T-34 Lifespan

[dugfromthearth]

so quick?

you've posted 7 times since any of the others have.

it's over.

[Mr. Tittles]

You have posted 133 times since 12-11-2003?

[JasonC]

I will address dugfromtheearth's post first off, point by point.

"MT says that the Russians concentrated on producing T-34's in 1943. His argument is that they increased production of T-34's in 1943, and decreased production in everything else."

Well, I don't think he said so, but if he had it just isn't so. They rolled out the SU-85, ramped SU-76 production, etc. Overall SU production went from less than 100 in 1942 to nearly 4000 in 1943.

"no one has claimed that in any situation where they could produce T-34's they did not."

Oh, they clearly did. The SU-122 and SU-85 are both based on the T-34 chassis. All of them could have been made as turreted T-34s instead. The Russians made 630 SU-122s and 750 SU-85s in 1943, vs. a handful of Su-122 prototypes at the very end of 1942. Obviously, using a portion of T-34 chassis production for upgunned, turretless types was considered more useful than just maximizing T-34 production. They certainly wanted to increase T-34 production too - they wanted to increase all types of production at the existing plants. And did so for most categories of equipment, tanks or not, mediums or not.

"debate about switching over factories to produce other types of tanks - which MT claims the Germans did and the Russians did not do - giving the Russians an edge in tank production."

The problem is the casual inference in those two statements. German production was not lower because they were switching, but because they delayed full mobilization until very late. German production was rising the whole time. In every category of AFV, including mediums. Whether switching or not. All were switching within size and weight categories. None were really switching between them - it just doesn't work.

What is true is the Germans completely abandoned turreted tank versions of the Pz III chassis in the course of 1943, in favor of turretless StuGs. The turret ring of the III could not be widened to take a long 75, and lesser guns proved obsolete. To get a useful gun, they went turretless. The III chassis had been the main German medium type earlier in the war, the one they planned as their main type. IV production, initially meant for a limited number of support tanks, was increased. This was possible because mobilization was late. III chassis production still remained very high (relative to other German types, mind), but IV was ramped to match it. The IIIs became StuGs and the IVs turreted tanks, both with the same long 75 guns.

Production of IIIs and IVs did not fall due to this switching. It rose, due to the ongoing mobilization the Germans were doing - later than the Russians - throughout 1943. The increase came in the IVs, while the IIIs did not decline but held steady, while switching to turretless.

Specifically, in 1942 the Germans made 994 Pz IVs, 2608 Pz IIIs, and 799 StuG/H or 3407 IIIs all told. In 1943 they made 3013 Pz IVs, 235 turreted IIIs early in the year, and 3215 StuG/Hs for 3450 IIIs all told. Actually there were another 100 Pz III flamm, some arty observation IIIs, etc, but that is the basic story. III production flat, switching to StuGs, IV production triples. Understand that it is IIIs and IVs combined that fill the "medium" role in the German production mix, not one or the other.

The Russians did not switch half of T-34 production to turretless. They produced upgunned SUs with a modest portion of overall production. And they designed the T-34/85, capable of holding a more useful gun (and 3 man turret crew) on the same chassis as before. They didn't need to switch the chassis to turretless because the existing hull accomodated a larger turret, just like the Pz IV. The turreted upgunning just didn't happen until 1944.

"However, MT is only concerned with medium tanks".

Um, then the claim reduces to, "the Russians had one type of medium, and the Germans had more than one". But there is no absolute concentration - they are making SUs with T-34 chassis. There is no satisfaction with the existing design - they are designing the T-34/85 and working out its bugs.

On the other side, the Panther was used as a medium doctrinally, but it was not a medium tank by weight or by its place in the quality mix. The Panther was as heavy as the IS-2, the Churchill, or the Pershing. In any other army it would be considered a heavy tank. The Germans just had a heavier series, the Tiger, and did not use the Panther the same way they used Tigers. So they designated it a medium.

If you look at the distribution of production and weight-quality, both German and Russian AFV production is bell curve shaped. The T-34 middle of the Russian bell corresponds to the III and IV series in German production - both turreted and turretless. The Panthers form the bulk of the right, heavier tail of the German bell, where you find SU-152s, IS-2s, and ISUs in the Russian distribution.

