TOW MISSLE ISSUES NOT REPRESENTED IN THE GAME

[BeondTheGrave]

22 hours ago, John Kettler said:

At An Loc, Vietnam, the ARVN troops killed many NVA T-54s and T-55s with the M72 LAW. There is some shocking information in the article on LAW backblast. Makes a WW II bazooka's seem anemic by comparison!

https://www.historynet.com/arsenal-m72-law-disposable-tank-killer.htm

BeyondTheGrave,

Have read the original SECRET version (link below) of General Gorman's assessment, which appeared in the SECRET level CIA quarterly Studies in Intelligence--in 1980 and was never seen by me in its full and classified form at any point in my 11+ years as a Soviet Threat Analyst. It was exactly the kind of horror story I got when I attended the Soviet Threat Technology Conference in 1985 at the CIA in Langley, Virginia. The summary conclusion was that the only weapons in the inventory that were viable current inventory antitank weapons were the Hellfire and the Maverick with its mighty 173 pound shaped charge warhead. Even the 105 mm DU round couldn't cut it in a frontal engagement at, I believe, 1000 meter range vs ERA equipped T-72. We, on the other hand, were highly vulnerable to theirs. This is why V Corps in Europe later was stripped practically bare of its state-of-the-art 120 mm armed M1HA Abrams tanks (DU in the armor), which had been specifically designed to resist the latest Soviet weapons, and firing the just fielded experimental Silver Bullet DU projectile for the Hail Mary attack into Iraq during Gulf War I.

The Defense Science Board Armor-Antiarmor Summer Study in 1984 came up with the same core conclusions. These are what drove the development and crash deployment of TOW 2A, then, when it was realized even the 6" warhead with double trumpet DU liner, standoff probe and precursor charge still couldn't get through the ERA, the TOW 2 B, with 2 EFF/EFP for top attack against the vastly less well protected top of the tank, aiming to put the missile smack over the turret. Was at Hughes Missile Systems Group, Operations Analysis Department when much of this went down. Hughes made the TOW and the Maverick back then, and my department was deeply involved in TOW analyses, including such things as KTOW (Korean TOW) installed on Hughes 500 helicopters.
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0000624298

Regards,

John Kettler

John, 

I've seen that document linked here before (perhaps you were even the one who linked it?) That has some good stuff in it. I wouldn't take everything Gorman says to the bank, your own experience is probably more reliable than what Gorman was writing. He was a bit more of a political general IMO, more willing to say what he had to to get the money he needed. But the fact of the matter was that the US was blindsided by the T-64 and -72s. They were still working on weapons to defeat and defend against the T-62 when in reality the Soviets hadn't stopped innovating. I've read documents as late as the early 1970s talking about how the MBT-70/XM-803 needed to be improved to fight the T-62. I wanted to go back in time and shout at those guys, 'Youre way behind the curve!' But thats the benefit of hindsight. Bad news that they only figured out how bad their understanding of the Red Army was in the 1980s. I was reading that BRIXMIS book (also a recommendation here) and its shocking how little of their information seems to have filtered out to the rest of NATO. Assuming half of what is in that book is true, British intelligence was routinely obtaining material and data from Soviet bases. And as I recall in 1970 the plans for the T-72 were nicked by the west. Yet I have never read one peep about that information, if really it had been taken influencing other decision making. Very strange. Just when you might almost think the Army had gotten its **** together, reality comes in and disabuses you of that. 

Ill have to find that Defense Science Board report. Cheers for that. I save everything I find here, I have a small document arsenal assembled for my dissertation. 

Cheers!

[John Kettler]

BeyondTheGrave,

Don't recall the title, but. there was a pretty good British doc on BRIXMIS which showed how exciting the job could be and had the tale of ballsy British action to secure an ERA block. Want to see that dissertation when it's done or even in draft form. You'll need to get a FOIA request submitted to get that DSB report, because I guarantee you it was SECRET level. Speaking of FOIA, here is a gold mine for DECLASSIFIED CIA Soviet and Warsaw Pact military intelligence. The chief problem with it is very persnickety search logic, so be prepared to get creative in how you phrase your queries. Once found a great study on the T-64 and T-64B, but failed to write it down. Took me forever to find it again weeks later!

