"SMG GAP" A Proposal...Take 2

[Madmatt]

Okay, you guys can continue here!

Madmatt

[aka_tom_w]

Big Time Software

Administrator

Member # 42

posted 07-09-2001 05:19 PM

Hehe... this thread is now coming into rather select company in terms of long arguments about fine

points. I recognize quite a few faces here that will remember the King of Fine Point Argument Threads

-> "Gamey Recon". Still my all time favorite

The most important goal of a simulation, especially one that is designed to reflect reality, is to keep a

balance between the extreme aspects of the simulation. The less capable the system is in this regard,

the less robust it becomes, and therefore the extremes cause the system to fail. In the case of a

historical simulation, the less realistic it becomes.

So... can someone make a case that in x specific situation with y specific variables that z specific force

would fight a little/alot better/worse in such and such a way compared to the enemy? Yes. But do

these assumptions always apply, as a rule, to all forces of that particular side in the same defined

situation (if there is even an attempt to narrow the scope)? No. I firmly believe that this CAN NOT be

done. Not as an inherent assumption based on nationality. So there are most likely other reasons why

x in y does z besides concluding "the Human beings in German uniforms weren't as capable of dealing

with the cold as Humans in Soviet uniforms were."

The main factors that I see when looking at a battle go something like this:

1. Basic level of training.

2. Amount of actual combat experience.

3. Unit cohesion prior to the battle.

4. Motivations specific to that battle, including the "big picture" surrounding this particular battle.

5. Physical fitness/wellness of the force.

6. Disposition of BOTH sides prior to combat.

7. Leadership strengths/weaknesses at particular levels of command.

8. Terrain and other natural conditions (like weather).

9. Weapons available to each side and how they generally matched up against each other.

10. General supply level (usually only a factor when extreme).

11. LUCK, which is most likely influenced by above.

There are certainly more factors that could be important, some of which might be more unique to the

particluar battle (like a sentry being asleap on duty or most defenders being drunk on captured

alcohol), but the above list is a pretty good sample of major influencing factors on a battle. Almost all

of the above factors can be simulated in CMBO, but a few have been added to CMBB.

Here is a good excercise for the "pro-National Modifiers" to engage in. When you look at a particular

battle, think about all the major aspects as I noted above. When you are all done look at how the two

sides stack up against each other. I will bet that whatever the outcome of the battle was these factors

will explain (in a hindsight way) how the battle was fought and why it ended as it did. All this without

even thinking about "this particular side was better at picking their noses while under fire compared to

the other side" So even IF one could argue that some national modifier or another was justified,

would it have had a significant impact on the battle compared to these other factors? I think not.

Now, onto a slightly different aspect. And that is about training as opposed to some natural (i.e. born

with) attribute type modifier.

Jeff's point about drill having an impact on the INTERNAL way a squad fights is valid. Not just because

of what weapon was the basis for squad tactics, but more importantly how training was actually

conducted in general. For example, Waffen SS training supposedely dropped most of the "standard"

aspects of training in favor of more practical use of time, such as exposing recruits to live fire

overhead. Now, if this is totally true, and a different force instead all sat around in classrooms for the

same length of time, I would expect there to be a difference when out on the field of battle. However,

this can be rectified in CM by giving one force a better Experience rating than the other. So for extreme

differences in training standards, I think the Experience rating (coupled with Fitness) does just fine.

But what about more subtle differences? I totally agree that 8 weeks of similar training for one nation

did not necessarily create the same exact type of soldier as another nation's army which also put its

men through 8 weeks of training. I also agree that putting a fresh bunch of young lads from a rural

district into rural combat for the first time would likely yeild better results than taking another bunch of

young lads straight out of an urban gehto.

BUT...

