you have the initiative) simply by not attacking along a longer portion of the front, keeping back larger reserves. Doing so will also dial down the enemy loss rate and reduce territorial gains, of course.

They regularly lost as many vehicles as they had in a given year, and made as many new ones. The only years that notably departed from this pattern were 1941, when they lost the huge pre war light tank fleet and production was not yet high enough to replace it, and the fleet size therefore collapse to 1/3rd of the pre-war figure, while becoming heavier in mix - and 1942, when losses were low and production high, largely because they held new tanks out of combat until unleashing them in the coordinated offensives late in the year. The fleet size consequently rebounded to pre-war levels.

Overall, Russian tank losses for the whole war were around 100,000 and so was Russian tank production. They also received imports, however, and they started with a 20,000 tank pre-war fleet. They ended the war with more like a 30,000 tank fleet. The fleet shrank to as low as 7,000 at the end of 1941, through early 1942. Which was as large as the German fleet ever got - all fronts, available whether running or not.

It was back up to 20k by the time of the Stalingrad counteroffensive. Russia lost 15k tanks in 1942, huge by anyone else's standards, but well below their production.

Russia did not outproduce Germany 10:1 in anything. More like 2:1. Even that they did not get because of a higher maximum production rate. They had the same industrial potential as Germany pre-war. The peak rate of German AFV production was as high as Russian AFV production at its peak.

But the Russians got to that level in 1942, a year after entering the war, while it wasn't until 1944 that Germany reached that level of tank production. Russia also started with a larger fleet. The result of the higher integral (from getting to their peak sooner) and starting point, was that the Russian fleet dwarfed the German one at all periods of the war, only getting close in the first half of 1942.

Germany lost the armor attrition war because it mobilized so slowly. It made up for this via a high kill ratio, at first. But in 1943, the German loss rate more than doubled over the previous year, and the overall fleet strength stopped growing significantly at about the 7k level. Production continued to rise until matching the Russian level by mid 1944. It was a basically linear rise, much slower than the Russian jump basically to their ceiling rate in a single year.

German losses rose along with their production. Operational fleet strength declined with periods of activity (e.g. Kursk to late 43) and rose with periods of relatively calm (e.g. end of 43 to just before Bagration) - but there was no overtaking of the existing 3:1 Russian fleet size lead as German production rose to Russian levels.

The Russians could indeed keep up the 1943 level of their own AFV losses indefinitely. In 1944 they made something like 29k AFVs, 7k above their 1943 loss rate. That is as big as the whole German fleet. Actually their losses fell in 1944 so the fleet grew again, but they could have kept it up even if their losses had increased somewhat.

What the Russians could not afford was to give the Germans the kind of fleet building breather the Germans gave them in 1942, after German AFV production was already pushed to the "on" position. If the Germans had had one year of 44 level production with 42 level losses, their fleet size would have doubled.

That they Germans did not have such a year in 1942 was an "own goal" due to failure to fully mobilize their own economy until after Stalingrad, due to overconfidence. That they did not have such a year in 1943, after they finally did mobilize the economy, was largely due to Russian pressure during and after Kursk forcing up their loss rate.

You can't appreciate the role of fleet sizes in the attrition war if you don't understand that Russian had just had such a year - that is what made the Stalingrad counteroffensive and Kursk huge reserve defense scheme possible. It was a result of keeping the loss rate relatively low for the first year after production jumped, by "slow playing" the commitment of new tank production.

For what it is worth.

[Mr. Tittles]

Excellent points.

The russians pushed hard with their numbers, relying on the T34/76, because they knew that through attrition, they would gain ground and beat the Germans tank modernization program.

I think that 1943 saw them concentrate more on the T34/76 and drop programs like the light tank and 'heavy' KV1s. 1943 was probably the year of the medium tank for the soviets. The Germans, who were stopping production of one tank, introducing another and fielding two more, were getting bum rushed.

My theory is that the Soviets learned that counter-attacking panzer units with tank armys during the German Kursk attack, while necessary, was very costly.

Post Kursk soviet operations probably focused T34/76 attacks against non-panzer units, forcing teh panzers themselves to counter-attack and that is how they drove the German operational numbers down after Kursk.

