How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Sojourner]

ISW summary for 18 October is talking about "company-sized elements of two Ukrainian naval infantry brigades", but they are speaking guardedly about its significance.

[Kinophile]

https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/from-impact-to-assessment-the-luhansk

Tatarigami has a substack. It's quite decent. 

[Harmon Rabb]

 The Crew of this AFU Flakpanzer Gepard, must have saved a lot of lives.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Sojourner said:

ISW summary for 18 October is talking about "company-sized elements of two Ukrainian naval infantry brigades", but they are speaking guardedly about its significance.

Company sized sounds way more plausible.  And yeah, with that sized force there's not much to talk about until it gets larger.  That's just not enough to do anything beyond being a worrisome thorn in Russia's side.

Steve

[sross112]

I'm betting the plan is to push more across, probably as many as can be sustained. i say this because it looks to me like a really good diversionary attack. If they can clear the area to the west, like stated above, defending won't be as difficult or supply intensive. So at least a couple brigades will demand a response from the RA. Enough of a response to contain a couple brigades will have to be significant, especially if the RA is as short on reserves as we think in the south. 

The reason I think we will see this is because we haven't seen much at all where the offensive was grinding in the south for a couple of weeks now. This after reports of the main line being breached. That means those forces have had the chance to rest, refit, or be replaced by fresh forces. A good diversionary attack to strip the defenders a little thinner would be a great idea before resuming the offensive with the focus on a breakout instead of a grind. 

May be all wrong here, but just my tea leaf reading.

[kluge]

Incidentally, the location on the left bank of the Dniper where this vehicle was blown up...

...is the exact same spot where Ukrainian forces were reportedly spotted recently.

At a minimum, this looks like a successful recon action that managed to traverse ~2km of marshland between the river bank and previously held Russian positions. Probably not much more than that for now, but it's certainly notable that this occurred along the route of one of the three bridges that previously traversed the river. One might think that would be an exceptionally well defended spot, but that does not appear to be the case.

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

Thread recommended by Michael Kofman: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1714715790153248909.html

Even though the first attacks were repelled, Russia will likely attack in this direction again in the future. There aren't many similar targets elsewhere. Progress will probably be slow, naturally depending on how much resources Russia will direct into capturing Avdiivka. 9/ 

In Bakhmut, Russians eventually switched from active flanking efforts into capturing the city block by block. If the Russians are fixated on capturing Avdiivka, there can be a long and difficult battle ahead, as Ukrainians are likely just as determined to hold it. 10/ 

In the long run, Ukraine may need to solve the encirclement threat with a counterattack. Especially the northern direction can develop into a real issue. Russians don’t need to advance far in order to make the situation more complicated for AFU. The distances are short. 11/ 

There are some worrying features, even though Ukraine managed to repel Russians for now.

Russia proved two things. It tried to take the initiative in a relatively fresh direction. Secondly, it still has reserves to do it, even though many have claimed the opposite. 12/ 

Even though it seems Russians have learned some lessions from previous offensives, for example from Vuhledar, the tactical outcome of the offensive in Avdiivka was still a failure. This, however, indicates that Russia aims to actively learn and adapt. 13/

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

6 hours ago, Kinophile said:

https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/from-impact-to-assessment-the-luhansk

Tatarigami has a substack. It's quite decent. 

Another successful ATACMS strike, this time on a Luhansk airfield

Too bad we are seeing these strikes only now at the end of the Ukrainian offensive season. Probably these will be a big help for the awaited "last push" of the current southern campaign before culmination and mud season. 

[cesmonkey]

12 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Thread recommended by Michael Kofman: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1714715790153248909.html

Even though the first attacks were repelled, Russia will likely attack in this direction again in the future. There aren't many similar targets elsewhere. Progress will probably be slow, naturally depending on how much resources Russia will direct into capturing Avdiivka. 9/ 

In Bakhmut, Russians eventually switched from active flanking efforts into capturing the city block by block. If the Russians are fixated on capturing Avdiivka, there can be a long and difficult battle ahead, as Ukrainians are likely just as determined to hold it. 10/ 

In the long run, Ukraine may need to solve the encirclement threat with a counterattack. Especially the northern direction can develop into a real issue. Russians don’t need to advance far in order to make the situation more complicated for AFU. The distances are short. 11/ 

There are some worrying features, even though Ukraine managed to repel Russians for now.