How in the WORLD are we supposed to qualify and quantify all thses multitude of possible differences

in the large variety of situations that can be experienced in combat? More importantly, how do you

compare a set of such attributes from one nation vs. the attributes of another FAIRLY? And how do

you do this in the correct relation to the real world impact such differences would have on the outcome

of a combat engagement? I say that it is utterly impossible to do this. Because of that, trying to modify

a select, almost random, assortment of differences based on whatever invented values are thought up

is "bad...bad...bad"

Jeff said in another thread that we only ask for strict fact finding and scientific results when someone's

opinion is at odds with our "gut instinct". That is not exactly true, as we have changed things around

when a) the element is highly subjective (but necessary to simulate) to begin with and a good

rational argument can be show as to why our opinion is flawed. Facts of course help the other side out

But in general, Jeff is correct that when we have a strong opinion about something we demand MORE

than just another strong counter opinion. Otherwise we would be changing things every other day

depending on which way the wind blew. Worse, the introduction of national modifiers would encourage

such behavior on our part, otherwise we would be constantly labled as "baised this, biased that". And

that would be "bad...bad...bad" So I say that digging our heels in, when necessary, is a good thing

for everybody.

Steve

| IP: Logged

Big Time Software

Administrator

Member # 42

posted 07-09-2001 05:59 PM

There is another aspect of national modifiers that got tossed in here, and that is the tactics used by

the player (or "mouse-wielding player" as Jeff put it ).

Higher level tactics, which are totally within the control of the player, can be influenced to more-or-less

conform to the real world tactics used by that formation in the same situations in the real war. The

Germans tried to engage the enemy at longer ranges than shorter, whenever possible. So if you are a

German player, your tactics will (generally) yeild better results if you try to emulate the real tactics used

by the Germans in WWII. Not because the player is FORCED to do this, or that there are some national

modifiers in place, but because the weapons, TO&E, C&C, etc. were designed to be used with such

tactics. A player can attempt to engage T34s or Shermans at 100m, but it is not a good idea.

It is true that the player can only influence the tactics used above squad level. This is true for all games

I can think of, including Close Combat, that do not focus on the single soldier as a commandable

element. So any differences that would come about at the sub-unit level would have to be programmed

in by us. But WHAT changes should we be programming in?

Jeff quoted a section from Gajkowski's translation of the German Squad tactics manual/s used around

mid-war timeframe. The quote stated that unlike other nations, the Germans based their squad around

the LMG and not the Rifle. I agree that this was the case, but what does this have to do with making

changes?

The reality that was described by Gajkowski is in fact already simulated in Combat Mission. Either the

tactic was an outgrowth of a better LMG vs. rifle reality OR was the outcome of a specific design goal to

have a better LMG and skimp on the rifle OR a combo of the two. Personally, I believe it was more a

result of design and a little to do with circumstances.

In any case, this German squad level tactical reality IS represented in Combat Mission. The German

squad is more effective at longer distances than the US squad (for example), which is more centered

around the rifle than the LMG (just as Gajkowski states). However, when distances are closed, the

Germans often found themselves at least evened out because another truism of combat is that the

more points of effective fire that can be brought to bear, the better the overall results. Hence the

German tactics designed to keep the enemy at a distance, especially while on the defensive.

If the enemy has the same number of men and only bolt action rifles with 5 shots, then the Germans

would still have an edge or at least be even. But this was not the case with US or Commonwealth

troops, both of which had more men and better rifles (Enfield was bolt action, but had 10 round box

mag). So the number of atomatic weapons, in addition to the LMG, was in theory upped in order to

compensate. Some formations, like SMG troops, were designed to give superior firepower at closer

range, sacrificing longer range firepower.

So what? Well, I for one use different tactics when I play as the German or Allied side. These tactics

are, in part, based on the capabilities of the squads under my command. The reason why is because

the squads "behave" differently and therefore must be used differently. These differences are based on

their weapons and how they were supposed to be used by the squad members using them. So if Tero

and others are simply asking us to make squads inherently different from each other, it is already done

If we are being asked to make the individual men (all else being equal) different from each other, we

will never do that.

Steve

| IP: Logged

Great Post Steve

Very informative....

Now lets continue with the Debate

its sort of interesting from the sidelines....

-tom w

[Username]

Steve sez.."In any case, this German squad level tactical reality IS represented in Combat Mission. The German

squad is more effective at longer distances than the US squad (for example), which is more centered

around the rifle than the LMG (just as Gajkowski states). However, when distances are closed, the

Germans often found themselves at least evened out because another truism of combat is that the

more points of effective fire that can be brought to bear, the better the overall results. Hence the

German tactics designed to keep the enemy at a distance, especially while on the defensive."

I dont think steve knows this but many times you want the enemy to get real close. Its called an ambush. The germans practised this and so does most everyone else.

