German Light tanks VS. Stuarts w/ dissapointing results...

[Marlow]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

How about, instead, we compare the typical German tanks *used in panzer Divisions* to the typical opponents they saw?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

From Achtung Panzer! Discussing 1940 Panzer division strength:

"Previously existing 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 10th Panzer Division had their Panzer Regiment composed of four Panzer Abteilungs. Each Panzer Regiment as well as each Panzer Battalion had its own Command Company. This company was made up of five PzKpfw II tanks along with other vehicles and towed artillery pieces. Each Panzer Battalion was composed of three companies. 1st company was equipped with five PzKpfw IV and ten PzKpfw I and II. 2nd and 3rd company were equipped with five PzKpfw III and seventeen PzKpfw I and II. PzKpfw I and II tanks, when possible were replaced with PzKpfw III and IV tanks."

So each panzer battalion had:

5 mark IIs

5 mark IIIs

5 mark IVs

44 mark I or IIs replaced when possible with mark IIIs or IVs.

If Achtung Panzer! is right, and these figures are accurate, then the "typical german tank" used in the Panzer division had either a one or two man turret, and no dedicated radio operator, the same as the French. All other things being equal, I'll take the bigger gun and better armor.

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

How about, instead, we compare the typical German tanks *used in panzer Divisions* to the typical opponents they saw?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

A minor quibble to your otherwise (as usual) excellent post, Jeff. Assuming I understand what you meant to say, it can be said that in May, 1940, the Germans had, for all practical purposes, no standard organisation for their Panzer divisions. There were a couple here and there that were pretty similar, but it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the TO&E of each division was unique. This was partly due to the fact that the Germans were still experimenting with the organisation of the Panzer and motorised divisions but mostly due to the fact that they didn't have enough of any kind of tank to give everybody the same equipment. Some divisions had predominantly the Pz. Mk. III, some the Mks. I and II, still others the Pz. 38t. Even as late as Barbarossa, several divisions were equiped with the 38t.

But it doesn't stop with the tanks. There was great variability in the establishment of infantry, artillery, and recon assets too. I have a book with this information in it somewhere. If I can think of it, I'll dig it out and post the specifics.

Michael

[This message has been edited by Michael emrys (edited 12-29-2000).]

[Jeff Heidman]

Field Panzer Strength priot to invasion of France:

Training (I/II) tanks without radios/3 man turrets: 1,619

"Modern" tanks (PzkpfwIII/IV, Czech): 975

Granted, there were more of the "old" tanks than "new", but it is hardly the case that the new tanks were a fraction of the old. And I never claimed otherwise.

As far as the Matilda II was concerned, the Brits had exactly 23 of them in France. Not exactly decisive. That is compared to about 500 of the light tanks that did not even have a actual gun (just a machine gun). They did have 73 Matilda I's. It had a 2-man crew and no main gun. So the Brits fielded 23 "modern" tanks to Germanies 900.

The French did not have a single model of tank equipped with a standard radio and 3-man turret. Not one. The Somua was a nice tank, but crippled by its lack of a radio or dedicated gunner, as were ALL French tanks.

I say again: Much of Germanies early success is attributed to their superior armor designs. Big gun/lots of armor != better tank.

Jeff Heidman

[Jeff Heidman]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Marlow:

The Matilda II outclassed any German tank of the period in ever category relevant to tank on tank fighting except mobility.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Matilda II had a very marginal gun (40mm). Some would argue (Guderian for one) that the most important part of a tank is its engine, so discounting mobility so casually is a bit dangerous.

The Matilda II was the King Tiger of the 40s, only without the guarantee kill gun. Big, slow, almost impervious, but it certainly was a problem for whatever unit it ran up against.

So, to sum up, it outclassed every German tank of the period in every aspect of tank on tank fighting with the exception of mobility and firepower. I would consider those two pretty important assets.

Jeff Heidman

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

I say again: Much of Germanies early success is attributed to their superior armor designs.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not much argument from me there. Most commentators state firmly that it was the German operational doctrine that gave them the decisive edge. Clearly, having large numbers of radios immensely faciltated the employment of that doctrine. The French would have been handicapped in emulating German tactics even had they tried.

Michael

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

It will be interesting to see whether BTS manages to successfully portray the considerable weaknesses some of those vehicles were afflicted with. Given the lack of command and control modelling, it will be difficult to do I think.

it is easy to model a better gun or thicker armor. A lot harder to model things like lack of spotting ability, lack of ability to control a unit once the shooting starts, and such, since the player ends up taking over most of those roles in a wargame anyway.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'm not yet convinced of that. I assume that at every spotting opportunity the program assesses the probability of a successful spot and rolls a die. In the case of vehicles with small crews or otherwise limited spotting ability, the probabilties will just be calculated at steeper odds.

