Eastern Front - What's the attraction?

[Grisha]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>My point was simply that by tying down 40% or so of German combat strength in June 1944, this allowed the disaster to Army group center to happen. Much of the problem was that the German's simply had no reserve to counterattack after the initial breakthroughs.

- Warren Peace<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Germans had plenty of armor on the Russian front in June of 1944. It's just that they were mainly located in the Army Groups south of Army Group Center. This was due to a massive Soviet deception campaign before Bagration. The Germans took the bait, sent most of their armor south, and Army Group Center was destroyed.

[This message has been edited by Grisha (edited 10-27-2000).]

[Warren Peace]

Grisha,

Are you seriously trying to argue that a 40% increase in German Force strength would have not made a significant difference in the outcome?

Warren

[Grisha]

There never would have been a 40% increase. Considering the German armies on the Italian front as well in the calculation, even if the western allies only threatened to invade Italy and/or France, there still would have been the necessity of a garrison in those two places, and that would have taken at least 20% of the Wehrmacht for garrison duty. This leaves 20% to be added on the Russian front. And when one realizes that German strength was never any higher than in 1941, and that 90% of German forces were in the Russian front in 1941, I can only say that it wouldn't have altered the outcome of WWII, only the date.

One thing we haven't addressed either are the Axis allies, such as Romania, Hungary, and Italy that were on the Russian front. Most of these troops were gone by 1943, and they're absence from the line was keenly felt by the Germans.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tss:

Usually only KIA and MIA are counted as irreversible losses. I have a hard time believing that the wounded are counted in those figures. As a rule of thumb, one casualty in 5 is KIA or MIA. Those figures sum to about 3 million. That would mean that the number of German KIA and MIA would be only around 600 thousand. The casualties of Bagration and the Rumanian offensive in 1944 by themselves amounted to 620000 KIA and MIA.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Tommi Yes according to Krivosheev's group, my data is from Mueller - Hillerbrand. Another aspect of IR losses would include medical losses as around 23.8 % of all Soviet wounded were returned to the front, the problem is we dont realy have any comparible German data, Ie, ill as in not battle related, Soviet troops records were kept & represented about 73% of Soviet medical losses as around 51% of the Soviet overall wounded passed thru Soviet evacuation hospitals.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

That 27 million figure for Soviet losses includes either wounded in addition to KIA and MIA or civilian deaths. Counting the number of wounded is pretty difficult, since some of them would remain unfit to enter the later duty and many were wounded more than once.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Tommi, lets just say that their is no concrecte number on Soviet losses, Ie Krivosheev's numbers have been challenged & rebuffed by other Russian historian's like Sokolov,who has also recently been challenged etc.

Sokolov picked apart Krivosheev's data & then presented his finding's citeing areas Krivosheev's group was in error Ie, Soviet Initial call up had errors of being cited to 12,000,000 to low, in Krivosheev in some cases.

Sokolov puts Soviet Military irreversible losses at 26.4 million & civilian losses at 16.9 million Below are *Sokolov's Soviet military IR losses by yea:

1941 - 5.5 million

1942 - 7.153 million

1943 - 6.965 million

1944 - 6.547 million

1945 - 2.534 million

Which Sokolov then compares to German Military IR losses on the Eastren Front data I gave yesterday, which gives us a correlation in favor of the German forces

of:

1941 - 18.1:1

1942 - 13.7:1

1943 - 10.4:1

1944 - 5.8:1

1945 - 4.6:1

*See: Sokolov B.V. The Cost of War: Human Losses for the USSR and Germany, 1939 - 1945 : Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol 9, No. 1 March 1996. p.176

Sokolov The Cost of War : Human losses of the USSR and Germany 1939 - 1945.

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 10-27-2000).]

[Los]

Tommi, the figure I quoted does not include civilian casualties. What I don't know is if it included those executed by the NKVD. I assume it does but at Stalingrad for instance the NKVD reported 13,500 executions of their own troops for the battle. Also at any given time on the Russian front there wre between 150,000-250,000 Russians in the process of serving out their death sentence in front line penal battalions and companies. I also doubt those figures included anything to do with partisan losses but I could be wrong. As an aside I read that when the Russians got around to doing their first official census (in the early fifties) since the October Revolution they were "short" apporximnately 50 million citizens (this would include all russain deaths from 1917 (or maybe even the beginning of WW1?), up through the reviolution, civil war, 20-40s Stalinist times, WW2, and the reckoning of internal scores shortly after the war.