He has made remarks on a few occasions about 'keeping the enemy 200 meters away' and german superiority of small arms at distance, etc.

But the reality is that killing is done close. Nothing but shades of suppresion are accomplished over 150 meters. Opening fire at distance when defending isnt practical. A good thing to do is to wait for the enemy to advance into the killing field.

A good reason for this is that covering fire from the enemy poses a great danger to their own advancing force. So by waiting till the last second to open fire, you maximize your firepower and hinder the enemys covering fire. A really crafty defender will be slightly reverse crested so that any covering fire FROM the enemy will have very little chance of hitting the defenders (and pose a danger to the attackers).

In Vietnam, dugin US troops could take out a 10:1 advantage on advancing troops. Thats just with automatic small arms. And at extremely close range. Granted, having full auto M16s helps alot. The germans did this in russia also. I forget the book but a german soldiers memoir speaks of the near point blank slaughter of troops. It was in southern russia.

Maybe the CM2 modeling of infantry firepower might show this. I know that in CMBO, defending means fire often , fire early...

Lewis

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Micheal Said: I disagree completely; check out Infantry Training 1937, or numerous articles by Mike Chappel, Ian V. Hogg, and others - the British and Canadians also used the firepower of the Bren Gun in the same way the Germans based their tactics on the MG 34/42. The rifle was virtually useless in combat - read Galloway for this.

I agree with the earlier point that the squad should be allowed to break down without morale penalty to reflect the actual tactic of breaking the section into a rifle and LMG team. The Battle Drill manual lays it out right there, and it was practiced religiously in action.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Michael Than Said: Jeff, what on earth does that have to do with CMBO?

British troops in France in 1940 also wore kilts and dug trenches.

By 1944, when CMBO picks up the story, infantry tactics had become considerably more - quite probably due to observation of what the Germans had done.

In fact, Blackburn tells us about the Demonstration unit that dressed in German uniforms and demonstrated German platoon tactics in open air theatres before most troops going into Europe in the summer of 1944.

Check out the US Army Handbook on the German Forces to see just how much the Allies really knew about German tactics - and how much they learned from them.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Jeff Says:

Again I am not discussing CMBO per say. I am discussing squad level battle drill (see previous posts on now defunct thread) Everyone seems to feel the necessity of either arguing weather “such and such” “should or should not” be included in CM. I dunno this for sure but I think the drive-through window for changes in CMBO is closed. You’ll have to go home and open a can of spaghetti-O’s.

Cant we simply have a discussion about history and how it relates to wargaming. Or is that strictly reserved for the forum of the damned over in the general topics area Topics here are so much more interesting.

Anyway you have aptly stated my point. British Infantry of 1940 didn’t fight like British Infantry of 1944 (and they apparently lost there Kilts as well). If you were Joe Wargame designer and had to span a topic on tactical combat between say Jun 22, 1941 – May 8, 1945 you will no doubt find that squad level battle drill evolves or changes. Infantry Squads spanning time periods of 1941 to 1945 shouldn’t, IMHO, simply be a function of adding in a few Sten guns or losing a Lewis gun and adding a Bren. We can disagree on this…its ok. It is an interesting topic.

[PzKpfw 1]

That's a question I meant to ask when ppl started bringing up RL Inf tactics , vs abstractions in CM, Steve will we have Inf ambush settings in CM2? other then say the hide command. Will the new fire lanes apply to Inf as well? & will we be able to limit ranges of engagement.

Regards, John Waters

[Jeff Duquette]

This is actually from the other thread although very tangent to the original topic.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Michael Said Something Else of Interest: Though I don't think Walters did it quite so often as he liked to have told the interviewer in the Valour and the Horror miniseries.

The interviewer quite incredulously asked "you mean you tried for a 6 inch bullseye on the first shot?"

Walters simply said "sure, why not" and the scene changed abruptly. Makes you wonder what was edited out...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Now I am not going to imply that Radley Walter’s methodology was the sole instigation for the following, but it was apparently enough of a reoccurring issue that German Engineers redesigned the Panthers Mantlet. Or perhaps altered the mantlet is more appropriate. Jentz has an excellent photo on page 96 and 99 of “Panther, The Quest for Combat Superiority” of the chin mantlet added to late war models of the Panther. The added hunk of steel was apparently added to prevent ricochets off the lower mantlet from piercing the thin deck armor and subsequently punching a tunnel through the driver or co-driver’s skull. No idea as to how many of these Panthers with chin mantlets were produced or actually saw combat.