The Russians are making the same shifts as the Germans. They are just about a year behind. They roll out IS-2s a year after Panthers. They roll out T-34/85s a year after long Pz IVs. They roll out SU-85s a year after long StuGs. They don't need to make half their fleet as SU-85s because they can make T-34/85s, so they aren't split between IIIs and IVs as the Germans are for their mediums. The Germans make half their mediums of 43 and 44 as turretless StuGs because they are split that way, and because the III chassis won't take a long 75 in a turret but will if turretless.

"the Germans are converting to Panther production, reducing their medium tank production"

It isn't reduced. It is increasing. Mobilization dominates tank production, not fleet mix moves. That is what I have been saying, over and over. The Germans made 4400 IIIs and IVs in 1942, 6450 IIIs and IVs in 1943 plus another 1750 Panthers. With minor III and IV types (Nashorn, Brumbar, Hummel) thrown in and if you count Panthers as "mediums", their "medium" AFV production doubled in 1943. On the same basis is nearly doubled again in 1944, to 15,000 (all III, IV, and Panther chassis AFVs).

If you leave out the Panther chassis types as "heavies", then it is 4400 in 1942, 6450 in 1943, 11,000 in 1944. The German mobilization is later and takes somewhat longer than the Russian jump in 1942. That is all. Fleet mix does not determine this. It is total inputs to all AFV production that determines this, limited by how fast the existing plant can absorb new resources and expand (more workers, more steel, etc). The reason German mobilization is slow is they weren't planning on a long war of attrition and didn't start seriously on the task until after Stalingrad.

The Russians get more medium tanks even when they change over to T-34/85s in 1944. Shifts in type produced simply do not have large impacts on the number produced. For large retoolings, you might have a period of down time, particularly if new designs are delayed by teething problems and the like. Shifts in basic economic policy and strategy do have large impacts on the number produced. Though those shifts take some time, and even after production increases the effect on strength in the field is an integral, so the earlier it happened the bigger the impact.

"The German campaigns to conquer Poland, France, and Russia were not based on superior tanks or tactics, but on superior strategy and operations."

Um, not on superior tanks - exactly. But the definitely were based in considerable part on superior tactics. German tactics remained superior even after the Russians improved their operations. By mid war, the Russians were "outplaying" the Germans at the operational level, clearly and by large amounts. Their strategic play was arguably better from the moment they entered - they had the right long war, total mobilization strategy from the begining, while the German quick war of maneuver strategy proved unsound in the event.

What the Germans had throughout the war was superior tactics. From midwar they had an edge in equipment quality too, though not a large one in the last year of the war (it peaked in 1943). This accounts for the very high kill ratio the Germans were able to achieve, even with an inferior strategy, and even after the Russians started outplaying them operationally and had superior numbers to bring to bear. Tactics don't beat a superior strategy and superior operations, however. They just make it more expensive for the side that wins the higher echelon aspects of the competition.

That the tactics mattered more than the equipment differences is clear from the time variation of the loss ratios achieved. The equipment edge was a swinging pendulum. Russian tanks were better in 1941 and 1942, much worse in 1943, worse but not be a lot in 1944. The loss ratio stayed high but moved in the opposite direction at many points. Highest is 1941 in the teeth of better Russian equipment. Falling in 1942 despite a narrowing equipment edge. Lower in 1943 despite the widest equipment edge, pro-German. Lower still in 1944, moving for once with the equipment edge, but still quite high despite vastly superior numbers and only a modest equipment edge.

So it is clear the Germans had something going for them that did not move with equipment edge differences and remained large even when their strategic and operational "play" were poor. It got smaller over the course of the war, but did not become "zero". Tactical ability is the obvious explanation of this "residual". All of this is far from the tank fleet mix point, however.

[ January 01, 2004, 01:37 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Mr. Tittles]

All of this is far from the tank fleet mix point, however.

Yes, much of it is.

I think that JasonC does not read my posts. He is also flip-flopping on his viewing of the data. He needs to throw in assault guns, SPs to try to get some credibility to his numbers game. I knew it would come to that.

SU76 (SP) numbers went up because Lt. Tank numbers went down (and perhaps because certain light tanks were canceled altogether).

StuG numbers went up because a medium tank was being cancelled.

T34 numbers went up and other vehicles based on its chassis ALSO went up.