Russia proved two things. It tried to take the initiative in a relatively fresh direction. Secondly, it still has reserves to do it, even though many have claimed the opposite. 12/ 

Even though it seems Russians have learned some lessions from previous offensives, for example from Vuhledar, the tactical outcome of the offensive in Avdiivka was still a failure. This, however, indicates that Russia aims to actively learn and adapt. 13/

Russian telegrammer Two Majors claims Ukraine is moving 3 units to the Avdiivka region:
https://t.me/dva_majors/27658
 

Quote

The enemy transferred the 1st separate tank brigade, 45th and 63rd separate rifle battalions to the Avdeevsky direction . Our troops are increasing the density of artillery fire and air strikes.

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

15 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

Russian telegrammer Two Majors claims Ukraine is moving 3 units to the Avdiivka region:
https://t.me/dva_majors/27658
 

 

similar worry about this on the "War on the Rocks"

Some pointers from the episode:

• Russian attack on Avdiivka is worrying. Russia has learned. The use of combined arms was on a completely different level than last year (artillery, air force, mechanized forces) and the scale was increased from companies to battalions. Even when it was a failure it was still a big improvement, as we have seen with Ukraine these types of operations are extremely hard to conduct even from competent and motivated forces. If this trend continues, there is cause for concern.
• Avdiivka shows that Russia feels it is in a strong position, at least proves that Russia is not on the ropes.
• Avdiivka risks becoming a new winter Bakhmut, i.e. a grinding, consuming battle.
• The culmination of Ukraine's offensive phase is around the corner.
• We will probably see the "last show" of this offensive within weeks. The likely goal is a breakthrough that would threaten Tokmak.
• The goals of the UKR offensives were not achieved. The political leadership announced the goals publicly at the beginning (minimum goal Tokmak, Bakhmut and Melitopol as maximalist obj.).
• Ukraine gets high marks for a good exchange ratio over the summer operation, especially taking into account the environment. Still, the substantial Russian losses seem to be sustainable for them.
• Now the eyes are on next year.
• Russia is going to have to conduct another major mobilization if it wants to "keep up the phase".
• Russian ammunition sources should not be underestimated. Iran, North Korea, etc. Russia has invested significantly in the war economy of these countries and its own. (note that this Ukrainian summer offensive was also carried out with E-Korean stocks) A significant challenge vs. Western production capacity.
• Next year, it will be challenging for the West to continue the same level of support as this summer, to enable Ukraine to keep the initiative.
• The political situation in the United States really becoming worrying.
• At the political level, complacency has spread in Europe and the United States that Russia is losing and cannot continue the war. The situation is the opposite, the West now has to make expensive decisions for a long war. Russia has resources and resilience as we have seen this year.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Russia proved two things. It tried to take the initiative in a relatively fresh direction. Secondly, it still has reserves to do it, even though many have claimed the opposite. 12/ 

Even though it seems Russians have learned some lessions from previous offensives, for example from Vuhledar, the tactical outcome of the offensive in Avdiivka was still a failure. This, however, indicates that Russia aims to actively learn and adapt.

Let’s not make too long leaps here. (And I know you are just summarizing)  Russia may have reserves.  Or it may well have taken risks along line units as well.  Avdiivka was a tactical offensive, that failed - not D Day.  Russia is learning, there is no arguing that.  The question is: are they learning at a competitive rate compared to the UA?

UA takes ground continuously for months = “well ya but it isn’t fast enough”

RA does a post mortem twitch = “Holy Crap, it is the end of days!”

[Offshoot]

Maybe we will see. The Russians are at it again

Quote

 

DeepState: about todays Russian attempted attack on Avdiivka front: “The enemy resumed assault operations from the direction of Krasnohorivka, Avdiivka front.