[Michael Dorosh]

Ok, Jeff, of course you do make a valid point that the British of 1940 were very different from the British of 1944, and you used effective source material to do it.

As for redesigning the Panther mantlet - the Germans did lots of odd things. They used zimmerit in huge quantities despite the fact there was absolutely no need for it - none of their enemies were using magnetic weapons.

It is possible the Germans simply recognized the shot trap feature and decided to fix it - that they did so is not proof that the Allies were able to routinely get that 6 inch bullseye on the first shot. I suspect Rexford might have something to say about that.

Anyway, not trying to be argumentative - Walters was one hell of a soldier and any Allied tanker who faced down a Panther was a brave man.

My main point, though, is that I think Steve is dead wrong when he says that the Germans were the only ones to use the firepower of the squad LMG as the basis for tactics at the squad and platoon level by June 1944 and beyond. From my limited perspective, anyway.

That sounds like a challenge, but I'd rather have CM2 a day or so early than have him defend himself on that point here, so I won't touch on that one too hard, if others don't.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

My main point, though, is that I think Steve is dead wrong when he says that the Germans were the only ones to use the firepower of the squad LMG as the basis for tactics at the squad and platoon level by June 1944 and beyond. From my limited perspective, anyway.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

They wern't Ie, Soviet Rifle Squad tactics were built around their LMG, in fact casualties were a secondary consideration to the Sqds priority on replacements as long as the squad had eneough ppl to left to operate the LMG replacements were slow in comeing.

Regards, John Waters

[ 07-10-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Battlefront.com]

Lewis,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I dont think steve knows this but many times you want the enemy to get real close. Its called an ambush. The germans practised this and so does most everyone else.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sure, but what is your point? When you achieve close range surprise you get benefits that are all out of proportion to the firepower you use. This is basic thinking. Of course, the better the firepower the better the results, so in fact the US squad would most likely be better in this role (in theory). However, ambushing is not always either practical or desirable. In fact, it is often neither. Like most risk:benefit ratios, an ambush also has the potential to fail as spectacullarly as it might succeed. All depends on the situation.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>He has made remarks on a few occasions about 'keeping the enemy 200 meters away' and german superiority of small arms at distance, etc.

But the reality is that killing is done close. Nothing but shades of suppresion are accomplished over 150 meters. Opening fire at distance when defending isnt practical.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

If all you have is just a bunch of vanila squads facing a superior enemy force (numerically), this is true. But the Germans, and others, designed their tactics around... Combined Arms, right? The concept was to fix the enemy with small arms and then crush the attack with mortars and artillery. The doctrine was against letting the enemy get too close because that would preclude effective aritllery and mortar support, as well as pose greater risk of losing the MLR.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>A good thing to do is to wait for the enemy to advance into the killing field.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Uhm... letting the enemy get too close also exposes you to being overrun and precludes the use of heavier weapons such as artillery. The US Army lost more than a few battles in Veitnam this way. In general 1960/70s combat in Vietnam to WWII Europe is a rather bad comparison to make, for many reasons. However, getting in close can cut either way, depending on the circumstances. Fixing the enemy at 200-300m and blasting the crap out of them with artillery tends to only go in the defender's favor.

John, yes... infantry can use the "Cover Arc" feature. If you combine this with a Hide you get a more flexible ability to Ambush than in CMBO. Because of this, Ambush as a specific order, has been removed.

Steve

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Lewis,

John, yes... infantry can use the "Cover Arc" feature. If you combine this with a Hide you get a more flexible ability to Ambush than in CMBO. Because of this, Ambush as a specific order, has been removed.

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

WOHOOOO Thank's Steve.....

Regards, John Waters

[Gyrene]

What bothers me the most is not that national differences are not included (Which is always a sticky point as we well know) but that individual units are identical asides from their weapons & numbers. Acoording to the way the system is now, why would the Germans bother with Mountain troops if regular Heer will do the job? What good are the SS? They're no better in the game than any other German unit. Same thing for the Allies, Airborne troops received quite a bit more "toughening" up training and usually received better quality volunteers than regular line troops, but in CM as it is they're just regular infantry with gammon bombs.