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/

Regards,

John Kettler

[Secondbrooks]

On 7/2/2021 at 5:17 AM, Gary R Lukas said:

First of all, after working with the TOW MISSLE SYSTEM for 8 years in the USMC ,it don't make me a TOW MISSLE EXPERT, BUT we had issues with the Regular TOW, Then the ITOW , then finally the TOW 2 came out and we had big issues with the TOW2. Shooting just the regular TOW Missile 10 times, we would have a failure rate of approximately 3-4 missile failures. most of those issues being a Broken Wire from the gun platform to the missile itself. We also had 2 missiles that blew up only 20-30 yards, which was an issue by itself because the TOW missile wasn't supposed to arm its warhead until it went over 50 yards. Here is my last issue about the TOW, they are way to accurate at short ranges. When you fired your TOW MISSILE after the missile leaves the launch tube  the gunner is trying to reacquire its target, then while that's going on , the flight motors kick in and you can't see ****!!!!! around after 10-15 seconds now you can finally make sense out of everything, you can now see the target, see the IR light on the missile and now your heart is pumping hard now because in another 6-10 seconds, your target is getting ready to be obliterated, and they don't even know it!!!!  So if the BF Community can start making the Tows Less Accurate at shorter ranges would be a start, Say from 50 yards to 1,000 yards the hit rate should only be around 60 to 65 percent, From 1,000-2,000 yards the hit accuracy will now be getting better so I would say 70-90 percent, then from  2,000-just over 3,000 yards my percentage would go from 80-95 percent. During Desert Storm during the battle the M2-M3 Bradley had a Huge problems

Oh boy, don't get me started on dismounted TOW! Served in Finland where that was the main method of using it.

We had 7 guys hauling the whole system (TOW2 with thermals) + couple missiles. With highly drilled squad (yes squad not team) it took 3 minutes to set it up. Same amount to disassemble. Man, i've spent my  years in reserves (20 years now) trying to think how to move it around faster, sleds or something. Maybe even carry it assembled and hope we don't break anything vital. Because if we'd end up into sights of opponent while in firing positions we are not moving anywhere and are going to be practically ground meat. Whole dis-/assembly process is such a hassle with guys running here and there while delivering/retriveing their pieces from firing position and getting into their close defense positions.

There were guys issued with Russian AT-4, those were whole another beast on this aspect. 3 man teams could operate them and if ****e hit the fan they could just pick it up and run, or hobble. No even close to similar hassle we had to have. I never had change to work with them, but our officers were kinda envious of how fast they were to move around.

Did complain about this with Shock Force once Marine pack was released and dismounted TOW was introduced, and Steve had it changed. I think they made it 3 and 7 minutes... It became practically stationary weapon system at that point.

We didn't have but one missile per squad to fire and it was reserved for gunner (i was squad leader) so i can't much talk about it's reliability or how it was to fire, but at times you heard that someone had mechanical with missile.

Yes, powerlines and large bodies of water are an issue, causing wires to short circuit. Also sun (if firing directly at sun). I don't see how undergrowth should be an systemic issue, wire is inside missile unwinding itself as missile flies along so if everything goes along well there should not be problem. But it's 20 years so maybe i've forgot something.

Edited January 7, 2022 by Secondbrooks

[Begemot]

Secondbrooks,

You stated for the TOW that "... powerlines and large bodies of water are an issue, causing wires to short circuit".  What about snow on the ground and precipitation, like moderate to heavy rain? Could these cause problems?

[Secondbrooks]

1 hour ago, Begemot said:

Secondbrooks,

You stated for the TOW that "... powerlines and large bodies of water are an issue, causing wires to short circuit".  What about snow on the ground and precipitation, like moderate to heavy rain? Could these cause problems?

It's been atleast decade since i last time read the manual so take this with grain of salt. With lakes and such there was mathematical formula how to calculate if wires has change to touch water before reaching target. But i don't think there was anything mentioned in TOW's manual of general wetness causing issues, thou who knows?

