"SMG Gap" A Proposal

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

Germanboy,

While I found the post rather interesting, and it certainly a convincing singular point of data suggesting that the Germans really did use high-supression weapons more, I think the issue of communication is seperate from the issue of weapons.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well yes and no

I see it as 'good weapons won't do you much good if you don't have the C&C structure to use them properly.

For the purposes of the argument here, I agree. But IRL, I think it maybe hard to divide the two neatly.

[Slapdragon]

First off, lets ignore the Tero ayran brotherhood comments for the good of any discussion. No proof for or against US submachineguns was presented, and none should be inferred. It was bait for another race war which we should leave to those who believe in that sort of thing.

Second -- The US did use its indirect weapons more. The CM model for SMG versus rifle appears to be dead on, but I think the light mortar model may actually be off. The reason is:

Germans in 1943 found that 60% of their casualties were coming from artillery. The US found the same post war.

US doctrine was for the light mortar to pin enemy troops.

Artillery, even when distant, would cause all but the most experienced troops to reduce volumes of fire.

The US had more mortars closer to the front than the Germans, and fired them blind more often than the game seems to warrant.

So, one issue may be that the light mortar is not able to fire blind very well (not really blind, more like being ordered to fire and an objective hill) and does not suppress as much as it should. I am developing numbers on this for later with a better review of literature, but suppressing mortars and rifle fire would make SMG charges harder to get off the ground.

Issue # 2 should be that green troops do not get as much bang out of automatics because ammo is wasted. This may extend to what we call regulars. It may be that we need to look at the cyclic rate, suppression rate, and combat rate of automatic weapons and look for more data on the use of automatics by less experienced troops. Certainly the German MP44 experience led them to train infantry to fire short bursts in all but the most extreme cases.

Perhaps also more ammo would be wasted as the unit becomes panicked.

These are just some ideas that I will hunt lit for later.

[Ron]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>We didn’t do that very well. You see, one of our training deficiencies was that almost all suppression was done by indirect fire weapons. Very little suppression was done by small arms. Occasionally, we would use our heavy machine guns. People thought first about mortars and artillery, then heavy machine guns, and finally, light machine guns. Really, they didn’t think much about using riflemen for suppression. They just thought of using riflemen for maneuvering and sharpshooting. The M-l rifle was a precision weapon but there were no precision targets.

So, my guess is that of the 14 attacks, five, six, or seven of them were merely the Germans looking for a hole. They were probing for the flanks. And, they were pretty good at that. They probably also ran their assault guns up a little bit from time to time, and fired while probing. There were probably only two or three rather large attacks. When I say large attacks, by the way, let me tell you, I’m only talking about 200 or 300 people at the most. Some of those large attacks might have been as few as 50 to 100 men.

INTERVIEWER: Did they usually include artillery?

GEN DEPUY: Some artillery, but nothing like we had. Some mortars, some assault guns, and a lot of small arms fire by the Germans. A lot of machine pistol fire, a lot of maneuver, and some hand grenades or potato mashers.

INTERVIEWER: Could you give us your significant impressions on German and US equipment, weapons, vehicles, and tactics?

GEN DEPUY: Well, I thought the German machine pistol, which was an area suppression weapon, had great advantages, whereas we were trained for point targets with rifles. So, the Germans, it would seem to me, were ahead of us there.

INTERVIEWER: Was there anything about their tactics, good or bad, that impressed you?

GEN DEPUY: Yes, the infantry tactics of the Germans involved a lot of direct fire suppression that our tactics didn’t. They didn’t have as much indirect fire suppression, as much artillery, as we did, but they had mortars, and direct fire suppression, coupled with a lot of movement.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks for the link tero, very interesting stuff and worth quoting again. Granted, it's only one man's view but enlightening nonetheless. I think also, as someone else pointed out already, the SMG issue is moot and really much ado about nothing. There were doctrinal and training differences between the armies which would be reflected in the TOE (yes, a variable TOE is a very good idea and historical).

Depuy stating that almost all suppression was from indirect fire caught my eye as I find myself doing the exact same thing with Allied troops, CW troops especially, more so than with the Germans who are able to fire, suppress and move with their small arms alone, even plain Rifle platoons if backed by a couple of MG42s. I think everyone can agree they would approach things differently in CM when commanding a FJ coy versus a British Rifle coy. BTS has done a pretty good job reflecting that imo.

Are SMGs overmodelled because people at TH want to restrict them and at the same time use them all the time? Or, shouldn't the Allies be able to use Paras with their added SMGs so they can 'fire and maneuver' more *evenly* with and like the Germans? How to prevent the "SMG rush" tactic? ....hmmm. Is CM perfect as is, the 'holy grail' of wargaming? - No, but isn't the real root of the problem the above and not the supposed over effectiveness of SMGs? All numbers, hypothesis and conclusions aside, won't a rarity factor lessen people from always picking SMGs troops every game? Won't the proposed changes to infantry movement/fire and MG fire make 'rushes' less viable?(something that isn't the exclusive property of SMG troops) Like everyone else I'll have to see.

What to do in the meantime? Well for starters play with people whose motive isn't just to always win.

Ron

[Jarmo]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

The CM model for SMG versus rifle appears to be dead on <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'm relly baffled here. Sincerely.

To me, it's obvious Jason's "total firepower" -theory is (fundamentally) correct. Even if his suggestion to remedy the situation is arguable.

Any idiot can see this.

And yet. A bunch of respected, obviously smart boarders fail to see the point. Even including BTS.

