How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[kimbosbread]

12 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

We haven't talked about systems like this in our TankIsDead™ style discussions, but this is another example of how low cost civilian electronics are threatening massive traditional military spending items.

Nobody wants a waifu pillow of “Girl and electronics workbench”, that’s the problem.

[ArmouredTopHat]

23 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is now in it's 3rd? year of operation since we first heard about it.  Seems to have been so successful that it's been expanded big time.

We haven't talked about systems like this in our TankIsDead™ style discussions, but this is another example of how low cost civilian electronics are threatening massive traditional military spending items.  Until recently only the "big boys", like Reytheon, could have made a network like this and I think we all know it would cost more than $500 a sensor!

Steve

To be fair, this is simply a detection system, not a kill system. Its still a million dollar investment when used in bulk and connected to a command system. Still, you are probably right in that a traditional big military company would find a way to 10x its cost for no good reason. I imagine they have kept quiet about it for OPSEC reasons. 

I wonder if there are applications for acoustic detection of FPV drones. 

Edited July 27 by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

49 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I agree that is the most likely explanation, however these could be improvisations to satisfy unfulfilled niches.  For example, they could be experimenting with having ATVs bring forward direct fire weapons because moving traditional vehicle based support weapons is problematic. 

To put this another way, there are two types of desperation we see.  The first is that X system is still being used but there's not enough of them to satisfy the need.  Desperate replacements.  The second is that existing systems might be plentiful, but aren't capable of doing what needs to be done.  Desperate in the sense that there's no new purpose built solution, instead relying upon old stuff.

We've seen a lot of instances of each of these by both sides.  Ukraine putting Maxim machineguns into frontline use or modifying old DShK with bipods and shoulder stocks are great examples of shortages.  Putting aged HMGs on the backs of pickup trucks to shoot down Russian/Iranian drones is an example of the second type.

Steve

Ukraine having to improvise makes a lot more sense with their significantly less deep stocks of...everything to be honest. 

The fact that Russian soldiers feel a need to take a BMP-1 gun and put it on a carriage that looks like something out of a Napoleonic gun battery says a lot about the state of affairs on the Russian side. Surely they have plenty of of SPG-9s laying around? Certainly the list of 'what the heck' improvisations  seem almost entirely Russian based. 

Edited July 27 by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

[ArmouredTopHat]

 

[Letter from Prague]

19 hours ago, The_Capt said:

We may not always agree but this one is right on point.

I go here so people can tell me it's not all doomed. The moment you start agreeing with me we really are in trouble.

[Letter from Prague]

2 hours ago, Holien said:

https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2024/07/ukrainian-drone-hit-bomber-olenya-airfield

Possible long range drone hit?

 

That is what I was thinking about. If Ukraine can hit airports, no more air-launched cruise missiles. And there is an Iskander factory somewhere in Russia and it is probably not in Vladivostok.

[Letter from Prague]

Ukraine Hacks ATMs Across Russia in Ongoing Massive Cyberattack

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/36471

Interesting. Anyone with information from the ground? This could impact things, the Russian banking system is pretty fragile already, considering they started giving bankers machine guns.

edit: "day five of massive Ukrainian cyberattack" ? Why am I learning of this now? Is this summer cyber-offensive or what?

Edited July 27 by Letter from Prague

[Erwin]

It's time to store cash as am sure it's only a question of time when our own financial systems are hit in the west - probably by China, if not Russia.  

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

To be fair, this is simply a detection system, not a kill system. Its still a million dollar investment when used in bulk and connected to a command system. Still, you are probably right in that a traditional big military company would find a way to 10x its cost for no good reason. I imagine they have kept quiet about it for OPSEC reasons.

Yes, that was what I was talking about.  A detection system like this in the past would likely run into the billions to cover that much territory.  But now? Millions.

When this was first put into the public domain a few years ago it was already an eyebrow raiser.  Now that it's been in use for a few years and expanded it's going to be viewed by some as a threat to their business interests.

1 hour ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I wonder if there are applications for acoustic detection of FPV drones. 