Los

It's an admittedly macabre fascination with these numbers but nevertheless incredible stuff. I sometimes wonder if the Soviet system's policies, doctrines, and operations were not at least as equally lethal and disastourous to the Red Army as they were to the German Army!

Los

[Krono]

For me, the attraction to the East Front has been something I have studied for about three years. Im American but I almost completely suround myself in German operations on all fronts, I dont know why either.Ive always had this odd fascination with Germany.

The sheer scale of the gargantuan struggle is unimaginable. The Russians and the Germans were fighting for their idiologies, way of life, and their own crusades against Fascism and Bolshevism. The loss of life on the Ostfront can in no way be compared to what happened in the West during the years of the war.

To put things into perspective from an American POV: When the Germans reached the gates of Moscow, and the elite Siberian divisons were pulled west from Manchuria and Siberia, the Russians launched a massive counterattack against Von Bock (not sure if this is the right general) and his army group. That battle alone cost the Soviets more then 150-180,000 men killed--nearly half of the total Americans killed in all years of WWII. Combine this with the losses a Stalingrad, Leningrad, Sevastopol, Kursk, Kiev, and the massive encirclements during the opneing weeks of the war.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Warren Peace:

My point was simply that by tying down 40% or so of German combat strength in June 1944, this allowed the disaster to Army group center to happen. Much of the problem was that the German's simply had no reserve to counterattack after the initial breakthroughs.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Which is it 40% of 'German combat strength' or 40% armor?. Manpower wise, the West & Italy didn't come close the Eastern Front commitments, as for armor numbers as of June 1 1944, the Eastern Front had a total of *4,740 tanks & assault guns, of which AGC had 553 AFVs. Adair puts pre - invasion German AFV strength, in the West at 1,850 tanks & assault gun's in June 1944, of course this total increases thru June with commitment of formations arriving in the invasion area.

The reason for the Soviet success was not only because of a lack of German reserves, it was because the Soviets with a maskirovka (deception) plan fooled German Intel on believing the Soviet summer offensive would be vs Army Group North Ukraine. The Germans falling for the ruse, then concentrated their by the time they realized their mistake it was to late.

All that's left then to debate IMHO is would any reserves shipped from the West have arrived in time to do any good as we know how much effectGerman reserves shipped from Byelorrussia had considering the Soviets initially employed **1,254,300 men, 4070 tanks & SU's, 24,363 Arty pieces & 5,327 aircraft.

In the end I'd think it would be fair to say that both the East & West needed each other to tie down German forces so they could not respond to each others offensives etc.

*See: Zaloga Steven Bagration 1944 Osprey Military Campaign Series # 42 p.26

**See: Glantz David M, House Jonathan. When Titans Clashed p.201

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 10-27-2000).]

[lassner.1]

Mr. Waters is correct, to an extent. I would add that beginning in late 1942, but especially by 1943 the Russian army improved drastically in its operational capabilities and fluency, while the German army stagnated. May I suggest, Mr. Peace, a look at David Glanz's "When Titans Clashed" and "Stumbling Colossus," and Williamson Murray/Allan R. Millett "A War to be Won" (really the latest take on the outstanding scholarship Murray and Millett have produced for years, and especially "Millitary Effectiveness vols. I-III).

----------

Gewaltige Naturen mit starker Eigenpersönlichkeit darf man nicht aus der Umgebung reissen, die ihren Rythmus angenommen hat. . . .In diesem Falle besteht die Gefahr, que du sublime au ridicule il n’y a qu’un pas.

[tss]

PzKpfw 1 wrote:

Tommi who mentioned WIA? as being included in the irreversible numbers I posted?

I could have sworn that I your post had a line (KIA, MIA, and WIA), but reading again it is clearly (KIA, MIA, and POW). Well, one piece of evidence more that I should get new glasses.

lets just say that their is no concrecte number on Soviet losses, Ie Krivosheev's numbers have been challenged & rebuffed by other Russian historian's like Sokolov,who has also looked into Mueller & Hillerbrand data etc.

