Great post-game analysis for Hapless' recent series

[slysniper]

I went ahead and just did one set of test to see what I could find any unusual aspects as to how the game is performing as to spotting or anything else when it comes to Russian armor. 

So I ran test on T55-a vs M60a1's at a range of 2000 meters

What findings I found, 

if the tanks were unbutton. The m60's were approx. 5 seconds faster than the T55's in spotting the enemy unit.

With many able to spot in under 10 seconds. 

If Button, the T-55 was having a much harder time spotting compared to the M60 approx. 10-15 second difference.

 

as for killing power, both sides were generally lethal on a hit.

 

As for accuracy of rounds, this was where I would say the M60 was again receiving better stats but I did not take the time to get accurate numbers but it was clear they were getting a few more hits on target in the same time frame.

 

Kill ratio for 2 minutes of combat was (4) M60 losses to (10) T55 losses.

 

What conclusions could I make  

 

A slight spotting advantage to the early version US tank.

If buttoned, The T55 is suffering spotting affects and is at a distinct disadvantage.

Accuracy and time taken to get a round on target was the main advantage as to which tank performed better.

Rounds on target were taking about a minute of combat to happen. So spotting was giving a slight advantage, but accuracy was appearing to be the possible bigger factor.

 

For balance on the battlefield a ratio of 2 to 1 would be required with the added numbers also providing the Russian side to out position the enemy in a flanking position if the situation allows.

But since most shot were producing kills. Spotting and hitting first was the biggest factor. getting to a range where ones shots would hit quickly would increase the who spots first as the bigger impact.  So the most important Russian aspect would be to engage with 3 to 1 ratio where the disadvantages would be removed because the rounds on target would turn to their advantage

 

Did anything here appear out of place to what is known about the units and how they should perform, not that I know of.

This is the approach one should take before making statements that are unfounded, then if game data test show numbers that seem off compared to real world data, that can be shown. then there is something to talk about and discuss as to the accuracy that is being portrayed.

 

 

[arkhangelsk2021]

Well, I'd actually say that seems fair. When buttoned, the M60 tank has the following means to search:
M36 periscope (magnification 7x)
10 glass blocks
M17A1 rangefinder (10x, 4 degree FOV, probably won't be used for search)
M32 periscope or M105D telescope (both 8x) by the gunner

The T-55 will have the following means
TPKU-2 periscope (magnification 5x)
4 periscopes
TSh2B-32P telescopic sight (7x)

When opened up, I'm going to guess the M60 tank commander has binoculars. So overall I'm not going to scream at these results.

[slysniper]

An interesting side note, Because dust does impact spotting on older tanks. I am pretty sure there is an advantage if you are in a tank duel and you have the wind blowing into you face.

Its an item I have wanted to test to see how much it impacts spotting, but have never done it. but make sure during any testing to not have wind as a factor.

[Amedeo]

2 hours ago, slysniper said:

Its an item I have wanted to test to see how much it impacts spotting, but have never done it. but make sure during any testing to not have wind as a factor.

In a test scenario if one wants to minimize the impact of dust on spotting, in addition to setting wind speed to zero, it's also important to set ground condition to damp.

[dbsapp]

There is no point in comparing T-55 and M60A1. 

M60A1 should be compared with T-62, as both tanks were mass produced in 60s and became classical competitors. There is nothing criminal in doing couch expertise ourselves (basically, the main thing we are engaged here), but it's better when it's done by professionals. So, as always, I suggest to refer to real documents. 

The evaluation of T-62 and its comparison with  M60A1 have been done TRADOC bulletin 10. Strangely enough, experts of US Army didn't mention anything about T-62 being much inferior to M60A1 in terms of spotting abilities, while stating that M60A1 is more effective at beyond 1500 meters ranges. They describe T-62 as very capable tank, in line with CIA\Army report that I had cited before. 

In "Vision devices" section they note, that "the T-62 is equipped with vision devices that enable it to fight effectively with all hatches closed and in conditions of reduced visibility".  

 

 

 

As we can see the real evaluation is far from claiming the Western tanks enjoy absolute superiority comparing to Soviet "metal junk", which is blind, unsophisticated and crude. 

 

Edited February 14, 2022 by dbsapp

[The_Capt]

On 2/7/2022 at 2:09 PM, dbsapp said:

Besides, every war is not restricted to "comparing tanks performance". In fact, tanks are just one piece of a broad puzzle picture, so comparing their qualities side by side doesn't solve any war history related questions. Good or bad performance, casualties or scores, usually are result of interplay of many factors, first of all, command quality, available intelligence and logistics.

