German\Allied armour kill ratios?

[StellarRat]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

Favorable can mean above 1:1, and I would certainly agree. Or favorable can mean 4:1, and the numbers just can't support it.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I was thinking around 2:1 in tank vs. tank, so I guess we agree on this pretty much.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

The numbers Lewis Quotes are correct. One underlying cause was that US tanks were repaired more often than Germans and returned to the field to become casualties again. German tanks were more often over run, or the German repair and recovery services could not deal with them.

.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Heres the operational status of SS PzBn 101 from Jun1 to Aug11 1944

JN1 45 (37)

JL1 30 (11) [-15]

JL5 30 (0)

JL8 28 (21) [-2]

JL9 28 (19)

JL10 28 (15)

JL11 28 (13)

JL12 28 (13)

JL15 28 (20)

JL16 28 (19)

JL21 25 (6) [-3]

JL22 25 (7)

JL23 25 (10)

JL24 25 (14)

JL28 25 (20)

JL31 25 (19)

AG4 25 (20)

AG7 25 (21)

AG10 17 (17)

AG11 11 (11)

Date Strength (Operational) [Total writeoffs]

It would be interesting to see the claims against this battalion and how many tanks it claims to have destroyed. The number of total writeoffs is low except for the initial 15. The 15 were over the month of June and included Villers Bocage and the initial Normandy battles. Whittmans exceptional numbers might be a starting point.

The data shows that the battalion did maintain a operational status from battlefield repairs. I dont think many panzer formations recieved replacements during this period. Many tanks were hit and recovered and either repaired or led to other repairs.

Lewis

[JasonC]

Also note that the total net movement out of the "Operational" category is 78 vehicles for the whole period, while the net strength reduction is only 34. Some of that movement out of "operational" will be due to breakdowns. Some will be due to battle damage later repaired. E.g. on July 5, the battalion had no running tanks. On July 21, it had 6 running tanks.

Also notice that the last two dates - which are after the breakout, before and after figures for the time of the Mortain attack actually - have total strength and operational the same. The repair locations were probably overrun by then, so only "runners" made it out, and even marginal tanks would be running if at all possible.

[Username]

Oct 43 transferred to Augustdorf

22 Oct 43 reformed in Augustdorf [Tessin: France]

4 Nov 43 redesignated schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102 effective 22 Oct 43

Jan 44 transferred to Argentan, France

Spring 44 Transferred to Wezep, the Netherlands 21 Apr-29 May 44 45 Tiger Is delivered

15 May 44 absorbs 268 men from s.SS-Panzer-Abteilung 103, not enough men to establish 3. Kompanie

6 Jun 44 personnel on courses at Paderborn return to Wezep

11-12 Jun 44 transfer to Calais region

14 Jun ordered to Normandy front

21-23 Jun detrainment of 2. Kompanie in Versailles, road march to the front begins with a number of breakdowns

2 Jul last trainload arrives in Versailles

7 Jul 44 28 operational tanks, but 3. Kompanie still hadn't reached the front

9 Jul-1 Aug 44 subordinated to 10. SS-Panzergrenadier Division Hohenstauffen

2 Aug transferred to sector of 9. SS-Panzergrenadier Division Frundsberg with 38 Tiger Is

1 Sep 44 all tanks lost during the retreat from Normandy Sep 44 redesignated schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 502 when reformed in Sennelager

Between 10 Jul and 20 Aug claimed 227 tanks and 28 AT guns

27 Dec 44 6 Tiger IIs delivered, later transferred to s.SS-Pz.Abt. 503

14 Feb 45-6 Mar 45 equipped with 31 Tiger IIs

early Mar 45 transferred to Stettin-Army Group Center

19 Mar 45 Küstrin area, Army Group Vistula

http://srd.yahoo.com/goo/Tiger+tank+101/11/*http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel /tigers.html

Well, heres some kill claims by another tiger battalion 102.

It would seem that when a tiger battalion could be supported by adequate recovery and parts, maintenance,etc. It could maintain a valuable presence. Its successes during this period was mainly in a defensive posture and very limited counterattacks.

Lewis

[ 09-07-2001: Message edited by: Username ]

[Username]

http://www.panzer-vi.fsnet.co.uk/tales_jscholl.html

This is a good site and contains a Tiger tank commanders diary. Seems planes were his biggest enemy.