Yes, that can be said. I haven't had a chance to read Sokolov's work but it is also a subject of controversy. There was a post on soc.history.world-war-ii (by one of the resident Russians) that presented some of its problems but I didn't save it then and I can't find it from deja.com. He claimed that Sokolov exaggerated the casualties for shock value. I don't know the truth in this subject.

The Sokolov's work seems to be pretty difficult to access. I just spent about 15 minutes trying to find the book or even reference to it from the internet without success. Also the common database of all Finnish university libraries didn't have it.

If you have access to the book, could you post its ISBN number to help the search?

Krivosheev's descriptions of battles are certainly way off in many cases and his decriptions of reasons for Winter War parrots the official Soviet propaganda.

Hmm. I just came upon one way roughly check the accuracy of the Winter War numbers. One Soviet veteran of the 7th Army tells in his memoirs that his division lost 23000 men during the 80 days that it participated in the war (initially it had 13000 men, there were 5000 left when the war ended and the division received 15000 men as replacements during the war). Krivosheev gives 7th Army's total lossess as 99919. If the veteran knew his unit's losses correctly, that would mean that one single division that wasn't present in December's bloody failures lost 1/4 of the casualties of the whole army. I don't have Soviet OOB available right now so I can't say how conceivable this is. I'll have to check this when I get home.

However, I have severe doubts on the figure of 26 million combat deaths. The population of Soviet Union before the war was (probably) between 150-180 millions. The male population of this would be 75-90 million, including children. I don't know how the Soviet age distribution looked, but losing 30% of all males as casualties of war sounds improbable to my ears.

- Tommi

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tss:

I could have sworn that I your post had a line (KIA, MIA, and WIA), but reading again it is clearly (KIA, MIA, and POW). Well, one piece of evidence more that I should get new glasses.

- Tommi<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

LOL no you don't need glasses the problem is use of the term 'irreversible losses' seems to be confusing to its writers as Sokolov changes his definition as well, hence my editing. Personaly I think yours is more accurate an definition.

Agreed, I'm waiting for more details myself from a friend who has some articles concerning the challenge to Sokolovs data.

You need to find:

Sokolov B.V. "The Cost of War: Human Losses for the USSR and Germany, 1939 - 1945: Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol 9, No. 1 March 1996. I believe Frank Cass's site has the back issues for sale try searching under Slavic Military Studies, The Journal of @:

http://www.frankcass.com/jnls/index.htm

Yes, & Sokolov makes a case that the 1941 USSR census pupulation total of 200.1 mililion cited by V.S. Kozhurin (based on the Jan 1 1941 census), is incorect & that the actual population was 209.3 miliion etc .

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 10-27-2000).]

[tss]

PzKpfw 1 wrote:

Sokolov B.V. "The Cost of War: Human Losses for the USSR and Germany, 1939 - 1945: Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol 9, No. 1 March 1996.

Thanks. I hope that the library of the Finnish Military Academy has a copy of that. Now I only need some time to visit the place. It is just about the only major library near Helsinki that doesn't have Internet interface (or any digital index at all).

Yes, & Sokolov makes a case that the 1941 USSR census pupulation total of 200.1 mililion cited by V.S. Kozhurin (based on the Jan 1 1941 census), is incorect & that the actual population was 209.3 miliion etc

Huh. I thought that the usual consensus is that the 1941 census _overestimated_ the USSR population by a relatively large margin.

BTW. About that Soviet division that I wrote about in the earlier message. The veteran was Grigori Garashenko and he served in the 95th Division. That division participated first in fights in the leftmost tip of the frontline, then it attacked at Summa sector and finally attacked to Viipuri in the final days of the war. Garashenko was a MG gunner and the assistant of the batallion politruk.

According to his memoirs the division received four times 4000-5000 men reinforcements during the war, over 18000 men (this figure was given to him by one of the officers of the staff of the division). The initial strength was not 13000 as I remembered but 15000 and it had less than 5000 men left after the war. The total number of casualties was thus 28000 men. That's about 190% casualties in less than three months, if the figure is correct.