I have 3 possible explanations.

1. You are all stupid. I alone am smart.

2. You just like arguing and pretend to not see the point.

3. I am missing something.

So.

All explanations have merit.

Even number three.

If someone here thinks number 3 is the right answer, PLEASE explain why. As I really, sincerely, in all humility, would like to know why. And I dont. Really.

So.

I repost the argument as I see it.

Please tell me where the fault is. At wich point.

Or is the whole chain of thought faulty? If so, why.

1. Bullet for bullet SMG's are less accurate than rifles.

2. SMG men carry about twice as many bullets as riflemen.

3. Thereby, total firepower (= firepower/"shot" x number of "shots") of SMG troops, at any range must be less than twice that of riflemen.

4. In CM, the total firepower of SMG troops is more than twice that of riflemen.

5. Something's wrong with the way CM handles ammo expenditure. (in favour of SMG's)

[Philistine]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jarmo:

{snip}

I repost the argument as I see it.

Please tell me where the fault is. At wich point.

Or is the whole chain of thought faulty? If so, why.

1. Bullet for bullet SMG's are less accurate than rifles.

2. SMG men carry about twice as many bullets as riflemen.

3. Thereby, total firepower (= firepower/"shot" x number of "shots") of SMG troops, at any range must be less than twice that of riflemen.

4. In CM, the total firepower of SMG troops is more than twice that of riflemen.

5. Something's wrong with the way CM handles ammo expenditure. (in favour of SMG's)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

(First, a caveat. I'm not convinced that SMG vs. Rifle rating/cost is appropriate in CM. However, some of the tweaks talked about for CM2 lead me to hope that there will not be as much of an issue in CM2.)

I believe the problem in the chain of logic is primarily in no. 3 (and thus no. 5 also).

I think the assumption implicitly made in no. 3 is that Firepower rating is solely a function of the lethatlity of the weapon, and thus, units of firepower are easily translatable to units of ammo, and thus translatable to actual rounds of ammunition. (e.g. at a given range, an M-1 rifle, with a firepower of x will kill y people per round, an MP-40 with a firepower of 2x will kill 2y people per round).

As I understand firepower, this is not necessarily so. A large part of firepower is also made up of suppressive effect. An assumption being made by CM is that an SMG has a higher suppressive effect than an equivalent rifle per "round" of ammunition. Whether this is true or not may be the subject of debate, but it seems to be generally accepted.

That is, I believe, the "flaw" in your chain of reasoning. "Bullets" are not being treated as equal. While generally, one bullter can, at most, kill one person (with the occasional grisly exception), it appears to be assumed that 10 bullets fired from a fully automatic weapon provide more suppression than those fired from a bolt-action or semi-automatic rifle.

(At least, that is my understanding of what the explanation is. I express no opinion on whether this is accurate or not. If anyone sees an additional flaw in the chain of logic, please let me know).

--Philistine

[ 07-03-2001: Message edited by: Philistine ]

[Jeff Heidman]

The problem is that as far as quantifiabe numbers go, all we have are the FP figures to work with. We have no real idea how those numbers effect suppression or lethality, but its all we have.

The other side of the coin is results. When it comes to results, it is obvious that there is something wrong, but it is not quantifiable at all, but compelling nonetheless. SMG troops are vastly more capable in CM than equally priced rifle troops under almost all reasonable circumstances, and seem to even be more effective than reports from WW2 would indicate.

Some seem to be of the opinion that SMG troops really were better than rifle troops in almost all combat situations, to the extent that CM has modelled them "almost perfectly". They cite the abandonment of the battle rifle ala M-1 Garand as evidence of that superiority.

But they neglect to mention that the SMG was also largely abandoned as front line general issue weapon. The modern assault rifle owes its heritage to the rifle as much as it does the SMG. Both were replaced by the assault rifle. Since the SMG is vastly more inexpensive than any assault rifle, this suggests that there was a recognized value in those attributes of the assault rifle that have been carried over from the battle rifle, i.e. the abilty to engage effectively at more than 50m.

In the end I am leaning towards the idea that the SMG does not have the effect at 100m, or possibly even 60m, that CM gives it.

From the value perspective, in CM1 the SMG is vastly under-priced. I can think of almost no situation where a rifle heavy squad is as useful as an SMG squad. Even on relatively open maps the few extra dribbles of rifle FP at +100m range do not have enough of an effect to counter the vast advatage the SMG will enjoy once it closes the range.

Jeff Heidman

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Philistine:

As I understand firepower, this is not necessarily so. A large part of firepower is also made up of suppressive effect. An assumption being made by CM is that an SMG has a higher suppressive effect than an equivalent rifle per "round" of ammunition. Whether this is true or not may be the subject of debate, but it seems to be generally accepted.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think this is the core of the counter-argument. As someone so incorrectly pointed out, SMG bullets kill people. That is not necessarily true. What they are supposed to do, together with the squad's lMG is to keep the attacker pinned in the killzone, where you throw mortars or artillery at them. Which then kills the enemy. Looking at the squad in isolation will give you false results - WW2 armies fought combined arms battles, so the squad was only one cog in a wheel.

Again, when you attack the SMG was supposed to give the squad the ability to suppress the enemy, thereby being able to move through the enemy's killzone, closing and avoiding shelling. The Germans might have done rather well at that, judging by the number of times I read of Allies calling artillery on their own positions, by definition that is something you only do when the enemy has bypassed your killzone alive.