I keep writing wires, i'm 90% sure that it's individual wire. And thus short circuit isn't probably correct terminology.

With sun issue is that IR-strobe in missile's tail (which is tracked by sight's IR-optic for guiding commands) gets sunk into sun's IR-radiation and launcher might loose track of missile. Similarily to IR-emiters used by Russians and Chinese. 

[John Kettler]

BFC et al.

Here is the crash course on firing limitations for the various models of TOW, going back to the ones of concern here. This is likely also of direct value to CMSF2 and CMBS. Not only does this below article at link address water obstacles, but high tension lines, which can electrocute the launch crew, wreck electronics or both, but such things as electrified rails, overhead trolley wires and other hazards. As far as the first two hazards are concerned, the name of the game is separation: Be as far away from them and as high above them as possible, consistent with mission and available terrain. The article has both illustrations and a nomogram. Ref water, the issue is clearly listed as electrical shorting of the guidance wires.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/23-34/Ch2.htm

On a related note, I made a quick call and spoke to brother George about firing TOW missiles through brush. He said the general practice was to avoid firing through anything that could snag the guidance wires but had no direct experience. He went on to note that the Bradley CFV was quite tall (was at Ft. Benning motor pool one day when visiting him long ago and got to see these houses on tracks snorting thunderously while emitting towering columns of exhaust)and  that when he was in Scouts they were set up on a hill and engaging targets on a hill across a valley, so brush wasn't an issue. He went on to say that it might well have been an issue for TOW ground mounts. To his statement I'd be inclined to add TOW jeeps as well.

Regards,

John Kettler

Edited January 9, 2022 by John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Beondthegrave,

Here's the BRIXMIS documentary I saw. Didn't realize how long BRIXMIS ran before, but it started in 1946. Here's the link to a short article on the genesis and making of this historic documentary.
 

And here's informal BRIXMIS video recorded in 1988, informal in the sense it was personal, rather than operational in purpose but very much documenting Cold War reality for posterity.It was shot from a BRIXMIS vehicle. The video comments are fascinating.
 

Regards,

John Kettler

Edited January 9, 2022 by John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Secondbrooks,

What were Finnish Army practices ref firing TOW over or through brush and such? Brother George had zero TOW ground mount experience, but you had tons of it. That makes you a SME in my book.

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Something which may or may not be relevant is that in 1972 TOW ER first rolled out. Thanks to some very smart engineers, a way was found to add 750 meters more of guidance wire to the spool, increasing TOW range from the baseline 3000 to 3750 meters, but without otherwise changing the missile at all. Initially, this was only for helicopters, desperately in need of staying as far away from the ZSU-23/4 in particular and SU/WP AD in general, and I don't know whether or not this was subsequently also done for ground units. Have so far found nothing online (cursory search) that goes into this specific issue. This useful chronicle of the TOW doesn't say.

https://asc.army.mil/docs/pubs/alt/2009/3_JulAugSep/articles/31_The_TOW_Missile--Precise_and_Powerful_200907.pdf

Regards,

John Kettler

Edited January 9, 2022 by John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Begemot,

Missed your question earlier, but I can say I saw zero mention in the Global Security piece, which was an excerpt from the relevant (and named) TOW manual, of snow as a hazard or restriction to TOW use. Nor was there anything that I saw regarding issues with rain. I think hail could possibly be an issue by breaking the guidance wires (a vanishingly small chance of a hailstone hitting  the guidance wires), but before TOW-2 arrived with the waffle iron (heated grid) to work with thermals and still fitted with the visible band xenon beacon (for backward compatibility with all TOW launchers), am of the opinion that a torrential downpour or blizzard could very well cause the tracker to lose the beacon, resulting in missile splat. Call that set of remarks informed technical speculation based on understanding how the beacon and tracker work in a daylight or adequately lit (full Moon, flares, reflected searchlights and such) engagement without the AN/TAS-4 thermal sight. An identified weather related issue was winds: quartering, crosswinds and gusts, all of which can set up tube vibration which disrupt tracking. Depending on the wind direction, screens could be built to protect the tube from those damaging vibrations. Firing through or over fires was a bad idea, since the guidance wires could burn! Generally, firing from bunkers, buildings and other enclosed spaces was prohibited absent special permission of the CO. And as enterprising as the jihadis have been in firing heavy weapons indoors, I can't recall ever seeing a TOW fired from inside a building, despite having watched stacks of jihadi ATGM launch videos.