The control problem is knottier. I don't claim to have worked that one out yet. It certainly isn't too soon to begin discussing it since it will be essential to CM2. I suppose one starting point would be to greatly lengthen the command delay (possibly over several turns). That might not prove popular, but that's the way it was. The program might also make it more likely for an uncontrolled unit to do something irrational. That too probably will not go down well with a certain set who have come to expect god-like C&C over all their units. But again, war is hell, ain't it?

Michael

[Jeff Heidman]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Not much argument from me there. Most commentators state firmly that it was the German operational doctrine that gave them the decisive edge. Clearly, having large numbers of radios immensely faciltated the employment of that doctrine. The French would have been handicapped in emulating German tactics even had they tried.

Michael<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think the two go hand in hand.

One is forced to ask oneself once you start doing any in depth study of AFV design and production in the immediate pre-war era:

"Why were the Germans the only ones to realize the importance of dedicated commanders and radios?"

The Germans were not successful because of their operational skill AND their superior tanks (meaning tanks with radios and three-man turrets), rather, they had superior tanks []because it was demanded by their operational doctrine.

If tanks were really just there to support the infantry attack, then radios and large turrets maybe are not so important. If your tanks will never be massed as an single striking force, then why spend all that money on radios so that 4 tanks can talk to each other?

But the Germans figured it out first. Not really, they just implemented it first, but we will leave that for the moment.

You can't seperate the German radios from the German doctrine any more than you can seperate the French lack of radios from the French doctrine.

The Germans were not techincal wizards, they just realized one fundamental idea before everyone else. Their tank design was driven by their operational doctrine, and proved decisive in on the tactical level as well.

Jeff Heidman

[Tiger]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As an interesting aside, it will be fun to see how many players who always play the Germans are going to stick with Jerry when its KV1 vs. mark III in CM2, or when the CharBs and Matildas show up in CM4.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Probably call in the Stuka dive bombers for close support.

john

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

The Germans were not successful because of their operational skill AND their superior tanks (meaning tanks with radios and three-man turrets), rather, they had superior tanks []because it was demanded by their operational doctrine.

If tanks were really just there to support the infantry attack, then radios and large turrets maybe are not so important. If your tanks will never be massed as an single striking force, then why spend all that money on radios so that 4 tanks can talk to each other?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed.

Michael

[Doug Beman]

Jeff, the Germans didn't really start facing T34s commonly until late 1941, if my memory of history is correct (and it might well not be) and when it happened that, combined with the weather, was what halted the Germans at the end of 1941. Such events as Kamenewo showed just how far behind the Germans were in tank technology; only towed 88s had a chance against the T34 at common battle ranges, and against the KV tanks even the 88 had trouble.

DjB

[Jarmo]

The Stuka is a good point.

The early german succes was not only because of the better

tank doctrine, but a better doctrine overall. A new kind of

cooperation between the different army branches.

Dive bombers, arty, tanks, infantry, all working together.

And of course, if a Matilda starts causing too much trouble,

bring in one of those handy 88 guns.

[Shadow 1st Hussars]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Trooper:

Ihe faster turret and faster reload time

NTM<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Only the american version.

[Major Tom]

Actually, the British had around 150 Cruiser tanks (Marks I-IV) in the 1st Armoured Division. These tanks were equal if not superior to the most common Mark III and IV tanks in the German inventory. The Mark III that saw service in France in 1940 was only equipped with a 37mm Gun, leaving the British with the 40mm Gun having the largest and most effective AT weapon mounted on a vehicle. The 40mm managed to still take out the latest German armour until 1942, albiet not at long ranges.

The Mark III and IV's equipped with 50mm Guns or Long Barrelled 75mm Guns along with extra bolted on armour were yet to be seen. German tanks were about as unreliable as Allied ones as well, however, seeing that they were advancing they could repair any broken down tank while the allies had to spike them.

The British also had about 300 of the Vickers Mark VI tanks, with the Mark VIC having a 15mm Gun. These were comparable to Panzer Mark I and II tanks (armed with 2x MG's or 1x MG and 1x 20mm).

23 Matilda II and 37 Matilda I tanks of the 4th and 7th RTR savaged Rommel's 7th Panzer Division and an SS Division (T-something?). A pretty good feat for such small numbers. Only an improvised screen of 88mm AA guns and lack of timely support by a French Light Mechanized Division caused the British attack to hald. Rommel stated later that he thought that he was up against 5 British Tank Divisions. British tanks were also generally equipped with Radio. It wasn't until 1942 when the Matilda II lost its title as queen of the battlefield in Africa.