So unless someone now tells me that the raw firepower only models killing and not suppressive power, I am inclined to not change the ammo load-out in my scenarios. I keep an open mind about this, but I am not convinced that there is a case for corrections.

Edit: just read Jeff's post. I don't have an opinion on the range of SMGs. Don't know enough about these things (apart from the fact that the Uzi is easy to disassemble and usually more dangerous to the bearer than anyone else). As to the effectiveness of SMG Squads in CMBO, I have never had a problem with that, but then again, I don't play much these days. I would have thought that you should be able to defeat them with a good mix of weapons. May well be wrong though.

[ 07-03-2001: Message edited by: Germanboy ]

[Slapdragon]

Firepower is not based solely on the killing power of a weapon per se (that is, line up two teams of 20 guys on a football pitch with weapons facing each other, blow a wistle, see who is left standing when the ammo is gone) but on several abstracts mostly ignored, but repeatedly pointed out in the discussion.

the first is suppressive power. Any bullet or explosion causes suppression when it zings by, but suppression is a log progression (or something similar) rather than a straight progression, meaning one bullet fired is not half as effective as two bullets fire, but possibly a quarter as effective. Still we can discuss it for simplicity sake right now as a straight progression, meaning gross rate of fire becomes your comparison guidlines.

In reality, suppression is more difficult. Suppression is a a cumulative damage that can be progressively recovered from, but which has a tipping point beyond which the unit panics. A unit receiving random long range rifle fire may be able to take the suppression all day, while a unit which gets machinegunned by a dozen LMGs will break in a second. So the reason suppression is a log function is that we need to figure how fast the situation heats up / over how long it takes for the heat to be applied. This is modified by leadership, experience, cover, and rest.

So an M1 may have a firing range ROF of 30 versus a K98 of 15 versus a BAR of 120. Fired in a normal manner, ROF would be halved at least, making the Garand and the K98 not to far apart in suppressing ability (7.5 versus 15), but the BAR is still out in front by a tonne (60). There are probablu break out points in this scale where we can say anything above this suppresses less well than the number suggests because the fire is not enough to keep trained soldiers heads down, while above this even a trained soldier ducks and thus is on his way to being suppressed.

For suppression, note that the value of the weapons killing power is not a factor, only the amount of lead and how fast the lead comes, and this includes some odd tipping points.

The casualty creating power is a factor of rate of fire, mass of shell, diameter of shell, energy of shell, penetration of shell, ease of aiming of weapon system, psycological isolation of soldier (weapons fought in teams fire more and aim better) and all of the various mitigating factors. A casualty in CM is not a casualty in the real world sense, it is merely a soldier who becomes ineffective for more than 1 hour due to enemy action. That could mean dead, but it could mean panicked, used for a stretcher bearer, sent for ammo, knocked out, used as a runner, or any number of other situations.

I am currently working on a restatement of Dupuy and Dunnigan as modified by SPIW/SAW/SALVO research and work done by Kevin Dockery, Ellis, British Small Arms (BSA) and others to define the variables as the current research stands to understand how they affect the game. It can get very complex, so I my abstractions listed above are a good starting point in figuring out this issue.

[Jeff Heidman]

All this talk of suppression is nice, but it doesn't reflect what happens in the CM games that I play where SMG infantry runs up against rifle infantry.

In those games, the SMG infantry KILLS the rifle infantry. They do not suppress them so that artillery can pound them; they sweep up and crush the rifles through overwhelming firepower. Artillery is a moot point.

WW2 may have been a combined arms fight, but when it comes to the infantry, the inherent (and serious) superiority of the SMG heavy infantry makes it very easy for the SMG player to toss good tactics out the window. Your best bet is to rush on offense, and skulk on defense.

One problem I mentioned in an earlier thread was the ease with which the CM player can order his infantry to charge into a woods or mount a coordinated assault on a treeline. In real life, telling a squad of men to charge a known enemy position was hardly a very sure thing.

Jeff Heidman

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

All this talk of suppression is nice, but it doesn't reflect what happens in the CM games that I play where SMG infantry runs up against rifle infantry.

In those games, the SMG infantry KILLS the rifle infantry. They do not suppress them so that artillery can pound them; they sweep up and crush the rifles through overwhelming firepower. Artillery is a moot point.

WW2 may have been a combined arms fight, but when it comes to the infantry, the inherent (and serious) superiority of the SMG heavy infantry makes it very easy for the SMG player to toss good tactics out the window. Your best bet is to rush on offense, and skulk on defense.

One problem I mentioned in an earlier thread was the ease with which the CM player can order his infantry to charge into a woods or mount a coordinated assault on a treeline. In real life, telling a squad of men to charge a known enemy position was hardly a very sure thing.

Jeff Heidman<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Jeff, I do not really and completely disagree here. What I think is that other tools in the US tool kit for example may be to blame for some of the problems that seem to stem from the SMG/Rifle mismatch (which is historical and in part countered in US squads by adding the second BAR).

Once we get some imperical numbers laid out, it may be easier to see the issue and point to the problem, or admit that it may just be an issue of tactics.

Again, this wont help the next couple of games, but is work for CM2 if we do it properly.

[Andrew H.]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

The CM model for SMG versus rifle appears to be dead on, <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's just wrong, at least when SMGs are used offensively. Even BTS doesn't believe that their SMG model is "dead on", which is why they're changing things for CM2 wrt to moving and firing.