I do not see how that really defeats my threory. If anything, it expands it: The Soviets were concentrating on a chassis type without decreasing an output of medium tanks on that chassis type. T34/76 production went up 25% and the total amount of assault guns on that chassis represent 8% of the total T34 chassis vehicles! Its a very moot point. I find it not as weak as Andreas' stipulation about KV plants having to switch to T34 plants, but its just a poor argument and shows a decline in logic. At best its grasping at straws. If the Soviets had only increased T34/76 production 8% and increased SU based on T34 chassis 25% of the years total, then I would concede the point. But its not the case and I will largely expect that it will be ignored as usual. The SU85 was introduced on an existing MBT and did not interfere with the production and increase in production of that tank. Its quite different than the case of utilizing an existing chassis (like the SU76 or StuG did) to field a better gun on old technology.

The Germans had Stug, Panzer IV, Panther and Tigers. All requiring different chassis needs.

I have to be honest. I can't finish reading JasonC's posts when he starts on such meanderings. So maybe its fair that he does not read my posts or ignore things like Soviets employing extra plants towards T34 manufacturing.

[ January 01, 2004, 03:21 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[JasonC]

As for declines in production of other types - which is not, incidentally, DFE's focus on mediums - T-70 chassis production increased moderately while switching to SU-76s, much as German III chassis production switched to StuGs.

I note that Tittles is saying the exact opposite of DFE on this point - that the increase in production of all mediums compared to heavies and lights is supposed to be the focus he is talking about, rather than a supposed focus within mediums.

The T-60 was discontinued, which is what accounts for the decline in overall light tank production. The original plants that built the T-60 had already switched to T-70s, and were working on SU-76 designs already (the "factory 37" design team).

T-60 production (after factory 37 moved on) was organized by GAZ, the large automotive "firm". They continued to make jeeps, trucks, and armored cars using the existing engine capacity. Existing T-60s were modified for secondary roles, like rocket launcher platforms and prime movers for the larger towed artillery pieces. The low end was just too small for a useful AFV anymore.

As for heavies, I already covered them previously. 43 was the slow year because the initial replacements for the KV were stopgaps. The KV-1S was not a sufficient improvement because armament was becoming more important as the Germans uparmored. The KV-85 was an improvement but soon the T-34 would take that gun. The answer was the IS series, but they fiddled with different guns for it (85 and 100) before settling on the long 122. Once they had the design, heavy production rapidly eclipsed the 1942 total. It was a temporary design related hiccup, not a change in focus.

Within mediums, 1943 was the year they went from one type, the T-34/76, to 3 - the T-34/76, the SU-122 early in the year, the SU-85 in the second half. It is true the SU-122 was discontinued by the fall. By January the T-34/85 was out - having spent a year and a half in design and development.

As for the idea that they didn't know how to use the T-34/76 in 1942 and that was the reason 1943 was "its year", um, they won the Stalingrad fight during 1942. With T-34s. Against Axis minors. They horded T-34s in Stavka reserve throughout the fall to make this possible. Whereas, in 1943, the targets of the Russian offensives were largely German, because the low hanging Axis minor "fruit" had already been picked.

Moreover, they did not use them exclusively against places where the Germans didn't have armor. The also used them right in front of massed German armor - defensively at Kursk, offensively west of Kiev in the fall. They certainly lost a lot of tanks that way. They broke through in other places, but threw masses of T-34s at German strong areas as well as weaker areas. The Germans were able to kill many T-34s in the places they were strong, but not without losses themselves, and therefore they were not really able to run from point to point defeating all the offensives.

In the first half of the year, the T-34 was still supplimented by large numbers of lights. In the second half, SUs became more numerous while lights became less so, but did not disappear from the mix. T-34s were half to two thirds at mid year and late in the year respectively.

The Russians certainly gained territory and the T-34 was their main AFV the year they did it. They kept their own fleet while preventing the German one from growing significantly, despite higher German production. But fleet mix issues had precious little to do with this.

The Russians had numbers because they had mobilized sooner than the Germans. In 1942 those numbers rebuilt their 1941 losses. From Stalingrad to the end of 1943, they used those numbers to throw the Germans out of most of the Ukraine. This was true in all categories of equipment, not just tanks or just medium tanks.