When the Germans met heavy allied resistance on the attack they had the ability to call on an air force that had total air superiority to knock out whatever foe was in front of them. Just like the Allies in 1944, the Germans in 1940 were fighting with slightly inferior equipment but had the benefit of air superiority and the initiative of the attack to move the odds in their favour. In fact, it was encountering superior Allied tanks in 1940 that led to upgrading the Mark III to a 50mm gun, the addition of extra armour, and the development of the Tiger I tank.

A typical French Armoured Division contained 2 Battalions of Light tanks (R-35's) and 2 Battalions of heavy tanks (B-1 Bis). They were severely short of Infantry (only 1-2 Battalions). The French Light Mechanized Divisions were better suited, and probably better organized even than German Armoured Divisions. They contained 2 Battalions of Light Tanks (H-35 H-39) and 2 Battalions of Medium Tanks (S-35) Plus 2 Battalions of Armoured Cars/Scout Tanks, along with a Brigade of Infantry. These DLM's had great success against the Germans in Belgium, unfortuantely they weren't in the Sedan region in May 1940.

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Major Tom:

In fact, it was encountering superior Allied tanks in 1940 that led to upgrading the Mark III to a 50mm gun, the addition of extra armour, and the development of the Tiger I tank.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You sure about that last part? I always heard it that it was the surprise encounter with the KV-1 and T-34 in 1941 that spurred the development of the Tiger.

Michael

[Major Tom]

The Germans started developing the Tiger I before entering Russia. If it was inspired by the T-34 and KV-I then it would incorporate all of the innovations in each of these vehicles (ie. sloped armour, Christie type suspension). The Panther and King Tiger was Germany's response to encountering Russian tanks. The Tiger I was so far in its development when the Russian armour was encountered that it would waste valuable resources trying to incorporate all of the lessons learned. The need for a heavy tank preceeded that of a perfect tank.

[von Lucke]

The vast majority of French tanks (some 1500 - 1700) were distributed at company strength throughout the Infantry regiments. This number ought to be compared with the 1130 Infantry battalions fielded in 1940 to appreciate the dilution of the French tank force. These tanks never fought at more than platoon strength, more often being sacrificed in ones and twos. When the infantry formations surrendered many tanks were captured intact, often without having fired a shot. Most were re-used by the Germans, either complete (Somuas defended Berlin in '45), or as tracked platforms for howitzers and AT guns (see Major Becker's work in Normandy).

A rare exception to the above, was the counter-attack of DeGaulle's 4th DLM (Division Legere Mechanique) near Montcornet on 16 May 1940 --- his co-ordinated use of armor pushed to within 2 miles of Gen. Guderian's XIX Corps HQ before over-extending and having to withdraw. Even so, it resulted in what were probably the first 2 tanker aces in history, when a pair of Char B1 bis claimed 13 German tanks destroyed (2x MkIV and 11x MkIII) between them.

As people have already commented, it will be interesting to see how BTS handles what is effectively a failure in doctrine vs technology (I consider the lack of radios and the one-man turret a doctrinal failure, as the technology was available, just not being utilized).

As we've seen in CMBO Quick Battles, most people just buy whatever the available points will get them, irregardless of whether those units ever functioned as a combat team. Just as Tigers seem to be everywhere in Normandy, expect to see Char B1's lumbering through the fields of Cambrai...

(PS: The Tiger project {a heavy assault tank capable of breaking through enemy defenses} hit the drawing board in 1937. The Germans --- in typically Teutonic anal-retentive manner --- just kept revising the design every 6 months as they ran into newer and bigger opponents).

[von Lucke]

Oh, yah --- the Stuart! Great tank! High rate of fire, fast turret traverse, 3x MGs! Can't beat it with a stick!

[Guest Michael emrys]

Strikes me as interesting how quickly a thread that started off talking about light tanks gravitated to the subject of heavy tanks. Too bad Einstein isn't around any longer, he could probably come up with a theory to explain it.

Michael

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

It will be interesting to see how CM models things like two man turrets and the absence of radios. WRT radios, I think having some sort of command radius from the lead tank in the platoon might work well, with there being longer delays for unradioed tanks, and even longer delays for unradioed tanks out of C&C. The delays needn't be huge for tanks in C&C, but they should probably be significant enough that players would have an incentive to give these tanks detailed, multi-turn orders. If the orders are poor, it would probably lead to the uncoordinated type of attack you sometimes hear that Soviet tankers made in early war. On the other hand, if the plan is good and the plan that the radioless tanks follow leads them to concentrate right on the German armor, the Germans are going to have significant problems. Although they could presumably scatter, get out of LOS, regroup, and attack elsewhere because of the flexibility of the radios.