So this is actually good but as was posted above, and talked about at length here, this goes beyond tank-on-tank gun accuracy.   A link to that TRADOC Bulletin would be nice too btw, dates kinda matter.  Anyway there seems to be  a typo here as the graphs show that the M60A1 gun is slightly more accurate, not less: I read 55% vs 50% for T62 at 1500, and the Heat round is a lot more accurate at 1500: 35% vs 20%

Advantage still looks like it goes to the M60A1 but not by an overwhelming margin:

Spotting: 10 vision block vs 7, the T62 has 4 periscopes vs 3 on the M60A1, the T62 one for the loader is the extra but that is a pretty narrow field of view. But lets give this one to the T62 but it feels shaky.

Range finding.  M60A1 has coincidence rangefinder (M17A1) while the T62 has stadiametric which is much less accurate.  Gotta give this one to the M60A1

Fire Computing:  M60A1 has a mechanical ballistic computer, T62 has human eyeball and brain.

Ergonomics: M60A1 is larger than a family RV, the T62 a freakin nightmare (see my previous posts)

C2: US pushed radio comms to lowest level and worked very hard on collective fire control at a platoon level.  Soviets had radios but they were "listen only" for the most part and doctrine basically kept everyone below Coy Comd on mute.  US takes that one.

20 hours ago, dbsapp said:

As we can see the real evaluation is far from claiming the Western tanks enjoy absolute superiority comparing to Soviet "metal junk", which is blind, unsophisticated and crude.

You are literally the only person saying this.  And you keep saying this no matter what evidence is presented.  Not only that, I already demonstrated that if you are not happy with the current balance just use crew quality to adjust it and you can come up with whatever "super-Soviets-hold-off-US-attacks-on-motherland" scenario/campaign you like, the 60 bucks you paid for the game gives you that ability.

I would offer that if your aim is for the developers to go: "Hey this dbsapps guys was right all along, let's totally revamp the stats on Soviet tanks until he says he is happy, cause he never has come back with 'what right looks like'", that ship has pretty much sailed.  We get a Soviet tank commander from 1979 in here who we can have a conversation with, I am all ears, but I am sorry to say that your credibility has pretty much been sunk by this point.

Edited February 15, 2022 by The_Capt

[Vanir Ausf B]

50 minutes ago, dbsapp said:

As we can see the real evaluation is far from claiming the Western tanks enjoy absolute superiority comparing to Soviet "metal junk", which is blind, unsophisticated and crude.

In my testing I have seen the Shturm-S exhibit excellent spotting ability, better than the M60A1.

You're tilting at windmills.

Edited February 14, 2022 by Vanir Ausf B

[dbsapp]

21 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 A link to that TRADOC Bulletin would be nice too btw, dates kinda matter. 

Sure https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA392790

By the way, while googling for this report, I found  @John Kettler had already presented this document here. 

 

[The_Capt]

16 minutes ago, dbsapp said:

Sure https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA392790

By the way, while googling for this report, I found  @John Kettler had already presented this document here. 

 

So you read Section IV of course and noted that a lot of these points have already been brought up here?  It also notes that "...limitations gives US tanks have the advantage on the modern battlefield", so long as we take our training seriously, which makes sense for a TRADOC document.

I actually think this part here is a little slanted.  It really does paint Soviet forces as robotic drones driving into kill zones, which I personally think was a wishful thinking myth.

[dbsapp]

2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So you read Section IV of course and noted that a lot of these points have already been brought up here?  It also notes that "...limitations gives US tanks have the advantage on the modern battlefield", so long as we take our training seriously, which makes sense for a TRADOC document.

I actually think this part here is a little slanted.  It really does paint Soviet forces as robotic drones driving into kill zones, which I personally think was a wishful thinking myth.

It's not surprising that CMCW and his report have a lot in common. 

As for how Soviet commanders employ their forces... Frankly I'm confused, since a) this is absolutely theoretical alternative history topic b) it has even less documentary confirmed basis that tanks performance. At least, tanks exits to he present day and their performance can be measured. That couldn't be said about Soviet commanders. 

Unfortunately, in my opinion, there is a certain truth to the assessment of Soviet command quality in this document. It was abyssal in the initial stages of WW2 and absolute awful during first war in Chechnya. On the other hand it showed itself as quite capable during Afghanistan, in Korea and in Vietnam. 