To truly provide a realistic wargaming experience and to take much of the shine away from VS SMG squads & other "bargain" purchases, individual squad type skills & training have to be taken into account.

VG squads are cheap because they were the bottom of the barrel, but as it stands now they can go toe to toe with any squad in CM, regardless of how much training they've supposedy had, as it is in CM a squad of SMG toting civilians could decimate a Canadian or British rifle equipped squad, which outside of an ambush in real life would be utterly ridiculous.

Again to drag the example of SL & ASL back from its hole, but those games modelled individual squad skills, such as climbing for the Rangers, self splitting squads for the USMC, etc, and individual morale levels for regular or "elite" infantry (Case in point, the US infantry's morale of 6 vs Airborne's morale of 7) and everyone seemed to be happy with it, even with the Finns' 8 morale and self rally ability for their elite units.

To continue to disregard individual units' training is a mistake that not only reduces part of the game's fun but also gives people wrong notions in a historical level.

If the PTO ever gets modeled in CM56 should the Japanese take morale hits exactly the same way as Volksstrum squads do? Should they fight close range exactly the same way as regular French infantry when it is a historical fact that their offensive infantry doctrine consisted on closing with the enemy to within bayonet range?

Individual squad abilities would bring out flaws in some squad types and highlight strenghts of other unit types and upset many people, but tough. Airborne units were better than conventional line troops on the assault, the SS were more efficient and cohesive than regular Heer, it's why both were at the tip of the spear.

I can't stress enough how important individual unit skills and training is, and yes, there is even room for some national modifiers in the game

Gyrene

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

[QB]They wern't Ie, Soviet Rifle Squad tactics were built around their LMG, in fact casualties were a secondary consideration to the Sqds priority on replacements as long as the squad had eneough ppl to left to operate the LMG replacements were slow in comeing.

Regards, John Waters

[QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks for the additional info. So I guess this kind of defeats whoever had the idea of a "national modifier" for the Germans because of their tactical treatment of LMGs.

I can see the rationale for reducing morale for split squads, due to the lack of proximity to the leader. But if a squad trained - and the British and Canadians really did ingrain this into their troops - to split into two under fire, is this a realistic restriction?

Did the Russian squad, for example, train to not just support the MG, but to fight split into teams?

[Michael Dorosh]

Ok, Gyrene I will agree with your conclusion. How to implement it?

You can see where I am going with the Commonwealth example. I think their squads should be able to split without morale penalty.

Perhaps Steve can explain why he disagrees? As I stated above, I can see why the penalty would be imposed, but am not sure it is the best way of simulating British squad tactics.

It would also be better to split into a 3 or 4 man Bren team, and a 5 or 6 man rifle team.

I realize CMBO is a closed book, but for future consideration I bring this up.

I would be interested in the German example (or American or Russian) and ways in which you think these national training characteristics might be implemented; it really is an interesting topic.

[ 07-10-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Battlefront.com]

Michael,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>My main point, though, is that I think Steve is dead wrong when he says that the Germans were the only ones to use the firepower of the squad LMG as the basis for tactics at the squad and platoon level by June 1944 and beyond. From my limited perspective, anyway.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree, at least in theory. My point was that the Allies did a poor job trying to duplicate the German squad concept. It was seen, first hand, in 1940 that the German belt fed MG34 was superior to anything that the Allies had. This was reinforced in Italy and then in France when the MG42 was experienced. Yet the US continued to use a gun that had been around since WWI as their "LMG" (the BAR), and the Commonwealth forces the Bren which featured a 30 round magazine. Hence my comments about them not being as LMG focused as the Germans.

Now, don't get me wrong, both guns were very good battle weapons. But as for its intended use, the MG34/42 was by far the more flexible weapon for this role. So it isn't that the US or Commonwealth forces didn't base their tactics around their LMG (they did at least in 1944/45), it was more that in reality the Germans had a better means of putting those tactics into effect. At least this is what I gather from my readings.

Oh, and to answer an earlier question... we are not going to do anything special for split squads. We drew the simulation line at Squad and do not wish to start muddying the waters by going lower. For once we start doing detailed team simulations we will get calls for detailed simulations of individiual men. With a multi-company to battalion focus, this is simply not a good idea.

