Question about "The Battle of Kursk"

[Shmavis]

I just finished this book which I'm guessing most of you already have read. I see what people were saying about how dry the text is. At times, it was like reading a technical manual on routine mechanical maintenance, but it was highly informative and engaging for the most part.

Not that I'm looking to pick apart this work, but I noticed something: Rudolf von Ribbentrop is mentioned as a Tiger company commander in the 1st SS Panzer Regiment. I thought he was a Pz IV company commander, which I have read elsewhere. Also, The "Tank Warning" operation(great stuff, by the way) includes him as a Pz IV platoon leader. Did Glantz and House just miss this detail in the fairly wide scope of this book?

[Shmavis]

*bump* What? No takers?

[Sergei]

I don't have that book, but how many times is that mentioned? It might be that he was mentioned to be a Panzer IV Co. commander, then at one stage someone misread it as Panzer VI Co. commander and decided to turn that into the more readable Tiger Co. commander. At least if the Tiger reference was made only once.

[Shmavis]

The reference is made 2 or 3 times. I didn't think about the Roman numerals possibly being confused. That makes sense.

[JasonC]

The book has a solid operational account of the German offensive phase, useful OOBs and a few charts, good maps. Glantz covers the Russian defense system and tactics better in a separate article. But the real strength of the book is that it does not pretend, as 9 out of 10 books on the subject do, that time stops when the Germans relinquish the initiative.

Why is Citadel, which failed, famous, while Kutuzov, which didn't, is almost unknown? Thanks to books like this one, nobody can take seriously the rot about the Germans "actually" winning, or the excuses about Sicily, or any of the rest of it. In books as good as Zetterling & Frankson, but mostly German side perspective, one does hear about "the Orel counteroffensive" - as single lines lamented for pulling off reserves in the north just before they are slated to hit the line. But not a word about their actual planning, progress, etc.

Glantz makes clear that the Russians were playing bigger chess, and playing it better. That the Orel salient is vulnerable precisely because the armor is bludgeoning Ponyri instead of linebackering. The Germans didn't notice armies being doubled into assault strength (and getting Guards designation), tank corps moving to the front, a whole tank army in reserve north of the entire battle area of the German offensive phase. (They did better on the eastern face, with an alert counter-concentration of arty in particular).

6 rifle divisions attack on a 16 km sector, at the join of 2 spread German infantry divisions. There is adequate infantry to widen it - 6 more RDs. The lone German PD in the area, the 5th, reacts to the breach before nightfall of the first day - the same sort of "sealing" one sees on the Russian side in the German offensive phase. But it is trying to stem multiple RDs, hasn't even seen the armor yet. The 5th tank corps goes in against them. Together they make 10 km by nightfall and are temporarily held by the 5th PD, the only available reserve.

On day two they have a second tank corps, the 1st, helping the 5th, plus a fresh guards RD, plus a widening of the front to the adjacent army. The break in is 23 km wide by 15 km deep by the end of the second day, and 5th PD is fighting for its life.

Meanwhile the eastern face attack is successfully stalled, but it consumes its local reserves and calls off the first forces to leave the southern attack, as well (2 PDs). 3 PDs are ordered to the northern break-in, to assist the 5th PD. But one is drawn away by another supporting attack, which is contains. The Russians then throw in their reserve tank army on the east face. By then the PDs drawn from the north face of the German attack are all engaged, without adequate force ever making it to the main north face drive.

The Germans realize they can't stop it and order the salient evacuated. Enough time for even that to happen requires the intervention, defensively, of mobile forces drawn from AG South - PD GD is fighting against the north face break-in before the end of July. They have more than half a dozen PDs backpeddling from converging Russian armies as the IDs evacuate.

Now, compare that offensive with the one previous, the Germans' own attempt.

But it doesn't stop with Kutuzov. Right after it, with reserves committed in the Orel salient area and forming a new line west of it, the Russians hit the southern face in Rumiantsev, in August. If the Germans beat all these units, why are they taking Kharkov the following month? Partly of course because they were needed elsewhere before then. The Russian counter takes the form of "ripple" fire by army scale offensives, which runs the Germans, first around, and eventually out of reserves.

It is a fine book, but you have to understand its intention and structure, and the implicit "compare and contrast" going on. If you read it like any other Wehrmacht worshipper's manual and read only the German attacks for the first few days, you will find it fair though high level compared to some others, rather less given to purple prose. But if you read the whole thing, you will see clearly that all the limited German successes were small potatoes to the scale the Russians were playing on, and set up their own successful offensives.

There is such a thing as outthinking and outplaying an opponent army. And this book is clear evidence of it, to anyone who sees what it is really about.

[Crinius]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Glantz covers the Russian defense system and tactics better in a separate article.

Can you please tell me where I can find that article?

[JasonC]

Sure, it is called "Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk". You can find it from the US army, here -

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz2/glantz2.asp

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

Given your clear gift for describing, deep understanding of and passion regarding so many little known or improperly understood Eastern Front battles, when will we have the pleasure of reading your book? You are both more enjoyable to read and easier to understand than Glantz.

Regards,

John Kettler

[RCHRD]

The greatest hindrance to the study of history is the opinions of historians. Glantz does a wonderful job of narrating the unfolding battle in this volume, unlike some of his others, and leaving the pontifications to his peers. The Soviet summer offensive of 43 was the campaign of that year, finally spreading out across the whole front, crossing the Dneiper, piercing the blockade of Leningrad, liberating the bulk of Ukraine, and evolving the Soviet artillery offensive into a weapon of annihilation. All, perhaps, made possible by the unremitting offensives of the year before, most tactical failures, but whittling threadbare German divisions to skeletons. And the 5th Pz would have met plenty of tanks, big ones, too. For every Soviet offensive in 43 and after, special tank units, the ‘Breakthrough Tk Regts’ (KV’s and then Stalins a year later) were assigned the assault divisions, along with the heavy SU’s just then coming into common usage.

[Grisha]

Shmavis,

There are errors like that in Glantz' book. He tends to miss a detail here and there when it comes to the Germans. You would be better served to confirm these things with more typical German references or sources. I think Glantz even mentions in the book that the PzV had an 88mm cannon.

Truth of the matter is, these sort of errors are beside the point of his book, which is to determine what really happened at Kursk, and why? Glantz goes into painful detail to unfold the sequences of events from both the German and Soviet sides. He shows in no uncertain terms that the Soviets took a horrendous beating tactically especially in armor. But, Glantz also shows that it was the timing and tempo of Soviet counterattacks that bogged German operational maneuver, forcing them to react numerous times to engagements on their flanks.

It should also be pointed out that German losses in manpower during Zitadelle were quite high as well, relatively speaking.