German\Allied armour kill ratios?

[Dogface21]

Is there any way to find out what the historical kill ratios were for armour in the ETO? It seems that german armour was supreme, but the allies just had alot more. Anyone know roughly how many sherms it took on average to kill a KT, or Panther?

If CM is anywhere close, I would have to geuss it averaged uot to 2 Allied for everyGerman tank. Although this doent account for the units lost to air raids ect...

Also, any hints of new( REAL)screenshotsfer CM:BB?

[lcm1947]

2 to 1 sounds right to me. That's about what happens in my games anyway. Although actually if I have jumbo's it gets it down but then depends on what the kraut's have. But yeah I think you got it with the 2 to 1. Let's see if that's really what the figures were in real life.

[KiwiJoe]

I think on the eastern front it was pretty much 6:1 in favour of the germans right threw the war.

[Dogface21]

Ouch. How fun is it going to be playing as the russians anyhow?

HHHHmmm lessee... Ive got 20 T- 34s here, 20 over there, and 15 comin up the middle, Maybe now i can kill that platoon of panthers!!!!

[Warmaker]

Well, as far as CM1 or the upcoming CM2 is concerned, it's going to come down to how you use your weapons. As well armored as the T-34's are, send them to slugging matches up front against the Panthers and you're asking for trouble. Same applies to most Western Allied armor.

Play around with plain vanilla M4 Shermans and PzKpfw IV's to learn how to be careful with your armor. It's easy to get reckless/careless when you know you've got uberpanzers.

I've seen numerous documentaries with interviews of surviving U.S. WWII tankers commenting on German panzer supremacy, namely the "Big Cats." I've heard numerously that on average, you'd need 4-5 Shermans to take out a Panther, but expect to lose at least 2 of them. Seeing your shots richochet off your target is discomforting... Basically, they had to rely on their numbers and wits to get by when you're outgunned and outarmored.

[Porajkl]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Dogface21:

Ouch. How fun is it going to be playing as the russians anyhow?

HHHHmmm lessee... Ive got 20 T- 34s here, 20 over there, and 15 comin up the middle, Maybe now i can kill that platoon of panthers!!!! <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

... or just buy some SU-100s and Panthers may run away...

And in the first years of war I wouldn't like to be in one of those PzIII or IV against T-34 or KV-series...

I guess it won't be so bad playing Russian side

[lcm1947]

When CM2 comes out I'll be playing the German's most of the time since all I've played in this game was the American's. It'll be nice having the big cat's for a change but then I guess the Russian's had their own super duper killing tanks. I'm even more interested in learning and seeing the different equipment, troops, etc that they had. Before this game I had read books on WWII but never did I ever read or at least remember how much greater the war was in the Eastern front. Man, you've got to give it to them, the Russian's, for holding up to that kind of scale. And the US & Allied's thought they had it bad. :eek:

[Doug Beman]

About the Eastern Front: until the Panther & Tiger reached combat (and both were several months too early from a testing&refinement perspective) the balance of tank vs tank ability was in favor of the Soviets. The T34 was practically invulnerable to German 50mm guns and the short 75 carried by early PzIVs. The longer 75mm on the PzIVG was better.

For a while after Panther and Tiger became truly combat-ready, their crews learned of the strength of their armor and adopted an attitude of virtually ignoring Soviet tanks. After the SU100 and T34-85 became common, German higher command actually distributed material to crews of Tigers and Panthers saying "you can't afford to ignore basic tactical doctrine anymore; if you stand up on a ridgeline picking a fight, you'll get knocked out."

DjB

[ 09-04-2001: Message edited by: Doug Beman ]

[The Commissar]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by KiwiJoe:

I think on the eastern front it was pretty much 6:1 in favour of the germans right threw the war. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Depends on the time period and the terrain fighting on. Late war Soviet machines were often the superiors of their German counterparts. However, while the Soviets enjoyed numerical superiority as well as good tanks, the Germans had the advantage of being on the defense and having had more experience.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Dogface21:

HHHHmmm lessee... Ive got 20 T- 34s here, 20 over there, and 15 comin up the middle, Maybe now i can kill that platoon of panthers!!!!