Soviets used a total of 40 divisions against Finns. The 7th Army had a total of 12 divisions, but I don't know whether all of them were committed to battle. The breakthrough battles of February were fought mostly by 95th, 100th, and 123th division. If we suppose that all divisions had similar casualties, that would give a total of 84000 men lost for these three divisions only. However, this is so large figure that I find it difficult to believe. I think I have to delve a little deeper into different casualty estimates before I dare to say anything definitive on the subject.

- Tommi

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

Yes, & Sokolov makes a case that the 1941 USSR census pupulation total of 200.1 mililion cited by V.S. Kozhurin (based on the Jan 1 1941 census), is incorect & that the actual population was 209.3 miliion etc

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sounds like he is going out of it way to proove his data.

I tend to disbelieve him. Less then half of Soviet population was men (due to previous wars).

That makes it 90 million. Only 1/2 was probably of military service age.

That make it 45 million. Not all of them went to the army. Some were in Far East armies. NKVD had over 1 million people policing camps. Some stayed at their jobs. (Like my grandfather - communication engineer in Far East)

A lot of Soviet men were destroyed by germans so they would not be able to be drafted by advancing soviets.

Sokolovs numbers would mean that ALL of the men available to Soviets for military service were KIA. Thats just not possible. Soviet union had an army after all in May 1945 - right?

[Warren Peace]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In the end I'd think it would be fair to say that both the East & West needed each other to tie down German forces

so they could not respond to each others offensives etc. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This has been my point all along. I got the feeling that there are many people who believe that the Western Front was not a significant factor in the outcome of the war. My point was that although the Russians did a majority of the fighting, the second front was necessary for the ultimate decsisive victory.

As for the 40% number, that refers to the number of divisions in the West at the time of D-Day and Bagration. This number comes from Seaton's book.

As for the deception, just remember that the Germans had total deception in the Ardennes and they were still defeated. More Divisions goes along way toward counteracting Deception.

Actually, come to think of it someone said "God favors the side with the largest Battalians" Who did say that?

[Hamstersss]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tss:

PzKpfw 1 wrote:

However, I have severe doubts on the figure of 26 million combat deaths. The population of Soviet Union before the war was (probably) between 150-180 millions. The male population of this would be 75-90 million, including children. I don't know how the Soviet age distribution looked, but losing 30% of all males as casualties of war sounds improbable to my ears.

- Tommi<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Tommi, I'm no expert on the Ostfront but in the American Civil War, 25% of white southern men of military age died in the war and the ACW was not nearly as total a war as the Ostfront.

------------------

Seen in the light of evolution, biology is, perhaps, intellectually the most satisfying and inspiring science. Without that light it becomes a pile of sundry facts—some of them interesting or curious but making no meaningful picture as a whole.

-Theodosius Dobzhansky, "Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution"

[This message has been edited by Elijah Meeks (edited 10-27-2000).]

[tss]

Elijah Meeks wrote:

Tommi, I'm no expert on the Ostfront but in the American Civil War, 25% of white southern men of military age died in the war and the ACW was not nearly as total a war as the Ostfront.

Interesting. I knew that ACW was a bloody affair but I didn't know that it was that bad.

In any case, that 30% figure referred to all men and it would mean that about 60% of men of military age.

The main reason why I find those percentages very suspicious is that a country in war has to leave a significant amount of population to work in non-military duties. Growing food, manufacturing equipment and ammo and the like.

When the Continuation War started, Finland conscripted 650000 men to army out of total population of 3.5 million (~20%). Most of the 18-40 year old men were taken in the army. The result was serious troubles with economy and a severe shortage of food. As a result, Finnish government had to release almost 300000 men back to oridinary work in early '42 and import large amounts of food from Germany.

Now, supposing that Solokov's figure for Soviet population is correct (which I doubt), Soviets lost 12% of their population as military KIAs. I can't see how their wartime infrastructure could survive those losses.

In the ACW case the South had one advantage that USSR didn't have during the war: a large portion of their work force was not used as soldiers: the slaves.