The soviet gains and encirclements made before the introduction of the T34/85 (spring 44) probably swung German war strategy towards the West. The Germans knew they could never win the war in the east unless the war in the west was won first.

[ December 29, 2003, 01:33 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

http://www.magweb.com/sample/sgmbn/sgm80sov.htm

This website claims: For example, in 1944, the Red Army lost 52.7 percent or 13,800 of the medium tanks which included the number available at the beginning of the year and those received from production.

The pdf file is worth dowloading from this page.

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by Bastables:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

Somebody please email me and let me know if the Soviets win the war or not.

Utterly clueless </font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

Excellent points.

The russians pushed hard with their numbers, relying on the T34/76, because they knew that through attrition, they would gain ground and beat the Germans tank modernization program.

Developing operational skill was more important than attrition.

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

I think that 1943 saw them concentrate more on the T34/76 and drop programs like the light tank and 'heavy' KV1s. 1943 was probably the year of the medium tank for the soviets. The Germans, who were stopping production of one tank, introducing another and fielding two more, were getting bum rushed.

They did not 'drop'light tanks, they started using the chassis for useful vehicles with Zis-3 guns. They also introduced a whole slew of new models in the assault gun range that were based on medium tank chassis. They also spent the year producing KV-1s and developing the IS range of tanks, so they were looking at the same problems as the Germans, but with a larger industrial base to work from. What happened was that their formations were standardised on specific models, which was different from the German mix and match approach. That was where standardisation happened, not in production. The Soviets began the year with formations fielding KV1, T34, and T70. They ended it with formations fielding KV1s, T34, SU76, SU122, SU152, probably some KV85. That does not look like standardisation to me.

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

My theory is that the Soviets learned that counter-attacking panzer units with tank armys during the German Kursk attack, while necessary, was very costly.

The appearance of 75L4x tanks in numbers made this costly, but this was not learned at Kursk, it was already clear from the winter battles of 1942/43. So long before Kursk it was clear to the Soviets that tank on tank was not the way to go. Kursk was a necessary expedient, because the Germans got through defenses in the south that they were not meant to get through. 5th Guards Tank Army was not meant to be destroyed at Prokhorovka, it was not supposed to go there in the first place.

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

Post Kursk soviet operations probably focused T34/76 attacks against non-panzer units, forcing teh panzers themselves to counter-attack and that is how they drove the German operational numbers down after Kursk.

So did pre-Kursk operations work, the only thing that was different at Kursk was that the Germans were attacking one last time, and needed to be stopped. Ever wondered why the Romanians were attacked during Uranus and the Hungarians in January 1943? The Soviets attacked the strong part of the German line for the last time in the Mars desaster. Thereafter they focussed on the weak parts.

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

The soviet gains and encirclements made before the introduction of the T34/85 (spring 44) probably swung German war strategy towards the West. The Germans knew they could never win the war in the east unless the war in the west was won first.

Post spring 1941 the Germans could not win the war. It took them to May 8th 1945 to catch up with that reality. Any strategic wriggling inbetween was just pointless idiocy. The German strategy was never informed by what it 'knew', it was informed by what it wished for, no matter how outlandish.

[Mr. Tittles]

Good points, I agree the Soviets had previous experience with concentrating against non-panzer forces (and trapping panzer forces in the encirclement..perhaps the best way to write them down) but..

Developing operational skill was more important than attrition.

Unfortunately for 11 million soviet soldiers, Operational Skills came from their Operational kills. The Soviets practised a very costly war. Even towards the end, it was a bloodbath in Berlin. But thats another debate I suppose.

Tanks: If you look at the Russain production numbers, 1943 was the year they produced the least heavy tanks (less than a third of what was produced in 42). It was also the year they dropped the number of type of light tanks AND production (again about a third the light tanks produced in 43 than 42). They DID increase by 25% or so the number of T34/76. 1944 saw a resugence in heavy tanks and a small falloff in t34 (both types)total numbers. T34 was tank of the year in 1943. I think the numbers back this up.

Post spring 1941 the Germans could not win the war. It took them to May 8th 1945 to catch up with that reality. Any strategic wriggling inbetween was just pointless idiocy. The German strategy was never informed by what it 'knew', it was informed by what it wished for, no matter how outlandish.