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Shows how much you know. Give me 55 T-34's and I'll give you a free ride to Berlin.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Doug Beman:

About the Eastern Front: until the Panther & Tiger reached combat (and both were several months too early from a testing&refinement perspective) the balance of tank vs tank ability was in favor of the Soviets. The T34 was practically invulnerable to German 50mm guns and the short 75 carried by early PzIVs. The longer 75mm on the PzIVG was better.

For a while after Panther and Tiger became truly combat-ready, their crews learned of the strength of their armor and adopted an attitude of virtually ignoring Soviet tanks. After the SU100 and T34-85 became common, German higher command actually distributed material to crews of Tigers and Panthers saying "you can't afford to ignore basic tactical doctrine anymore; if you stand up on a ridgeline picking a fight, you'll get knocked out."

DjB

]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually there was an interim phase where PIIIL60 and PIVL48 alongside Marder and StuG could effectively deal with the T3476 horde. So, in the early war, when the german tanks had 37mm, 50mm short, 75L24; they were manhandled by the T34s, KV1s. When the germans got the PIII and PIV uparmored and upgunned, they did alright. When the Big cats came out, they had a short period of dominance. But the russians went for numbers of T34/85, su100 and the rest of their monsters in smaller numbers, the germans were doomed.

Lewis

[JasonC]

First off, there are enourmous amount of bilge and hyperbole expended on this subject. And often people are talking about entirely different things, sometimes without knowing it.

The leading example is the distinction between total tanks KOed, and tanks KOed by other tanks. Anti-tank guns (and heavy FLAK) killed a lot of attacking tanks. Mines, air attack, artillery fire, and infantry AT weapons killed a few, making up in time of operation what they lacked in specific lethality or range.

Many of these items rely on the tank approaching the weapon, and thus kill far more attacking tanks (PAK, mines, infantry AT) and very few defending ones. While the leading cause of destruction of defending tanks is other tanks (and TDs). Attackers lose many tanks to defending infantry formations (including their PAK), in locations where no enemy armor is present at all. The greater the numerical edge in armor, the more such locations there are, and the smaller the portion of killed attacking tanks got killed by defending tanks.

Why does this matter? Because many often naively compare total tank losses between two whole armies, and then just assume the average tank kill ratio is the ratio of the total losses. Not so, not even close. Less than half the dead tanks on one side may be due to tanks, and 90% of the dead ones on the other side might be. Then the tank-to-tank kill ratio would be only 1/2 the overall dead tanks ratio.

Then there is the difference between tank kills claimed and reduction in tank strength. There are distinct layers between those concepts, which are not at all the same numerically. First there is a difference between tanks claimed and tanks knocked out on the battlefield. And second there is a difference between tanks knocked out on the battlefield and reduction in tank strength. Third, there are sometimes conceptual problems, with claims of "armored vehicles" that may mean true AFV (tanks plus TDs, with full guns), or may include light armor and halftracks; or "tanks" may be restricted to turreted, topped tanks rather than TDs.

Differences of the first kind arise (1) from simple overestimates, tanks claimed as killed that simply weren't. They might have been hit but not killed, or might not have been hit at all. But claims are also systematically higher than kills because (2) multiple claims are sometimes entered for the same dead AFV. Either because the killing weapon was not clear, or because the tank was "overkilled" - penetrated again after it was already knocked out, by somebody that didn't know it was already dead. When detailed after action reports are available for both sides in the same fight, you sometimes find agreement on number of kills, but more often you find each side claiming about twice the kills they actually got.

As for differences between tanks actually KOed on the field and reductions in tank strength, there are many causes seperating the two. The most obvious and the least overlooked is new production. Occasionally someone will get the impression from a steady fleet size that few tanks have been lost by that side. But in fact, a whole river of new vehicles have passed into the fleet while others have passed out. This error is easy to avoid, though, because production statistics are well kept and easily available.

