How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

I think he means that technically speaking, Russia will probably never exactly run out of war material, because before that happens it will reduce consumption/exposition to risk when faced with a shortage. Therefore one can not just draw a graph with one line representing average production, the other average consumption and at the point where they meet, the Russian army will stop firing guns or have no more tanks. He says this in all his podcasts in particular whenever ammo production is discussed, so I am fairly confident this is what is meant here as well.

And whereas the Russians can decide to reduce the firing rate/usage rate pretty much at will, they cannot increase the production rate by will alone, therefore the replacement rate is the more objectively observable variable.

 

That was my read also. 

[The_Capt]

54 minutes ago, sburke said:

The other question is, what are they counting that matters?  Maybe Russia can sustain MBT losses, maybe continue to scrounge artillery shells etc.  But those A50 AEW aircraft are in short supply and appear to be an endangered species.  The UA seems to have a laser focus on strategic assets that have a downstream effectiveness on Russia's ability to fight this war. 

As you said a while back - "- Re-think C4.  Data is a resource more important than gas.  We need to see the modern battlefield as a competitive data, information and knowledge environment.  We need to stop going to war to validate what we already know and accept that things are evolving very quickly."

If the UA can further deplete Russia's C4 capability more options become available to wage strategic strikes on Russia's infrastructure as well as find opportunities to use the F16 aircraft as they become available.

I think that if RA C4 can be eroded the effects are a lot deeper than strategic strikes.  If Russia cannot managed the C4 space, it cannot react to events in the field.  Nor can it employ a competitive targeting enterprise.  If the UA can achieve information superiority, and are backed up with resources to exploit that, we could see operational level corrosive warfare that can create RA collapse.

A key question is at what point can the RA no longer effectively defend an 800 km front?  At that point collapse becomes likely and the area will have to fall back onto a lower energy state and shrink that frontage.  The result will be opportunities for the UA to retake significant ground and regain momentum.  Information is a key component of all this is it really allows the RA to be able to react with low troop density along that very long frontage.  Take that away and those troops essentially are pushed back in time.  Go back far enough, like say WW2 level of C4, and 300 troops cannot hold a km as they are now.

To my mind this dimension of the war is more important than tank production.

Edited March 11 by The_Capt

[Battlefront.com]

My take on the Kofman statement is similar, though I also had the same reaction The_Capt had.  If for no other reason than the academic word salad he tossed.

We've talked about this many times before and, "technically", running out of something is never the question to ask.  The correct question to ask is when will a reduction in X result in a meaningful negative impact on Y.

Case in point is that Ukraine did not "run out" of artillery shells, ever, but on several occasions the supply was reduced to an extent that Russia was able to leverage advantage.  Be it taking ground it might not have taken or taking it with fewer casualties than it otherwise would have.

So the question should not be "when will Russia run out of X", because as argued the answer is "never".  The more relevant question for Russia is "when will Russia run out of X Soviet era stockpile".  And even that is not really the right question.  "When will Russia run down its X Soviet era stockpile to the point of it impacting replacement/sustainment of Y capability?"

We just saw photographic evidence that Russia has probably exhausted one of its primary stockpiles of mothballed artillery systems.  Let's presume they didn't move any or have other yards of similar size.  This means every new loss will require a new system be built if there is to be a replacement.  Russia has yet to face that sort of supply constraint and it is unclear what it will do when the inevitable happens.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

pour one out for

 

 

There's been a lot of great sounding rumors that have turned out to be untrue.  My hope is this is not one of them.

Steve

[dan/california]

Read Dmitri every day.

[dan/california]

 

[Kinophile]

 

 

[Kinophile]

Further to that strange ship attack:

We'll see. 

Could easily be just this:

"ship was grounded after Russia blew the Nova Kakhovka dam last June. Being used as a command/control base". 

Edited March 11 by Kinophile

[masc]

 

[Battlefront.com]

11 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Further to that strange ship attack:

We'll see. 

Could easily be just this:

"ship was grounded after Russia blew the Nova Kakhovka dam last June. Being used as a command/control base". 

There must have been a reason to hit the ship NOW.  I doubt Russia just started using it and I also doubt that Ukraine just caught wind of its use.  I'm not saying the rumors are true, just that I don't think the strike was done to nail a couple of dudes with headphones.

Steve

[Kinophile]

13 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

There must have been a reason to hit the ship NOW.  I doubt Russia just started using it and I also doubt that Ukraine just caught wind of its use.  I'm not saying the rumors are true, just that I don't think the strike was done to nail a couple of dudes with headphones.

Steve

So Possibly both are true -  it is an existing observation post and Teplinksky visited. UKR got wind and ploinked him. 

[Carolus]

Teplinsky is apparently alive, and the Thirteen guy was killed by Kadyrovites after starting beef with them.

No idea what was on that ship.

 

I don't see a reason to kill Teplinsky. Isn't he the idiot who only ordered meat assaults and wasted Russian material by sending them into narrow approaches at Krynky?

Ukraine should aim to keep as many of the old guard in Russia alive during the war. Their corruption and incompetence is 30% of Ukrainian war power (the rest is half Western tech, half massive titanium balls and grit).

Why risk a motivated up-and-coming nationalist to take his spot? Someone who has the kind of brains Putin would normally keep out of the higher ranks?

 

Edited March 11 by Carolus

[kimbosbread]

Abandoned ship on a channel being used as a Russian base is so 1960s French spy fiction.