Regards,

John Kettler

[BeondTheGrave]

10 hours ago, John Kettler said:

Beondthegrave,

Here's the BRIXMIS documentary I saw. Didn't realize how long BRIXMIS ran before, but it started in 1946. Here's the link to a short article on the genesis and making of this historic documentary.
 

And here's informal BRIXMIS video recorded in 1988, informal in the sense it was personal, rather than operational in purpose but very much documenting Cold War reality for posterity.It was shot from a BRIXMIS vehicle. The video comments are fascinating.
 

Regards,

John Kettler

There is a really good book about BRIXMIS called just BRIXMIS. Im not sure how much of it is true, some of the stories give me a 'fish tale' sort of vibe, but if half of what they say is based in fact the organization seems to have been pretty impressive. Also true were the guys who would get their cars rammed by GDR tuckers trying to protect their bases. A couple guys, Brit, French, and American, were killed that way. 

[MikeyD]

Another problem of firing over bodies of water is the guidance flare would reflect off the water's surface that the automatic guidance was likely to over-correct. 

[Combatintman]

18 hours ago, BeondTheGrave said:

There is a really good book about BRIXMIS called just BRIXMIS. Im not sure how much of it is true, some of the stories give me a 'fish tale' sort of vibe, but if half of what they say is based in fact the organization seems to have been pretty impressive. Also true were the guys who would get their cars rammed by GDR tuckers trying to protect their bases. A couple guys, Brit, French, and American, were killed that way. 

I know a few ex-BRIXMIS types, part of their training used to take place at my depot and I used to monitor SOXMIS, their Soviet equivalent who got up to similar shenanigans - I think Tony Geraghty's book, if that's the one you're referring to, is pretty representative of what went on.

[civdiv]

On 7/2/2021 at 2:49 PM, slysniper said:

Interesting original post, since you have imput from someone that actually used the system.

I was only able to watch such guys use the system. 

I do agree, he has some valid points as to accuracy of the weapon.

But I would like to point out, some of the failure problem is during training, they are using old munitions, getting rid of the stuff that has been sitting around the longest.

So that is a factor in some of the failure rate.

Personnally, as for firing problems, I would say it was 1 in 5. from what I saw. As for missing the target, he likely has some good points for short range.

But I do recall long range targets being missed a lot. Normally something failed with the communication by them. Wire issues. So not sure his high percentage at the longest ranges would be correct.

I would tend to agree with the age of the munitions. When I was attached to a Counter Mech unit, all of the TOW failures in training were from stocks that were decades old. The one exception was when a gunner forgot to hyper elevate for a berm and the TOW hit like five meters from me. Luckily it did not explode.

[civdiv]

On 1/9/2022 at 5:47 AM, John Kettler said:

Something which may or may not be relevant is that in 1972 TOW ER first rolled out. Thanks to some very smart engineers, a way was found to add 750 meters more of guidance wire to the spool, increasing TOW range from the baseline 3000 to 3750 meters, but without otherwise changing the missile at all. Initially, this was only for helicopters, desperately in need of staying as far away from the ZSU-23/4 in particular and SU/WP AD in general, and I don't know whether or not this was subsequently also done for ground units. Have so far found nothing online (cursory search) that goes into this specific issue. This useful chronicle of the TOW doesn't say.

https://asc.army.mil/docs/pubs/alt/2009/3_JulAugSep/articles/31_The_TOW_Missile--Precise_and_Powerful_200907.pdf

Regards,

John Kettler

When I was ATTACHED to a Counter Mech unit (so ground launched TOW) the given range for a TOW was 3,750. This was circa ‘93.