As I mentioned earlier, the US history of the Bulge (which featured a lot of attacks by SMG armed troops) and which contains a lot of small unit actions, doesn't suggest that the use of SMGs gave the Germans the type of overwhelming advantage that they frequently have in CM on the attack.

You can argue, of course, that this is meaningless because it is proving a negative, but that sort of misses the mark. Lots and lots of CMBO players have noted that SMGs are particularly deadly on the attack. The historical record does not reflect that US troops found that SMGs were particularly deadly on the attack. Moreover, US troops were not particularly reticent when it came to pointing out German equipment that they felt was better than their equipment.

One way of interpreting this data would be to suggest that SMGs were really effective on the attack, but no one mentioned it. A more reasonable interpretation would be that SMGs were not particularly effective on the attack. To the extent that CM doesn't model this, it should be fixed to do so.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

As I mentioned earlier, the US history of the Bulge (which featured a lot of attacks by SMG armed troops) and which contains a lot of small unit actions, doesn't suggest that the use of SMGs gave the Germans the type of overwhelming advantage that they frequently have in CM on the attack.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Have you tried this with green SMG squads attacking regular or veteran US infantry? Which to me would really reflect the Bulge battles. Unfortunately we are also lacking the fitness rating that will come in for CMBB, where again the Germans should be a notch below the Americans.

The backbone of the German army in the Bulge were infantrymen with little training and insufficient supply. Also, the Germans suffered from the US artillery. I am quite unsure whether this historical evidence can be used to support this case, because your average QB simply does not follow the historical realities.

I look forward to seeing the test results if someone does it. I would suspect the German SMG squad to do much less well. Maybe I try it later tonight myself.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

That's just wrong, at least when SMGs are used offensively. Even BTS doesn't believe that their SMG model is "dead on", which is why they're changing things for CM2 wrt to moving and firing.

As I mentioned earlier, the US history of the Bulge (which featured a lot of attacks by SMG armed troops) and which contains a lot of small unit actions, doesn't suggest that the use of SMGs gave the Germans the type of overwhelming advantage that they frequently have in CM on the attack.

You can argue, of course, that this is meaningless because it is proving a negative, but that sort of misses the mark. Lots and lots of CMBO players have noted that SMGs are particularly deadly on the attack. The historical record does not reflect that US troops found that SMGs were particularly deadly on the attack. Moreover, US troops were not particularly reticent when it came to pointing out German equipment that they felt was better than their equipment.

One way of interpreting this data would be to suggest that SMGs were really effective on the attack, but no one mentioned it. A more reasonable interpretation would be that SMGs were not particularly effective on the attack. To the extent that CM doesn't model this, it should be fixed to do so.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But this is just the point -- the SMG model is not wrong, it may be another part of the model that is wrong which causes SMGs to be more effective.

To many people want to solve a problem by adding a +5 bonus (or whatever) to any issue rather than fixing the model. We here this a lot with German tanks. Any time a King Tiger falls prey to an allied tank there is a suggestion that it needs to be beefed up.

Reducing the SMG or increasing it should be part of changing the model. As I said, the model may be broken in how light artillery is used on board, in how units are ordered to advance or retreat, or in any of a number of other fundemental problems. The solution is not to tweek the SMG which appears close or dead on to its target, but to fix the part of the model which is being abused in gamey tactics.

In fact, I have heard BTS say that the firepower is not the issue, but perhaps one of the underlying problems associated with how attacks proceed. I propose we look at the model holistically instead of peice meal and try and find out where the theory under it needs tweeking rather than trying to push on one end, then shove the bulge that pops out on the other end back in.

This is a similar issue with unit costs. The unit costs are based on a holistic formula used through out the game. It is a bad idea to tweek unit costs. Instead, you can do what Vanir mention, and that is (to paraphrase this worthy gentleman) look at the underlying assumptions of the model. For example, maybe the model weighs too heaviliy for longer range fire power and too lightly for short range. This could be solve not by individually messing with the units, but by working to change the model.

So it is useful to forget trying to tweek at corners, and more useful trying to remodel, especially since nothing can really get done until an engine update. A remodel requires that we look for the true reason for an ahistorical result (assuming it is tactical in nature) and tweeking the model.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Have you tried this with green SMG squads attacking regular or veteran US infantry? Which to me would really reflect the Bulge battles. Unfortunately we are also lacking the fitness rating that will come in for CMBB, where again the Germans should be a notch below the Americans.

The backbone of the German army in the Bulge were infantrymen with little training and insufficient supply. Also, the Germans suffered from the US artillery. I am quite unsure whether this historical evidence can be used to support this case, because your average QB simply does not follow the historical realities.

I look forward to seeing the test results if someone does it. I would suspect the German SMG squad to do much less well. Maybe I try it later tonight myself.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

GB, if you like, tomorrow, we can set up a TCP/IP game and test this.

[Jeff Heidman]

Slpadragon,

I agree with your latest post. While I think it is entirely possible that the SMG is just plain not as powerful as it is modelled. i.e. the weapon itself is not as accurate and hence not as effective as it is modelled, you are certainly correct that you have to make sure you are fixing the actual problem, instead of a symptom of the problem.

Your posts would be much more convincing if you did not trot out the rather tired and inaccurate uber-Tiger reference in every single discussion, whether it is relevant or not.

Jeff Heidman

[Jarmo]

OK, I believe I understand the counterargument now.

SMG's, by virtue of being automatic weapons, have greater supressive power than rifles. Even bullet for bullet. And even if their killpower is not all that high.

And that's why CM gives SMG's superior firepower.

That's a good point.