[JasonC]

Claims are 5 times the units own total losses. Quite common. Does it mean the unit KOed 5 for 1? Unlikely.

The example of the other unit shows net movement out of "operational" was 2 1/4 times total write offs (and some will be masked because tanks moved both ways in the same day, etc). Some are breakdowns, but the number of battlefield KOs the unit suffered could easily have been 1.5-2 times the number of total write offs suffered - the rest being recovered and put back into service.

Meanwhile, on the claim side, we know from numerous examples that claims are often inflated by a factor of two, compared to KOs inflicted, because of errors, overkills leading to the same tank claimed more than once, etc.

So what is the actual KO ratio? We can't tell, but it was probably somewhere between 1.6 and 3.3 to one for that unit, with 2-2.5 a "likely" region. Which is about what you'd expect from a host of broader indicators pointing to the same sort of number - overall losses, typical degrees of inflation of claims, rates of recoverable losses.

The distorted larger ratio claims come merely from comparing one's own total write offs, with merely claimed enemy. Which are apples and oranges, as repeatedly pointed out.

[Username]

jason do you have any data that backs up your pessimism? Anybody can say "We dont know". Anybody can cast doubts and feel smart.

Look at Kursk. For so many years it was the fabled death ride of the SS divisions. The victors told the stories. The authors used the victors stories to write history. The BS sets the height that the truth must jump over.

The Kursk story is more like the SS divisions continued to fight after the big defeat. They fought the Kursk battles and generally came out on top but lost overall because of failure to take objectives and resistance to throw in reserves. you gotta gamble big to win big y'know. But the books on the shelves claim that thousands of Tigers are still burning.

Ever heard the line "tell a lie often enough and its the truth?". Sometimes its who tells the story first that sets the truth.

Lewis

[Slapdragon]

For Armor, unlike fighters in the AAF, a kill was defined as a surveyed wreck (Logistics in the European Theater of Operation 1955). A surveyed wreck meant that a survey team, looking over the combat reports from tanks battalions and companies, would look over the scene of the action, so a recovered tank would not be a kill because a survey team would never find it.

This means that tank casualties from the monthly reports (as opposed to those from the Battalion war books kept on a daily basis) were pretty accurate. There was no huge over esitmation. I cannot prove it, but I am certian that the Germans were no less lax in their recording of kills.

Some units kept there own kill tallies, and these tallies could be flights of fancy, and the kills of individual tanks might be mere speculation when compared to the survey process, but corrected kill totals on the ground were pretty accurate.

It should be noted that in the US Army almost 75% of all vehicle kills of the two main types were recovered and returned to service. Most not returned to service caught fire or were penetrated through and through thus damaging the armor.

The German army likely did not recover this high of a percentage of tanks(and in any case, the US would turn dead tanks into prime movers, tractors, supply haulers, and all sorts of other things, while the British would build there own set of funnies) but it is shure that it recovered something, especially from tanks destroyed in the rear lines by aircraft.

[Username]

Pz6 Team : According to records your tank destroyed 20 T-34's & 23 guns would you say that was correct ?

Bobby: Ja that would be about right. We had special engineers that were there for salvage & it was them who normally told us the numbers. We then counted how many rounds we had fired & the position of the kills & worked it out. Actually it was more like 22 T-34's as there were 54 wrecked tanks left behind & I fired 25 AP rounds. As for the guns I wouldn't like to say as Jurgen fired more rounds at them then me & I think the total was around 40 destroyed I think he killed more than me.

( Bobby continued on for about another hour about his adventures in the east all along similiar lines to the above)

http://www.panzer-vi.fsnet.co.uk/tales_bwoll.html

This is from Bobby Woll. He was with Whittman and later a Tiger commander himself.

I have other data I will post. It seems that the Tigers needed alot of mechanical attention but were very survivable.

Lewis

[Roksovkiy]

Tanks kills were always confirmed when the situation allowed.

During July 12th prokhorovka the Leibstandarte division alone claimed 192 Soviet tanks destoyed.

II SS Panzer Korps General Paul Hausser thought this was scarcely credible until he visited the battlefield and walked around the hulks, each was numbered in white chalk to confirm the kills. This was only in the Leibstandarte sector during Prokorovka.