 

[slysniper]

4 hours ago, dbsapp said:

There is no point in comparing T-55 and M60A1. 

M60A1 should be compared with T-62, as both tanks were mass produced in 60s and became classical competitors. There is nothing criminal in doing couch expertise ourselves (basically, the main thing we are engaged here), but it's better when it's done by professionals. So, as always, I suggest to refer to real documents. 

The evaluation of T-62 and its comparison with  M60A1 have been done TRADOC bulletin 10. Strangely enough, experts of US Army didn't mention anything about T-62 being much inferior to M60A1 in terms of spotting abilities, while stating that M60A1 is more effective at beyond 1500 meters ranges. They describe T-62 as very capable tank, in line with CIA\Army report that I had cited before. 

In "Vision devices" section they note, that "the T-62 is equipped with vision devices that enable it to fight effectively with all hatches closed and in conditions of reduced visibility".

 

 

Well, if you would spend a few moments and run some test in the game and compare it to the professional information that you share, you might learn to stop making incorrect statements.

So I did an adjustment, Ran a few samples of the test. Now T62 (1975) vs M60 A1 

at the range that this data is shown at, 1500 meters

combat for only one minute.

Results quickly show that the Russian tanks have the advantage losses were 30 M60a1 to 17 T62,s

spotting seemed about equal as to who were getting off first shots. 

As for shots on target, I would say the game was a little under the percentages shown in the charts.

Or course all this can be tested out to get accurate numbers.

 

But wait, what's this the T62 is Out performing the M60A1   in almost 2 to 1 losses.

within a matter of minutes I have a test proving the T62 is performing better than the M60 and your world should be great. But you keep saying they are incorrectly modeled. 

Learn to take the time to find out what the game is doing. 

If you are having problems with the tank, it has to do with who is controlling it, the tank has the advantage.

 

 

 

 

 

Edited February 14, 2022 by slysniper

[THH149]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I actually think this part here is a little slanted.  It really does paint Soviet forces as robotic drones driving into kill zones, which I personally think was a wishful thinking myth.

I agree with you on this, not only the game encourages the Soviet players to very carefully read the terrain and manage the totality of their combined arms assets (to get the necessary 3:1 to 6:1 plus force ratios) but I've seen US sources from the era praise the Soviets on how they read the terrain  and use it to their advantage. 

[THH149]

On 2/11/2022 at 4:02 AM, Simcoe said:

On the Russian side, what’s everyone’s take on using artillery to shutdown likely sight lines? Do people prefer using smoke or HE? I’m finding that M60’s don’t suffer very much from artillery fire unless they are a direct target. 

I recall that in Soviet Training Scenario 1, the Soviets were encouraged to add significant smoke after their artillery barrage before the tanks began their advance over the open field. It works well, unless there are gaps.

That scenario is a symphony that's well worth playing twice: once with the suggested Soviet method, and a second time using whatever approach you would have done playing US, or your usual style of play.

[arkhangelsk2021]

On 2/15/2022 at 2:29 AM, The_Capt said:

C2: US pushed radio comms to lowest level and worked very hard on collective fire control at a platoon level.  Soviets had radios but they were "listen only" for the most part and doctrine basically kept everyone below Coy Comd on mute.  US takes that one.

I'd be very careful concerning this last point. You cited FM-100-2-1 for this, where it does say:

Quote

As might be expected, the authority of the platoon leader is even more restricted. He is not authorized to transmit on the radio except in an extreme emergency or to request support.

First is the provenance of this idea. In the 1976 DIA Defence Intelligence Report, Soviet Tank Company Tactics, Section C (page 5), we have:

Quote

8. CONTROL LEVEL. It is important to note that control of the command radio net is retained at battalion level, and when the company operates as part of a battalion there will probably be no company net, but all tanks will monitor the battalion net and receive orders from the battalion commander.

9. RADIO SECURITY. The tank company, in common with other Soviet units, is forbidden to make radio transmissions immediately before contact is made with the enemy. Radio sets are operated on listening silence until contact has been made. During combat, only the company commander is authorized to transmit on the company frequency. Transmissions are short and kept to a minimum. Platoon leaders are allowed to transmit only in emergencies. In combat, orders and tactical reports are transmitted in the clear while references to terrain features and other units are encoded.