Makes me think all wepons should have two values. Killpower and supressive power.

But I'm almost convinced CM doesn't have two independent values. Only one, used for both killpower and supressive power.

The result being that SMG's have both values higher than rifles. Killpower and supressive power. Per bullet fired.

So I still disagree, even more than before. With everybody, even with Jason's "fix".

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jarmo:

OK, I believe I understand the counterargument now.

SMG's, by virtue of being automatic weapons, have greater supressive power than rifles. Even bullet for bullet. And even if their killpower is not all that high.

And that's why CM gives SMG's superior firepower.

That's a good point.

Makes me think all wepons should have two values. Killpower and supressive power.

But I'm almost convinced CM doesn't have two independent values. Only one, used for both killpower and supressive power.

The result being that SMG's have both values higher than rifles. Killpower and supressive power. Per bullet fired.

So I still disagree, even more than before. With everybody, even with Jason's "fix".<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

CM has only one value, but that value is a composite of the two factors, making it a complex number which is harder to decode from by the book statistics. Like figuring out were a planet is by the motion of a star, it is a multivariate number made into a single figure for ease of use in the game.

the Tiger example is useful because it is the most commonly found symptom of the issue, one that has happened a dozen times (more by Steve Grammont's count). Although at this point, it may be more useful to change that to uberFinland rather than uberTiger.

[Slapdragon]

I should also add that the two factors appear to be complex numbers themselves, so if we laid the variable out on end we would get 5-6 maybe more.

The reason I know this is that i have for some time tried to make the small arms FP numbers square with published data on the weapons and their actual use in combat. In most cases no single factor dominates, but I can usually get the FP numbers to fall in close when I start working with a number of the major variables and do not assume either killing power or suppressing power is the only factor involved.

[JasonC]

On the suppression argument, people are failing to realize the effects already built in to the sound CM system. If an SMG has the same killing power over ammo load as a rifle with more CM shot, it will still suppress more, precisely as it should. Because its fp per unit time is still higher.

A longer period of time means more time for continuous recovery from suppression results. The faster a given amount of CM firepower is delivered, the more sharply the target unit drops down the morale states. And the lower you go in the morale states, the slower the recovery is to the next higher level.

CM has already modeled the difference between killing power and suppressive power, quite accurately. Small doses of fp continually applied result in less suppression and breaking than the same all applied at once, even with the same number of casualties caused.

There is thus no justification for "double counting" the fp, by giving SMGs higher fp over total ammo load as well. The latter *does* measure men put down, and not men merely suppressed, in CM systems today. Whereas fp per unit time does measure men suppressed, and SMGs will remain better at it due to their higher rate of fire, regardless of the ammo changes. Firing faster inherently suppresses more, and the CM game system already "knows it". It is not necessary to pretend it also kills more, directly, by fudging fp numbers on the causalty side.

All of which was gone through more than a month ago with BTS.

The other aspect of the case that people seem to me to be overlooking, is the logic behind the "where are they?" question about Allied SMGs. It is possible on the one hand that SMGs were dramatically more effective in combat than rifles, and it is possible that CM overmodels them on the other hand. In the first case, however, it is unbelievable that the more abundant SMGs the allies had available did not make their way to the front. In the second case, it is possible.

You see, CM as it stands today shows two distinct estimates that it seems to me cannot simultaneously be correct. The first is that SMGs are dramatically better than rifles, and the second is that none of the allies acted on this in squad weapon composition. Because they had the SMGs, somewhere. If they did not feel any need for them at the front, it was probably because they felt SMGs had weaknesses.

In other words, something any tactical dunce can figure out about CM after playing "a chance encounter" three or four times for the sake of his amusement, escaped the notice of several hundred thousand professional military combatants whose lives depended on noticing it, for months on end. If the difference were a slight edge this might be believable and chalked up to doctrine. But when it is as huge an edge as CM purports it to be, it is not believable.

If SMGs were as good as CM shows them, then allied SMGs (which were more numerous overall, as I have been at pains to show) would have migrated to the front. If that did not happen to any large degree, then the drawbacks of SMGs must of left them reasonable close to rifles in overall effectiveness - even if each stood out in a different aspect.

Now, as for the post war move to assault rifles, and later (less mentioned so far here) to smaller rounds and then to shorter burst fire, what all of them have in common is attempting to maximize not just rate of fire - which could easily be maximized with high cyclic rate SMGs, cheaply - but instead to maximize fp over whole ammo load.

Accuracy does that, and assault rifles have more of it than SMGs. More rounds carried does that, and 5.56mm is easier to carry than 7.62mm. 3 round bursts does that compared to full auto. The move has obviously been not toward the maximum rate of throwing stuff at the enemy, but toward doing more with the whole carried load. Yes, with high peak ROF for rushes and suppression.

But ROF alone is not considered adequate. ROF alone has weakness, therefore it then had a weakness too. And that weakness is obvious - not putting down very many men before running out of ammo, at all but the closest ranges.

If anyone thinks SMGs would not be effective after my proposed changes - or would not suppress more - then they obviously have not tried what they pretend to judge and condemn. In any fight in which the first few shots establish a fire ascendency (through greater suppression) that is never let go, but pushed "a l'outrance" to the closest range, SMGs remain just as deadly as today, when they have 30-35 shots per squad.

It does not take the 31st or 36th shot to suppress a nearby target or move close enough to hurt it badly while it remains suppressed. What you can't manage to do with the changes is sit down SMGs 100 yards from riflemen and shoot the heck out of them all day. You simply have to use them as SMGs, rather than pretending they are just souped up ordinary infantry.