[Kinophile]

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

7 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

 

 

My assumption is the amount of damage the preemptive strike did is over presented, but ANY preemptive move by Ukraine is exactly what they need to be doing.  Russia's reliance on pre-planned time tables means a significant zapping prior to execution throws the whole thing into chaos.  I mean, more than it would be after the attack started.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

33 minutes ago, Carolus said:

Teplinsky is apparently alive, and the Thirteen guy was killed by Kadyrovites after starting beef with them.

No idea what was on that ship.

 

I don't see a reason to kill Teplinsky. Isn't he the idiot who only ordered meat assaults and wasted Russian material by sending them into narrow approaches at Krynky?

Ukraine should aim to keep as many of the old guard in Russia alive during the war. Their corruption and incompetence is 30% of Ukrainian war power (the rest is half Western tech, half massive titanium balls and grit).

Why risk a motivated up-and-coming nationalist to take his spot? Someone who has the kind of brains Putin would normally keep out of the higher ranks?

 

So far no Russian senior commander has shown any skill IMHO.  So killing one or two of them won't have any impact on the war either way in terms of strategy.  However, from a morale standpoint killing him would be very good for one side more than the other!

Good riddance to 13th.  Funny that he was murdered by his own side.  I guess that's what happens when your side isn't really just one side.

Steve

[Beleg85]

47 minutes ago, Carolus said:

Teplinsky is apparently alive, and the Thirteen guy was killed by Kadyrovites after starting beef with them.

No idea what was on that ship.

 

I don't see a reason to kill Teplinsky. Isn't he the idiot who only ordered meat assaults and wasted Russian material by sending them into narrow approaches at Krynky?

Ukraine should aim to keep as many of the old guard in Russia alive during the war. Their corruption and incompetence is 30% of Ukrainian war power (the rest is half Western tech, half massive titanium balls and grit).

Why risk a motivated up-and-coming nationalist to take his spot? Someone who has the kind of brains Putin would normally keep out of the higher ranks?

 

Interesting rumours.

1. Tieplinsky is not an idiot, he was one of more "known" Russian generals of (reportedly and relatively to others) some better standing among soldiers. He doesn't (didn't?) shy away from visiting edge of frontlines. Also, some connected him to group of generals that Kremlin was unsure of during Prig's coup. It seems his death is a rumour so far.

2. 13th was  known source of still some level of independence , it's amazing how many milbloggers get killed/canceled/commited suicides in different ways already...if story about Chechens will confirm, it may be actually more than a common brawl. But his pciture seems fake- he was bearded several days ago.

3. What an idiot installed listening post on big ship in the middle of flat nowhere, when Ukrainians fly drones day and night, have thermal cameras and actually enjoy rare electonical advantage in the area? even reaching it with supplies would be difficult.

 

On other side, clip with Ukrainian MIG 29 shot down by own air defence 8th of march resurfaced.

 

Edited March 11 by Beleg85

[Kinophile]

Not gospel truth of course, but extra info. 

 

[Kinophile]

Not dead yet? 

 

 

[Kinophile]

Big claim. Nm Telenko, it's a Rob Lee/FT tweet. So take with salt. 

 

[sburke]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Big claim. Nm Telenko, it's a Rob Lee/FT tweet. So take with salt. 

 

What do we figure are the base requirements for Russia to maintain AEW coverage.? I would find it hard to believe they would forego any coverage at all over their Far East bases.  They need to cover the Moscow/St Petersburg axis and then the actual war zone. You need multiple shifts and time for maintenance.  What is the minimum they need to avoid gaps or start prioritizing away from Far East coverage- assuming they haven't done so already.

 

Heh heh just had an amusing thought.  I guess Russia won't be doing another major military exercise with China.  Be real embarrassing to show up with T55s and no AEW craft.  

Edited March 12 by sburke

[Kinophile]

 

 

[cesmonkey]

Another story on how Avdiivka fell:
 

 

[Kinophile]

If you're not already aware of him, this guy (assuming) does really good threads on various Soviet weaponry and vehicles. Time to share. 

 

Edited March 12 by Kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, sburke said:

What do we figure are the base requirements for Russia to maintain AEW coverage.? I would find it hard to believe they would forego any coverage at all over their Far East bases.  They need to cover the Moscow/St Petersburg axis and then the actual war zone. You need multiple shifts and time for maintenance.  What is the minimum they need to avoid gaps or start prioritizing away from Far East coverage- assuming they haven't done so already.

 

Heh heh just had an amusing thought.  I guess Russia won't be doing another major military exercise with China.  Be real embarrassing to show up with T55s and no AEW craft.  

Trent is at least on the right track because this is simple math, physics, and dancing with probabilities.

1 plane is not possible to provide 24 hour coverage because in less time than that the plane will run out of fuel, the crew will be exhausted, or something brakes.  This means, at a minimum, 2 planes are required to provide continuous coverage; one takes off to relieve the other before that one leaves its station.  The thing is if 12 hour shifts become a daily requirement all you've done is MAYBE extended the time before there's a problem with either a crew or a plane that doesn't allow a relief flight to launch on time.  So 2 planes doesn't work.  Three planes gives you 8 hour shifts and 16 hours of downtime per airframe.  There's a little wiggle room if one plane has a significant problem, but only 16 hours before back to the 2 plane scenario.  This is a likely scenario beyond a short period of 24/7 coverage.  Which gives us the 4 "realistic" planes Trent is talking about.

The real question is... do we know how many planes Russia can use since two were popped out of the sky and maybe (probably) some were burned on the ground?  I've not seen one yet, so Trent might be off the mark there.

Whatever the case is, I think it's pretty clear that somewhere that used to get covered is no longer getting any, or at least not regular, coverage.  The same would be true for the US if it lost a half dozen AWACS and none of its allies decided to help out.

And yet some think Russia's somehow winning the war...

Steve