Steve

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Michael Said: It is possible the Germans simply recognized the shot trap feature and decided to fix it - that they did so is not proof that the Allies were able to routinely get that 6 inch bullseye on the first shot. I suspect Rexford might have something to say about that.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don’t disagree. I don’t want to diverge anymore than I have already on this tangent subject, but I am guessing that the actual design may have been more a function of lucky hits (or unlucky hits for victim Panther crews). Certain percentages of AFV hits are on the turret…of these hits a certain amount will hit the lower mantlet and richochet onto the upper deck.

British Army Operational Groups conducted a study (WO 291/823) on “The Practability of Pin-Pointing Aim in Anti-Tank Gunnery”. To briefly summarize; This study was originally conducted to determine if German Heavies could be combated via pin-point tank\anti-tank gunnery techniques. The long and the short of this study (which involved a fair amount of target firing) was that pinpoint gunnery was not practical beyond close ranges (I think 500 meters or less) as systematic dispersion tended to kick in beyond that envelope. So Sherman II’s combating Tiger I’s at a range of 750m via the Sherman plugging the Tiger in the turret ring or optic entry points on the mantlet etc was not deemed as a valid approach to tank combat. To much luck involved as normal engagement ranges in ETO were typically on the order of 1000 – 1200 meters (Normandy’s closed terrain an obvious exception). Interestingly enough Walter’s indicates he employed this tactic at ranges of 900 to 1000 yrds. :eek:

[Battlefront.com]

Gyrene,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>What bothers me the most is not that national differences are not included (Which is always a sticky point as we well know) but that individual units are identical asides from their weapons & numbers.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

True, if Experience and Fitness are both set to identical levels. However, you are really downplaying the impact the different weapons make. Do a quick test yourself. Play a game using just SMG troops, then one using plain old Pattern 44 infantry on the SAME map against the SAME enemy force. Do that for a couple of different maps and enemy forces. Now, tell me that you use the SAME exact tactics and yeilded the SAME results

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Acoording to the way the system is now, why would the Germans bother with Mountain troops if regular Heer will do the job? What good are the SS? They're no better in the game than any other German unit.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

If they are all armed the same, have the same number of men, the same Experience, and the same Fitness (again, new rating)... sure, that is correct. But did all of these troops in real life have all of these factors the same? No.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Same thing for the Allies, Airborne troops received quite a bit more "toughening" up training and usually received better quality volunteers than regular line troops, but in CM as it is they're just regular infantry with gammon bombs.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

With the exception of jumping out of planes, is this unrealistic? I mean, why should a just out of jumpschool Airborne unit have some sort of inherent advantage over a regular infantry unit that has fought from Africa to Aachen? It should have an advantage over a fresh rifle unit though, which means adjusting the Experience level up one notch for the paras.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>To truly provide a realistic wargaming experience and to take much of the shine away from VS SMG squads & other "bargain" purchases, individual squad type skills & training have to be taken into account. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I totally disagree. If you don't utilize all the features we already have in the game to differentiate between better and poorer quality troops, you STILL have the differences in weapons. And like I said above, can you seriously tell me that the different weapon mixes are trivial?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>VG squads are cheap because they were the bottom of the barrel, but as it stands now they can go toe to toe with any squad in CM, <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ding-ding-ding-ding... another example why we shouldn't have this sort of "this unit is better than that unit" sort of arbitrary stuff. What do I mean? VG troops were NOT necessarily the bottom of the barrel. In fact, some were the best formations the Germans had in the field at the time. The VG formation was just an organizational variant used by the Germans for a short period of time before they went with the Pattern 45. So stereo typing VG troops as being poor quality is an urban legand, myth, factually incorrect, biased, etc. opinion that exemplifies why it is a bad idea to go down this path.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>...regardless of how much training they've supposedy had, as it is in CM a squad of SMG toting civilians could decimate a Canadian or British rifle equipped squad, which outside of an ambush in real life would be utterly ridiculous.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Wrong. Try playing with a bunch of Conscript or Green troops against a mix of Regulars and Vets and tell me what happens when the poorer quality force goes on the attack.

