"SMG GAP" A Proposal...Take 2

[Jeff Duquette]

Nice summation John.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Slapdragon Said:A great study called: "Tactical Aerial Interdiction in the Second World War, European Theater" done by the Army<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Also a nice post. Slapdragon do you by chance have a copy of this report?

[Slapdragon]

Parts of it in my pile, it is a 1953 study, something like 650 pages long. You may want to try the GPO, since a lot of times longer reports of this sort get turned into books for historical purposes, which is actually how I think I first came across it.

[argie]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

BTW tero, any problems with MG modeling currently in CM apply equally to all MGs in the game, not just German MGs.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Arrrggghhhh!!!! The Forum read my mind!!! I did a quote and the machine selected exactly the phrase I was looking for...

In fact, most of the complains are from Allied players who can't stop SMG hordes with their HMGs

[Gary T]

At the risk of being labelled anally retentive:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Acoording to the way the system is now, why would the Germans bother with Mountain troops if regular Heer will do the job? What good are the SS? They're no better in the game than any other German unit.

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If they are all armed the same, have the same number of men, the same Experience, and the same Fitness (again, new rating)... sure, that is correct. But did all of these troops in real life have all of these factors the same? No.

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<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

As far as I am aware there was no such thing as a Gebirgsjager squad in the German TOE, certainly not one armed as it is within CMBO. One could perhaps argue that because the two mountain divisions fighting on the Western Front had recently been transferred from years of fighting in the forests of Finland (6SS) and Lappland

(2)they may have amassed a higher level of automatic firepower. However I hope that within CMBB the Gebirgsjager are armed as their regular counterparts - although I would like to see them keep their mountain caps. As someone else mentioned the diference between a GJD and an ID was of a divisional level (and to some extent the way the heavy weapons were dished out) than the squad/platoon organisation.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> I trust you will inhibit the German forces available in Finland to SS Gebirgsjägers in the north of Finland and Lapland and Detachment Kuhlmey air support and a small number of Stugs and infantry in the south of Finland/Karelian Isthmus for a short period of time during the summer of 1944. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What!???! No 163. and 169. ID's in central Finland? You jest surely? Not to mention the Army GJ in northern Finland.

For what its worth I agree with BTS over the experience\fitness versus national modifiers. As long as you have enough levels to work with you should be able to recreate any force's competence or otherwise.

Cheers,

Gary.

[Battlefront.com]

Even an "unsuccessful" air strike broke up cohesion and confidence, which can not be measured in "x vehicles of this type found on the battlefield by ground troops days or weeks later". The 1st person reports from German commanders and soldiers, especially at Mortain, mention airpower and the threat of airpower as being a significant factor on the battlefield. Vehicles were moved at night as much as possible, for example (also due to artillery I suspect). From reading about the failed counter attack at Mortain, I recall quite a bit of comments like "planes came down and shot up convoy. No major damage but we lost 1 hour getting reorganized". That sort of thing. Anyhoo, I am one of those that feel the statistical accounting for what planes did and did not "kill" is somewhere between what is claimed by the pilots and what the grunts on the ground determined.

Tero, you insist that the behavior of the squads is the same. I do not agree. But in any case, you have yet to describe the different types of behavior you expect which are not present. In my opinion, so far the things you have detailed can be simulated in CM (QB aspects aside) or are "national modifiers" which are out of the question for all the reasons described. Your comments about Absolute and Relative Spotting are valid, although since you have yet to describe the differences that CM doesn't simulate I don't understand what spotting has to do with behavior unique to one squad or another.

The Regional setting will NOT include a northern and southern Finnish front. Just Finland. We don't want to have 100 different Regions, just the four major ones. But yes, you won't be able to purchase Panthers or Italian troops to fight alongside Finnish forces.

QuickBattles can have more subtle features, which Regions greatly aids, but they can NEVER be as detailed as a hand crafted scenario. It just is not possible to do this. At least not without months of tedious programming, which is simply out of the question.

Steve

[ 07-11-2001: Message edited by: Big Time Software ]

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

In and around 1944 German attack doctrine, especially armored doctrine, was also busted up by the realities on the ground. Difficult terrain and plenty of enemy air activity made the sweaping movements of previous years impossible or at least costly. The Mortain offensive was one of the bloodiest examples of bad terrain and enemy air activity I can think of. They were slaughtered while trying to execute the doctrine of days gone by.

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

So whats your point? You want to talk about armor and airplanes? I thought we were discussing infantry.

Anyway. The Mortain debacle was a hitler thing. The generals wouldnt have done it if they didnt have to. It wasnt busted up by the realities on the ground but rather the realities in the air. Total air supremacy. The "doctrine" called for someone to have that. Unfortunately for the germans, THEY didnt have it. So they werent practising doctrine but rather suicide.

When you start throwing apples and oranges around you really dont do much for threads. And people start quoting 650 page reports on airplanes. So whats this about smgs again?

To repeat my points..

If the attackers are on tanks, like the russians, use long range fires (HMG, mortar, arty) to seperate the infantry from the armor. This allows the armor to be dealt with without escort. Here, the german doctrine would have worked by the way.

Limit your vulnerability to direct prep fires. This often means using reverse slopes, etc.

Slaughter infantry on foot at close range first if they dont have armor support. You bag a bunch outright, make the survivors flee into the rest of the attackers echelon, thereby spreading panic.