- Tommi

[Jeff Duquette]

I suspect that this wont change anyone's preconceived notions of the relative importance of the western allies impact in Europe…its still interesting. Adolf Hitler words

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Fuehrer Headquarters

3 November 1943

Top Secret

The Fuehrer

OKW/WFSt/Op.No. 662656/43 g.K. Chefs

27 Copies

Copy No.____

Directive No. 51

For the last two and one-half years the bitter and costly struggle against Bolshevism has made the utmost demands upon the bulk of our military resources and energies. This commitment was in keeping with the seriousness of the danger, and

the over-all situation.

The situation has since changed. The threat from the East remains, but an even greater danger looms in the West: the Anglo-American landing! In the East, the vastness of the space will, as a last resort, permit a loss of territory even on a major scale, without suffering a mortal blow to Germany's chance for survival.

Not so in the West! If the enemy here succeeds in penetrating our defenses on a wide front, consequences of staggering proportions will follow within a short time. All signs point to an offensive against the Western Front of Europe no later than spring, and perhaps earlier...

signed: Adolf Hitler

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

An on-line hypertext version of this directive is available at: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-4/7-4_d.htm

My personal two cents on the subject:The Soviets probably would have won the war in Europe without the Allied invasion, with the stipulation that the German troops tied down in France, Italy, Norway, Holland, Greece remained tied down to counter a potential Anglo-American push in these areas.

I also believe the Anglo-Americans would have also eventually won the war, with or without the Soviets.

In either case the war in Europe would have been protracted one or two years. In the case of an Anglo-American War unassisted by the Soviets...the Germans would have become the wieners of the Nuclear Bomb lottery. Defeat of Japan in this hypo-scenario...who knows...surrender in 47-48ish.

Grisha:

You commie sympathizer! Whittman is goin down buddy. You maybe be good at killin helpless half-tracks…just wait till my super Fireflys start pumpin 17 ponder rounds into your hide.

Photo courtesy of the most excellent Russian Military Zone. URL for the Russian Military Zone Web Site: http://history.vif2.ru/

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-27-2000).]

[Steve Clark]

To further add to Meeks' ACW numbers, the total white population breaks down as follows (in millions):

Union: 18.8

Border: 2.5

Confederacy: 5.4

Total: 26.7

Thus 600,000 casualties represent 2.2% of the white population.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by killmore:

Sounds like he is going out of it way to proove his data.

I tend to disbelieve him. Less then half of Soviet population was men (due to previous wars).

That makes it 90 million. Only 1/2 was probably of military service age.

That make it 45 million. Not all of them went to the army. Some were in Far East armies. NKVD had over 1 million people policing camps. Some stayed at their jobs. (Like my grandfather - communication engineer in Far East)

A lot of Soviet men were destroyed by germans so they would not be able to be drafted by advancing soviets.

Sokolovs numbers would mean that ALL of the men available to Soviets for military service were KIA. Thats just not possible. Soviet union had an army after all in May 1945 - right?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Killmore; I really wouldn't know, basically every Russian historian who is dealing in Soviet losses, has or is, going out of their way to prove their numbers. What we do have our the major works trying to address this issue, as with Sokolov's 'Tsena pobedy' in 1991, and then the Krivosheev's group 'Grif sekretnosti sniat' in 1993 along with various other Russian historian's works Ie, Mertsalov, Volkogonov, Alekseev, Isupov, Kunetov, & Maslow etc.

The truth is, the actual cost of the war in Russian human loss terms will probably never be known, as records are incomplete and other stumbling blocks exist, as in the fact that during the Winter war with Finland due to Soviet measures taken against espopionage, Soviet troops had their pay books & id medallions taken from them, which only adds to the problem of assessing data on casualties during that time period as well as the fact their was not even an 'official' Soviet loss & burial accounting organization until March 1941.

By 1942 many Soviet troops still had not received ID medallions, or even pay books & the Commissar for Defense actually canceled the issuing medallions' altogether in an order in late 1942 & even discouraged paybook issue, as they feared the true scope of losses would become known by the general troops & result in more desertions etc.