There are two other causes of difference between tank KOs on the field and reduction in tank strength that are harder to measure. First, some tanks lost are recovered and reused. If half the KO'ed tanks were, and the same after a second kill, etc, then twice as many tanks would need to be KO'ed on the field to reduce fleet strength by a given amount, for good. Second, tanks are lost for maintenance reasons, or cannabilized for parts to keep others running, without having been KOed. Or after having been recovered. A related issue is that tanks are often in a category of "needing repair", instead of "operational" on the one hand or "dead, total loss" on the other. Whether they count as dead then depends on the time scale. A KO'ed tank may be as good as dead for purposes of the next two weeks fighting, but not a total loss from the standpoint of the next two months.

The numbers that are easiest to come by are total reductions in fleet strength from all causes. The way you can arrive at them is to look at fleet strength at different dates, and production between those dates. But keep in mind that, for all of the reasons above, you cannot assume the total reductions arrived at that way, equal KO'ed tanks, let alone KO'ed tanks taken out by other tanks alone.

All that out of the way, let's look at the 6:1 allegation on the Russian front. Sometimes this is restricted to Panthers and Tigers, sometimes for all tanks. It is easy enough to see that it has to be false for all tanks. The Russians made 102K tanks during the war of all types combined, and received another 8K in lend-lease. They ended the war with a larger tank fleet than they started with. Their total complete losses to all causes cannot be much above 100K, therefore.

A modest portion of those losses were due to German aircraft or field artillery, and some were due to anti-tank mines (the Germans laid 21 million of them during the war). Infantry anti-tank weapons got few early on but a higher portion toward the end. In Italy, in terrain particularly suited to use of mines, the Brits reported 1/3rd of all their tanks lost were KO'ed by mines. It was lower in the wider Russian steppe, certainly, but might easily have been 5-10%.

There is good reason to estimate infantry AT kills around 15K - the Germans awarded medals for doing so successfully, and we know how many of the medals were awarded. Some undoubtedly KOed tanks in situations where none could learn of it; others killed some on other fronts. If this is a bit high the previous might be a bit low, but between them they probably account for 20K.

Leaving 80K for PAK, heavy FLAK, and AFVs of all kinds. The Germans fielded approximately even numbers of PAK and FLAK on the one hand, and AFVs on the other. The Russian front was the main front for most of the war, and much larger than the others. Easily 4/5ths of the German effort was there, for tank and anti-tank issues anyway. Which means they had ~40k each of tanks and anti-tank guns. Which means the average losses inflicted by each was - one.

The anti-tank guns, more vunerable to being taken out by artillery, probably accounted for less than one each. But even if they only got 0.5 each, that will only boost the tank vs. tank kills to 1.5 to 1. Some portion of the German tanks were lost to things besides Russian tanks, but after the Russians took the offensive, not that many. This might boost the overall average for the tanks back to 2 or 2.5 to 1.

It is often claimed that Tigers and Panthers got 5-6 to 1. Well, they were about 20% of the total German AFV fleet in the late war - which incidentally is a useful corrective to the notion that all of the German fleet was such beasties. If they got 5:1, that leaves .8 of the German AFV fleet to get 1 to 1.5. Which means a kill ratio between 1.25 and 1.875 to 1, or "between 1:1 and 2:1".

This conclusion is still rough, though. Additional causes boosting the ratio might be greater German maintenance losses, lower Russian ones, say because the German tanks lasted longer in combat. The problem with this notion is the average lifetime of the two side's AFVs were equal by 1944, and the German edge there was only about 20% in 1943. The Germans lost fewer tanks to all causes, but that is because their fleet was smaller; the -rate- was similar. Maintenance losses should track a rate fairly closely, since it is a clear case of "the more you have, the more you will see break down". It is still possible this sort of thing might push the ratio for vanilla German AFVs as high as 2:1 - but certainly not higher.

Another issue is the time of the losses. People often look at the total loss ratios and imagine they are giving them unbiased information about Panthers dueling attacking T-34s at 2km range in 1944. But the Russians lost most of their initial tank fleet to Pz IIIs in 1941, when the Germans lost very little in armor terms. The German armor losses are "weighted" toward the period of the Russian offensive, while a significant portion of the Russian losses were 45mm T-26s and BTs KOed long before.