If you are fighting an enemy that is attacking, with no tanks, no direct covering fire, no air force, etc; than by all means open fire at maximum ranges!!!!

If the enemy wants to get close to you, they will. Barring a flat desert, they will get close. If it means crawling all night, they will. I have read many accounts of troops launching assaults from almost grenade range. If the LMGs and HMGs dont immediately fire, than its an overrun for sure.

I think I am discussing what a german infantry defender should do in a defense of a fixed position. I am not sure what steve is discussing with columns of marching troops shooting at other columns or tanks getting bombed in narrow gullies, etc...

Lewis

[PzKpfw 1]

Oh I agree Steve on the demoralizing effects TAC Air had. Ie, the British interogateing prisoners that had participated in Mortain, were mainly concerned with what effects the threat of being hit, by Typhoon 60lb rockets had on tank crews.

The interogation's told them what they wanted to hear, Ie, yes German tank crews were scared of RP attacks, & the interogations also sugested a large number of German tank crew abandoned their tanks & fled.

At the same time they were very interested * disapointed in the hit rate of their rockets, vs actual tanks destroyed etc. TAC Air was never that effective against tanks as most works have led us to believe but that is because air power is always used in a General statement, as we see when you break it down into smaller pieces vs Ie, tanks the all powerful illusion begins to fade.

Mortain was the ultimate test of Allied purose designed aircraft vs Tanks in the West, it was fought under text book conditions & circumstances, which never presented themselves in the West again. In this sense is why the actual number of KO'

d tanks is important as well as morale etc, in the final anylyss.

As for Mortain it is very possible had TAC Air not responded in such force the Germans would have broken through as the Allies only had light forces in the area. In fact Bradley commented had the Germans gone a several thousand yards South, they would have been in Avranches on the 1st day. But then again the German's didn't have ULTRA to tell them the state of Allied force dispositions & placement.

Regards, John Waters

[ 07-11-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Battlefront.com]

Lewis,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>So whats your point? You want to talk about armor and airplanes? I thought we were discussing infantry.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

We are. But in case it has escaped your acute powers of observation, this entire thread (even going back to the original one) has drifted on and off topic here and there. Sorry if that bugs you.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Anyway. The Mortain debacle was a hitler thing. The generals wouldnt have done it if they didnt have to. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Great point, except that it means nothing.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It wasnt busted up by the realities on the ground but rather the realities in the air. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Partly. But the terrain was a key factor because it kept the Germans bunched up and snarled in traffic jams. Because of this they could not deploy properly. Even if the Allies hadn't pounced on them from the air I doubt the end result would have been much different.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>So they werent practising doctrine but rather suicide.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree with this point.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>When you start throwing apples and oranges around you really dont do much for threads. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It was an example of a point made from a point made from a point. Perhaps you should read the whole thread of conversation and not just the end of it. The reality on the ground was that the days of German forces fanning out over the distances were gone, yet their doctrine had remained (officially at least) largely unchanged. But you are right, this has nothing to do with infantry tactics.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>If the attackers are on tanks, like the russians, use long range fires (HMG, mortar, arty) to seperate the infantry from the armor. This allows the armor to be dealt with without escort. Here, the german doctrine would have worked by the way.

Limit your vulnerability to direct prep fires. This often means using reverse slopes, etc.

Slaughter infantry on foot at close range first if they dont have armor support. You bag a bunch outright, make the survivors flee into the rest of the attackers echelon, thereby spreading panic.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed. And how is this different than what I outlined before?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>If you are fighting an enemy that is attacking, with no tanks, no direct covering fire, no air force, etc; than by all means open fire at maximum ranges!!!!<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yup, which as I said is clearly outlined in the German squad field manuals. Rifle units were instructed to fire at ranges of around 600m in this case. Otherwise they are supposed to open up around 300m or so, after the LMG rips at 400m or so. At least that is what their manuals say, which is what we are talking about here.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>If the enemy wants to get close to you, they will. Barring a flat desert, they will get close. If it means crawling all night, they will. I have read many accounts of troops launching assaults from almost grenade range. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

True, which is more evidence to support the discussion that German tactics, which were used in 1941 and before, became very problematic to use in practice as the war ground on in the East. By the time Normandy came around the German infantry units were too often on their own, or at least with far fewer means of support than in days of old. This further necessitated changes in tactical doctrine and basic unit organization, influenced in no small pat due to manpower and equipment shortages BTW.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>If the LMGs and HMGs dont immediately fire, than its an overrun for sure.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Germans even advocated keeping "silent MGs" behind the MLR. These MGs were supposed to remain quite until the enemy was upon the MLR itself or when the enemy was clearly in retreat. Through this action they would either (hopefully) turn the tide of the battle or ensure that the enemy went away a little more discouraged than before. Once again, the doctrine specifically calls for not letting the enemy get in that close to begin with. These were basically safety measures

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I think I am discussing what a german infantry defender should do in a defense of a fixed position. I am not sure what steve is discussing with columns of marching troops shooting at other columns or tanks getting bombed in narrow gullies, etc...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What you are discussing is one particular adaptation German forces made to conditions. What I am talking about is their standard doctrine and founding principles. You can disagree (and do your usual "debating" tactics of obfuscation and abuse) all you want, but I am taking this stuff right out of the German Squad handbooks from pre war and mid war.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Hi John,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Oh I agree Steve on the demoralizing effects TAC Air had. Ie, the British interogateing prisoners that had participated in Mortain, were mainly concerned with what effects the threat of being hit, by Typhoon 60lb rockets had on tank crews.