Incidentally, it also brings out the superiority of the MP44 to the MP40. With 35 shots to 50 for rifles, the MP40 has 10% less fp over whole ammo load of an M-1 at 100 yards (9x35 = .9x7x50). But an MP44 has 20% more. Both deliver their fp faster and so suppress more than the M-1. But the MP44 is accurate enough to also kill more over the long run, while the MP40 is not.

I have had my say on the whole matter and leave it to you all, as I am going to be out of town for a while anyway. My parting recommendation to the skeptics is to *try it* before passing judgement on the proposal - especially the ammo tweak proposal, as opposed to the infantry type recommendations.

Play a game or three with heightened ammo for rifle squads and reduced ammo for squads heavy on the automatics. I think you will find the changes moderate, realistic in feel, and that they make choice of weapon types and use of the type choosen rather more interesting than the present "autos rule" settings.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

The other aspect of the case that people seem to me to be overlooking, is the logic behind the "where are they?" question about Allied SMGs. It is possible on the one hand that SMGs were dramatically more effective in combat than rifles, and it is possible that CM overmodels them on the other hand. In the first case, however, it is unbelievable that the more abundant SMGs the allies had available did not make their way to the front. In the second case, it is possible.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think you are still not addressing the point I made - in the Bulge, the German SMGs were mostly in the hands of less well trained (green in CM terms) troops who went up against the US soldiers of the 1st, 28th, 82nd and 101st divisions amongst others (Regular to Vet, some might argue Crack). All these US soldiers were well supplied and amply supported by tanks, TDs, air and artillery.

I am therefore not surprised that the US Army as an instiution did not see the SMG as a sufficient threat to abandon their approach to small arms, without further research. They were winning the war equipped as they were, why should they change the winning formula? Related example, they knew that their Repple-Depple system was crap, and did not change it.

I therefore don't buy your logic for two reasons:

1) It remains to be shown that in CM, when you try to REALLY simulate (i.e. not a QB) Anyday, January 1945, the Germans will come out 'rocking'. I doubt they will, but am open to this.

2) Armies are essentially bureaucracies, and bureaucracies are funny beasts. So even if the frontline commanders had decided that SMGs were what it took to win the war, would the brass have assented? On the available evidence, I doubt it.

Having said all that, I will give this ammo tweak a try.

[ASL Veteran]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

In other words, something any tactical dunce can figure out about CM after playing "a chance encounter" three or four times for the sake of his amusement, escaped the notice of several hundred thousand professional military combatants whose lives depended on noticing it, for months on end. If the difference were a slight edge this might be believable and chalked up to doctrine. But when it is as huge an edge as CM purports it to be, it is not believable.

If SMGs were as good as CM shows them, then allied SMGs (which were more numerous overall, as I have been at pains to show) would have migrated to the front. If that did not happen to any large degree, then the drawbacks of SMGs must of left them reasonable close to rifles in overall effectiveness - even if each stood out in a different aspect.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, the Soviets seemed to like the SMG just fine. One might even speculate that the Germans gained their 'fondness' of the SMG from their experiences on the Eastern Front fighting back hordes of SMG toting storm squads in Stalingrad. Prior to Stalingrad I don't think the SMG was used by the Germans very differently, or in any greater numbers, than they were by the Western Allies. Could it be possible that the Western Allied approach to combat was different than that of the Germans - or even that of the Soviets? I think it is not only possible, but probable.

[Andrew H.]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

I think you are still not addressing the point I made - in the Bulge, the German SMGs were mostly in the hands of less well trained (green in CM terms) troops who went up against the US soldiers of the 1st, 28th, 82nd and 101st divisions amongst others (Regular to Vet, some might argue Crack<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

While I do think that the effectiveness of SMGs on the attack is overstated in CM, it is true that the relative quality and equipment of the troops involved form another variable that is hard to separate from the weapons involved.

Many of the battles in the Ardennes when the Germans were on the offensive have a lot of similarities (especially if we exclude the first two days of the battle as well as actions involving the 106th Div):

The US troops are in a village blocking the exit out of a valley (or over a river, or on a main road). The Germans don't really have good flanking opportunities because of the steep walls of the valley (or the river, or the absence of roads). For the past 6 weeks, the village was occupied by a platoon which had nothing better to do than chop down trees to establish clear fire lanes, check ranges, dig entrenchments, and familiarize themselves with the terrain. The village is now occupied in company strength by (mostly) retreating, but experienced, US troops. Usually there are some extra 30 cal. MGs or a spare heavy weapons platoon sent by HQ, plus a platoon of tank destroyers (which usually means not M10s, but 4 57mm AT guns).

These guys are faced by a depleted battalion of relatively inexperienced German soldiers who are behind schedule, and, in many cases, haven't eaten in 2 days because the roads are so congested.

So the Germans have to attack this village. They attack, they're shot up, they waver and run back to the trees. They attack again, are shot up again, they waver again, they run back to the trees. They attack a third time, are shot up, waver, and then get hit by a huge amount of artillery. They retreat and/or give up.

Alternatively, a small group of Germans were able to occupy a couple of buildings on the outskirts of the village; they surrender when night falls.

The reason I like BTS's proposed reduction in the ability to move and fire is because the attacking Germans in these accounts don't seem to be firing their weapons -- there may be mortar fire, or LMG fire, but there are not really any accounts of the troops actually moving across the field firing as they come. So BTS's fix would model this reported behavior.