The Germans did not have numbers, not because they were switching types, but because they had gambled from the summer of 1941 through the end of 1942 on winning the war without needing them. They lost that gamble. It was a predictable loss, an "own goal", due to overconfidence and underestimating the Russians.

[ January 01, 2004, 03:20 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[JasonC]

I read your posts, Tittles. You might read mine. You are not the only one in the thread, and DFE was making a slightly different argument than your own. He wanted to limit the issue to medium tanks, claiming a focus within that category on the T-34. Which is not correct, as SUs based on it came out in the year in question. His argument - focus within mediums - is different from yours - alleged focus on mediums as a category. I must be allowed to answer both people I am talking to, without it being assumed I have misunderstood you, when I am replying to each of his points.

[Mr. Tittles]

I think that DFE was summarizing the thread. He even said so.

Anyway..

51% of Soviet AFV were built in 1942 were on the T34 chassis. 71% of 1943 Soviet AFV were built on the T34 chassis.

Did the total numbers of AFV produced go up? No they went down. 550 vehicles or so.

As shown before , heavy tanks (even using SU152, etc) went down. Light tanks (even using SU76) went down.

[ January 01, 2004, 03:37 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[JasonC]

"However, MT is only concerned with medium tanks."

That's what he said. Is it accurate, given your last several posts, in which the alleged focus on mediums is all about declining numbers of lights and heavies produced in 1943?

He may have thought he was simply recapitulating your side of the argument. In fact, he was modifying it, supplying an interpretation of it he considered charitable or strengthening to your position. (Since my previous arguments had dealt with lights and heavies).

It did not in fact strengthen that position, because it was made without knowing that the Russians diversified T-34 chassis production that year, rather than consolidating it. I had to explain this to him.

Our discussion had focused on lights and heavies, the issue being "did the Russians intentionally focus on medium production, and T-34s in particular, in 1943"? He noticed that we hadn't discussed focus within mediums. Which we didn't bother to do, because we both knew that they made a wider variety there in 1943, while still increasing the number of plain T-34s.

He did not know this before, I presume (since he says what he knows of Russian tank production is all from this thread). He made the statement that he thought the claim was - whenever they could make T-34s they could, and they only made other things in factories that couldn't make them. Which is not the case (they made SUs in T-34 factories from their chassis, about 1/10th of the production runs), but before he brought up variety within mediums it hadn't arisen in the thread, so it is understandable he didn't know about it.

P.S. you might look at my post at 2:14. It addresses the issue of light and heavy production and the real causes for each going down. Which was not any intentional focus on T-34s or a shift in what was being made in the existing heavy or light plants. But was instead 2 different issues internal to each weight class - T-60 based SU-76s not succeeding and that production line therefore being switched (back) to other automotive work, and the design delays involved in the switch from KVs to IS series heavies. Meanwhile, German production was not lower because of switching - it was increasing rapidly, but lower than Russian production absolutely due to delayed mobilization.

[ January 01, 2004, 03:46 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Mr. Tittles]

Turreted tanks (all kinds)

1942

T34/76 was 51%

1943

t34/76 was 78%

[Mr. Tittles]

I think the Germans made another big mistake in the production of Hornets and Hummels and Brummbar and StuGIV in 1943. These vehicles represent 800 some chassis of the Panzer IV type (or a hybrid of panzer III/IV). If just half of them would have been panzer IV/longs, it would have meant a 15% increase in turreted panzer IVs.

Considering the power of the Panzer IVlong during 1943, this could have tipped the scales at Kursk or held back the Soviets in the later battles of 1943.

The Hornet, as deadly as it was, was overkill in 1943 since the majority of turreted tanks were light tanks and T34/76 or T34 chassis variants!

The Hummel should have been made in smaller numbers and 150mm guns just given prime movers (either halftracks or obsolete tanks).

The diversion of the T34 chassis to a 85mm gun was especially usefull considering the heavy tanks and armor facing the Soviets. It was a good 4.4% investment that paid handsome dividends. Again, a case of the soviets making the right move at the right time! Its just so funny that the argument that JasonC is trying to make about SU85/SU122 eating into T34/76 production is actually worse in the case of the Panzer IV chassis!

Update: SU85 plus SU122 was 8% of total T34 chassis in 1943

[ January 01, 2004, 06:55 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[JasonC]

Restricting the analysis to turret tanks alone in the year the Russians rolled out SUs in the thousands and the Germans switched one of their main chassis lines to all StuGs is just ludicrous.