This particular system is unlikely to help much.  The following is informed speculation on the limitations of such a system:

First, detection will be difficult because small drones are fairly quiet and that would mean a denser sensor net than is necessary for the flying lawnmowers it's designed to detect. 

Second, if a small drone was detected, it's unlikely to be useful information because small drones are EVERYWHERE.  How do you track dozens of drones moving between sensors?  You don't.  What you'd be able to do is know "there are drones near Sensor X" and that's about it. 

Third, many of those drones will be friendly, which means false positives because it is impractical to have unique audio signatures for friendly drones (technically it is possible, of course).

So the detection of small drones will continue to be a problem with or without such a system.

Steve

[kimbosbread]

Yeah, I agree that acoustic detection is not useful for kamikaze drones:

• The time between detection and desired boom are pretty low, vs ghetto cruise missiles that will be in the air for several hours after they cross the border so you have time to hunt them and set up defences
• Smaller drones are not very loud, and high frequency sound is in audible past short distances, so you won’t hear them if they are 100m overhead and not hovering

[dan/california]

7 hours ago, Grigb said:

The guy name is Konstantin Golovin. He have health issues (40 years old) and AFAIR knee wound from prior assaults. But instead of going to hospital he was politely asked (first time they always polite) to go to assault to help his boys. Being typical RU man he decided to show how Patriotic Macho he is and agreed. 

What you see is not actual assault. This is widely dispersed column I was talking about before. What you do not see on video (some parts were edited out) he had buddy not far (do not remember what happened to buddy). And there was anti-drone shotgunner somewhat away. Everybody else is from 5 to 20 minutes away. 

• They guy was walking to reinforce already captured position and to continue assault
• He was spotted by Observer drone and then got FPV drone that gave him more shrapnel wounds and left him blind on one eye
• Being wounded and shocked the guy ran backward and tried to hide in line that was tree line in the past (due to crappy FPV optics it is still better than hiding in the open field)
• Few more drones arrived to finish him but the shotgunner arrived and drones switched all attention to him
• The shotgunner managed to take few drones down but was eventually overwhelmed and killed
• Due to FPV crappy optics with narrow field off view drones overlooked the guy and he was able to crawl away while shotgunner was blasting at drones

They guy managed to return, got finally to hospital, went through several surgeries, became low grade celebrity (due to surviving terror of drone encounter) and left to live terrible life of half blind disabled person in RU.

Many thanks for the full rundown! A couple of more questions since you seem to following this particular situation. Did he receive the payout he was promised? And is there any indication his minor celebrity status will be sufficient to get him a job as a traffic cop or similar? I am just really curious if the Russian system will completely bleep the guy even though he is internet famous, at least by mobik standards.

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I am so shocked.  I mean SHOCKED.  The day Russia allows a real investigation on its soil is the day Russia has changed in a fundamentally good way.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Ukraine having to improvise makes a lot more sense with their significantly less deep stocks of...everything to be honest. 

Oh for absolute sure on that point.  I just used Ukraine's examples because we know, for sure, why those two mentioned things happened.  With the Russians... well... who knows.  I suspect it is a combination of the two things, with the exception of obvious things like MT-LBs, T-62s, WW2 howitzers, and Scooby Doo vans.  Those are all clearly acts of desperation due to shortages rather than desperate adaptation to a new tactical need.  Cope cages, on the other hand, are the latter.

Steve

[Tux]

4 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Some interesting comments here made by the Russians.

• Logistics increasingly hampered and constrained overall, Ukrainians are making a concerted effort to focus on logistics at least in some areas.
• UGVs deployed by the Russians break within days. (!)
• Drone resupply possible but lack of heavy drones means limited payloads. (In contrast to heavy Ukrainian drones that can deliver more)
• Grave concern made about logistical prospects come the winter.
• Suggestion that terrain is currently helping with concealment (lots of leaves) and that this will be changed within a few months and only exasperate issues. 

Ukraine really might be onto a long term winner here if they keep up the logistical harassment with drones. The Russians dont see to really have an answer for this. 