The interogation's told them what they wanted to hear, Ie, yes German tank crews were scared of RP attacks, & the interogations also sugested a large number of German tank crew abandoned their tanks & fled. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

How widespread this was, of course, is up for debate. But I think you agree that there is ample evidence that there is a lot of truth to this.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>At the same time they were very interested * disapointed in the hit rate of their rockets, vs actual tanks destroyed etc. TAC Air was never that effective against tanks as most works have led us to believe but that is because air power is always used in a General statement, as we see when you break it down into smaller pieces vs Ie, tanks the all powerful illusion begins to fade. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree. The impact of airpower, overall, was overblown DURING and after the war. I have a 1943 publication on the US bombing effects over Germany. From reading this you would think Germany was wiped off the face of the Earth

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Mortain was the ultimate test of Allied purose designed aircraft vs Tanks in the West, it was fought under text book conditions & circumstances, which never presented themselves in the West again. In this sense is why the actual number of KO'd tanks is important as well as morale etc, in the final anylyss. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

True. If there were a hundred tanks that were obviously KO'd by air cataloged by the bean counters, then one could assume that there were even more that were shot up and recovered.

One does have to wonder how much German counter measures affected the outcome here. Standard proceedure was to have one or more crew members tasked with spotting enemy aircraft. If spotted the vehicle would seek imediate cover. If care had been taken, the vehicle would have some camoflage already on it so a good spot would make it hard to find from the air. So again, how much energy and time did the Germans expend avoiding the aircraft and did it have an affect on the offensive? Did the "successful" counter measures the Germans developed reduce the possible outcome of the air attacks i.e. what would have happened if this was the first time these German troops found themselves without air superiority?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As for Mortain it is very possible had TAC Air not responded in such force the Germans would have broken through as the Allies only had light forces in the area. In fact Bradley commented had the Germans gone a several thousand yards South, they would have been in Avranches on the 1st day. But then again the German's didn't have ULTRA to tell them the state of Allied force dispositions & placement. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Which is one reason why I think the Germans were doomed even if the skies had been overcast. Just like with the Bulge, the Germans simply weren't in a good position to begin with and sooner rather than later the Allies would have made them pay dearly for whatever gains they managed to scrape up.

Steve

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

But in case it has escaped your acute powers of observation, this entire thread (even going back to the original one) has drifted on and off topic here and there. Sorry if that bugs you.

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sounds like a general topic there colonel.

I am trying to discuss the game, the reality, the doctrine and possible improvements. All, to be sure, devoted towards, CM2 betterment.

But, in any case, would it be possible to include a couple of scenarios in the CM2 demo; one that is basically an infantry game and one a mixed arms/and or an armor scenario? I think it will showcase whats in store better than these meandering discourses.

Perhaps there can be a moderator here when an administrator is posting?

Lewis

PS I knew you would pull up the bulge. The germans were absolutely short of everything needed to succeed. They didnt have the gas needed for just driving to the objectives let alone battle conditions. They did not have the repair or recovery vehicles needed and guaranteed a one way ticket into the mountains for most of the tanks. They were short of artillery rounds.

They were following no doctrine. Why not drop it?

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Steve Said: The 1st person reports from German commanders and soldiers, especially at Mortain, mention airpower and the threat of airpower as being a significant factor on the battlefield. Vehicles were moved at night as much as possible, for example (also due to artillery I suspect).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Since we’re jumping all over the place in this thread, which works for me, keeps things interesting, but numerous 1st person reports from American & British Commanders and Soldiers, discuss the superiority of German Tank Optics. Why should we place credence in German combat anecdotes regarding morale effect Allied Tactical Air had on German combat operations and yet place no credence on Allied anecdotes regarding the superiority of German tank optics? Now I don't disagree with these German anecdotes regarding Allied tactical Air effects. Actually I’m just curious as to how your acceptance criteria for combat anecdotes are laid out.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: “German Evaluation of Allied Air Interdiction in World War II” Sub-Study II. A Study prepared for Headquarters of USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Oct 1969.

Evaluations of German officers, almost universally and most emphatically, credit Allied air power with their defeat in Western Europe. First they cite Allied air superiority in the overall sense, as it permitted Allied freedom of action on the around and in the air. More specifically, they cite air interdiction as the factor that led directly to their defeat on the ground. This testimony must be discounted as to some extent as self-serving, coming as it did mostly from Army officers who were searching for an excuse for the failure of the German Army on the ground and finding in the failure of the Luftwaffe a scapegoat.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[PzKpfw 1]

Hi Steve:

The one problem I have seen discussed with German operations in Normandy a bit, was that the German armor seemed to not like leaving the roads, Allied tanker interveiws seem to supt this, as they also bring up German armor instead of traveling X country in Normandy stuck to to the roads.

This was one reason one author brought up why the conditions were perfect at Mortain as all the German armor was just driving the in a line. I read a German account that stated they were using the road for speed & had hoped to get to their jump off points to break up into battle formations.

But either way this does bring up questions on how much of a threat they considered Allied TAC air, or that it was considered worth the risk for that operation. Or they realy counted on the promised Luftwaffe fighter cover, or they were counting on their escorting AA to cut down on losses.