Leibstandarte combat report 12 July losses:

Total lossed: 18 Tanks

Repairable: 14 Tanks

Unrecoverable 4 Tanks

Romitrov’s own admission of his tank losses tally with German figures, his tank charge was a slaughter.

[coe]

Hmmm, if two shermans are lost taking out a panther how does that compute tonnage wise - does a panther weight twice as much as a sherman?

[JasonC]

"do you have any data that backs up your pessimism"

Yes and I have presented it at great length on this board. (Why you call it "pessimism" is another story, which I leave to you). If you believe the German claim figures alone, without downward correction for overestimates, then total dead AFV are greater than the number of AFVs made by 1945 by all powers combined, including the Germans. It is not my fault if you (and many others) prefer to ignore the reasoning involved.

If every German tank and PAK KO'ed 5-10 Allied AFV, which is often claimed, the Allied AFV total at the end of the war would be negative, and a larger number in absolute magnitude than total Allied production. Leaving aside breakdowns, mines, artillery HE, tankbuster aircraft, and infantry weapons.

And it has nothing whatever to do with believing any authority about losses at this battle or that, biased or not, estimated or not. All you have to believe is the production figures, recognize the fact that the Allies did have AFVs remaining at the end of the war (while the Germans didn't), and make any honest set of estimates of causes of loss. But an exhaustive one, not for a just a sliver of time, space, units, or types. When claims are made about averages, that is sort of necessary.

You can then rejigger the estimates to your heart's content, accepting no authority if you like. The Germans still fielded ~50K AFV and another ~50K heavy PAK, and net losses of Allied AFVs were no more than 200K. (Proof - they made only slightly more than that, and had larger fleets at the end of the war than at the begining. Far larger in the case of the western Allies). The overall average of kills per German heavy AT item is therefore no better than 2, and in fact it is less because breakdown, mines, infantry AT, yada yada, got plenty of them.

You might believe the PAK got less than the tanks (I do), and that this or that tank type got more than the average. But it is sorta part of the definition of "average" that for all variance above the average there must also be variance below it. Somewhere, in that strange reality-land some prefer not to visit - so unlike Lake Woebegone.

All weapons are not above average.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

[QB

If every German tank and PAK KO'ed 5-10 Allied AFV, which is often claimed, the Allied AFV total at the end of the war would be negative, and a larger number in absolute magnitude than total Allied production. Leaving aside breakdowns, mines, artillery HE, tankbuster aircraft, and infantry weapons.

.[/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You miss the point. It was at certain times that the germans achieved this and higher. It was not every german vehicle for the whole war. Thats the part that you are missing.

The T34/76 were not that great in the attack after 1941. Actually most tanks arent but ALL the weaknesses stand out in the attack. They were slaughtered.

But I take it you will see what you want to see.

Lewis

[Andrew H.]

I would be interested is seeing what sort of figures back the 10-1 claim; I rooted around on the internet and, as is so often the case, found a lot of sites repeating the claim, but nothing really supporting the claim.

1. Why I could believe the claim.

From mid to late war, Tigers were often employed in heavy detachments used as a roving fire brigade to stop enemy breakthroughs. This type of employment probably meant that the Tigers would often be fighting enemy tanks with a minimum amount of supporting infantry, etc. This is a recipe for a lot of tank kills, without having to worry much about side shots or too many heavy PaKs. It's easier to rack up high kill numbers when you don't have to lead a breakthrough yourself.

2. Why I'm skeptical

The absolute numbers are just so high, particularly given the relative rarity of the Tigers. Also, the Tigers just weren't uebertanks. Gavin and his men dealt with them pretty handily on Sicily, and the Soviets captured one of the first ones used on the Eastern front pretty easily by simply using an AT gun.

I guess it wouldn't really surprise me if certain heavy tank units had 10-1 kill ratios, especially at the end of the war. But claiming that Tigers knocked out 12,000 allied tanks seems, well, improbable.

[JasonC]

"not every german vehicle for the whole war"

In other words, the average is lower. That is what "every for the whole war" means, right?