Oh... and a bunch of untrained Soviet troops were known to beat up larger forces of much better trained Germans. And towards the end, Volkssturm units fighting in Königsberg bled many an experienced Soviet formation white.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Airborne units were better than conventional line troops on the assault, the SS were more efficient and cohesive than regular Heer, it's why both were at the tip of the spear.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Wrong again. Some German Airborne units were hardly trained at all, and that training was rather conventional infantry based. Most Waffen SS units were sub standard, some were downright incapable. This was true even in 1939 (Polizei) and got worse as the Waffen SS expanded.

Again... biases make a VERY poor platform for a game based on realism. So I say again, "bad... bad... bad.."

Steve

[Slapdragon]

Steve,

I think Gyrene means Volkstrum and not Volksgrenadier.

Not that it changes the argument any.

[OGSF]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Gyrene:

If the PTO ever gets modeled in CM56 should the Japanese take morale hits exactly the same way as Volksstrum squads do? Should they fight close range exactly the same way as regular French infantry when it is a historical fact that their offensive infantry doctrine consisted on closing with the enemy to within bayonet range?

Individual squad abilities would bring out flaws in some squad types and highlight strenghts of other unit types and upset many people, but tough. Airborne units were better than conventional line troops on the assault, the SS were more efficient and cohesive than regular Heer, it's why both were at the tip of the spear.

I can't stress enough how important individual unit skills and training is, and yes, there is even room for some national modifiers in the game

Gyrene<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But this is all there, depending on how well a scenario is designed or how historically accurate a player tries to purchase their units.

SS Hamstermen have better weapon load out than Heer. To have conscript SS troops in a game would be ridiculous. To have elite Heer troops in a game would be ridiculous. A scenario with veteran SS and green / conscript Volksstrum against regular / veteran British would be pretty plausible, especially if the "fanatic" factor was increased for the SS.

All of this is doable as the game stands.

Airborne troops were lightly armed, elite units. Dropped in Normandy on June 5th / 6th they encountered (largely) conscript / regular Heer units. A notable exception being St Mair Eglise (sic). A simple thing to model in a CM scenario.

Japanese troops would likely be regular / veteran troops with maximum fanaticism, against regular / veteran Marines with a sprinkling of crack troops amongst them. Japanese / French conflicts were not a notabley common occurrance in WWII.

I don't see how the modifiers you think are necessary are not already available in CM.

Would a "nationality modifier" have the Italians prone to surrender at first shot? I suggest you read about the British battle to take Keren in Eritrea fom the Italians in 1941. Both this battle and the Italian surrenders in other parts of North Africa can be modelled in great detail in CM as it stands - morale settings, conscript vs regular vs veteran, fanaticism settings are all there.

OGSF

[Battlefront.com]

If he meant Volkssturm instead of Volksgrenadier, then it still doesn't change the argument. The typical engagement should have Conscript Volkssturm, without many supporting arms, going up against a sturdy combined arms Allied force of Regular or Veteran. My money is on the Allied force. However, in real life such poor quality German forces did give the Allies many a bloody nose. Gyrene appears to think that this is unrealistic.

Steve

[Slapdragon]

Hey Steve

Seeing that you are into WW2 memorabilia, I saw an add for Italian WW2 issue Rifles. Never fired, only dropped once.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Too funny Well, at least it would match that WWII Italian tunic I saw up on eBay. Not a scratch on it, but unforuntately the sleeves are badly stained. At first I thought it was blood, but that would be rather unusual. Turns out it was pasta sauce. Apparently they weren't issue napkins so, in the great European tradition, used their sleeves to wipe up after dinner.

Steve

P.S. 3rd generation Italian-American (and other stuff too!) poking fun at one of my most favorite cuisines

[ 07-10-2001: Message edited by: Big Time Software ]

[Jeff Duquette]

I think most combatants in WWI took the lesson of the machine gun to hart and during the inter-war years developed squad level tactics inclusive of some sort of squad light machine gun or automatic rifle. But there are differences in philosophy in the perception of how musketry was employed or LMG\automatic rifles were employed or fire and movement was or was not emphasized.

No one wants to read about the stinky French Army of 1940 but here it is anyway. One last post for the evening before the wife comes in here and kicks my ass.