As to morale effects we have the anecdotal reports from interagations, but we also have other anecdotal reports to where German troops seemed unimpressed with TAC air Ie, one German tank crewman stated he thought RP attacks were 'unimpressive', as the accuracy of the RPs was so bad.

Ie, an British report on RP effectiveness stated that errors in range & trajectory were as high as 150ft at 1,200yrds (1,100m) & 20 m- 30% of the RP's fired failed to explode on impact.

In another example an German tank crewman told how his Panther Plt in the Ardennes would sit their & take US strafeing, until the US planes left, then drive on when it was over. Danny Parker goes into some of this in his book To Win The Winter Sky.

The Germans themselves have always stated Allied airpower was the major factor in their defeat in the West, but little is said of Soviet TAC air in the same vein even though Soviet TAC operations on the Eastren front were on a much larger scale then Allied TAC operations in the West.

It's interesting that the Germans never used their TAC aircraft in the West,as they were the only country to develop dedicated tank destroyer aircraft. Virtualy all their GA aircraft operated in the East, except during late 1944 when one FW190F-8 group armed with RPs operated in the West but no records have been found of their operations. After the surrender the British Disarmanent personell, found a handful of JU-87G's & HS-129B's in the Westren air feild depots.

Regards, John waters

[ 07-11-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Username:

Sounds like a general topic there colonel.

I am trying to discuss the game, the reality, the doctrine and possible improvements. All, to be sure, devoted towards, CM2 betterment.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, I gotta grant you, Lewis, you certainly have balls to lecture Steve that you are trying to guide a topic for the "betterment" of CM2. But on the core topic issue (SMG's), given that neither you or I know just exactly HOW SMG's & MG's now perform in CM2 just yet, then what frame of reference do we have to lecture that CM2 can be "further improved" in handling SMG's?

But, in any case, would it be possible to include a couple of scenarios in the CM2 demo; one that is basically an infantry game and one a mixed arms/and or an armor scenario? I think it will showcase whats in store better than these meandering discourses.

There have been at least a couple of occasions where BTS (Steve) outlined the revisions to CM2 as would impact the "SMG issue." Until as such time as the CM2 demo is posted (whenever that is), perhaps one could suggest instead that these revisions be posted as a "FAQ" response or at various CM support sites.

Perhaps there can be a moderator here when an administrator is posting?

Like I said---balls. Do you have someone in mind already for a moderator?

I will venture to say, Lewis, that this topic is "drifting" as it is because at this point in time, there is very little to add on the SMG issue (beyond speculation) until we see the changes wrought in CM2 for ourselves.

[Battlefront.com]

Jeff,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Since we’re jumping all over the place in this thread, which works for me, keeps things interesting, but numerous 1st person reports from American & British Commanders and Soldiers, discuss the superiority of German Tank Optics. Why should we place credence in German combat anecdotes regarding morale effect Allied Tactical Air had on German combat operations and yet place no credence on Allied anecdotes regarding the superiority of German tank optics? Now I don't disagree with these German anecdotes regarding Allied tactical Air effects. Actually I’m just curious as to how your acceptance criteria for combat anecdotes are laid out.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Are you serious? Come off it. Where did I ever say that "all 1st person observations are a bunch of BS"? In fact I have consistantly said the opposite. What I have also said is that veteran accounts can not be taken in a vacuum. ESPECIALLY when the discussion is about a highly complex, technical, and even variable element, yet the veteran comments being batted about are about as vauge as can possibly be.

There is also something to be said about cause and effect. If a veteran saw three of his platoon's tanks blow up and said "must be those German optics", on what basis was this decision formed? Kinda like this statement found in the report you cited...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>More specifically, they cite air interdiction as the factor that led directly to their defeat on the ground. This testimony must be discounted to some extent as self-serving, coming as it did mostly from Army officers who were searching for an excuse for the failure of the German Army on the ground and finding in the failure of the Luftwaffe a scapegoat.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Reword it a bit and maybe this is why the US tankers were so quick to find the German optics "obviously superior"...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> More specifically, they cite poor tank and (particullarly) optics design decisions as the factor that led directly to their defeat on the ground. This testimony must be discounte to some extent as self-serving, coming as it did mostly from tank officers who were searching for an excuse for the failure of their training and abilities on the ground and finding in the failure of the War Department a scapegoat.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The motivations of ANY veteran acount must be looked at for potential misinformation of one form or another, either deliberate or through ignorance. A person that takes a veteran's statements as the word of God needs to take a step back (or three). I mean, last time I checked the Panther was not armed with an 88 and Tigers were not the standard equipment of Volksgrenadier divisions, in spite of veteran's comments to the contrary

Anyway, this is a rather silly point to make in the first place. I am not taking a bunch of German veteran reports and proposing that we transform their vauge opinions into highly sophisticated and critical equations in the game. Those who want to quote some vauge stuff about "German optics are obviously superior" appear to want us to do just that. Huge difference.

Was Allied TAC airpower a significant factor in ground operations of the German Army in Normandy? I think someone would be hard pressed to say no. Otherwise, why bother having an airfore at all? Especially today when they are so damned expensive. There is room for debate about how effective airpower was in WWII (both tactical and strategic), but only a fool would argue that it had no impact on the enemy. But was it a decisive element? Personally, I don't think Allied TAC strikes were what broke the German Army's back. If neither side had an airforce I still think the German goose was cooked. But the Allies having total air supremacy certainly had an impact.

