German\Allied armour kill ratios?

[Username]

More encyclopedia jasonica.

jasons arguments come down to "See? alot of T34/85 in Berlin, ergo, they won the war.". (I thought that was Maximus' line.)

Again, for those that think they can blow smoke out thier butts and impress people, unless tank on tank battle data can be offered up, alot of the numbers you see here are open to interpretation. When tank-on-tank data is put here, it is poo-poo'd by the self proclaimed "analyzer". So I am posting data on the combatants OWN claims against themselves. That is, total writeoffs reported by the side losing the tanks. Perhaps jason will explain how these are understated just like the kill claims are overstated.

Just for the record, I was refering to T34 and KV manhandling the early panzers. Most of the tank kills were against other soviet tanks because the T34/KV1 were minority vehicles during 1941 (maybe 42 also).

Anyone can see through the rest of the jasons blather (hes desperately trying to put words into others mouths). He wont address previous points like the fact that Tiger and panther numbers steadily increased but thats to be expected. I said it before, arguing with jason is an exercise in futility.

Lewis

[PzKpfw 1]

I would question how any of us here can empirecly challenge the claimed 'tank' kills of any nation in WW2, as their is no way to verify any of the data, not thru formula, guestimates, etc.

People have tried for years to discount or prove their tank loss theories etc, Ie, one group attempted to use Soviet unit loss data, to compare to an German Tiger Abt data by date etc, it failed as Soviet data was non existant & or incomplete. Several groups have attempted this as well with varying results.

Another example was US records for Italy where in one engagement Sherman's claimed a large number of Tigers KO'd,& the data was accepted for years & in book recounts as well.

Problem is later when the Tiger Abt war diaries were studied it was found the Abt had not suffered anywhere near the losses that had been claimed by US tankers etc.

In a few cases we can directly compare tank losses vs tank claims on both sides from unit diaries etc, but in the majority of the cases as in the East, it's just not possible at this time to verify or to disprove the claims etc.

Ie, during the 'defensive' phase of Zitadelle (May 23 - July 12 1943) the Soviet's lost 1,614 tanks & SU's, & then 'lost' another 2,586 tank's & SU's during the offensive stage (July 12 - Aug 18 1943) yet no breakdown by cause of loss is given. Nor is their any open way to 'verify' these numbers etc, nor is their anyway to verify cause of loss even when the data is supplied as mistakes in COD were often made by the inspectors whom filed the reports etc.

The Soviet's, Germans, US etc also made mistakes in tank destruction identification Ie, Soviet claims from Prokhorovka also included Ferdinand's though we now know from German records II SS Pz Korps had no Ferdinands. Ie, in Italy PzKpfw IV's destroyed were often claimed as Tiger's etc.

Regards, John Waters

[ 09-10-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[JasonC]

Roksovkiy continues to confuse a claim with a kill, and calls things "confirmed" that are just claims about the other side's losses. Apparently if a claim is signed twice and reduced to achive form he thinks it thereby becomes true. It doesn't. And the same sort of reports that award 10:1 ratios to Tigers award 5:1 ratios to StuG.

As I have said repeatedly, on average claims of the other guy's losses are overestimated by a factor of two compared to what is seen to happen to tank strength on the other side of the hill. And the reasons for this are obvious and have nothing to do with intentional distortion - repeat claims for the same KOed AFV, kills reported for tanks only damaged and put back into service quickly, kills claimed that were kills at all, category confusion about light armor, etc.

As an aside, Roksovkiy also accepts a 2.5:1 figure for overall losses, which was the original question. The dispute about how high the ratios were for particular types, units, and periods are a seperable matter, I quite agree. But this does not mean that claims known to be wrong about the overall story should be accepted for each piece of it, or for arbitrarily selected ones.

John says nobody can know anything, or everything, about the subject this long after the fact with data so open to mistakes. Not everything or with certainty, I quite agree. Know nothing, on the contrary. We can falsify particular extreme claims by using known data, allowing for significant distortion for kinds known to be less reliable - including kill claims made about the other side's losses, which was the only example of supposed unknowability John actually cited. His own method of checking such claims - losses reported on the other side of the hill - to show they are in general unreliable, shows also how more nearly correct and comparable figures can be arrived at.

Reports of the other guy's losses are inherently unreliable and high. Reports of one's own losses, when available and fitting other known factors, are much more reliable. Most of the falsifiable ratio claims commonly made come solely from comparing one side's known total write offs with its own claims about the other side's battlefield KOs.

This is not a general inability to know anything, but a particular and known mistake in reasoning. It prevents acceptance of certain kinds of figures (claims), or meaningful ratios between figures of different kinds (claims to own total write-off figures). It does not prevent all knowledge of what happened, within reasonable ranges of error.

Incidentally, the "Elephants" claimed by the Russians in the south were undoubtedly Nashorns, two units of which were operating in that sector. The men there had probably never seen a true Elephant, since they had never been employed before except on the opposite front in the same time period. They called all the long 88mm TDs the same thing because they hadn't yet seen both, to be able to tell the difference.