Works cant even agree on MIA/POWs Ie, Krivosheev lists the number of Soviet forces MIA/POW from 1943 - 1945 as 604,000 while according to German records they took 746,000 during that time period. While they also can't agree on Front Force dispositions, Ie, at Kursk, Krivosheev lists the Central Forces as of 05.07.43 as 746,000, while Sokolov lists Central Front as 704,000 on 05.07.43. Krivosheev lists the Soviet irreversible losses for 1942 at 3,258,216 while Volkogonov puts the 1942 IR losses at 5,888,236, Volkogonov's monthly IR loss breakdown for 1942 is 1.8 times higher then the Krivosheev groups figures, etc.

As to the Soviet manpower mobilization in WW2 official figures including the peace time forces was 34,476,700 men of which 3,614,000 were used in non combat positions Ie, economic positions, & non Com positions within the military as of 01.07.45 11,390,600 men were in the Soviet armed forces with another 1,046,000 in medical facilities and another 425,000 Soviet POWs returned from captivity.

Sokolov states that the official call up data may be in error of 2 to 4 million effectives if or not it includes the over 4,000,000 volunteers of which over 2,000,000 were conscripted & that the official mobilization numbers do not reflect men who were drafted directly into front line combat units, which was believed to be in the millions, Sokolov puts the final mobilization at 42.9 million with the addition of an Soviet miscalculations in manpower Ie, volunteers conscripted party formation transition to the armed forces, & direct conscription into frontline units at 12,000,000 effectives.

As to the IR totals Sokolov brings up that the Moscow museum's WW2 database records contain information by name on 17,000,000 KIA/MIA Soviet troops, & as of 1996 another 1,000,000 names was to be added by the 50th anniversary of WW2. This data does not contain the names of the 6.3 million Soviet POWs, in German captivity, of which only 1,836,000 returned to Russia.

Krivosheev's group list's Soviet battle casualties from 1941 - till the end of the war as 14,685,593, and the number of ill as 7,641,312. This data was calculated by military medical facility records according to Krivosheev, medical losses according to Soviet troop reports was 15,296,473 battle casualties & 3,047,675 ill.

The discrepancy in Krivosheev's work is explained in that the former figures refer to all casualties, while the the 2nd refer only to active duty duty personnel which would explain the difference in the ill numbers, but not the difference of over 600,000 in active duty battle casualties.

Sokolov believes the data represents evacuated personnel and does not reflect troop numbers who were wounded & returned to their units or died in the field aid stations Ie, as of 1945 Soviet records show that over 1,191,000 Soviet troops had been wounded at least twice during their service the St. Petersburg Military medical museum holds records on over 32,000,000 Soviet personnel who were admitted to medical facilities during the war, their are no records to date on Soviet personnel who died, or were patched up by frontline Soviet medical Bn's.

These are but a few of the examples I can give that show just how much confusion their is concerning, Soviet loss studies. I suggest if your interested you obtain a copy of Sokolov's paper, then draw your own conclusions from that on what's accurate etc, this is one reason I am eager to read the papers challenging Sokolov's works.

Tommi, the census has been called into question by Russian historians who don't agree with other Russian historians , and is another topic of debate as well.

Jeff, as I have gone into before here & in the other topic you brought it up in, that order did not hold up past Bagration's commencement and really went out the window after Falaise.

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 10-28-2000).]

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Jeff, as I have gone into before here & in the other topic you brought it up in, that order did not hold up past Bagration's commencement and really went out the window after Falaise.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

John

But it's such a great directive to quote. I can't help throwing it out whenever possible. If I could figure out a way to work it into the discussion on 88mm accuracy...shoot...I'd put it in there too. The rest is all just speculation. Fun to discuss. I have seen this same discussion on several other forums. Very popular subject matter. It typically seems to go nowhere. Nothing is resolved and no ones minds really get changed. But I am enjoying the information you folks are throwing out.

Anyway if this threads intent is to get a show of hands for who wants CM2 in Russia, I got two hands raised. In my mind there is no better subject matter for wargames than the Russo-German War. Tank variety, scenario variety, terrain variety...the Ruskie Front has all the right ingredients for great wargames.

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-27-2000).]