Anybody notice how many CM games they play have air activity? Obviously we don't think it was a big factor in frontline fighting.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Hi John,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As to morale effects we have the anecdotal reports from interagations, but we also have other anecdotal reports to where German troops seemed unimpressed with TAC air Ie, one German tank crewman stated he thought RP attacks were 'unimpressive', as the accuracy of the RPs was so bad. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ask 100 veterans the same question and you are likely to get 110 different answers However, you are unlikely to get a veteran to say "ja, I vas zo scared I pissed my pants and ran avay as fasht az I culdt run!" Too often veteran accounts tend to downplay the levels of fear they felt. This is only natural as it is Human nature to not want others to see yourself as "weak". I've got a few German veteran accounts who rated the Americans as the poorest quality enemy they ever fought, and others that said they were in fact the best troops they faced. Truth is often somewhere inbetween.

However, I am inclined to side more with the "unimpressed" viewpoint on the rockets. Not because I believe one set of quotes more blindly than another, but because I look for other evidence out there. Rocket technology was rather primative at the time, and coupled with the British evaluation of their own weapon ad John cited, it looks like rockets were a less reliable way of hitting and killing a target than plain old bullets. Or at least that is a possibility. I don't know much about the rocket stuff so this so it is only a superficial opinion.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In another example an German tank crewman told how his Panther Plt in the Ardennes would sit their & take US strafeing, until the US planes left, then drive on when it was over. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

So, a Green tank crew, with only minimal training and experience, would just sit there and wait it out? Or did only the guys that managed to live long enough figure out the air attacks were all fluff and no substance and stopped bailing out of their vehicles when the shit hit the fan? I'm not saying anything either way on this, just pointing out that it is hard to tell from such a statement what to believe. I have read some rather unbelievable stuff about what soldiers claim they did. Not calling them liars, but flawed memories and a bit of truth stretching have been known to happen But I am sure there is some truth to this. If the Allied plane came up as a surprise, you might as well stay put and hope for the best.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The Germans themselves have always stated Allied airpower was the major factor in their defeat in the West, but little is said of Soviet TAC air in the same vein even though Soviet TAC operations on the Eastren front were on a much larger scale then Allied TAC operations in the West. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Honestly, I think the Germans (interviewed at least) don't like to talk about the aspects of the Soviet technology/tactics that were superior to those of the Germans. They have, as some critics have charged, focused a little too heavily on the sterotypes. Hard to support stereotypes if you are constantly talking about how good the enemy was in ways that can't be explained by simple brute force and superior numbers. This is, of course, just my opinion (although I know others share it).

The Germans did nickname the Il-2 the "Black Death". I'm sure it wasn't because the Germans thought Soviet pilots carried The Plague

If you want a good book suggestion, check out "Red Pheonix" by Hardesty. Good in depth book on the history of the Red Airforce in WWII. Recent and full of lots of data.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It's interesting that the Germans never used their TAC aircraft in the West,as they were the only country to develop dedicated tank destroyer aircraft.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Germans needed either local air superiority or no enemy air activity for their tank busters to operate effectively. In the East they could at least hope to get off a mission before the enemy found them. In the West, where the front was much more compact and with a higher density of Allied fighters (haven't checked the numbers, but I believe this to be correct), this was not as easy to do.

Steve

PS. Thanks Spook, but I am sure Lewis (and everybody else here) knows that he is most humorous when he attemps sarcasim. Not in a positive way either

[Slapdragon]

I am just now completing my 400th oral history interview and am a lecturer for oral history methods in our history department at the University of South Carolina. When you collect an oral history, which is merely a formalized long interview, you get lots of excellent data, but people do not remember some things very well, and remember some things in interesting ways.

US Soldiers who fought in the second Vietnam War remember that the Vietcong had better weapons that they did. Infantryman almost to a man express admiration for the AK-47, and felt they were at a disadvantage when facing it. Oddly enough other researcher who interview Vietcong in Vietnam find out they agree, 180 degrees off. The Vietcong preferred the M-16 because it was lighter, was easier to fire, and had more "firepower".

If you read the autobiography "Guns Up" you will find numerous accounts of US Marines preferring NVA field packs, ammo vests, and feild gear. Then you find out that the NVA preferred US Marine Alice gear for its sturdy nature.

In addition, when you talk with a World War Two veteran, you find out that they only had a very loose idea of where they were, who they faced, the technical characteristics of their weapons, and the arms of the enemy. Usually you have to use aided recall, which means havinbg a copy of their Battalion day book in front of you before you start to get some sort of agreement going and attach their memories to places (when that is possible).

Take the excellent oral histories done on Hellcat TD men. As far as the Hellcaters were concerned, the 76mm they had was a match for any German gun and able to take on the heaviest the enemy had to offer. They talk about making first round hits while moving 20 miles per hour, about moving so fast down roads that enemy AT gunners could not swing fast enough to follow, and other feats, such as going head to head with King Tigers.

They are not liars. To them, their 76mm got the job done, and they never did know or worry about its penetration at 750 meters. Whenever they went head to head with a tank in the dust of battle and survived the tank became a Tiger of a King Tiger. In fact, all historians use a variety of data to make historical truth out of chaos.

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

BTW tero, any problems with MG modeling currently in CM apply equally to all MGs in the game, not just German MGs.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I know. But we were talking about German tactics and doctrine, hence the specification.