Once again, a column with a significant number of equipment pushed towards the railway track with the aim of gaining a foothold on it for further exit to Stepove. However, the work of the artillerymen of 31st, 110th and "Presidential" Brigades of Ukraine did not allow another armored fist of the enemy to succeed.

As we have already noted before, it is not yet time to say that the enemy's offensive actions in the Avdiivka area have ended, because it is not known how many more reserves they have to go on an assault. And today's assault is an example of the fact that the active phase continues, the shock fist of a large number of equipment and personnel is still available. We are monitoring the situation.”

 

The Facebook page this came from says it is today:

 

Edited October 19, 2023 by Offshoot

[The_MonkeyKing]

49 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Let’s not make too long leaps here. (And I know you are just summarizing)  Russia may have reserves.  Or it may well have taken risks along line units as well.  Avdiivka was a tactical offensive, that failed - not D Day.  Russia is learning, there is no arguing that.  The question is: are they learning at a competitive rate compared to the UA?

UA takes ground continuously for months = “well ya but it isn’t fast enough”

RA does a post mortem twitch = “Holy Crap, it is the end of days!”

Yeah, I agree.

There is the possibility of this being some Russian last attempt to try to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, by gaining the initiative or at least moving the fight to Adviivka from the south.

But I am doubtful, more likely this is not "last attempt" but just "an attempt"

[The_Capt]

28 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Yeah, I agree.

There is the possibility of this being some Russian last attempt to try to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, by gaining the initiative or at least moving the fight to Adviivka from the south.

But I am doubtful, more likely this is not "last attempt" but just "an attempt"

The RA has what?  300k troops in Ukraine right now?  The are definitely going to keep making trouble.  Lower level commanders know there is enormous heat and light right now to demonstrate success and loyalty to the boss.  Last guy to step out of line got blowed up all over a Russian wheat field.(keep aiming for the bushes Priggy!). So I would expect more RA pushes and nibbles.  Now if they could actually string those together into an operational effect, let alone decision…well we could have a conversation.

UA needs to do same, and I suspect they are still on a track.  I just don’t know if it will pay off.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Heh, was going to be my comment.  12000 effective fighting force is a freakin division.  A Division on the enemy side of the Dnipro with a secure sustainment link is terrifying for the RA defence.  I am not confident we are seeing that level of operation but a boy can hope and pray.

I am confident we will not see that either at all or maybe sometime in the last month of the war. In the present conditions, it is about as likely as the grand cavalry charge prepared in expectation of breakthrough and exploitation before the Loos offensive, the Somme offensive, the Cambrai offensive etc. in WWI. Finally, when the Entente were in position to exploit a breakthrough, they did it with hundreds of tanks and the war ended in a few weeks.

I like the brief summary from a new Wavell Room article https://wavellroom.com/2023/10/13/countering-tactical-kamikaze-drones-ideas-urgently-needed/:

"Ukrainian counter-measures: keep your distance

A tactical counter-measure (employed by both sides) is the withdrawal of platforms and systems from the frontline i.e. 10-15km where they are at least out of range to FPV drones.  This has created an inverted frontline. Units in contact are now dug-in infantry with their supporting organic weapons such as mortars and anti-tank missiles; drone operators; and the ECM detachments seeking to disrupt or down the other’s drones.  Communications are constantly degraded by the saturation of jamming systems.

Self-evidently, such an abnormal frontline is the opposite of manoeuvre warfare.  Neither side is daring to manoeuvre, except in very favourable circumstances, because the cost is too high.  ‘Going over the top’ has become prohibitive in lives and materiel."

I think it is exactly to the point. Now a large number of troops on the attack can be stopped by a very low number of troops on the defence, extremely dispersed and supported by massed fires.  There is therefore no sense in  massing units on the attack, unless to increase own losses, because it is so extremely easy for the defender to achieve sufficient force ratio for a successful defence anyway. The numbers on the attack are used for rotation and replacement, not for overwhelming the enemy. 