I think you mean 44? But even if thats what you mean, the Germans only chance WAS in the West (as slim a chance as it was) after spring 44. They could possibly beat the Allies on the beach or develop a war of attrition across France. But in any case, they do not have your hindsight. They blew it. But again, another debate.

[Andreas]

The numbers of heavy tanks dropped for reasons outlined. Standardisation in formations, and less marginal usefulness of KV1 over T34, combined with the switch from KV1 to KV85 and IS tanks. Also, the SU1x2 series of guns took on the role that previously would have been with the KV series, i.e. breakthrough.

I would be interested to hear if in actuality any factories were switched from KV to T34 production (switchover to the SU series or IS does not count). I doubt that was the case, and that would be the only proof for your theory. If, as I believe, it did not happen, your theory falls apart. The numbers are meaningless, they can mean all sorts of things - most likely increased efficiency of production at the T34 plants, that were not lumbered with switch-overs.

I mean 1941. I suggest you do a bit more googling (or even better reading 'Germany and the second world war' would be a good start) if you seriously believe that Germany could win the war by Spring 1944, even with the slimmest chance of all.

Operational skills are the reason for operational kills, not the other way round. From December 1941 the Red Army had numerical superiority. It took them until 12 months later to be able to use it. That to me indicates that numbers were not the key factor in allowing the Red Army to beat the Germans. It was their developing skill at using their numbers. A skill that got very good towards the end. Even taking Berlin is much less of a slaughter than people suppose, if you look at what they accomplished and how quickly they did it. We have been around this particular block numerous times, you can do a search.

[Mr. Tittles]

You tell me what you think my theory is and I will tell you if you are mistaken.

As far as this..

I mean 1941. I suggest you do a bit more googling (or even better reading 'Germany and the second world war' would be a good start) if you seriously believe that Germany could win the war by Spring 1944, even with the slimmest chance of all.

I don't seriously believe the Germans could have won any war in the last century or this century. I said what the Germans believed. Doesnt matter if they were delusional or sane or just a bunch of disagreeable troublemakers (no offense), it was the frame of mind of the Germans. Realitys such as the folly of the eastern front could even get through their thick skulls. Please understand its not what I believe. Its not a hard concept.

Not that I am saying you aren't a wonderful fella Andreas.

[ December 29, 2003, 05:25 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

I think that 1943 saw them concentrate more on the T34/76 and drop programs like the light tank and 'heavy' KV1s.

Emphasis by me.

[Mr. Tittles]

Light tanks

---------1940----1941---1942----1943---1944--1945

T-26----1549

BT-7----706

T-40------41-----638

T-50--------------48-----15

T-60------------1385---4660

T-70-------------------4913---3483

1942 shows 3 types of light tanks being produced. 1943 shows one type being produced. T70 production numbers go down in 1943.

Heavy tanks

----------1940----1941---1942---1943---1944

KV-1------141----1258---1860

KV-1S--------------------585---621

KV-85--------------------------148

KV-2-------102----100

KV-8---------------------102----35

KV1 production stopped in 1943 and the numbers decreased from 42 to 43.

---------1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

T-34/76 117 3020 12572 15820 4100

T-34/85-----------------------------10615 21108

[ December 29, 2003, 05:53 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

I would be interested to hear if in actuality any factories were switched from KV to T34 production (switchover to the SU series or IS does not count). I doubt that was the case, and that would be the only proof for your theory. If, as I believe, it did not happen, your theory falls apart. The numbers are meaningless, they can mean all sorts of things - most likely increased efficiency of production at the T34 plants, that were not lumbered with switch-overs.

Not sure why you think that would be 'proof'. Why not switch from light tanks to T34 tanks? Would that meet your criteria? (not that I think that matters either). What about building a new plant or expanding existing ones? What if IS-2 tanks were built at neither light tank, KV plant but at new plants? What would this mean to you? (not that it means anything but I would be curious to hear it).

Update: (yes Ive been Googling Andreas..)