[Tero]

>When the unit operates out of CC. It can

>still move around. But it takes longer to do

>so because the SL is now spending more time

>trying to second-guess the PL's intentions.

>In the abstracted sense.

This is rather the individual initiative aspect I mean. Why is it assumed the SL automatically second quesses the PL's intetions when the squad is out of CC ? In defence the squad is given a task and if the squad falls out of CC the task does not automatically disapear. In attack the SL has been most propably told the grand scheme and what role he plays in that production. If there are mid-game changes in that grand design I fully agree the delay should be imposed. If the scheme goes forth unchanged then the CC should not hinder any squad movements that adhere to that design.

But then again there are no such "grand design" orders present in CM at the moment so this is all academic. The player can plot extended movements but that is not really realistic as it is too constrictive and micromanagement intensive.

>Perhaps added toggles can be provided for

>"quick battle" generation in CM2.

QB with more variables for the player to choose from (global settings editor) ? Not a bad idea IMO, actually.

>Because the SL is still "veteran" in my

>earlier example. You seem to be confusing

>something here.

I'm thinking in QB terms and how there is no way to have these kinds of veteran PL / green squad mixes.

>On the first point, yes, absolute spotting

>is problematic, and we can only hope in time

>that methods to mollify this in later CM

>versions may come to pass. But that's an

>issue that doesn't lend to simple solutions.

No simple solutions, but when it is perfected the results will be very realistic.

>On the latter, if you are asking if a

>special "out-of-CC" response applys to

>German sub-unit (squad) leaders across the

>board, you're steering down that

>"nationality" path again.

It was just an example, damn it. It looks silly if we drop all reference to nationalities and start using "insert preferred nationality" markers in examples like this.

>And even if briefed down to squad level on a

>"plan," what if the whole plan goes in the

>trash can because the enemy shows up in a

>completely different direction than

>anticipated?

This is a thing that is not really in CM scope.

Seriously: ut depends what the enemy intentions are. In CM scope battle you pretty much know what kind of a battle you are fighting: ME, Assault, Attack, Probe (curiously enough there are no defensive missions defined for the battle ie assault vs delay or attack vs stand fast etc ) That means you also know what the enemy intentions are. Anticipating local counter attacks SHOULD be a part of the plan. That means that fragmentary orders are drawn accordingly in case that counter attack hits. Ergo: command delays for out-of-CC units should not be as severe in that respect either, unless there is a recall or similar drastic measure involved.

>Then the Germans who "rehearsed" would have

>to go from scratch. But now they have no

>time to rehearse or "drill" the needed

>counter-response.

I know the Red Army rehearsed assaults againts mock ups in comparable terrain. From the German side only Eben-Emael comes to mind. Was rehearsing with detailed plans to attack specific point targets a German SOP ?

>Are you assuming that German squads, at all

>experience levels and throughout the entire

>war's course, had backup plans for each &

>every last contingency that could happen on

>a battlefield? If so, then not a good

>assumption.

What they (and everybody else) did have was established battle/combat drills for every major TYPE of battle their pre-war thinkers had come up with. That means that a unit can go from attack to defensive on its own. Any squad out of CC would not be clueless when an unexpected battle field stimulus presented itself that posed a clear and present danger to the squad.

"No contact with PL, sarge. Roger, Roger.... There is an enemy tank moving down the road towards us..... does not compute..... wait....stop moving towards the objective, come about and move to cover behind those trees." All this takes a shorter time to do if the PL is in contact ?

>No. Units in cover aren't spotted

>immediately. They'll only "light up" if they

>open fire.

>

>A leader's "stealth" helps his units stay

>hidden, but isn't the only factor to "hide"

>those units.

Are you sure. What is that PL stealth bonus good for ? Is it just emperors new clothes ?

>Again, experience levels of platoon leaders

>(& higher) don't transmit to sub-units.

>A green unit in CC is still a green unit.

>Rather, the leader "attributes" >(combat/command/stealth/morale) transmit

>into select bonuses for the units in CC.

I am talking about the other bonuses, not experience. Since the PL holds all the cards concerning them the sub-units do revert to their default settings, which are in turn determined by their experice level.

>You might rather that German (or other)

>squads be more "autonomous," and not have to

>be in CC so much. And if experience level of

>the squad is high enough, perhaps they could

>get by (at least on defense).

I think there is some issues left with the fact that the game engine is attack oriented. The defender does not get any benefits they would have had IRL when it comes to planning ahead for the battle for example.

>But it was the same for German squads as it

>was for all others: if events changed on the

>battlefield in an unanticipated way, then

>someone higher up had to give guidance.

I think Prokhorovka is a good example. How much time did the sub-units have to get prepared when they unexpectedly came upon the enemy units ?

>Bottom line repeated---regardless of

>nationality, you have to abide by C&C

>realities to expect your units to operate in

>the most effective way. And units that stay

>out of CC too long have a higher likelihood

>to get into a "stupid" situation.

Is the timeframe incorporated in out-of-CC penalties ? It would be a fair solution to this question. It is easier to project the PL's moves 10 seconds ago that 10 minutes ago.