Now the attacking and the wavering might be due to the troops' green status; perhaps vet troops would advance across the field, take heavy losses because they can't fire back (effectively against troops in foxholes) until they reach close range (20 or 30m), where their SMGs can be used to great effect.

[Vanir Ausf B]

After reading tero's Dupey post, I think it is entirely possible that the US was simply mistaken about the effectiveness of SMGs and the M1 rifle. SMGs apparently did not fit into their philosophy of what proper infantry tactics were. The Germans had a rather different view. I don't see what other conclusion can be drawn.

None of this alters the fact that SMGs are woefully under priced in CM.

[Tero]

More goodies, courtesy of the of US Army Historical branch:

(NB: the typos are mostly due to Acrobat text copy not recoqnizing scanned text properly)

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=18

“In spite of its handicap of sounding like a. Jap.25-caliber light machine gun, the Thompson sub-machine gun proved very satisfactory for speck personnel such as linemen, artillery forward observers, vehicle drivers, and reconnaissance personnel. Its limited range made it especialy useful in combat in rear areas.

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=143

Use Your Rifle Colonel Harry B. Shermatl, Commanding Officer -th Infantry, ITALY: “We have a hard time getting riflemen to we their rifles; they depend on the artillery and other supporting weapons too much. In most cases it would be better if they fired even if there is no visible target. A group of riflemen may be stopped by a German machine gun which they can’t locate, but if they will open fire in the general direction of the machine gun the Germans will usually pull out. I believe that we have placed too much emphasis on fire orders and fire control by unit leaders. Men must be taught to open fire at once in the general direction of any target that is holding them up, without waiting for any squad leader or other individual to tell them to open fire.”

Attacking a Village “Daylight attacks against these hilltop villages are almost out of the question as casualties are invariably high. Extensive we of a limited night attack has proven to he the best method of hwdling this situation. The attack is made on as dark a night as possible. Silence is necessary and is relatively easy to obtain since the ground over which the approach is made ic mostly cultivated. ‘The process of infiltration must hc systematic and every building gained should he immediately turned into a strong point for the attacker. “It is advisable, where possible, to have the forward attacking elements allotted a high proportion of submachine guns. Each man should carry at least two to four hand grenades. They are invaluable in clearing buildings.

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=144

Weapons and Equipment “Reconnaissance platoons were armed with submachine guns, carbines, and M1 rifles. The shorter weapons (submachine gun and carbine) were preferred by small patrols as they were easier to carry and aim in the jungle growth. Large patrols remaining in one locality for a considerable period frequently employed the light machine guns for local security.

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=145

“Two submachine guns and two rifles or carbines provide a good distribution of arms for a four-man patrol, which is the size we prefer. A submachine gun should always lead.

Carbine: Great stress was laid on the proper use of the carbine by Lieutenant Colonel F. 0. Hortcll of the 45th Infantry Division as a result of operations at ANZIO in March. “When the carbine is used properly in lieu of ,the pistol it becomes a dangerous and accurate weapon, but when it is used in place of the M1 rifle, a grave mistake has been made. Always remember that any target that can be hit by a carbine can also be hit by an M1 rifle, but the reverse is not true.”

Using Enemy Weapons: Lieutenant Fosdick, a platobn leader of the 4th’ Infantry Division, FRANCE, reports: “When captured enemy weapons are to be used by any member of a unit, all member; of the unit must be so informed; On one occasion,a sergeant was killed when he

began to fire with a captured German machine pistol. This weapon has a characteristic sound when fired. Other troops of, the sergeant’s own unit thought a German sniper was in their midst and fired on the sergeant, killing him.”

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=146

“Staff Sergears Robert G. Rhodes, Company B, 315th Infantry, 79th Division, WBS in charge of the platoon that had just captured a certain hill position on the Seine River, north of Paris. The inevitable counterattack was expected at any minute and the sergeant

lost no time in preparing for it. He placed we squad close to the crest of the elevation: this groop was to serve as a base of fire. The other two squads he distributed, one on the right front and one on the left front, both well forward. The two Rank squads were given German machine pistols and German machine guns and were given orders not to fire until the enemy had advanced beyond their position.

C&ml M. Kammerer, 34th Infantry Divisiort, ITALY: “In training in the States, emphasize again that ground once gained, however cheaply, must be held. Time after time, patrols sent out to determine enemy strength find the hill or other objective unoccupied. Almost invariably the whole patrol comet back to report. Then some other unit is ordered forward to occupy the reconnoitered area, only to find it alive with enemy who smother the attacking unit with fire from machine pistols, light machine guns, and mortars.”

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=148

Comments extracted from a 96th Injnntr.y Division report on the LEYTE operation : “Patrolling became an important part of the operations of this division Gtbin its assigned zone. “The leading scouts of the patrol should be armed with a submachine gun, and at least one man near the center of the patrol should be armed with a BAR to provide fire support in case it ,becomes necessary.

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=352

i. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT. The Germans equip their ground battle-reconnaissance patrols with machine pistols and one or two light machine guns that are used to cover the patrol’s approach or withdrawal.

a. AMUNITION ALLOWANCES. The initial issue (Erste Austellung) of ammunition is the total ammunition carried by a formation in columns,

in dumps, and with the troolls. The initial issue is systvmatically replaced as it is expended, on the basis of reports of ammunition remaining on hand sent from the divisions through corps to army, except as operational conditions modify the system. The allowance per formation is based on the number of weapons called for in the table of organization of the unit. Each weapon, in turn, has a number of rounds which is allotted to it as ammunition quota or unit of issue (Munitions Ausstattung). Two units of issue for all weapons of the division are carried within the division,

while another Unit of issue for all weapons in the army is held on army columns or trains as an army reserve. Thus each army has three ammunition quotas or units of issue for all weapons of the army.