Now, was the loss ratio higher once the Russians were attacking, as you imply? No. Russian tank losses were highest in 1941, while German tank losses were lowest that year. German tank losses rose every year afterward, but they were still relatively low in 1942. They lost fewer tanks per unit time while they had Pz IIIs, and more per unit time with the late war, post 1942 fleet mix, which included the heavily armored varities. While Russian tank losses were high every year except for a dip in 1942, when the fleet was small after the 1941 losses.

You can easily track German losses because their fleet size stayed almost constant. The loss rate and the production rate were about the same throughout the war, up until late '44. After that production was falling and losses accelerating, and the fleet evaporated in consequence.

On the Russian side, they lost the entire pre-war fleet in the first 6 months, and were left with what the had produced in the same period. Which left the fleet 1/3rd its original size at the start of 1942. By the end of that year it was back up to around the prewar size, because production exploded. The loss rate went up with the fleet size; more to lose meant more losses. The fleet size more or less stabilized at near the pre-war level, and production plateau'd as well. In '44 and '45 the size increased somewhat, so by the end the whole fleet was about 1/3rd larger than at the begining.

Russian tank losses in calender 1943 plus the first half of 44 were probably about 2-3 times German tank losses for the same period. (The Germans made ~18K AFV in that period). This is the period of the Russian offensives in which supposedly "they were slaughtered", as you put it - while their fleet size was steady.

The Russians took their losses not only from German tanks but from German PAK, which were fielded in equal numbers to the AFVs, and somewhat in advance of them in raw AT capability, time-wise. E.g. there were 88 Flak batteries operating long before Tigers; long 50mm PAK had become standard while most of the tanks were still short 50mm or short 75mm; 75mm PAK were initially more numerous than 75mm tanks, so much so the Marders plugged the gap; 88mm dedicated PAK arrived earlier and were twice as numerous as AFV mounted 88 long - and 1/3rd of the latter were thin-skinned Nashorns.

German losses to Russian PAK undoubtedly declined rather seriously once the Germans went over to the defensive, for obvious reasons. Meaning most of the German tanks lost in the critical period were lost to Russian tanks. The average in the critical period, therefore, was probably somewhere between 1.5 to 1 and 3 to 1, with 2 to 1, or a little higher, the most likely figure

Which is not a long way from what it probably was for the whole war, in the east anyway. The steep Russian tank losses of 1941 were approximately balanced by steep German ones in 1945. So it is not surprising the overall average and the average in the critical period - which is ~40% of the war by time, to begin with, so it can't be very far from the overall average or it'd just drag the average away with it - are quite close.

During the same period the Russians only basically destroyed army group south twice over and retook the Ukraine. So, just how slaughtered were they? Do you think they lost say 10 times what the Germans did in that period? Funny, the German AFV fleet was about steady in size, and 18K new ones came out of the factories. The Russian fleet size did not dip. Do you suppose the Russians lost 180K tanks in those 18 months to German tanks alone? Gee, that is way more than they ever had or made.

Now, if you don't mean the period of the critical Russian offensives - and you don't mean the overall average, for that period or for the war - and perhaps don't even mean for the average German AFV - then what was the point again? Some German AFVs killed more than 2-3 Russian tanks. Um, duh.

Take the 2 per average figure for a second and look at the expected spread from pure chance. Suppose we match up AFVs and 1/3 of the time the German gets KOed and 2/3rds of the time the Russian gets KOed, one or the other. Then the average over many trials will be the ratio of the probabilities of course, or 2:1. But how many German tanks will get 10 or more, by pure chance, out of a tank population of say 40,000? About 700. What if the average ratio were 3 to 1? Then 2250 would get "streaks" 10 long. This is ignoring effects from crew quality or make of tank, which would make for longer "tails" in the distribution. Some individual results are of course above average - even in Vegas.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

I would be interested is seeing what sort of figures back the 10-1 claim; I rooted around on the internet and, as is so often the case, found a lot of sites repeating the claim, but nothing really supporting the claim.

1. Why I could believe the claim.

From mid to late war, Tigers were often employed in heavy detachments used as a roving fire brigade to stop enemy breakthroughs. This type of employment probably meant that the Tigers would often be fighting enemy tanks with a minimum amount of supporting infantry, etc. This is a recipe for a lot of tank kills, without having to worry much about side shots or too many heavy PaKs. It's easier to rack up high kill numbers when you don't have to lead a breakthrough yourself.