Almost the same but somehow an 'extreme' was added to the Field Manual's rendition without a clear basis. In Chapter 5, Section B (page 14), we have:

Quote

5.       FIRE CONTROL ON OPERATIONS. In a company operation, the company commander controls the fire of each tank by radio. Tank fire is concentrated upon targets according to the priority assigned by the commander. Antitank guided missiles {ATGM) are first priority targets. In the assault, tanks engage the target which is closest and most dangerous to them. Targets are indicated by use of encoded terrain reference points, by tracer fire, by the commander pointing his gun at the target, or by use of the target azimuth scale. The company or platoon commander gives a fire mission containing the following elements:

a.       Call sign of unit or tank to fire.

b.       Target location by use of reference point.

c.       Fire mission: destruction or neutralization.

d.       Firing procedure: fire from march, short halt, etc.

e.       Type of round: AP, HE, fragmentation.

f.        Number of rounds to be fired or when to cease fire.

It's possible to designate targets without using the radio, such as by shooting tracers at the target. But how the platoon commander is supposed to express this long order except by radio is unclear.

Second, I'm not sure if the Russians have been informed about this.

The platoon commander at 21:15 here is using the radio, as is his deputy. Does this look like an 'extreme' emergency (even simulated) and is commanding his own vehicles 'requesting support'? Also, in Panzer Destroyer, there's no shortage of times when radio is used below the company level:

Quote

Marder and I were covering the withdrawal with our two tanks. We were the last to reach the pontoon bridge and had already crossed the most exposed part, when strong cannon fire struck us from behind. I found time to tell Misha over the radio: ‘We’re on fire!’ Then I heard his reply: ‘We’re on fire, too.’

• Krysov, Vasiliy. Panzer Destroyer . Pen and Sword. Kindle Edition. (location 383)

Over the radio I warned Levanov, the commander of my second self-propelled gun, not to open fire before our first shot.

• Krysov, Vasiliy. Panzer Destroyer . Pen and Sword. Kindle Edition. (location 705)

It even comes out to say:

Quote

Since the moment of opening fire, the crews had been allowed to use plain speech over the radio. I got in touch with Levanov, and he reported: ‘There s been a ricochet hit by an armour-piercing shell, but there are no casualties.’

• Krysov, Vasiliy. Panzer Destroyer . Pen and Sword. Kindle Edition. (location 737)

I waved my helmet over my head towards Levanov’s vehicle, which meant ‘radio contact’. ‘Ivan, a tank is sitting behind the second house from us. Turn your self-propelled gun around and keep both corners of the house in your gunsight! Don’t let it withdraw!’

• Krysov, Vasiliy. Panzer Destroyer . Pen and Sword. Kindle Edition. (location 968)

Let's go to another book, Red Army Tank Commander.

Quote

You are on the move, you look for targets, you shoot, you spin around. A T-34-76 commander works like a circus artist – he lays the gun, he shoots, he gives orders to his gunloader and driver, he gets in touch with the other tanks from the platoon via radio.

• Bryukhov, Vasiliy. Red Army Tank Commander . Pen and Sword. Kindle Edition. (location 523)

How is he going to manage that if he isn't allowed to use the radio…

Quote

Zorya, the tank commander from another platoon, acted listlessly and irresolutely. His platoon commander Chebashvili continually urged him on via two-way radio, helping him to maintain the right direction and find the indicated targets.

• Bryukhov, Vasiliy. Red Army Tank Commander. Pen and Sword. Kindle Edition. (location 1141)

In Suvorov's Aquarium, we even have:

Quote

'There's a crane ahead . . .' came a call from the commander of the sixth tank, sent ahead. (page 22)

Or even, in this description of Soviet squad tactics by a Soviet officer:

http://army.armor.kiev.ua/tactik/mso_nastup.php

Quote

Communication with the platoon commander is visual, the BMP radio station or the R-147 radio station, or the squad leader receives orders through the R-147P radio receiver.

The R-147 is a handheld radio weighing less than 1kg. It's not clear how many squads actually got a R-147 or equivalent, but at least no one is telling them not to use it.

Third, game-making consideration: if you try to simulate the downsides, you have to be even more ready to simulate the upsides. Can you? Because FM100-2-1 is really missing the forest for the trees.

The fundamental difference between the Soviets and the Americans comes down to one assumption – is a battalion still something a commander can directly control?