1). AMMUNITION ISSUES Of the two ammunition units of issue that are found within the division, over one unit is found forward on the men, with the guns, and as company and battalion reserves, while less than one full unit of issue is retained as a division reserve in division columns and dumps. The exact quantity issued to each man is largely determined by the amount held by the battalion and company as their reserves. The following charts exemplify the units of issue found in infantry and artillery units of an army.

Ammunition Issues (Rounds) for a VolksGrenadier Division :

9-mm machine pistol.

Forwar issue 690

Division reserve 512

Propable Army reserve 601

7.92-mm machine pistol.

Forwar issue 540

Division reserve 630

Propable Army reserve 720

7.92-mm rifle

Forwar issue 75

Division reserve 87

Propable Army reserve 99

7.92-mm rifle (for troops other than infantry troops)

Forwar issue 25

Division reserve 20

Propable Army reserve 22

7.92-mm semi-auto rifle.

FI 159

DR 135

PAR 147

7.92.mm LMG

FI 3450

DR 2505

PAR 2977

7.92.LMG (for arty and AT troops)

FI 1350

DR 1020

PAR 1183

7.92-mm HvMG

FI 6300

DR 4750

PAR 5525

c. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE. The unit of issue of ammunition is not to be confused with the daily expenditure amount of ammunition.

The latter does not arrive at any constant figure, but varies with the type of action, the area of fighting, and the other factors mentioned in paragraph 1. By analogy with the reserve amounts reserves, while less than one full unit of issue of other expendable supplies, however, it is possible that three units of fire are judged by the Germans to be sufficient to maintain an army for a period of roughly eight to ten days.

On the American OB side I could dig up an OB for armoured division in 1942 and 1943.

Source Simon Forty: American Armour portfolio ISBN 0 7110 1052 8:

Men------------------------1942...1943

---------------------------14620..10937

Rifles .30cal--------------1628...2063

Carb. 30 cal---------------6042...5286

Pistols 45cal--------------3850...NA

LMG's 30cal----------------291....465

HMG 50cal------------------103....404

SMG (inc. on ord vehicles)-1654...NA

SMG (on 1/4 ton trucks)----506....NA

[ 07-04-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Tero]

>It is not necessary to pretend it also kills

>more, directly, by fudging fp numbers on the

>causalty side.

But was the SMG any less deadly IRL, compared to the single shot/semi-auto rifles ?

>In the first case, however, it is

>unbelievable that the more abundant SMGs the

>allies had available did not make their way

>to the front. In the second case, it is

>possible.

Third case: as with the TD doctrine of the US Army there were fundamental doctrinal and tactical issues that precluded the use of SMG as a weapon of choice in the regular infantry units. They were seen as spray and prey weapons with little or no combat value so they went to special units, vehicle crews and etc. Also it can be thought that the Tommy gun being mentally listed as a ganster weapon had an impact on the prestige of SMG's over marksman rifleman carrying a M1.

The Soviets too viewed the SMG largely a police weapon not suitable for combat but they kickstarted their SMG development and manufacturing after their experiences during Winter War.

>The first is that SMGs are dramatically

>better than rifles,

When used correctly under proper circumstances, yes.

>and the second is that none of the allies

>acted on this in squad weapon composition.

Assuming you mean CM scope western Allies they did arm their special units (Commandos, SOE, Rangers etc) prominently with SMG's. And the vehicle crews were given SMG's or carbines because they were more compact and they did not require marksmanship infantry training to be effective.

>Because they had the SMGs, somewhere. If

>they did not feel any need for them at the

>front, it was probably because they felt

>SMGs had weaknesses.

What was the SOP of the Allies, close up on the enemy and take his position by assault or bombard the positions into oblivion ? If their SOP called for bombardment there was no need for a weapon that was effective only in close up combat.

>If the difference were a slight edge this

>might be believable and chalked up to

>doctrine. But when it is as huge an edge as

>CM purports it to be, it is not believable.

I think there is nothing wrong with the modelling now. The sources I have found and posted indicate that it was all down to tactics and doctrine. Over and over again the remarks state that US Army marksmanship training discouraged shooting at unseen enemies, even if they were suppressing the unit. Instead of using the infantry man as a fire suppression tool the doctrine called for the use artillery.

>If SMGs were as good as CM shows them, then

>allied SMGs (which were more numerous

>overall, as I have been at pains to show)

>would have migrated to the front. If that

>did not happen to any large degree, then the

>drawbacks of SMGs must of left them

>reasonable close to rifles in overall

>effectiveness - even if each stood out in a

>different aspect.

Different armies learn different things from the same lessons they are given. Because the Western Allies did not find the SMG ideal for their tactics and doctrine should that POV be ahistorically imposed on the other armies ?

>Now, as for the post war move to assault

>rifles, and later (less mentioned so far

>here) to smaller rounds and then to shorter

>burst fire, what all of them have in common

>is attempting to maximize not just rate of

>fire - which could easily be maximized with

>high cyclic rate SMGs, cheaply - but instead

>to maximize fp over whole ammo load.

You left out increased muzzle velocity. That is a vital factor in post-war development.