2. Why I'm skeptical

The absolute numbers are just so high, particularly given the relative rarity of the Tigers. Also, the Tigers just weren't uebertanks. Gavin and his men dealt with them pretty handily on Sicily, and the Soviets captured one of the first ones used on the Eastern front pretty easily by simply using an AT gun.

I guess it wouldn't really surprise me if certain heavy tank units had 10-1 kill ratios, especially at the end of the war. But claiming that Tigers knocked out 12,000 allied tanks seems, well, improbable.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Pill.

I think the 10-1 is one of those urban legends, like 6 Shermans per Tiger, that started some place and took on a life of its own. The reality is that some tanks, in some units, scored very well, and some did not, and some types of tanks were lucky, and some were not.

[JasonC]

Right. And crew quality. Also, the chances of long streaks get rather better when you can lose your own tank a few times. For example, if you ask how many can kill 36 for a loss of 4 out of 50K, then you have 2/3rd to the 36th, times one third to the 4th, times the number of ways to pick 4 out of 36, which is 91,390. Times the 50K of course, to get expecteds in the population, gives 26 expected "aces" that good - by pure luck, with a 2:1 edge vs. the enemy tanks, only.

If instead the best 17% (1/6th - heavies and Panthers) of the German tanks have 3:1, and the best 25% of the crews have only an 80% as high chance of losing trial (effect on probability, not on results), then the chance for those fellows would be 20% lose, 80% win, and they'd have a 5:1 kill average. For 1/24th of the fleet - with a poor set of crews the same amount worse, and the lighter AFVs in the distribution the same amount worse than the better ones.

What should their streaks look like, on those estimated prior probabilities? The sample size is smaller - only 2100 are both well equipped and the better crews. But the chances are better each time. 225 of them would have streaks 10 long without losses. Losing their own tank 4 times while winning 40, you'd have 44 choose 4 (which is 77x43x41 or 135,751 ways with a little simplification), .8 to the 40th and .2 to the 4th, times 2100, is 61 of them or ~3%, among the better crews alone. Some of the less skilled crews would join either total, making up for the skill edge just by being luckier - picked out of a larger group.

What about the prior probabilities needed for 1 tanker in the whole war to rack up 300 kills for the loss of his own tank 5 times? Break out the Mathematica, because this calculation would bust your calculator's limited memory. There are 48 trillion ways to choose 5 elements out of a list of 300. Times a modest 50,000 AFVs taking their chance. Have to fiddle a little to find what x satisfies x^295 times (1-x)^5 makes the expected result exactly "1". The answer is 9.9%. That's right Virginia, if they had 9:1 expected kills (90% vs. 10%), then pure chance would produce one (expected) 300 streak with 5 "own goals" allowed.

Andrew is also right to bring up the operational factors. Because the evidence is that the operational factors, in a broad sense, matter more than tank specs. E.g. the German losses were far lower in the period when they had only Pz IIIz, because they were winning operationally, on the attack, generating favorable local odds fights. Ergo, winning (that big) was even better "armor" than a Panther glacis. A "roving halfback" defensive AT role 2km inside the German defended zone was undoubtedly safer - even for StuG - than trying to hold the front line.

The point of the probability calculations is that such effects do not have to reach very long odds or certainties, in order to produce some outliers in a sizeable population that are quite a ways out. To infer from such outliers that average chances were very long odds in favor of the Germans would be incorrect.

It is yet another example of the "averaging up" phenomenon, so typical of merely anecdotal impressions about the war. Every German tank is a Panther or Tiger, and every tanker is an ace, and every shell issued is the most capable for that gun or role. Chop off the upper 1/6th of the distribution on any subject and roll them all together, and what do you get? The Lake Woebegone version of the war. For some unknown reason, only Hellcat drivers (that's a joke) and German mobile troops are on the receiving end of the treatment.

Averages about complex historical processes, about which many details are known, are highly resistent to subjective hyperbole. Because all the different numbers check each other - the first principle of all accounting. Distorting one or two figures out of the set upward from their proper value produces a mismatch, somewhere in the criss-crossed set of relationships among the numbers themselves. It is the same sort of reason bank employees can't easily pilfer electronic-entry millions without getting caught.