A more likely picture, correcting for the time weighting, would have Tigers and Panthers averaging 3.3 kills apiece, and vanilla German AFVs in the late war (mostly StuG III and Panzer IV, also Jadgpanzer, Hetzer, Marder, etc) averaging more like 1. 6K of the former would account for 20K, while 20K of the latter would account for 20K; PAK and FLAK at .5 each would account for another ~20K (which might well be low), while infantry AT, mines, air, artillery would account for another ~20K between them. The last ~20K were KO'ed in the first 6 months or so, mostly by Pz IIIs and Pz IVs with short guns. The common claims about kill ratios would then be high by about a factor of two - which is a common degree of distortion created by claims vs. the confirmed realities.

It is a rough picture. For instance, it leaves no room for maintenance losses, but also none for "rekills" of recovered tanks. Each may have been a third to a half, but they are in different directions so they may balance out. I hope it shows that a complete accounting is needed before making claims based purely on dividing lost tanks here by lost tanks there, let alone claimed tanks here by known total losses there.

As for the western front, the Germans used little armor on it, and what they did use came in two large waves, each then reduced by attrition after producing a "held", static front for a month or two. The Germans sent ~2500 AFVs to Normandy, and employed ~2500 more in the winter counterattacks in the Ardennes and Alsace. They lost ~90% of the former and well more than half of the latter, in 2 months and 1 month respectively. The total used up in the rest of the campaign was probably no more than the same amount again - including smaller counterattacks like the Lorraine counterattack outside Nancy, the battle for the Remagen bridgehead, etc.

The main point is that from early August until December, and again from February to the end of the war, the western Allies faced very little in the way of committed armor. This does not mean they didn't lose tanks - they lost tanks to PAK and FLAK, AT mines, infantry AT weapons, and mechanical breakdowns. And a few to AFVs, but small compared to the losses to them in Normandy and the Bulge. Especially the Brits and US independent battalions, supporting the infantry, in the former case; the US armor divisions in the latter case.

If you look at typical US armor battalions that have left records, you find they turned over their tanks 1 to 1.5 times in the course of the war. Battle losses are about half of that, maintenance or upgrades the other half. Losses are higher for units fighting in the hedgerows from the get-go, lower for units that missed that part, lowest for those that missed both that and the Bulge fighting (in time or in space, i.e. not on the Bulge part of the front).

Often half the battalion's losses for the whole war come in a single week or so of its heaviest fighting, with the other half spread out in losses of 1-2 per week to roadblock ambushes, artillery fire, or mines. Armor tries not to "fight fair", and often achieves lopsided local odds you don't see in CM, or reaches for overwhelming fire support if they face enemies anything like their own scale. This is especially true later in the war.

At the operational level, most fights were decided by total forces committed and volume of fire support, not by the tactical characteristics of the rival AFVs. When total forces are comparable, you still don't see AFV characteristics dominate. Instead you see a temporary stalemate (overall, with plenty of counter-punching), attrition at a rapid clip (e.g. operational AFV strengths halved in 1 month) to both sides, and then an odds-based swing toward the side that can replace the losses better, once the other guy's fleet is small enough. And in the west, that was the Allies.

The Germans never had even local success in an armored counterattack without superior infantry and artillery odds to back up the initial success of the tanks. Most of their armored counterattacks failed within a day, in a couple of larger cases within a week, of being launched. The Bulge was the biggest and lasted a month, made possible by initial AFV odds north of 4:1 and infantry odds about the same at first. The large gains were over within a week, the same time it took the overall forces at the point of attack to stabilize. Two weeks of hard fighting followed, with the front moving little. There was a week of relative pause in early January, after the last German attacks petered out. By then German losses, along with to meet the Russian winter offensive in the east, let the front move eastward again when the Allies attacked.

For a western tanker in the periods of intense armor activity, going up against the heavier Germans (of which the Panther was by far the most numerous) was undoubtedly unpleasant. That includes a month and a half of fighting in Normandy (after the bulk of the German armor arrived, before the Cobra breakout), and about a month in the Bulge. By comparison the other 3/4ths of the campaign were a cake-walk for the western tankers. They worried about faust ambushes, mines, and hidden PAK, not front armor plates.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

First off, there are enourmous amount of bilge and hyperbole expended on this subject. And often people are talking about entirely different things, sometimes without knowing it.

.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I am reminded of our recent "All tank battalions experience being the same in WWII" discussion.