If the Soviets switched over production capability of major components of the KVs to the T34, would that satisfy your criteria? (hint: the answer is only available online). Even you must know that all the parts of a major weapons system are not made inside the confines of one plant.

[ December 29, 2003, 06:24 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

What if the Soviets started up a whole new plant that ONLY produced T34/76 guns? Lets say they geared this up in late 42 and it cranked WAY up in 43? What say if it only went on to produce 85mm guns for the T34/85 series? Would this be concentrating some production effort on T34/76?

But what if not only the above was true but that plants that were producing KV guns now stopped making so many of them, and started making more T34/76 guns?

What would you say Andreas? What would you say?

[JasonC]

Andreas is right that there was no conscious focus on the T-34/76 involved, not in 1943. Russian light tank factories were not converted to T-34 factories because they couldn't be. They were pre-war automotive factories, not tank factories. They made the T-60 and T-70 instead of making trucks.

In 1943 they converted to making SU-76s on the same chassis. Production did not decline for the T-70 chassis, it increased - it just moved to turretless SP rather than turreted lights. 42 - 4883 T-70s. 43 - 3343 T-70s plus 1928 SU-76 equals 5271 AFVs - marginally higher with a disruptive changeover. 44 - 7155 SU-76s.

This shift paralleled the German one in 1942 to remove Pz38s and Pz IIs from production as turreted tanks, in favor of Marders - and the 1943 one to replace the turreted Pz III with the StuG. Both sides found that AFVs with main armament 50mm and below had become obsolete. Neither side could afford to give up the numerical production of their lighter chassis lines. Neither side could effectively shift from the light lines to mediums, as factory capacity not raw inputs was the AFV production bottleneck.

At the start of 1942, the Germans were still making tanks with 20mm and 37mm main armament - Pz IIs and 38s. The Russians were making tanks with 20mm and 45mm main armament - T-60s and T-70s. In 1943, the Germans were still trying to get turreted tanks out of the Pz III chassis, but gave up by the end of the year. The Russians tried to get turreted tanks out of the T-70 chassis, but gave up by the end of the year. The Germans made flocks of StuGs instead, from the second half of 1943 on. The Russians made flocks of SU-76s.

As for the high end, 1943 was the nadir of Russian heavy tank production actually delivered, because it was the changeover year from the KV chassis to the IS chassis. In 1942, around 2500 heavies were made, split between KV-1 and KV-1S models. In 1943, 5 types of heavy were made - 700 SU-152 which used the KV chassis, 450 KV-1S, 130 KV-85, the first 100 IS series tanks, and a small number of ISUs - around 1400 all told. In 1944 production of heavies was more like 5k, split about evenly between turreted IS and turretless ISUs.

There was no abandonment of the heavy tank idea. It was just recognized - as early as 1942 - that the KV chassis wouldn't cut it anymore. That led to the development of the IS chassis. In the transition period, various expediants were tried to extend the useful life of the old KV chassis - the faster KV-1S, the upgunned KV-85, the turretless SU-152 (arguably the best of the lot). But the heavy industry as a whole was retooling for IS series vehicles, as fast as those could be designed and have their development stage kinks ironed out. Which was significantly harder than putting a ZIS-3 on a T-70 chassis.

There are fewer real trade offs in AFV production than you might suppose. Once an economy is fully mobilized for war, it loses flexibility to shift from production of A to production of B based on overall input constraints alone (total cost e.g.). Mobilization is a jigsaw puzzle, in which planned production of X must match planned production of Y and Z in definite ratios, set by the planned sorts of equipment meant to be used. Every deviation from the original types planned involves significant overall loss, in the form of mismatches between X and Z, or lost time waiting for Z production to fufill needs matching available Y, etc.

You can always produce less of a type that has become obsolete, with some overall savings. But you can't transform those savings into more of some other type very easily. You've already planned to ramp those other useful types about as much as the various bottlenecks you face allowed.

In the present case, shutting down T-60 factories might free up workers and some steel production. But it wouldn't create T-34 factories out of the ether, and the existing T-34 factories were being fed inputs as fast as possible already. In practice, you could have more trucks rather than useless T-60s - or SU-76s rather than marginal T-70s and saturated towed ZIS-3s - but not more T-34s.

For what it is worth.