It would be interesting to understand how far back the combat sustainment bottleneck has been pushed on either side.  A few days ago @Grigb noted that battlefield strikes, not OTH logistical attacks, were what has forced both sides to such historically low force densities at the frontline.  To be fair, I think Grigb was talking about attacks on storage depots and the like when he spoke about "OTH", but the source quoted above is not the first I've seen claiming that the border of "advanced logistics" has been pushed back 8-10km from the front.  What's more, it suggests that this is approaching the point where sustainment of even the current, hollowed out frontline force structure is a problem.

So I have some questions and wondered whether you folks could help strengthen my understanding (even if I'm just missing something bleedingly obvious):

1. What is the meaningful difference (if any) between low force densities caused by frontline strikes and those caused by (enforced) logistical constraints?  One results in spare logistical capacity sat idle and the other in spare combat capability likewise, right?
2. Is it just a coincidence that we seem to be in a situation whereby low force densities are apparently working at the limit imposed both by units' survivability at the front and by the capacity of at least Russia's logistics to support them?  I mean those are two different variables, defined by different constraining factors.  What are the odds that Ukraine's frontline and OTH strike capabilities just happen to constrain both Russia's frontline presence and the logistics required to support that presence at exactly the right ratio, so that neither have any room for expansion?  Why is it not 'we could field a higher density of forces if only we could supply them' or 'we could supply a higher density if only they would survive any length of time at the front'?
3. Where do we think the defining logistical constraints are biting, if it's not as far back as supply depots?  Is it 8-10km from the frontline, behind which there's loads of (or at least some) fat?  How much further back does it need realistically to be pushed in order to render any meaningful frontline presence impractical?

[billbindc]

18 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So I tell my students, “look at the first 15 years of the Cold War”.  They were by far the most dangerous.  Largely because the “rules” had not been written or normalized.  We were in a disruptive time with every player still trying to figure out the equilibrium through which to compete but not completely destroy each other.  After the Cuban Missile Crisis, things pretty much smoothed out and both sides dug  in for a long haul on established lines.  We had close calls, particularly in 1983 but we were also saved then by these “norms”.

We are entering into a new era and it will require new rules and norms that we have not figured out yet.  Warfare is not the only thing changing.  Leading us are at least two political generations who know nothing but the post-Cold War Great Peace.  They were raised in academic schools that embraced this whole “end of history” stuff and then entered government and political arenas all designed for exploiting that peace.

What they forgot was the faces of their fathers and grandfathers (nod to King).  That post-Cold War peace came at great sacrifice and cold-blooded calculation.  As we enter into this new era, the shortfalls of these schools of thought are just as dislocated as the western military schools who grew up assuming air supremacy.  The rules are being re-written in front of our eyes…the only real question left is, “do we want our hands on the pen?”

I call a Fukuyama Violation.

Rule 1202a-b: “When references to Fukuyama refer to the misreading of him rather than the fact that he actually predicted where we are now, all such violators will send billbindc one (1) six (6) pack of an unfiltered American style IPA (non-fruit forward) upon notice of said violation.”

[ArmouredTopHat]

Wagner had a VERY bad time in Malia today. 

[Letter from Prague]

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

I call a Fukuyama Violation.

Rule 1202a-b: “When references to Fukuyama refer to the misreading of him rather than the fact that he actually predicted where we are now, all such violators will send billbindc one (1) six (6) pack of an unfiltered American style IPA (non-fruit forward) upon notice of said violation.”

Some authors just have the worst luck so and became in common circles known for a completely backwards interpretation of their work so when you hear their name, you never know which way. See also Machiavelli, Nietzsche and Heinlein.

[ArmouredTopHat]

A very informative and somewhat sobering expert take on the F-16. Very valid points discussed.

Some positives not quite covered in the video that I think still make them entirely worth the venture.