Because the Soviets answer Yes to this question, the 'troop management' system is geared to support this. First, the subunit is a little smaller than its American equivalent. Second, he's supposed to work out from a Command-Observation Point, where he can observe as much of his AOR as possible, both friendly and enemy. Third, the battalion is placed on one net so he can personally hear as much of the battle as possible without delay.

Though I've argued FM100 really exaggerated it, the limitations on platoon and squad use of the radio are likely true to some extent. Those are the inevitable side effects of putting 30+ subscribers onto one frequency – you just have to ration airtime out and so the platoons and squads won't squawk nearly as much as their American counterparts.

However, once anything is on the radio net, every subscriber including the commander will have the opportunity to learn of it. The commander's orders will also be promulgated without delay within the battalion.

There's nothing Combat Mission can do in the orders bit since the player can set orders down to his squads. However, the reporting bit might be represented by eliminating limits on horizontal and vertical propagation up to battalion level. This:

Immediately becomes this:

Edited February 16, 2022 by arkhangelsk2021
Getting rid of extra blank space.

[Grey_Fox]

@arkhangelsk2021 why are you citing WW2-era documents to question Cold War era doctrine? 

[arkhangelsk2021]

41 minutes ago, Grey_Fox said:

@arkhangelsk2021 why are you citing WW2-era documents to question Cold War era doctrine? 

I cited a series of sources forming a line. The Youtube video is of a film dating to 1968, then two WWII sources, Aquarium (Suvorov) also is of a scene in the late sixties, and the last source claims to be about the tactics in the 80s.

Second, do you really want to argue that the Soviet radio net became more restricted over the decades? Especially since it's highly unlikely you know what the FM used to form its opinion. And it doesn't even line up with parts of American documents.

Edited February 16, 2022 by arkhangelsk2021
Add one more point.

[The_Capt]

45 minutes ago, Grey_Fox said:

@arkhangelsk2021 why are you citing WW2-era documents to question Cold War era doctrine? 

Hey at least we are citing sources now so that is a start.

So all the sources in "part one" really support what we already saw going in, Soviet doctrine stressed centralized control at the tactical level.  The strengths and weaknesses of this system may be debated but essentially there appears, from a western assessment at least, that there was little to no empowerment at a low level in Soviet C2.  So what?  Well this is not as much about "giving fire orders", which I would be surprised if the Soviets did not do, even if it was adoctrinal when they came under fire, this is about peer to peer passage of spotting information. 

When one is advancing in a Cbt Team or some combination thereof the ability for eyeballs in the same tactical sub-unit to talk to each other is key.  So this is tank 1 telling all tanks in the platoon "I see something over there".  The US C2 system allows for inter-platoon communications and has developed sophisticated procedures to allow one group to communicate directly with the another below the platoon level on the platoon net.  I do not see a lot on the equivalent occurring in the Soviet system.  Now some may say, "well the Soviets will do it under fire anyway (i.e. 'extreme')" but it does not work that way.  If you do not train for it and develop sub-systems of information flow then when the shooting starts you wind up with total chaos.  In fact the Soviet idea what "we can all wait til the shooting starts to talk" is pretty risky but even then the only people doing the talking are company and platoon commanders.  One will get more centralized control but you lose a lot in the peer-to-peer space and slow things down with respect to targeting.  That US "squawking" you mention is actually really important. 

Now to "part 2 - Soviet were really using radios".  That video is something but I am not sure I would put much more stock into it than I would a western training film.  These sorts of things tend to be idealized versions of how things are done, as demonstrated at 21:55 (just after the guy in the hole uses a radio) with the Soviet officer bravely marching, head held high, into the middle of a firefight.

Written sources, well now we have something, but as Grey_Fox mentions a lot from WW2 which makes me wonder if the Soviets did not have much more democratization of information flow during the war, which for some reason their doctrine tried to scrub out.

In that link, that is Cold War era, again comms all seem to pretty much flow up in a nice tight system with no mention of lateral flow; however, it does speak to the idea that a squad (assuming it doesn't have the one-way R-147P) can pass information to platoon.  I assume these comms are open and in the clear every call is a "charlie-charlie" so peer squads are privy to it, this is a sub-unit C2 system.  The website is unclear on when and where this system fits in (it mentions "80s") and the authors are guys I really want to talk to as they have veterans from the era.  So maybe the organic C2 system was much better than western assessments, nothing here is a slam dunk but that site does sow a seed in the mind.  