Again from English “On Infantry” regarding state of squad level infantry tactics in the French Army of 1940.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The combat and fire unit of the French infantry was its Great War innovation, the groupe de combat, 12 strong (sic Squad). Its members were virtually tied to the light machine gun, the fusil mitrailleuse, according to whether their individual role was "to move it, service it, feed it, or protect it." Not surprisingly, the tactical training of automatic-rifle and machine gun teams was maintained at a reasonable standard, the technique of creating a tidal wave of small-arms fire ahead of advancing infantry being developed to a particularly high pitch. The rifle, on the other hand, was regarded as very much a subsidiary weapon, and the standard of shooting was universally low. The further subdivision of the groupe into an automatic rifle squad and a rifle team partially reflected this priority since the latter, commanded by a corporal, was not strictly a rifle team but rather a specialized bombing cell of grenade thrower, grenade firer, 'and three riflemen cum-grenadiers. 'Ideally suited for clearing the fire bays and traverses of a trench system, the French groupe remained essentially indivisible and un-trained to maneuver within itself; whereas the German Gruppe operated by fire and movement, the former represented fire preceding movement. This difference in the organization of the smallest component of the French and German infantry reflected the overall doctrinal difference between the two armies.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

By the way Michael regarding my post on some of the inadequacies of the British 1937 Infantry Training Manual…I do have a copy of the British Army 1927 Infantry Training Manual, and anything has to be an improvement over this 1927 document. 300 plus pages, and only 10 pages of the manual are dedicated to Battle Drill.

[Gen-x87H]

The SMG problem should only be changed if the historical facts say it should. To just change the make up of American platoons because one feels that the germans have an unfair advantage is gamey. I enjoy this game because it gives me a feeling of being on a WWII battlefield. Apply a little real world tactics and 9 out of 10 time it works.

Make use of some of that wonderful Close support Infanty tanks. The allied side is stacked with them. Think about it. 75,95mm gun vs an MP40\44. They will smash any kind of SMG rush real fast.

Gen

[Mark IV]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Gyrene:

Acoording to the way the system is now, why would the Germans bother with Mountain troops if regular Heer will do the job? What good are the SS? They're no better in the game than any other German unit. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's what the Heer kept saying.

Crank up the Fanaticism, crank down the Experience (as the only CM quantifier of "classroom learning"), and all other things being equal, you've got a bunch of dead heroes.

Obviously, many Waffen SS troops went on to attain great combat skill and presence. Many others who wore the runes were wrong time, wrong place, as many accounts of the Bulge (for example) show. Like the rest of the Wehrmacht, attrition took its toll on the quality of the 'cruits, and their professionalism was criticised from the get-go. The latest gear and a hell of an attitude is no substitute for survival as a fighting force.

A lot of special troops had skills that are outside the scope of CM, and within a CM battle they are just triggers or targets like everybody else. Mountain troops were trained and organized to exist in mountainous country, but this includes a lot of logistical prep that has already taken place by the time our CM battle opens up. Assuming they got into harm's way, with guns and ammo, their mountaineering is over with, and now they are grunts. It isn't as though they have one leg longer than the other for loping along mountain trails, or greater lung capacity. They were organized to function logistically in mountainous terrain which is why the scenario is occurring where it is, in the first place. Many Gebirgsjaegers fought and died on ground as level as Kansas, because they were infantry units first and specialists second.

Same with Engineers. They could build bridges, clear minefields (I mean really), and erect or clear near-impenetrable obstacles, but not usually within an hour under fire. Unfortunately, that is where CM finds them... in that hour where they are "up front" and returning rifle fire.

Fallschirmjaegers are the classic example... cool MG for an air drop, but once you're on the ground, you find yourself looking around for spare MG42s. Like most special units, some of their equipment was a compromise for special situations, but they were thrown into the cauldron of conventional war with what they had at hand. By the time our CM scenario opens, they're on the ground and looking for cover and fire support like everyone else, no matter what kind of knife they had in their boot.

If you had a scenario which modeled Ami regs and Gebirgsjaegers in a race to grab and hold a mountain-top against all comers, I think the gerbiltruppen as a rule would have an edge, as far as getting there fustest with the mostest. But the modifier required to reflect this would be awfully esoteric, and would be meaningless in the vast bulk of scenarios.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Did the Russian squad, for example, train to not just support the MG, but to fight split into teams?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No Soviet Sqds did not break into fire teams, they were not that flexible. The

Sqad fought as a whole with Squad leader responsible for every action the Sqd performed, the Riflemen's sole task was to suport the LMG.

Regards, John Waters

[ 07-10-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]