[ 07-12-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Naja]

My God - I think tero is owed an apology by not just Slapdragon but Steve, for "trying to defend the indefensable." To even equate tero's arguments to the great dragon's slaying of the arian brotherhood in his glorious college years is disgusting.... I stopped reading at page 9 of the last thread (I had to work... real work) and caught up on what I thought were good points made by tero. (Are we all really equal? I mean equal weight, height, thinking, love of country?) Unfortunately the "elites" of this bbs have taken it upon themselves to "defend America's honor"...BULL. The Japanese might be the only exception "because it is documented...Kamakazis" ...BULL.... Every country at one time or another believes in what it is fighting for and its people are willing to sacrifice all they have in that endeavor. The average Joe fought and died for his country while most number crunchers lived to "fight another day." If being a "grog" is being able to push numbers and stats down an "opponent's" throat ad nausium - all the while ignoring valid points "while typing faster than I can talk".. you can have your text-based battlefield.. but I bet I can shoot my mp5k straight and true when it counts (relevant to the "debate") better than a "city boy" who never "finished off" that small bird with your bb gun at 6.....Slappy yor a good debator (sic) - try defending America's belief in national modifiers when Blacks were used as truck drivers, cooks...Because ...welll according to the documentation of the time "that's all they were good for"...leave the fighting to the people who have the biggest libraries or type the fastest and things will be ok......just disgusted...If Steve and Slapdragon have already apologised then I am sorry if I offended; I haven't had time to read the new thread.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Naja:

My God - I think tero is owed an apology by not just Slapdragon but Steve, for "trying to defend the indefensable." To even equate tero's arguments to the great dragon's slaying of the arian brotherhood in his glorious college years is disgusting.... I stopped reading at page 9 of the last thread (I had to work... real work) and caught up on what I thought were good points made by tero. (Are we all really equal? I mean equal weight, height, thinking, love of country?) Unfortunately the "elites" of this bbs have taken it upon themselves to "defend America's honor"...BULL. The Japanese might be the only exception "because it is documented...Kamakazis" ...BULL.... Every country at one time or another believes in what it is fighting for and its people are willing to sacrifice all they have in that endeavor. The average Joe fought and died for his country while most number crunchers lived to "fight another day." If being a "grog" is being able to push numbers and stats down an "opponent's" throat ad nausium - all the while ignoring valid points "while typing faster than I can talk".. you can have your text-based battlefield.. but I bet I can shoot my mp5k straight and true when it counts (relevant to the "debate") better than a "city boy" who never "finished off" that small bird with your bb gun at 6.....Slappy yor a good debator (sic) - try defending America's belief in national modifiers when Blacks were used as truck drivers, cooks...Because ...welll according to the documentation of the time "that's all they were good for"...leave the fighting to the people who have the biggest libraries or type the fastest and things will be ok......just disgusted...If Steve and Slapdragon have already apologised then I am sorry if I offended; I haven't had time to read the new thread.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What on earth are you rambling about?

[imported_argie]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

What on earth are you rambling about?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Heh, dunno. I am afraid that someone drank too much Coolaid this morning.

It is not entirely clear why anyone should apologize to Tero. Because the obvious points he has made in these two threads? Hmmm .... no. First Tero was advocating national modifiers, but it turned out that he did not really want national modifiers, it was something slightly different. But that "something" became irrelevant as it could not be solved unless we get rid of absolute spotting, (the connection there was neither fully explained). So instead we now have a problem with CC in CMBO. But Tero has not been terrifyingly explicit in regards to what the problem actually is, and how it ought to be remedied. (This is not to say that everyone else has been saintly, not at all)

But in a twisted way, I am enjoying reading this thread.

Mattias

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Naja:

crazy talk crazy talk bla blah blah shooting mp5k,crazy talk with no sentence stops - try defending America's belief in national modifiers when Blacks were used as truck drivers, cooks...Because ...welll according to the documentation of the time "that's all they were good for"...leave the fighting to the people who have the biggest libraries or type the fastest and things will be ok.....more crazy talk bla blah...If Steve and Slapdragon have already apologised then I am sorry if I offended; I haven't had time to read the new thread.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well geez Naja, if only I had seen your comments about black soldiers I would have completely changed my tune, quit reading other persons posts, and fully embraced national modifiers. Hell Naja, I have been so blind to dare using facts when I could have embraced a more lucid and intellectual style of commentary, including something about owning an MP5K and a bb-gun which I just don't get but I am sure is quite relevant and enlightening.

As for people thinking all black soldiers were good for was driving trucks during World War Two, that is a stereotype that was only true in a small portion of military circles and was quickly disabused. But you are right, anyone who embraces national stereotyping as a basis for abstract modifiers would have to give black soldiers, including the elite 761sts, a -20 to hit. Gad, if only you had posted earlier I would not have been so blind. THE HUMANITY!!!!

Thank you Naja for leading me to the light. I am a changed man. No more facts, no more evidence, no more periods in my sentences only pauses .... I am buying a bb-gun, an MP-5k, and some large doses of psychotropic narcotics before the next national modifiers thread starts up so I can be on the side of god next time.

[ 07-12-2001: Message edited by: Slapdragon ]

[Tero]

>Hmmm .... no. First Tero was advocating

>national modifiers, but it turned out that

>he did not really want national modifiers,

>it was something slightly different.

Some choose to call them national biases. I try using terms like force specific modifier. I think the closes thing to a unemotional term is squad or combat drill.

And I still definitively think that while all men are created equal the military training we receive is not universally the same with all the aspects receiving the same attention and the same solutions.