In these circumstances, how can an attack look like? Theoretically, speaking Infiltration and probing by dismounted infantry +counterbattery+ deep fires on the enemy rear to interrupt the flow of ammunition to support the counterbatery effort +ECM, again to support the crucial counterbattery effort. Once the counterbattery battle achieves success, then fires can be partially shifted more to the enemy's first line so that those dispersed, camouflaged and fortified infantry outposts can be whittled down.  Then repeated infiltration and probing combined with indirect fires is carried out until those infantry outposts either withdraw or can be stormed. Then the process has to be repeated on each new defence line because its inherent slowness means that the defender will ALWAYS be able to create and man another defence line behind the previous one.

Which to me seems exactly how the Ukrainians are fighting in Zaporozhe. The only potential way to progress from this to a more efficient system I see in 1) massive attrition of RUS artillery combined with some way to degrade RUS drones AND discovery of technical means to deal with RUS obstacles, AP mines included;. if the RUS finally run out of tubes AND become unable to substitute them with Lancets and FPV drones, AND the Ukrainians find a way to quickly go through even massive minefields, then the attacks can be started instead of lengthy  counterbattery battle, with a simultaneous engagement  of many defensive outposts over several defence lines with supressive, not necessarily destructive artillery and PGM fires, and Ukrainian attack hopefully will be able to continue without too much of a pause through several of those lines. Either by way of mechanised assault or on foot, Keiserschlacht style.

The 2nd way out is IMHO  the general morale failure caused by combination of massive losses cumulated over years on the entire frontline with the war weariness on the home front. The "1917 moment".

PS. I am aware of the ubiquituous caveats, that all historical analogies are deceitful, and this is not World War I, etc. but taking them in stride I think that at this moment, it basically this is recreated World War I. And the technical and organisational developments which happened since 1918  have combined to make it even more of a stereotypised World War I than the real World War I was.

 

 

[Maciej Zwolinski]

10 hours ago, Kinophile said:

https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/from-impact-to-assessment-the-luhansk

Tatarigami has a substack. It's quite decent. 

Do you have access to the paid stuff? If yes, is it worth the price?

[cesmonkey]

Two Majors this morning:
https://t.me/dva_majors/27691
 

Quote

Kherson region

In the morning the enemy has been highly active near the village. Krynki. Actions are no longer characterized as separate tasks of the DRG, and more enemy forces are also involved.

The combat work of the Russian Army is underway to destroy the Ukrainian Armed Forces that have broken through.

 

[cesmonkey]

A negative view from a Russian telegrammer posted about 10 hours ago:
https://t.me/infomil_live/967
 

Quote

Our warrior subscribers from the Donetsk direction spoke about the situation in Avdievka .

There is no need to talk about successes on our part. The entire theater of military operations consists of 4 forest plantations. If they manage to knock the enemy out of the line of defense, then they completely destroy all the trenches with artillery and tanks. After such shelling, the position becomes impossible to hold. All that has been achieved at the moment is moving the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces away from ours and increasing the gray zone.

The current results of the offensive, which has been going on for almost 10 days, are in no way worth the losses incurred. No one cared about counter-battery combat or the ultimate superiority in fired shells. To put it quite frankly, the sector of the front most fortified by the enemy was chosen and no other result should have been expected.

 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

I am confident we will not see that either at all or maybe sometime in the last month of the war. In the present conditions, it is about as likely as the grand cavalry charge prepared in expectation of breakthrough and exploitation before the Loos offensive, the Somme offensive, the Cambrai offensive etc. in WWI. Finally, when the Entente were in position to exploit a breakthrough, they did it with hundreds of tanks and the war ended in a few weeks.

I like the brief summary from a new Wavell Room article https://wavellroom.com/2023/10/13/countering-tactical-kamikaze-drones-ideas-urgently-needed/:

"Ukrainian counter-measures: keep your distance

A tactical counter-measure (employed by both sides) is the withdrawal of platforms and systems from the frontline i.e. 10-15km where they are at least out of range to FPV drones.  This has created an inverted frontline. Units in contact are now dug-in infantry with their supporting organic weapons such as mortars and anti-tank missiles; drone operators; and the ECM detachments seeking to disrupt or down the other’s drones.  Communications are constantly degraded by the saturation of jamming systems.