You were handily dividing up AFV destroyed by armored divisions to try to back up your claims for battalions. Here , you take the stance of chiding others. You are preaching to the choir, doctor heal thyself.

70% of allied armor in the west was destroyed via AP. That includes german tanks, ATG, SPAT, assault guns.

40% of german tanks were destroyed by AP. the next leading cause of german tank destruction was self destruction. Out of gas/ammo/not running/surrounded/etc. the germans blew them up.

In the late war, german tanks only had an advantage at long range. This is hard to use in an attack under west european battlefields. Leading with armor was the way to lose an attack.

Armor does not mean tank attack. Armored warfare deals with combined arms with the tank at the cutting edge. Only in the desert or vast open area of russia could tanks operate independantly. When one side has such an air and arty advantage as the allies did in ETO, tanks become less of the cutting edge.

I think the germans had some defensive armored warfare success after the retreat in france. They worked with the terrain. In france, they wanted to attack to win. There was no other consideration. If they fought a fighting retreat, they could have been in better shape for the eventual bulge counterattack.

Lewis

[Slapdragon]

The numbers Lewis Quotes are correct. One underlying cause was that US tanks were repaired more often than Germans and returned to the field to become casualties again. German tanks were more often over run, or the German repair and recovery services could not deal with them.

Overall, counting all AFVs (not halftracks unless they carried a cannon) the ratio reported by Dunnigan is 1 to 1.6 in favor of the Germans. For every Panther the Germans fielded, they also had a half dozen less impressive AFVS.

A major difference in Allied (including Russian) and German forces that does not come out in CM playing, was that the Allies assigned far more tanks to infantry units than the Germans, and those tanks often rarely faced German armor. This is why the German developed the excellent AT weapons they had -- they had relatively fewer tanks and needed something to keep enemy tanks off their infantry. If we really played CM to conform with the war on the ground, then the allied player would get tanks in half the battles, the German would get them in a tenth of the battles, or some such ratio.

[Roksovkiy]

The heavy german tanks did have extremely high kill ratios.

The official records of the schwere Tiger Abteilungs were made available in 1983. Total Confirmed kills were well above 12,000 tanks for Tiger IE.

Tiger IE losses

Lost in action - 706

Destroyed by crew/abandoned - 592

Total losses 1298

The Average kill ratio for the Tiger I was just above 12:1

[JasonC]

Why do you assume "self-destruction" and "AP" are mutually exclusive? I'll bet many AFV were blown up by their crews after being abandoned, to prevent capture. But abandoned in the first place because they were holed or M-killed, or left in a repair yard they first entered because they were holed, etc. The unit histories mention many such cases.

As for the 12000 "confirmed" kills by Tiger Is, confirmed by whom? Claimed is more like it. I don't know how many times I have to repeat that a figure for known total losses reported by a friendly side, and a figure for claimed kills supposedly achieved, made about tanks on the opposite side, are distinctly not comparable. One refers to total losses net of recoveries, the other refers to claims (which may be duplicated) about kills (which may not have died at all), that may have been recovered. As a rule of thumb, claims are generally twice as high as realities, viewed from the other side.

But let's suppose for a second that the typical common claims are all true. Tiger Is killed 12000, say, and Tiger IIs with 40% as many tanks but less time, killed perhaps 3000, and 90 Elephants killed 5000, and Panthers killed 6 each or 36000, and StuGs and Panzer IVs killed 3 each (some actually claim the StuGs outscored tanks), and 88s were enourmously effective and bagged 10 each, and hidden PAK typically killed 2-3 from ambush before succumbing, and those causes got 70%), and of course the early war fleet KOed all the Russian tanks lost in 41 and 42. Only 360,000 dead tanks there. Whoops, nobody made that many, all sides, Germans included, by 1945 - back to the invention of the tank.

Incidentally, I certainly agree with the figure of 70% of western allied tank losses being due to AP, at least in France (in Italy, mines did more as already mentioned). But "AP" is obviously not "tanks". The Germans fielded relatively small amounts of armor in the west, for only modest portions of the campaign - as already explained in detail. But they had PAK in every infantry division every month.