John also mentions another figure for Russian tank losses in the Kursk period, which he expends to include late May and a period in August. The total period he gives the figures for is 87 days long. He gives a figure of 4200 AFVs lost in that period, which is perfectly believable. However, it is worth noting that Russian production over the same expanded period would come to around 5700 AFVs. German production over the same period would be around 2500 AFV.

The loss figures are consistent with a loss ratio on the order of 2:1, while the rival 6:1 explanation would put German losses over the same period at just 700 AFV (not in the peak week of the offensive, but from late May to mid August). Total German tank strength should then have climbed on the order of 1500 AFV (allowing some losses elsewhere) or more than 20% during the Kursk campaign.

I don't think anyone actually maintains it did. The usual claim is that the panzer divisions still existed and were still fighting at 1/2 strength or better during the defensive phase, therefore the German armor must not have been destroyed at Kursk. But it needn't have been, and given the replacement stream could not have been, absolutely, unless the Russians actually outscored the Germans in absolute terms, which nobody maintains.

Whereas my claim all along has been (1) the Germans had a favorable absolute kill ratio at Kursk on the order of 2 to 1 but (2) their front line armor strength was attrited, particularly in July, (3) the Russians replaced their losses more rapidly and thus achieved a local odds edge which (4) had operational consequences. And in particular, tech spec advantages of a Tigers and Panthers did not have such operational consequences - because there weren't enough of them or their ratios weren't high enough or both.

Next we get to lewis who offered the least of the remaining debators. He reduces my specific point that the Russian won the decisive battles of the war in the exact time window when German tank specs were superior and as yet uncountered, and being fielded in increasing numbers as he himself insists, and when he claims the Russians "were being slaughtered" - to noting that T-34/85s arrived in Berlin a year and a half later.

He does not face the problem with his own preferred story about what was happening, at all. The war was lost between the opening of Kursk and just prior to the begining of the overdetermined outcome in Bagration. This is the precise period in which the Germans had Tigers and Panthers in the field and the Russians did not yet have fleets of T-34/85s or anything as capable as the SU-100, to duel with them.

Next lewis tries to hang everything on the expanding role of Panthers and Tigers in the German fleet mix in this period. Every fleet mix changes its composition toward production rates, after those production rates change and with a lag. In the fall of 1943 there were still quite a number of Pz IIIs running around, though production of them had ceased.

Naturally tanks that have been discontinued form a falling portion of the fleet mix over time. Those being introduce initially form a small portion of the fleet and thus a small portion of the losses, while they are a comparatively high portion of the production stream.

For example, Tigers and Panthers fielded at Kursk were 1/7.5 of the tanks present, while Tiger and Panther production in 1943 were more like 1/4 of AFV produced. The largest production models were however Pz IV long and StuG. The fleet of early 1944 was therefore a portion of Panthers and Tiger plus lots of these 75mm long medium AFV, while the old Pz III fleet was basically gone. This was an ordinary "product transition", and does not require any higher kill ratio.

There undoubtedly was a somewhat higher ratio for these types compared to the vanilla types; it just probably wasn't 10:1 as often claimed. If it were, the ~2400 of the critters produced in 1943 would more than account for all Russian tank losses of that year, on their own, leaving nothing for the main fleet model 75L48s, the older decaying Pz III fleet (down to ~1/3rd of the force by Kursk and less effective, certainly), the Marders and Nashorns, the towed 88s and PAK, the mines artillery airforce of infantry. It is an extravagant claim on its face. And the only evidence for it are claims of the same type known to be grossly wrong if believed from all units for the whole war.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

I would question how any of us here can empirecly challenge the claimed 'tank' kills of any nation in WW2, as their is no way to verify any of the data, not thru formula, guestimates, etc.

]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That is also what I am saying. The origional question is tank-vs-tank battles. Jason loves to try to take people down paths where he feels that discussions must go.

In answer to the origional question, I think I have already answered it.

Unless people start posting after action reports of tank units fighting other tank units, then overall numbers can be taken anyway you want.

Lewis

[Ari Maenpaa]

Just for general interest here’s the kill/loss stats for the Finnish StuG IIIGs during the Soviet summer offensive in Karelia '44:

Kills 87

Losses 8

Couple of facts to note:

- There were about 20 operational Finnish StuGs fighting in those battles.

- The StuG's saw about three weeks of front-line duty and only about seven days of tank fighting.

- The Finnish Armoured Division which utilised these vehicles was one of the best trained units in the Finnish Army.

- Most of the 'kills' were T-34s, but there were also ISU-152s and very likely some IS-tanks too. (The Finnish Army was not familiar with the new Soviet IS-2s in ‘44 and therefore referred to them as KV-tanks)

This information comes from http://www.geocities.com/~fi1877/sturmi.html and more detailed statistics with other data can be found there.

Feel free to criticize.

Ari