Of course, this is only true for those willing to use their own reason and get their fingers grubby in the data. All of it, to cross check everything, not just unconnected bits and pieces. If one relies entirely on "executive summary" authorities instead, one can be fooled about anything. (Which is why Barings isn't its own bank anymore, incidentally).

For what it is worth.

[JasonC]

To Slapdragon - Oh, I think the origin of the high ratios particularly applied to the heavier German tanks is obvious enough. Not urban legend, sound tactical advice.

If the Germans send a heavy tank platoon, send two companies. If they send a company, send a tank battalion and a TD battalion. If they send a full battalion, send a full armor division.

This was not meant to produce fair fights, it was meant to win - and not win ugly on a shoestring, with heavy losses, either. "Bring 6 to 1" was sound tactical advice against the better German makes. Against Pz IVs and StuGs, they probably tried to bring 2-3 times.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Roksovkiy:

Tanks kills were always confirmed when the situation allowed.

During July 12th prokhorovka the Leibstandarte division alone claimed 192 Soviet tanks destoyed.

II SS Panzer Korps General Paul Hausser thought this was scarcely credible until he visited the battlefield and walked around the hulks, each was numbered in white chalk to confirm the kills. This was only in the Leibstandarte sector during Prokorovka.

Leibstandarte combat report 12 July losses:

Total lossed: 18 Tanks

Repairable: 14 Tanks

Unrecoverable 4 Tanks

Romitrov’s own admission of his tank losses tally with German figures, his tank charge was a slaughter.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Heres a pretty good site that lists RUSSIAN claims about RUSSIAN losses.

http://history.vif2.ru/library/archives/losses/losses3.html

The russians seem to be feeding in armor. The losses being greater than the starting TOE during battles. I believe this meant that the russians would sacrifice tanks in slaughters to try to achieve their goals.

Operation Availability of AFVs at the start of operation Total losses Details

Battle casualties Tech fauilures Other

From report of 1st Guard Tank Army.

Kursk-Belgorod operation. Defensive period 5/7-20/7.1943 631 (511) 954 (783) 854 (716) 100 (68) - (-)

Kursk-Belgorod operation. Offensive period 3/8-31/8-1943 542 (418) 1040 (889) 706 (646) 334 (243) - (-)

The 1st guards tank army lost 1.5 as many T34 during the offense then they possesed in the beginning! There must have been stores of T34 in tank parks waiting to be delivered to these slaughter hauses.

[JasonC]

The tank losses listed for the Kursk front for July and August in those tables (which I analysed months ago) come to 4300. Production for the same period comes to about 4150. Kursk thus drew down the fleet size marginally in July and by the end of August it was back were it started. Without any stored up parks of reserve tanks really needed - although the previous 4 months had been a period of build-up on both sides, of course.

During the same period, the Germans were making about 1000 AFV per month (or perhaps only 850-900, depending on how you count things like SPA and such). And German fleet size was not growing. Production was in the ratio 2.2-2.5 to 1 favor the Russians. Losses probably were ijn that ratio as well, favor the Germans of course.

Yes Virginia, you have to KO them faster than they are built to reduce the number fielded. Tank fleets are stocks between two flows, out of the factory and knocked out in the field. Those flows generally balance, because any imbalance in them changes fleet size and the loss rate responds (fewer to lose, lower losses; more to use, more done with them, etc).

If you think Russian tank losses in the Kursk period were more then 2.5 times what the German ones were, then you have to explain why the German fleet didn't expand during the period. Because they were producing ~1000 a month themselves.

Also, for the umpteenth time, the tank losses the Allies (including the Russians) took where from PAK as well as tanks, not to mention the grab-bag other category of mines, artillery, air, and infantry AT.

[ 09-09-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

"Bring 6 to 1" was sound tactical advice against the better German makes. Against Pz IVs and StuGs, they probably tried to bring 2-3 times.

If the memoires are indicative ALL German tanks were considered Tigers in the west so that would mean the Western Allies did indeed seek to stack them 6 to 1 all the time.