Overall, the Germans fielded a heavy PAK for every AFV they possessed, so the tank portion of the AP kills is probably on the order of half their AP kills, or somewhat better since the tanks were presumably more effective on average. Half of the AP kills is 35% of tank losses, and is thus a lower bound. While about 50% of total losses is a reasonable upper bound - 30% not by AP, 20% by PAK, leaves the tanks 2.5 times as effective as the PAK - probably on the high side. Somewhere in that range.

All weapons are not above average, because things have to exist first before they can count as a kill. Nor is there any great mystery in the subject; kill claims are apples, and known total write offs of friendly vehicles are oranges.

As for the supposed defensive successes of German armor in the west, where are they? Goodwood in July. Market Garden (hardly due to the armor alone of course). A local counterattack on a modest scale in the Hurtgen, at Schmidt, worked. And?

Armor counterattacked at Caretan, and failed in hours. Armor counterattacked outside St. Lo, and failed in hours. Armor counterattacked at Mortain, and failed in days. Armor counterattacked outside Nancy, and failed in days. Armor and a lot more counterattacked in the Bulge, and failed in weeks. Armor counterattacked in Alsace, and each wave failed in days. Armor counterattacked at Remagen, and failed in days. Nobody is talking about mythical leading with tanks and violating combined arms principles. Every one of those attacks was launched by combined arms forces.

If you look at the defensive successes, armor is not conspicuous. Armor was involved in the defensive success in front of UK forces in Normandy. The tough defense in front of St. Lo in Normandy was accomplished by infantry of the FJ; armor sent to help failed in its counterattacks. It had precious little to do with the successful stand at the west-wall. Allied supply overreach and tough infantry defensive fighting did that. The defensive of Metz was an infantry affair. The defense of the rest of the Lorraine, after the armor failed outside Nancy, was accomplished by tough Panzergrenadier divisions with nothing left but a few assault guns, plus infantry, PAK, artillery, rivers, and mud. The successful defense in the Hurtgen was an infantry affair, only a short episode at Schmidt excepted, and that was not decisive.

What other defensive successes do you have in mind? I may be overlooking a few cases, but most of the campaign consisted either in those successful infantry defense episodes, those failed armored counterattack episodes buying time with steel, or the Allies marching steadily east. Name me two operational cases in western Europe where instead, defensive German armor, through its technical superiority or its manner of employment, stopped Allied advances cold. I sincerely doubt you can. I can name Goodwood.

I know perfectly well the German armor often did such things in the east, against the Russians. Especially far into a Russian offensive, when they were into their own version of supply overreach - and when using entire an panzer corps massed side by side. The technical superiority of Panthers and Tigers at 2km ranges, in open country, undoubtedly contributed in such cases.

In the west I just do not see such examples, at all. Personally I think this is largely because the Germans didn't have enough armor in the west to do that sort of thing, and also because they mishandled what they had. They threw it away on failed counterattacks out of desperation. The Goodwood example is noticable as the only time they put full TOE strength armor into the line in greater than corps strength for expressly defensive purposes - opposite the Brits in Normandy from late June through mid-July. Far from being the typical use made of the German armor, it was expectional in that respect. It lasted about one month, covering half fhe shortest line that existed in the western campaign.

[ 09-04-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[killmore]

Very good replys JasonC.

I have seen germans claiming 30:1 advantage of soviet tanks. Since Germans had 200 it would mean Soviets had 6000.

It was around a pocket 6x12 kilometers, this would mean you that if you put soviet tanks right beside each other it would create a closed circle around pocket with tanks to spare.

I doubt that soviet would have 6000 tanks around such a small packet.

[JonS]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

...Name me two operational cases in western Europe where instead, defensive German armor, through its technical superiority or its manner of employment, stopped Allied advances cold. I sincerely doubt you can. I can name Goodwood.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Does Epsom count?

[JasonC]

It is a fine question. It is not quite the obvious success of Goodwood, where the Germans were clearly outnumbered and clearly smashed the attack. Certainly there was no breakthrough, and by the end the Brits had lost well over 100 tanks. The German armor did not get off anything like "free", though.