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

Killmore; I realy wouldn't know, basicly every Russian historian who is dealing in Soviet losses, has or is, going out of their way to prove their numbers

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

One more thing. Soviet union (Stalin?) made interesting statement in one of his speeches for soldiers in 1942. He said: "We cannot loose any more ground because we already lost over 80 million people". He meant that over 80 million were already under german occupation. The huge losses in 1942/1943 described in that work would contradict this statement. If Soviet union already lost 80 million people then it would not be able to loose so many in rest of 1942 and 1943.

Now I am not saying that it is entirely impossible that there were 26 million KIA. But the other numbers just don't seem to support these huge losses...

I would love to find out the truth.

What was the german estimate of Soviet losses? I know that sometimes germans would claim that the destroyed more Soviet tanks in one battle than the Soviets had on the entire front at that time.

So if germans claimed 26 million dead then that number would be totally made up.

[Hamstersss]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Steve Clark:

To further add to Meeks' ACW numbers, the total white population breaks down as follows (in millions):

Union: 18.8

Border: 2.5

Confederacy: 5.4

Total: 26.7

Thus 600,000 casualties represent 2.2% of the white population.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The point of my statement having been that a nation that is invaded and fights tooth and nail, as the Russians did, can use up men at a rate that can be thought of today as unbelievable. While I do not know enough about the Ostfront to declare support for any one stand, I would be shocked but not surprised to learn that it was on the high end of the estimates shown here.

------------------

I've got far more annoying things than that up my sleeve.

-Meeks

You must wear awfully loose shirts to fit an oompah band up your sleeve.

-Chrisl

[Grisha]

Jeff,

WRT brewing halftracks, there is a unique sound they make when an 88 hits them. Something like opening a sardine can with a can opener. Makes me hungry

And as for your Fireflies, I will certainly try to see how the new explosion graphics I just d/l'ed will look

[Grisha]

Warren,

Now that I've quibbled over a few things with you, I will say that when the western Allies landed in Normandy, many Soviet citizens breathed a sigh of relief, because now it meant they weren't in it alone any longer in Europe. Also, lend lease was very helpful to the Soviet war effort, increasing their mobility, and enhancing their communications. Everything the western Allies did helped to end the war in Germany a little sooner.

Another thing the Soviets were very appreciative of was the Allied heavy bombing campaign. This campaign forced a large portion of the Luftwaffe jagdfliegeren stationed in the Russian front to redeploy in Germany, aiding the efforts of the VVS in no small measure. The terrible losses sustained by the bomber crews during '43 were known to many Soviets during that time, and taken to heart.

While we may never agree on who did most to win the war in Europe, there can be no denying that the Germans were defeated by a group effort of primarily the US, the UK/Commonwealth, and the Soviet Union.

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

I'm not convinced that D-Day was necessary to win WWII, although I do believe that it was necessary to prevent, say, a soviet-controlled people's republic of France. I think, though, that the outcome may have been different if there had been no U.S. or British participation at all, including no lend lease -- or if, say, the UK signed an armistice in April '41 and the U.S. was never brought into the war. In that case, with no bombing, no threat of a second front, and German free to trade with the rest of the world (i.e., no titanium shortage), the result of the war may have been different. Although Hitler still may have found a way to lose; he was gifted that way.

On a somewhat unrelated matter, I don't think that Germany developing the atomic bomb would have made much difference on way or the other. Because the US dropped the Bomb on Japan and Japan surrendered, there is a tendency to see the Bomb as a war-ending weapon...but of course a lot of Japan's surrender has to do with their complete exhaustion at the end of the war. If, say, the USSR was fighting in Poland two years later than they otherwise did (say, 1947) and Germany develops an atomic bomb and drops it on Moscow, I don't think that the USSR is just going to give up. After all, some conventional bombing raids killed as many people as he bombs over Hiroshima or Nagasaki. And the US only managed to produce three bombs. In fact, I believe that the US nuclear arsenal in 1949 was six bombs.

[Jeff Duquette]

To further muddy the waters regarding Soviet Combat Casulties suffered during WWII, one source of descrepency lies in the incidence of multiple wounds being suffered by the same soldier. Incidence of multiple wounds could potentially skew our perception of over all combat casualty statistics. From: Colonel-General G.F. Krivosheev’s ”Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses In the 20th Century” (pg 88, 89)