[Skipper]

Annual tank losses closely corellate to annual tank production. Which is what it all boils down to. You always lose roughly as many tanks as you can make, the question is what do you get in exchange for that.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

And German fleet size was not growing. Production was in the ratio 2.2-2.5 to 1 favor the Russians. Losses probably were ijn that ratio as well, favor the Germans of course.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This isnt true for the Tiger I fleet. It rose in 1943 even with Kursk. It did not fall during a month till early 1944. It finally declined during the summer of 1944. This is also true for the Panther. The summer battles of 1944 being the worse for the german tanks overall.

The panzer IV fleet followed a trend of barely keeping up with the pace of loss (with some close months). But the Panzer IV fleet also gradually continued to grow. It also took a beating during the summer of 1944.

I think this thread has taken the typical JasonC route. He wants so desperately to make his point that he gets away from the initial interest.

I think the question initially asked was about tank on tank battles. This scenario will be (hopefully) more common in CM2 than CMBO. CMBO being more an infantry game/combined arms game.

So, when the germans are defending in tank battles (1942-1944), they will have better kill ratios most of the time. This all depends on time frame, ratio of attacker to defender, terrain, etc. In attacks by german armor, unless they have Tiger tanks against weaker gunned defenders (45mm gun vehicles, T34/76), they can expect to have lesser kill ratios and even be on the losing side of the ratio. No big whoop but thats they way it was.

But dont worry, more numbers and math and strange logic will follow this post. Unless someone can produce tank-on-tank battle data, It is really up to people seeing the overall numbers how they want to.

Lewis

PS I am using Panzer Truppen 2 as a source.

[JasonC]

"taken the typical JasonC route" as opposed to the typical lewis route LOL.

I think it is worth recounting after this quip exactly how you and I each entered this discussion, and what was the original subject being discussed. A fellow asked the perfectly straightforward and reasonable question, about what kill ratio of German tanks vs. Allied tanks probably occurred.

Almost immediately, he heard "2:1" from LCM (not me), which is in fact correct - or every nearly so on all the best evidence. LCM gave the figure because that is what was asked; he did not support it with any elaborate argument, and being until then not controverted had no reason to. Since then, I have presented evidence in favor of the 2:1 estimate, which slapdragon (citing Dunnigan's estimate of 1.6 to 1 for the west) and Stellar Rat both agreed with, after making their own points.

You yourself (reluctantly, it seemed to me) agreed that 5:1+ kill ratios are not true as averages for the whole war, which was after all the original question. So who was the one who changed the subject? I don't say it was you - it was one of many issues raised in response to a later claim.

Someone else (not you or me) said in Russia the right answer was not 2:1 but 6:1. Which is a common myth. He presented no evidence in favor of this notion. He got a quick response from another fellow saying in effect "actually, the Russian tanks were technically quite good, and the early German ones sucked".

The bearing this had on the actual question was unclear; the fellow did not allege it meant the ratio was y rather than x, he merely made a point about the early war tanks technically speaking. This was the first real change of subject, or potential change of subject, or confusion of two different subjects - tech specs of tanks and kill ratios of tanks, which are not remotely the same thing.

Another fellow then remarked that the Russians had technically good tanks and many of them, but the Germans were more experienced and on the defensive. This at least allowed that tank specs and loss ratios are not the same, and there is truth in it. However, it was too loose to be unmisleading. Of course each side was on the offensive for different parts of the war. The Germans also had technically good tanks in part of the war. Relative experience changed over time. The implication was also there that being on the offensive increases relative losses, which is not in the least obvious from the real history.

It was at this point that you entered the discussion. With a full throated statement of the technological tank-spec determined view of things, which is as much a myth as the 6:1 idea, though distinct from it. You stated baldly that the German tanks were "manhandled" in 1941, because they only had lousy tanks. Which was blatantly false, since they racked up their highest kill ratio in that year. Oh, the tanks were worse than the T-34 and KV, certainly, but the manhandling was decidedly the other way, despite this.

Your capsule history of rival tech specs continued, in every case comparing the best vehicles fielded on each side, purely in their tech abilities in tank dueling, without reference to much of anything else. The only other factor mentioned was numbers, implicit in the term "hordes".