The defensive success was largely achieved by putting in as many men and tanks to stop the assault, as the Brits had thrown into it in the first place. The German counterattack did no more than restore the line. Borderline, I'd say.

I'm inclined to chalk it up to even odds rather than "armor", but arguably the ability to maneuver two divisions into the "breech" rapidly was due to them being Panzer divisions. Technical superiority of the armor? Maybe that would show up in the rival tank strength reductions, but the operational result would have been obtained using that many Panzer IVs.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Roksovkiy:

The heavy german tanks did have extremely high kill ratios.

The official records of the schwere Tiger Abteilungs were made available in 1983. Total Confirmed kills were well above 12,000 tanks for Tiger IE.

Tiger IE losses

Lost in action - 706

Destroyed by crew/abandoned - 592

Total losses 1298

The Average kill ratio for the Tiger I was just above 12:1<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I read a pretty good website about a Tiger tank commanders diary from the east and west front. It was pretty clear that Tiger tankmen were very competitive and tracked each others feats pretty closely.

An example was that they didnt consider assault guns as kills (su122, etc). They also only considered burning a tank a kill (Mickeys). The author had a lot of truck kills and the other tank men goofed on him about it. In reality, trucks were very valuable on the eastern front.

I think the Tiger Is in the east had some of the best success as tank killers (and assault tanks for attacking). This rapidly dropped off in 1944 as the allies had better weapons. The StuG also enjoyed a killing spree till 44. Looking at some of the Tiger tank battalions 'runners' numbers, I wonder if overall the StuG was a better buy (in defensive battles). The Panther was born into a world in decline. As it was coming up in numbers, it was meeting more capable enemy tanks (in much greater numbers) and greater threats (HC weapons). It may have been a great tank, but its side armor was not 'Tiger' class at any time. Leading with panthers in an attack was going to cost some tanks. Usually not even worth recovering because they burned.

In the attack, the german tanks were no better than the allies in close terrain. They should have been used more in an overwatch/second echelon during combined arms battles. They should have been used to smash allied counter-attacks and defend the ground gained. Unfortunately, this would limit the speed of attack also. Getting pounded by arty and air would be the result.

Lewis

[Roksovkiy]

The heavy Tiger battalions were over and over involved in the heaviest fighting in the east.

They would have a disproportionate number of tank kills compared to other tanks and anti-tank guns on average. The small number of tigers manufactured directly affects its kill ratio. For the Ferdinands, as only 90 were manufactured this had a big significance as 10:1 would only denote 900 enemy tanks knocked.

The figures are averages for the course of the war. Some tigers knocked out over 100 enemy tanks, some tigers were destroyed being deployed without any enemy kills, but on average the ratio was over 10:1.

All of the confirmed kills were for the majority of cases validated by other friendly units.

Without doubt, the Russians repaired many of the knocked out tanks when the Germans did not control the battle.

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Roksovkiy:

Some tigers knocked out over 100 enemy tanks, some tigers were destroyed being deployed without any enemy kills, but on average the ratio was over 10:1.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I doubt that there were many of these. Best German ace had about 100 some kills and his tank burned a couple of times. So his kills can not be attributed to a single tiger.

[StellarRat]

I read a book a long time ago by some German tank platoon commander and I seem to remember him saying that they were getting 5:1 kills with their PZ III's at the start of Russian Campaign. He said that even though the Russians had better guns and armor his platoon was more organized and their gunnery was much more accurate and rapid. Most of the time they were able to out maneuver the Russian tanks and take them from the flanks or rear. Don't ask me to give you the title of the book because I don't remember it.

[JasonC]

In 1941 that is quite believable. The kill rate then might have risen very high. Much of the Russian fleet were 45mm gun light tanks with pretty thin armor - T-26 and BT models. They lost them by the thousands. Most of them were in need of repair at the time of the invasion, and they were not all mobilized. When they did get into action it was often piecemeal, a platoon or company of Russian light tanks with green crews facing a battalion of German mediums with better crews. The Russians also had 2 man turrets and few radios, making tactical coordination and the ability to find targets in the heat of action, limited at best.