• Replacing aged and overworked soviet legacy fighters is crucial, even if it will be a long and painful process. 
• Access to NATO air delivered munitions is far more sustainable long term. said munitions are also likely to be considerably better than what the Ukrainians are currently firing (lack of a proper BVR missile on par with the Russians seriously compromises what can currently be done)
• F-16s still constitute a radically improved airframe with far more capability than the current inventory of UAF jets. (especially with regards to BVR combat / radar coverage)  While maintenance of the airframe will be a challenge, the airframes themselves are replaceable given vast stocks of F-16 in NATO use. 
• Even if used largely defensively, deployment of F-16s will complicate VKS plans and force them to consider an angle of attack that up until this point was simply not a problem beforehand (proper BVR air to air threat risk) Threat in being is a very serious thing for air combat. 
• Their existence will tie up a shed load of Russian resources dedicated to destroying them. It is likely Ukraine are going to wage a concerted war of deception together with F-16 operations to make the Russians waste as much assets as possible seeking them out. We already see this with other 'high value' targets such as HIMARs. 
• Further demonstration that Russian 'red lines' are a load of horsesh*t and that support for Ukraine must continue. 

 

Edited July 27 by ArmouredTopHat

[chrisl]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is now in it's 3rd? year of operation since we first heard about it.  Seems to have been so successful that it's been expanded big time.

We haven't talked about systems like this in our TankIsDead™ style discussions, but this is another example of how low cost civilian electronics are threatening massive traditional military spending items.  Until recently only the "big boys", like Reytheon, could have made a network like this and I think we all know it would cost more than $500 a sensor!

Steve

My recommendation before they did it this way was to just make it a phone app that people can run in the background.  If you have the sound and the GPS coordinates of the phone you can do MLAT, even if the phone is moving around.

[billbindc]

20 minutes ago, Letter from Prague said:

Some authors just have the worst luck so and became in common circles known for a completely backwards interpretation of their work so when you hear their name, you never know which way. See also Machiavelli, Nietzsche and Heinlein.

Sure. But it keeps me in beer so....

[chrisl]

5 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

To be fair, this is simply a detection system, not a kill system. Its still a million dollar investment when used in bulk and connected to a command system. Still, you are probably right in that a traditional big military company would find a way to 10x its cost for no good reason. I imagine they have kept quiet about it for OPSEC reasons. 

I wonder if there are applications for acoustic detection of FPV drones. 

It's an accurate localization system that gives you time to put the kill systems in the right place.

It's basically ADSBExchange with acoustic sensors.

If you're not familiar with public ADS-B receivers, for about $150 you can put an antenna, software defined radio, and small computer in your home network to pick up ADS-B signals.  If you supply feeds to the various big sites (FR24, Flightaware, ADSBexchange, ADSB.fi) you get special access benefits in return.  ADS-B normally works by receiving actual telemetry data from aircraft (lat/lon, alt, speed, ID, etc).  But not all aircraft are equipped to transmit full ADS-B telemetry, particularly military A/C, and some law enforcement are allowed to turn off telemetry in some circumstances.  But they all are transmitting hex codes. MLAT uses timing data from the receiver network to localize the aircraft very accurately and precisely, even without any GPS data at all. This phone network is just doing the acoustic version.

detecting FPV (or any electric motor) drones is a lot harder than detecting Shaheds and Orlans.  They're basically flying lawnmower engines, and I can assure you that you can hear lawnmower engines for miles if you don't have a lot of obstacles in the way.  I can walk into mountains from home and you can hear lawnmowers and leafblowers from miles away once you've got a little bit of elevation difference.

Edited July 27 by chrisl

[chrisl]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

First, detection will be difficult because small drones are fairly quiet and that would mean a denser sensor net than is necessary for the flying lawnmowers it's designed to detect. 

Second, if a small drone was detected, it's unlikely to be useful information because small drones are EVERYWHERE.  How do you track dozens of drones moving between sensors?  You don't.  What you'd be able to do is know "there are drones near Sensor X" and that's about it. 

Third, many of those drones will be friendly, which means false positives because it is impractical to have unique audio signatures for friendly drones (technically it is possible, of course).

So the detection of small drones will continue to be a problem with or without such a system.