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Restricting the analysis to turret tanks alone in the year the Russians rolled out SUs in the thousands and the Germans switched one of their main chassis lines to all StuGs is just ludicrous.

Total SU vehicles (SU76, SU85, SU122, SU152, ISU122) amounts to 4018 for 1943. Its about 16% of the total AFV production. As already stated, T34/76 alone were 71% of the AFV production. The remaining 13% is turreted light and heavy tanks. That means ONE vehcile type (t34/76) was 4.44 times more common than the sum total of FIVE types of SU vehciles put together.

Before you were claiming 25% was a 'marginal' number. Slice it any which way that suits you I guess.

[ January 01, 2004, 06:41 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[dugfromthearth]

"He made the statement that he thought the claim was - whenever they could make T-34s they could, and they only made other things in factories that couldn't make them."

Right, no-one had commented on it so I assumed it was a given. Thanks for clarifying.

[JasonC]

Weight class - Year - Percentage

----------1942-----1943------1944-

Heavy-------10-------5--------16--

Med SU-------0-------6---------8--

T-34--------52------67--------52--

T-70--------20------22--------24--

T-60--------18-------0---------0--

Heavy means KV or IS chassis, and includes KV-1, KV-1S, KV-85, SU-152, ISU-122, ISU-152, and IS-2.

Med SU means upgunned T-34 chassis, and includes SU-85, SU-100, SU-122.

T-34 means turreted T-34 chassis, and includes T-34/76 and T-34/85.

T-70 means that chassis, and includes turreted T-70s and SU-76s.

T-60 means turreted T-60s, discontinued after 1942.

There is a phase out of the lightest T-60s, and there is a one year hiccup in the heavies between the KVs and the IS series. Overall it is a bell, with a skew toward "light" in 1942 until the T-60s are dropped.

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Weight class - Year - Percentage

----------1942-----1943------1944-

Heavy-------10-------5--------16--

Med SU-------0-------6---------8--

T-34--------52------67--------52--

T-70--------20------22--------24--

T-60--------18-------0---------0--

Heavy means KV or IS chassis, and includes KV-1, KV-1S, KV-85, SU-152, ISU-122, ISU-152, and IS-2.

Med SU means upgunned T-34 chassis, and includes SU-85, SU-100, SU-122.

T-34 means turreted T-34 chassis, and includes T-34/76 and T-34/85.

T-70 means that chassis, and includes turreted T-70s and SU-76s.

T-60 means turreted T-60s, discontinued after 1942.

There is a phase out of the lightest T-60s, and there is a one year hiccup in the heavies between the KVs and the IS series. Overall it is a bell, with a skew toward "light" in 1942 until the T-60s are dropped.

Cute. You break out the SU chassis on the T34 but include Heavys to include SU 152, ISU, etc. You do the same with the light tanks including SU76.

Slice it any which way you please I guess.

Even this data (whats your source?) shows that the T34 goes from half the vehicles in 42 to 2/3rds in 43 (actually its higher if you include 'Medium SU').

[Mr. Tittles]

http://www.battlefield.ru/t34_76_2.html

This website shows 7 T34 factories during the war. Also has quarterly output of one of the factorys. Interestingly, the 1942 output was ABOVE planning.

So we go from 2 plants to 7 plants from the start to the end.

[ January 01, 2004, 08:08 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[JasonC]

For the Germans

Weight class - Year - Percentage

----------1942-----1943------1944-

Tiger-------1--------6---------6--

Panther-----0-------15--------22--

III&IV------75------65--------61--

Pz38--------11-------7--------11--

PzII--------12-------6---------1--

[Mr. Tittles]

Maybe you need to define weight class. Does weight class have to do with weight? T34/76 and SU85 and SU122 need to be weighed?

[JasonC]

I assume you and others are able to add. You can toss the SUs in with the 34s to make a chassis argument, or in with the non-34s to make a focus on turreted 34s argument. Similarly, you can toss the 60s in with the 70s to make an all-lights argument, or look at the 70s to see what they were doing with just that still-useful line.

With my German stats you can toss the Panthers in with the Tigers as heavies, or in with the IIIs and IVs as mediums. Do as you jolly well please. The Russians were no more focused on the 34 chassis than the Germans were on the III and IV chassis combined. The increase in 34 portion in 1943 was temporary, until the IS series came back on line.