There are a couple of different ways to model one-and-two man turrets. One thing would be to decide if the disadvantages of a two man turret might be smaller in lighter tanks (see, this post *is* about light tanks ). I could imagine, although I don't know, that having the commander load the gun with a 37mm shell (I think the shell, including the cartridge is about 1 1/2 inches in diameter and about 15" long) would be less distracting than in, say, a T-34, where the 76mm shell is larger, heavier, and definitely requires more attention and both hands.

Buttoned commanders might reduce c&c more, or perhaps increase delay, but commanders would have to be buttoned if they were helping fire the gun in a one-or-two man turret.

And of course ROF would be slower.

WRT to France 1940, I think that doctrine was more important than the actual equipment used. I believe that the Germans could have won in about the same way if they had the French tanks and the French had the German tanks. Even if your tanks have radios and three-man turrets, you won't be able to do anything about the local armor superiority of 20 to 1, or about the fact that you have no artillery because it was either knocked out by Stukas or cut off and destroyed. And of course now the Stukas are looking for you.

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

WRT radios, I think having some sort of command radius from the lead tank in the platoon might work well, with there being longer delays for unradioed tanks, and even longer delays for unradioed tanks out of C&C. The delays needn't be huge for tanks in C&C, but they should probably be significant enough that players would have an incentive to give these tanks detailed, multi-turn orders.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think you're on the right track here, but in addition to a command radius, there needs to be some way for accounting for intervening terrain. That is, a command tank should not be able to give or change orders to any tank out of its LOS regardless of range. The uncommanded tank would simply strive to complete its last valid order or (perhaps much less likely) something on its own initiative the way the TAC AI already works.

Michael

[Major Tom]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by von Lucke:

The vast majority of French tanks (some 1500 - 1700) were distributed at company strength throughout the Infantry regiments. This number ought to be compared with the 1130 Infantry battalions fielded in 1940 to appreciate the dilution of the French tank force.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

My understanding was that most independent French tank units worked primarily at the Battalion level. I have a book of Camoflage and markings for Allied and Axis tanks from 1939 to 1940, and all of the historical pictures of independent (mostly R-35, with each battalion containing 45 Tanks) units stated Battalion sized (ie. this tank belonged to this independent battalion). These battalions were either directly attached to a division, or, more commonly attached to a GBC (loosely translated as Group of Tank Battalions) which had 2-4 Battalions, roughly a Brigade sized unit.

There were a few independent Tank Companies, but, they were primarily B1 Bis and D2 tanks. Not every infantry Battalion had Armoured accompanyment, only the Motorized Divisions had tank strength, and this was an attached company.

In a way, a tactical CM battle will be much better for the French than for the Germans, since it was more common for Armour to be present with an Infantry force as it wasn't totally concentrated in the 10 Panzer Divisions and Motorized Divisions.

[Kanonier Reichmann]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Strikes me as interesting how quickly a thread that started off talking about light tanks gravitated to the subject of heavy tanks. Too bad Einstein isn't around any longer, he could probably come up with a theory to explain it.

Michael<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Don't tell me you haven't heard of Einsteins "Theory of Heavativity"? It's been published since the 1950's!

Regards

Jim R.

[Jarmo]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael emrys:

I think you're on the right track here, but in addition to a command radius, there needs to be some way for accounting for intervening terrain. That is, a command tank should not be able to give or change orders to any tank out of its LOS regardless of range.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don't think so. If that'd be the way the tanks are handled,

then that should also be the way for the infantry squads.

Might make the game a bit too unplayable.

I wonder if the moral penalties could be given to tanks as well

as infantry. A lone panicked T-34 hiding in a bush after being

scared by a King Tiger.

[Jeff Heidman]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jarmo:

I don't think so. If that'd be the way the tanks are handled,

then that should also be the way for the infantry squads.

Might make the game a bit too unplayable.

I wonder if the moral penalties could be given to tanks as well

as infantry. A lone panicked T-34 hiding in a bush after being

scared by a King Tiger. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Jarmo,

The reason it needs to be different is that when it comes to infantry, everyone is in the same boat (not really, the Soviets will need to be dealt with, maybe). Sure, it is questionable how a squad gets controlled by the player, but it is the same for all nationalities.

Armor is different. Some vehicles had radios, some did not. That makes a huge difference in Real-Life that is going to be hard to match in CM.

Under the current system, people are going to wonder why the French got stomped so badly, because without any way to simulate the 2 (or even 1) man turrets and lack of radios, it becomes hard to tell that the French tanks were inferior to the Pz III/IV they went up against.

The problem is that this issue is an issue that wargamers typically want to ignore in the interest of playing the game.

Jeff Heidman

[Jarmo]

I didn't mean there should be no penalties.

Just that the "out of radius units should be left to AI"

is way too harsh IMO.