Steve

Moving between sensors isn't a problem so much as their props running at variable speed.

For an ICE that's running at constant speed you can do what amounts to Shazam to match signals across sensors (which is how you do MLAT in the first place).  

But electric motors are much quieter to start with, and then when you start varying the prop speed it gets harder to keep track of a single acoustic source (but probably not impossible).

It would probably make more sense, at least for now, to add SDR dongles to some fraction of the phones and use RF for tracking drones.  When I got mine for ADS-B it was ~$90. I think they're about $30 retail now.  It would probably be a "custom" one for Ukraine, but not all that custom, and they wouldn't have to put one on every phone the effective range for RF detection is much farther than acoustic, and if the drone is being controlled from the other side of the lines, it's going to have enough RF output to be easy to detect as it comes in.  Once they're all AI, you're out of luck, unless they're sending RT video but not receiving commands.

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, billbindc said:

I call a Fukuyama Violation.

Rule 1202a-b: “When references to Fukuyama refer to the misreading of him rather than the fact that he actually predicted where we are now, all such violators will send billbindc one (1) six (6) pack of an unfiltered American style IPA (non-fruit forward) upon notice of said violation.”

Who the hell is Fukuyama?  American IPA is just fine for children and those recovering from surgery but not grown men.

[Edit: ok, looked him up.  So what is the deal here?  He was all “end of history” and ideological conflict?  What was the misread? I feel like I have walked into a foreign country and am being ticketed for not giving proper respect to ducks]

Edited July 27 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, Tux said:

It would be interesting to understand how far back the combat sustainment bottleneck has been pushed on either side.  A few days ago @Grigb noted that battlefield strikes, not OTH logistical attacks, were what has forced both sides to such historically low force densities at the frontline.  To be fair, I think Grigb was talking about attacks on storage depots and the like when he spoke about "OTH", but the source quoted above is not the first I've seen claiming that the border of "advanced logistics" has been pushed back 8-10km from the front.  What's more, it suggests that this is approaching the point where sustainment of even the current, hollowed out frontline force structure is a problem.

So I have some questions and wondered whether you folks could help strengthen my understanding (even if I'm just missing something bleedingly obvious):

1. What is the meaningful difference (if any) between low force densities caused by frontline strikes and those caused by (enforced) logistical constraints?  One results in spare logistical capacity sat idle and the other in spare combat capability likewise, right?
2. Is it just a coincidence that we seem to be in a situation whereby low force densities are apparently working at the limit imposed both by units' survivability at the front and by the capacity of at least Russia's logistics to support them?  I mean those are two different variables, defined by different constraining factors.  What are the odds that Ukraine's frontline and OTH strike capabilities just happen to constrain both Russia's frontline presence and the logistics required to support that presence at exactly the right ratio, so that neither have any room for expansion?  Why is it not 'we could field a higher density of forces if only we could supply them' or 'we could supply a higher density if only they would survive any length of time at the front'?
3. Where do we think the defining logistical constraints are biting, if it's not as far back as supply depots?  Is it 8-10km from the frontline, behind which there's loads of (or at least some) fat?  How much further back does it need realistically to be pushed in order to render any meaningful frontline presence impractical?

I am not sure I buy into the initial interpretation to be honest.  It is not one or the other, it is the combination of both.  Hammering logistics prevents sustainment of large concentrations of troops and offensive exploitations, while strikes (which only work with ubiquitous ISR) are forcing dispersion.  At the same time ISR and strike are allowing fewer forces to effectively cover frontages in defence and denial.

We basically have two operational systems that can sustain denial with very low troops densities, while the offensive requirements are too high for both sustainment and strike issues.  Offensively we see penny packet small tactical surges almost happening in a pulse echelon to try and move forward.  The costs are enormous and chances for full breakout almost nil. Corrosive warfare may still work but it is not attriting fast enough to break already low energy systems. We almost need a form of Sanitization warfare to regain forward movement but the strike/fires packages to do that have not appeared on the battlefield. 

So other than strategic collapse….we are stuck…for now.