The Germans phased out IIs just like the Russians phased out T-60s. The continued to get use out of 38s as SP guns, just as the Russians continued to get use out of T-70s as SU-76s. Both sides increase their portion going to the top end as the war progresses, both make half to two third as mediums. The Germans develop more of a skew to heavy by 1944, while the Russians have a broader bell in 1942.

The reason the Russian had more T-34s was not that they focused on T-34s more than the Germans focused on long 75 vehicles on the III and IV chassis. It was that their overall production hit levels the Germans only reached in 1944, as early as 1942. They had an extra year's worth of tanks at peak output rates because they mobilized sooner.

I've now given enough facts for anybody who likes to see for themselves, and repeated the basic points beyond most people's likely patience. So toodles, Tittles. Have a pleasant monologue.

[JasonC]

SU-85, SU-122, and T-34 are the same chassis. The guns are different, the body of the vehicle is not. They are all basically 30 ton mediums.

P.S. 45mm. All I have to say about your last. And now I really am through with this thread...

[ January 01, 2004, 08:38 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Mr. Tittles]

While Jason skews the numbers, I would like to discuss the Panzer III insanity. From almost the start, StuG manufacturing was a major end user of this chassis.

Starting in 1940, there were 396 37mm versions and 466 50L42 versions made along with 184 StuG shorts.

In 1942 we see L42, L60, AND 75mm short turreted tanks, 90 StuG short 75mm and (thank god) 702 StuG 75mmLong.

In 1943 we see L60, turreted 75mm short, 100 flamethrowers, and StuG long.

The rest of the war shows 3850 StuG in 44 and 863 in 45.

The Germans did not run a program on this tank that showed any focus. Mobilization or not, it was a very diluted effort.

[ January 02, 2004, 03:19 AM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

When you say III&IV, how many different vehicles are you clumping? Is it TEN to ELEVEN???

[ January 01, 2004, 09:02 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

With my German stats you can toss the Panthers in with the Tigers as heavies, or in with the IIIs and IVs as mediums. Do as you jolly well please. The Russians were no more focused on the 34 chassis than the Germans were on the III and IV chassis combined. The increase in 34 portion in 1943 was temporary, until the IS series came back on line.

This is why we beat dead horses. Cause, unlike real dead horses (who will stop posting eventually), jasonc likes to change the tune again.

My point WAS that the soviets concentrated (not to the point of exclusion) on T34 production during 1943. Your numbers show it and if the SU mediums are added, just as you added in the others, it supports me further. YOU focused on the chassis argument and it didnt matter anyway!Thanks. toodles to you and yours.

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Restricting the analysis to turret tanks alone in the year the Russians rolled out SUs in the thousands and the Germans switched one of their main chassis lines to all StuGs is just ludicrous.

Turreted tanks represent offensive combat power.

[ January 02, 2004, 03:34 AM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

In the first half of 1942, there were 3 plants making T34:

1.#183

2. #112

3. Stalingrad

So we see the Soviets started with two and have three during the first half of 42. The logic is that they eventually had 7 plants producing by the end of the war.

Tank plants are essentially assembly plants. They are supplied by foundrys that make armor plate and perhaps cut it to size, engine manufacturers who supply tested engines/trannys etc, gun suppliers who produce and test guns and supply them. All these items are the assembled into tanks just as cars are made. You do not put an untested major sub-system into a tank. Its a stupid thing to do.

I have shown that the Soviets increased the supplier of a major sub-component, the T34/76 gun system. That they dedicated a new plant to this major sub-system, more than anything else, proves the concentration on the t34/76 series. The output of the 3 gun plants (increased from 2) met the needs of the new program. This is what scared Andreas off with a parting shot of throwing a hissy fit. While his talents are not limited to creating scenarios that are best handled with Alt-Q, he likes to jump into a thread late, stir up a hulabaloo and then run off quickly.

An interesting example is Uralmash. Initially a supplier of turrets, it was ordered to be a T34 producer (assembly plant itself). It developed a 'pressed-turret' (forged) also and was then directed to be a SU producer. It was probably the center of SU production from late 43 on. The other T34 plants focusing on T34/76 and T34/85.

[ January 01, 2004, 10:03 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]