Self-evidently, such an abnormal frontline is the opposite of manoeuvre warfare.  Neither side is daring to manoeuvre, except in very favourable circumstances, because the cost is too high.  ‘Going over the top’ has become prohibitive in lives and materiel."

I think it is exactly to the point. Now a large number of troops on the attack can be stopped by a very low number of troops on the defence, extremely dispersed and supported by massed fires.  There is therefore no sense in  massing units on the attack, unless to increase own losses, because it is so extremely easy for the defender to achieve sufficient force ratio for a successful defence anyway. The numbers on the attack are used for rotation and replacement, not for overwhelming the enemy. 

In these circumstances, how can an attack look like? Theoretically, speaking Infiltration and probing by dismounted infantry +counterbattery+ deep fires on the enemy rear to interrupt the flow of ammunition to support the counterbatery effort +ECM, again to support the crucial counterbattery effort. Once the counterbattery battle achieves success, then fires can be partially shifted more to the enemy's first line so that those dispersed, camouflaged and fortified infantry outposts can be whittled down.  Then repeated infiltration and probing combined with indirect fires is carried out until those infantry outposts either withdraw or can be stormed. Then the process has to be repeated on each new defence line because its inherent slowness means that the defender will ALWAYS be able to create and man another defence line behind the previous one.

Which to me seems exactly how the Ukrainians are fighting in Zaporozhe. The only potential way to progress from this to a more efficient system I see in 1) massive attrition of RUS artillery combined with some way to degrade RUS drones AND discovery of technical means to deal with RUS obstacles, AP mines included;. if the RUS finally run out of tubes AND become unable to substitute them with Lancets and FPV drones, AND the Ukrainians find a way to quickly go through even massive minefields, then the attacks can be started instead of lengthy  counterbattery battle, with a simultaneous engagement  of many defensive outposts over several defence lines with supressive, not necessarily destructive artillery and PGM fires, and Ukrainian attack hopefully will be able to continue without too much of a pause through several of those lines. Either by way of mechanised assault or on foot, Keiserschlacht style.

The 2nd way out is IMHO  the general morale failure caused by combination of massive losses cumulated over years on the entire frontline with the war weariness on the home front. The "1917 moment".

PS. I am aware of the ubiquituous caveats, that all historical analogies are deceitful, and this is not World War I, etc. but taking them in stride I think that at this moment, it basically this is recreated World War I. And the technical and organisational developments which happened since 1918  have combined to make it even more of a stereotypised World War I than the real World War I was.

 

 

 

27 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

A negative view from a Russian telegrammer posted about 10 hours ago:
https://t.me/infomil_live/967
 

 

Reading these two post together seems to sum up the situation nicely. My biggest question at this point is can an offensive be pushed in weather bad enough to ground the drones?  This is basically how Wagner took Soledar. The extremely low troop density at line of contact would seem vulnerable if the fires complex was not able to work normally.

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Let’s not make too long leaps here.

My feelings exactly.  I rolled my eyes when I read WotR summary posted by Monkey King.  I don't like doing that, but well... here's why:

4 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Some pointers from the episode:

 

• Russian attack on Avdiivka is worrying. Russia has learned. The use of combined arms was on a completely different level than last year (artillery, air force, mechanized forces) and the scale was increased from companies to battalions. Even when it was a failure it was still a big improvement, as we have seen with Ukraine these types of operations are extremely hard to conduct even from competent and motivated forces. If this trend continues, there is cause for concern.

 

I've been saying this since the start of the operation, but they left out the fact that "elite" infantry were not used.  So I stand by my position that what Russia learned was that throwing unsupported cannon fodder at prepared Ukrainian units doesn't achieve much.  Otherwise, how is this attack any different than other large scale attacks in the past, with possible addition of more air strikes?

And I take issue with the difficulty of launching multiple battalion sized attacks in multiple locations.  It's actually VERY easy to do this.  What is extremely difficult is doing it successfully.  Russia just proved that, once again, issuing unrealistic orders and forcing zombie troops to pursue them is not a winning capability. They've been doing this THE ENTIRE WAR and they are NOT LEARNING from it.  If Russia was truly learning from their past losses is that they don't have a force that is capable of offensive action without taking massive losses in the process.