According to this remarkable reading of history, the Germans lost in 1941, things stabilized between late 1942 and mid 1943, after which the Germans were dominate for a supposedly brief period that actually would measure 6-12 months - from first "big cats" to early to mid '44, when enough T-34/85s were around to reverse things. Oh, and you felt it important to mention SU-100s, which actually didn't see any action until early '45, long after the war was decided. But had to be mentioned because the whole idea was that tank specs were dominate, and it has good specs.

Which history is completely wrong at every point save one - eventually a lot of T-34/85s were made it to Berlin. Perhaps all you meant to do was give a history of tank specs, and for that it was reasonably enough, fleshing out the earlier comment made by somebody else that in the early war the Russian tanks were technically good.

Which only shows that the whole tech dominance idea is completely wrong, and the best fielded tanks in technical terms are a remarkably poor predictor of operational outcomes, or for that matter changing kill ratios. The Germans got their most favorable kill ratios not in Tigers and Panthers, even in the period before the T-34/85 was fielded in serious numbers. They got them in Pz IIIs, and in 50L42 Pz IIIs even more than in improved ones. At the one time when their best tanks were clearly inferior to the best Russian makes, they did best.

Obviously the real reason is that operational factors - winning or losing - as well as doctrine and training - are simply more important than tech specs. Also, fleets are not composed of their best vehicles, but of mixed types with varying capabilities. It also belies the notion that attacking is what really leads to high tank losses. Russian relative losses were lower in the late war, higher in the early. German relative losses were higher in the late war, lower in the early. As one might expect, but directly contrary to the "attacking is what gets ya" notion, the side that is attacking is the side that is winning, and does better at those times than it does at other times.

When I entered the discussion, I offered evidence against the 6:1 story and in favor of the 2:1 figure already given by somebody else. The propounder of the former story wasn't you, obviously, whatever you have said about it since. I also addressed the "manhandled in 1941" aka tech dominance story, which you had put forward, and which also included the "defense is easier" angle - because in fact defense is harder. (Ask a Russian vet of 1941 - if you can find a live one). And I listed a sea of factors and pitfalls involved in the whole subject. Last, I offer the point that periods of high attrition create an odds swing in favor of the side capable of replacing the losses faster, leading to operational wins. Meant as a more significant real factor (or process if you like) than the tech dominance idea.

As I read your subsequent responses, the Germans, instead of losing the war between summer 1943 (when they had "dominance" from the first "big cats") and say spring of 1944 (when T-34/85s appeared in numbers), they were supposedly winning. The Russians were being slaughtered, tech specs being the most important thing and the Germans having better tanks at the top of their fleet mix in that period than the Russians did. (Arguably, they had better ones for the remainder of the war - i.e. essentially the entire period they were losing For the top anyway, rather than for the mix).

All that unpleasantness from Orel and Kharkov to the Dnepr bend was actually Russian propaganda, and AG South wasn't really busted wide open. The decisive battles of the entire war were actually decided in favor of the supposedly losing side, presumably because they had better front armor plates or something.

It really is a serious problem for the tech dominance story, isn't it? I mean, the period when only T-34/76 fleets faced defenders who had Tigers and Panthers, and had at least converted all other production to 75L48, is the precise period in which the side with all the biggest cats on the field lost the war.

How did this happen? I already explained it with some care, when I spoke about the odds swing in favor of the side capable of replacing losses faster, resulting from a period of high attrition.

There is a similar problem with the 6:1 idea. Not having been outproduced 6:1 in tanks, had that ratio really been achieved the Russians would have run out of tanks and the Germans wouldn't have. Which just isn't what happened. Whereas the 2:1 figure is perfectly believable - having been outproduced by more than that, the Germans lost despite a favorable absolute kill ratio. Because the kill ratio in their favor was smaller than the production ratio against them.

6:1 and tech dominance and a defender's edge, fail to predict the actual events of the war. 2:1 and replacement rate dominance and an edge to strategic initiative, predict them perfectly.

[Roksovkiy]

The average for all German tanks may have been 2.5:1 for the entire war, but the average for the Tiger tank was much higher.

The Tiger I specifically did have an average kill ratio of 10:1.

The daily tank losses and CONFIRMED enemy tank kills for SS and army Tiger Abteilungs show this ratio on microfilm at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.

As those reports were intended to allow the corps commander to assess the combat strength, and effectiveness of his divisions they are considered accurate and thorough primary evidence to the US army post war.