>But that "something" became irrelevant as it

>could not be solved unless we get rid of

>absolute spotting, (the connection there was

>neither fully explained).

Sorry, I sometimes forget not all of us receive actual military training (in an army that fought a war in the last 200 years ). For your benefit repost of my "revelation":

It would seem that ALL solutions to tactical situations and tactical problems rely on the units perception of the battlefield. All the training is directed at responding to stimuli that the individual unit receives (radio messages, aural and visual spotting etc) according to the preferences set by the respective military establishments.

And with absolute spotting that individual unit perception is negated. The TacAI works with the data it has available and if that data is gamey (in the sense that the force is handeled as a sort of amoeba and that all the data one part of the amoeba gets is instantly available to all the other parts) there is aboslutely no way to simulate intricate approaches each army developed to counter the changing battle field situations.

Thus any and all attempts to induce differentiated, army specific tactics and doctrines to simulate the different paths the different armies took to reach their goals (which were more often than not very different) that are not based on technical facts (mv, fp, signals equipment etc.) or such abstractions as fitness and experience level are inherently impossible to model without the results becomming gamey, unbalansed, unrealistic and historically untrue.

So while my POV on differentiated, army specific tactics and doctrines is still as firm as ever I will have to put a lid on it until the spotting is changed from absolute spotting to relative spotting.

If there are points you want me to clarify please ask.

I realised that any changes made have to stem from purely techinical considerations. To quantify differences in the combat drill you would have to take in data from training manuals and quantify the differences in the apporaches each army took to deal with tactical problems. But the absolute spotting negates all attempts to implement these differences as no squad is a true individual in the face of the game engine.

>So instead we now have a problem with CC in

>CMBO. But Tero has not been terrifyingly

>explicit in regards to what the problem

>actually is, and how it ought to be

>remedied.

It all started with a few remarks on experience levels and PL dynamics.

>(This is not to say that everyone

>else has been saintly, not at all)

Please feel free to chip in. It is not hard. Start typing your thoughts and ideas on the matter and brace yourself...

>But in a twisted way, I am enjoying reading

>this thread.

Is Peng an über-Finn ? :cool:

[ 07-12-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

What on earth are you rambling about?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Something about real work, MP-5K shooting at bb-guns, black kamikaze soldiers, and someone (Tero?) having a large library. Andreas, you just need to read this post closer and you will see that it is actually quite inciteful and relevant to the discussion. In fact, now that I know bb-gun shooting is relevant I am going to make up statistics on the number of bb-guns in each country (books....bad, stereotypes...good) and use that as the basis for national modifiers, since I am now against you and believe in National modifiers.

In fact, I thing I will list the new ones I am proposing.

Lithuania -- +25 (I just like the name).

Italy -- +20 (great wine in that country)

Germany -- +15 (heck, we knew thay had to be almost the best)

I am still working on the list, but I will finish it soon so we can lobby Steve to get those national modifiers into the game.

Also, I am not sure what Tero wants in the game, but I agree 100% and will never disagree with Tero again on any subject.

[Tero]

>Tero, you insist that the behavior of the

>squads is the same. I do not agree.

One clarification needed: what constitutes "different behaviour" in your opinion ?

I can make a regular WH platoon act the same way a regular British platoon acts, despite their inherent differences in arms and assets available. I think that is not extraordinary in itself.

>But in any case, you have yet to describe

>the different types of behavior you expect

>which are not present.

I'm still compiling the data. Now that the entire thing turned purely technical on me I have had to rethink my startegy.

You have seen the Finnish infantry platoons TO&E. How would such a platoon act in CM as it is ? From between the lines I have surmised that in CM the infantry effectivness is affected by FP almost as much as, if not more, than by experience rating.

I can not think of a type of platoon TO&E in CM which is as weak as the reglation Finnish platoon is in terms of FP.

>In my opinion, so far the things you have

>detailed can be simulated in CM (QB aspects

>aside) or are "national modifiers" which are

>out of the question for all the reasons

>described.

The only remaining thing is now balancing the Finnish FP to the terrain and make it as historically viable as possible. Among other things.

>Your comments about Absolute and Relative

>Spotting are valid, although since you have

>yet to describe the differences that CM

>doesn't simulate I don't understand what

>spotting has to do with behavior unique to

>one squad or another.

As things stand the squads are not truly autonomous, independent entities in the face of the game engine. Their behaviour is fundamentally... flawed is not the correct term here... tainted (?) and influenced by the data it receives from units with which it could not possibly and realistically have contact with.

A VERY extreme example: a squad out of CC is diddy bopping into an ambush and a CAS strike flies overhead revealing an ambushing unit, which is withing range of the squad. The squad opens fire on the hiding enemy unit which routs and runs and the ambush is foiled.

>The Regional setting will NOT include a

>northern and southern Finnish front. Just

>Finland. We don't want to have 100

>different Regions, just the four major ones.

>But yes, you won't be able to purchase

>Panthers or Italian troops to fight

>alongside Finnish forces.

OK.

>QuickBattles can have more subtle features,

>which Regions greatly aids, but they can

>NEVER be as detailed as a hand crafted

>scenario. It just is not possible to do

>this. At least not without months of

>tedious programming, which is simply out of

>the question.

I thought as much. Perhaps when the engine is overhauled and rewritten.

[ 07-12-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[ 07-12-2001: Message edited by: tero ]