Contrast this with Ukraine.  They tried large scale multiple battalion coordinated attacks and found that they weren't up to the challenge.  Ukraine, therefore, learned and learned quickly to go back to something it was competent at... company sized attacks with very limited objectives.

And why is this "worrying"?  Nobody expected Russia to still be using the same exact tactics as it did in February 2022, so why is it "worrying" that they have made some changes 1.75 years into the war that wound up being just as ineffective as the ones that came before them?  That eventually they will figure something out?

4 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Avdiivka shows that Russia feels it is in a strong position, at least proves that Russia is not on the ropes.

What the HELL is a military analyst doing making a statement like this?  Battle of the Bulge and Spring Awakening at least proved that Nazi Germany were not on the ropes?  My god... sometimes I wonder if they think about what they say before saying it.

Russia still has a lot of combat power.  Fact.  But what about the possibility that Russia is desperate and this is the best that it can come up with?  To me, that is the sign of the invader being "on the ropes".

As for the rest of it (Ukraine's counter offensive is about to, or already has, culminated) looks fine to me.  It's pretty clear that the offensive stalled out early and has only made progress through intelligent grinding attacks which, not surprisingly, have pretty clearly exceeded Ukraine's ability to sustain momentum.  The landings on the left bank of the Dnepr are the equivalent of Russia's attack on Avdiivka from what I can tell.  They are hoping to distract rather than to open up a new front.

Steve

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/10/negotiating-with-russia-is-still-a-bad-idea.html?utm_medium=rand_social&utm_source=threads

Once you scratch below the surface, however, the case for negotiating with Russia quickly falls apart.

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Thread recommended by Michael Kofman: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1714715790153248909.html

Even though the first attacks were repelled, Russia will likely attack in this direction again in the future. There aren't many similar targets elsewhere. Progress will probably be slow, naturally depending on how much resources Russia will direct into capturing Avdiivka. 9/ 

In Bakhmut, Russians eventually switched from active flanking efforts into capturing the city block by block. If the Russians are fixated on capturing Avdiivka, there can be a long and difficult battle ahead, as Ukrainians are likely just as determined to hold it. 10/ 

In the long run, Ukraine may need to solve the encirclement threat with a counterattack. Especially the northern direction can develop into a real issue. Russians don’t need to advance far in order to make the situation more complicated for AFU. The distances are short. 11/ 

There are some worrying features, even though Ukraine managed to repel Russians for now.

Russia proved two things. It tried to take the initiative in a relatively fresh direction. Secondly, it still has reserves to do it, even though many have claimed the opposite. 12/ 

Even though it seems Russians have learned some lessions from previous offensives, for example from Vuhledar, the tactical outcome of the offensive in Avdiivka was still a failure. This, however, indicates that Russia aims to actively learn and adapt. 13/

 

In addition to the comments I just made, I think it's clear that Russia intends (at least) to throw DPR and Storm Z manpower into another Bakhmut meat grinder operation.  And just like Bakhmut, that will likely be costly for Ukraine should it resist to the same degree as it did before.  More costly to Russia, but they obviously don't seem to be concerned about losses.

I will quibble with the characterization that we're wrong to say that Russia lacks reserves.  Indications are that the forces in Avdiivka operations were either already in place or came at the expense of the north, with prematurely committed strategic reserve forces taking their places.  This is not "reserves" in my definition. 

In fact, we also have the WonR interview concluding that Russia now, more than ever, needs to conduct a new partial mobilization.  If they have reserves they wouldn't need to do that.

Steve

[cesmonkey]

 

[kimbosbread]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Russia still has a lot of combat power.  Fact.  But what about the possibility that Russia is desperate and this is the best that it can come up with?  To me, that is the sign of the invader being "on the ropes".

I can’t second this enough. If Russia was confident, they wouldn’t be wasting precious treasure on something that doesn’t change their strategic position or as some people would say, expand their option space.

If Russia was confident, they’d be improving their fortifications and blunting Ukraine’s offense while clevely husbanding their resources for the spring.

[cesmonkey]

There may be a pathway soon for getting more U.S. aid approved for Ukraine ...