As to the "up side", ya not really buying it.  Over the last 40 years the limits of centralized control at a tactical level and advantages of decentralized have been aptly demonstrated (e.g. Gulf War).  The US/western system does allow for direct calls to all units (we called it the "charlie-charlie") but it is the sub-systems built in that allow for empowered use of that information that appears to be the fundamental difference in the C2 systems, again matters of degree here.  The only spin I can think of is that the Soviets mastered their system and somehow took it to a whole new level that allowed it to transcend the friction and chaos of warfare.  I am not sure that the Soviets believed "a battalion still something a commander can directly control"  to be honest, if they had they would have invested a lot more redundancy around that commander.  My sense is that a battalion, in the Soviet thinking, was a piece of ammunition and their operational method of warfare was to fire it for effect and then load another one behind it.  So "control" only had to be just enough.  The US and west had a very different philosophy. 

In game, these are soft factors.  We have run tests that show 4 tanks can spot better than one, the question was can 4 US tanks spot better than 4 Soviet tanks, with C2 as a factor in that advantage/disadvantage (i.e. horizontal)?   Whether this is a factor in vertical targeting is an interesting question, never tested that.

In conclusion, this does open up the door to the idea that we have fallen into a western bias trap in the assessment of Soviet Cold War tactical C2.  I suspect that adjusting troop quality can amend this in game right now but I would definitely like to see more from actual veterans of the era on how their sub-platoon and Coy C2 actually worked.  If we can get enough of that, then perhaps a revisit of some soft factors in-game is required. 

 

[domfluff]

Whilst I think history seems to have shown that smaller, decentralised control is the better solution to modern warfare - suggested by how both the Russian and Ukrainian armies have pushed things further and further down their organisational structure, especially artillery, although this has happened in different ways - I do think there are still potential advantages to a centralised system, especially on the offensive.

To take the extremes in the abstract: a battalion which operates as a single unit requires minimal orders to get going. Everyone knows their place, and where everyone else is, so the command structure can be made pretty simple. In the other extreme, where every platoon commander can run off on his own initiative, I suspect the end result could look a lot like herding cats.

Sure, that can be overcome with proper drill and training, etc., but that's not as necessary for the centralised approach, which can also be an advantage.

Clearly the main loss is flexibility - "battalions as ammunition" is correct, I think, in the sense that it's a resource to expend in order to accomplish a task, much like an artillery battery, but that implies you're committing it and hoping that it works. If something unexpected happens, you're probably relying on the regiment committing a second battalion to do something about it.

 

[The_Capt]

5 minutes ago, domfluff said:

look a lot like herding cats

Heh, we call it "agency vs formation".  Last time big dumb mass 'worked' was the 19th century and that is really abstracting the realities on the ground but large formations blasting each other, with the one who could hold its mass the longest winning is the "provenance of this idea" and historically it held some water [aside: on retro-grade doctrine, happens all the time.  Militaries has shown they can un-learn incredibly well.  For example, the Romans revolutionized "smart mass" in comparison to its peers and the "mass agency" of the warrior cultures they faced in conquest but many militaries forgot the "smart" part later. 

Thanks to education and liberalization (damn you literacy), the idea that we can simply send 18 yrs old into a slaughter in formation kinda died in WW1 (with notable exceptions). So in WW2 we see variations on "smart mass" theme which carry over into the Cold War.  The issue between the Soviets and western forces of NATO seems to be "how smart does that mass really need to be?" and here we have a spectrum, and a lot of speculation.  NATO leaned towards, smarter = better, Soviets (at least as far as mainstream sources note), "just smart enough, because we are really smart at operational level" [note, CM is Bn and below, but for the Soviet-o-philes out there I suspect advantage for them lies in their operational doctrine, not tactical]. 

So what?  Well Gulf War was a demonstration of the collision of these two principles and it appears, to even the most cynical eyes, that "smart wins out".  This would be why every modern military on all sides, Russian, Chinese, you name it, moved away from dumber mass and towards buzzwords like "information dominance" and "decision superiority".  The COIN-Hell we have lived for 20 years even demonstrated that we were the "dumb mass" compared to really empowered insurgents.  So here we are, everyone trying to be smarter even in the unmanned space. 

This is where "CM should model virtues of centralization" kinda sticks in the throat because I am not sure there is any proof there was any.  Why? Because human beings of late 20th century, even those Soviet kill-bots, were nowhere near the same as human beings of the 19th century with respect to agency/awareness and ways of war must adapt to the medium they are within and in this case that medium is the people.