In 1942 the Russian loss rate fell significantly, and this let their exploding production increase the size of the fleet back to the higher levels present near the start of the war. And they were better tanks this time. German tank losses were still low until near the end of the year. By 1943 the Russian fleet was uniformly good, and equal or better than much of the German fleet. The German tankers still had a distinct edge in crew quality. The experience gap narrowed in 1944, however.

There is no difficulty seeing how high ratios could be achieved during a period when German losses were tiny. But from mid 43 on, German tank losses were no longer tiny. And the Russians did not lose several times the total number of AFVs they possessed.

If you only read kill claims from one side, you would always think the other's whole fleet was dead several times over, because kill claims are systematically inflated for reasons already discussed. They are inflated when made by P-47 and Typhoon pilots; when made by Hellcat drivers; when made by Soviet SU gunners; when made by StuG drivers - and when made by Tiger commanders. It is just the nature of the beast.

[StellarRat]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

If you only read kill claims from one side, you would always think the other's whole fleet was dead several times over, because kill claims are systematically inflated for reasons already discussed. They are inflated when made by P-47 and Typhoon pilots; when made by Hellcat drivers; when made by Soviet SU gunners; when made by StuG drivers - and when made by Tiger commanders. It is just the nature of the beast.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yeah, the big problem there is that usually multiple crews will claim kills on the same vehicle or airplane because they shot at it and it died even though 10 other crews were doing the same thing. Impossible to tell whose shots actually killed the target.

I still think German tanks had a favorable kill ratio throughout the war (although I don't feel like doing a big stat study to prove it.) I guess the main reason I believe this is because they produced way less armor than the Allies, but the Allies lost a lot of tanks. But, I will definately grant you that many of the losses had to have been from causes other than tank fire. The fact that the Allies were so fearful of any German tanks that showed up on the battlefield is a testament to their deadliness.

[ 09-05-2001: Message edited by: StellarRat ]

[JasonC]

Favorable can mean above 1:1, and I would certainly agree. Or favorable can mean 4:1, and the numbers just can't support it. The Allies made a lot of tanks but had a few more left at the end than the Germans did. They might have lost as many as four times as many tanks all told (though three times is more likely). But they didn't lose all of them to German tanks.

Maybe half of them, at the outside - with their equal numbers of PAK and heavy FLAK the next leading cause. In case everybody forgot, the "88s" (including all the ones called that that weren't) are every bit as talked about by the vets who had to face them as the tanks.

Which means the best the overall kill ratio can be is on the order of 2:1. (Higher in Russia, and early; lower later, etc). I've seen reasonably careful claims that say 1.6 to 1 for the western front, and that is in the believable range.

What are not believable are the endless fish stories about every weapon being above average. The notion that a tank isn't better unless it gets 5:1 or 10:1 kill ratios, is a result of over-exposure to hyperbolic propaganda claims. Tanks are similar enough in threats faced, vunerabilities to the important operational factors like overall odds, and a host of similar factors, that expecting enourmous differences between their average performance is implausible to begin with.

The totals available to be KOed will not support the exaggerated "every weapon always an 'ace'" story line. Why is so much invested in such claims anyway? Because they fit a technological determinism view of warfare, for one. That it isn't how many tanks, where, used how, but exactly which make that ought to matter.

Because they fit a prowess heroism view of warfare, for another. Average performances are near each other, which are hardly surprising when you think what the word "average" really means. Think how much is being lumped into such broad averages, that must wash out hundreds of factors merely because they can vary every which way.

"This is random. Integrate it over all the trials and you will get zero" is a very common bit of statistics. The heroism view wants one average to beat another average by huge amounts, which is looking for heroism in all the wrong places. Meaning, in an... -average-, almost by definition not a heroic thing.

Why the interest in the technological determinism and heroism views of the nature of war? Both are common and recurring, certainly. But they also happen to have been the views informing the strategy of one of the combatants. Whereas other major combatants tended to view warfare as an industrial process, a mass effort, a contest of resources, production, attrition. And obviously production and attrition are more decisive if average effectiveness factors are limited , to 1.5-2 times at most - since production varied 4-5 to 1.

If average effectiveness differences had been on the order of 10:1, then the better side of that relation would have won despite production differences half that size. But they didn't. Because the real effectiveness differences simply weren't that large. They were swamped by resource and production differences.