What is maneuver warfare?

[Henri]

In a recent thread on the US contribution to maneuver warfare, somewone asked for a definition of maneuver warfare. I responded that it was something like the use of fire and movement to dirupt, dislocate and destroy the enemy, and others posted their own definitions.But this is not satsifactory, andI went back to the books.

Before I go on, I think that this is an important issue for Combat Mission - whether or not the principles of maneuver warfare can be applied in this game -but this is another issue for the moment.

It is interesting that both Lind ("Maneuver Warfare Handbook") and Leonhard ("The Art of Maneuver") do not manage in their books to give a definition of what maneuver warfare is, although they define a lot of other terms like push-pull reconnaissance, Boyd cycle, mission order, obejctives and so on, and describe in some detail the elements of maneuver warfare.

As the two above authors point out, Maneuver Warare is a term which has led to a lot of confusion among experts, so it is not surprising that non-experts are confused. it is a lot easier to say what it is than what it isn't. for example, according to Leonhard, although the US military in the 70's adopted the concept for its Airland Battle Doctrine, it bifurcated back to attrition warfare concepts, only the Marines sticking to the ideas.

Well I'm not going to attempt to define here what more knowledgeable authors too hundreds of pages to explain; but I WILL give two criteria for recognizing what maneuver warfare is not: it is not movement for movement's sake, although movement is usually involved, and it is the incompatible with attrition warfare, whether or not this kind of theory advocates pitting strength against weakness as does maneuver warfare.

let me finish with an example of why attrition warfare is difficult to accomplish in Combat Mission; in a maneuver warfare context, a commander would not say "Capture Hill 302 in order to prevent the enemy from using highway 101 to cross the river". Instead a commander would say "Prevent the enemy from heading toward the river using highway 101 re Hill 302". Although the difference might appear minor, it is not, because in the second case, the sub-commander feels no compulsion to hold the hill, rather he is told to focus on the objective, whetehr or not the circumstances require or allow to hold Hill 302.

It is easy to see that all wargames based on achieving victory by capturing specific objective flags throw a major monkey wrench from the start on any simulation of maneuver warfare. Unfortunately, with the present status of AI, I can't think of any wargame that does not have this major defect. One unfinished one is "crisis", but there is no sign of a final version, and another is "Road to Moscow", which seems unlikely ever tosee the light of day.

so Combat Mission is no worst than other wargames in this respect, but it is also no better...

Henri

[Lorak]

Nice post.

The one thing I do like about CM is that it is flexiable.

For example:

Why couldn't a scenario designer, (with your battle example), design exactly what you want?

All it would take is a map, position hill302 on it in a good overwatch position, (maybe already defended). Then set an exit zone (making it to the road). Have a small group of germans defend the hill, then have german reenforcments arrive whose goal is to make it accross the terrain and to the road. The allies goal would be to stop the germans from exiting. They can decide if the hill is important enough for this goal or not.

Obviously This scenario would have absolutly NO flags, the only points are for exit/non-exit. This battle would be perfect for a Human-Human battle. Not sure how the AI would handle a straight exit map.

thoughts?

Lorak

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"Do not wait to strike till the iron is hot; but make it hot by striking."--William Butler Yeats

Cesspool

[109 Gustav]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Lorak:

Obviously This scenario would have absolutly NO flags, the only points are for exit/non-exit. This battle would be perfect for a Human-Human battle. Not sure how the AI would handle a straight exit map.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I've heard that the AI gets confused when there aren't victory flags, but it might work. It'd be a fun scenario.

On maneuver warfare, Heinz Guderian said that a tank's engine is just as much of a weapon as it's gun. This was proved in France, when German tanks often had nothing more than a machine gun as their main weapon, but the mere mention of panzers sent French troops running for the rear. Although French and British tanks were often better than the German ones in a firefight, by using armor in concentration and as a mobile weapon, the German tanks won out.

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Well my skiff's a twenty dollar boat, And I hope to God she stays afloat.

But if somehow my skiff goes down, I'll freeze to death before I drown.

And pray my body will be found, Alaska salmon fishing, boys, Alaska salmon fishing.

-Commercial fishing in Kodiak, Alaska

[Guest Big Time Software]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It is easy to see that all wargames based on achieving victory by capturing specific objective flags throw a major monkey wrench from the start on any simulation of maneuver warfare. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is a blanket statement, and as such I must strongly disagree with it. Many, many, many battles were fought over a specific hill or a specific town or a specific bridge. If the defender was pushed off of this location, they would try and retake it (if possible). There are cases of some hills echanging hands a half dozen times before the battle was conlcuded infavor of one side. So, again, as a blanket statement I must say it is wrong.

There are ways in CM to downplay the significance of Objective areas. The Scenario designer can give the defender a lot of victory points which means that the losing the Objective won't hurt per se. You can also have NO Objectives on a hill and instead put one at the back end of the map on a road. Meaning that the Attacker has to get past the dominating hill to secure the Objective (in this case a Road).

So I guess I don't see where CM fails to meet the definition of Manuver warfare as described by Henri.

As for what Manuver warfare is (IMHO), it is NOT any one thing. This is why it is not well defined. There are at least three different types of manuver warfare:

1. Tactical - basically, how capable is an individual unit/vehicle of traversing terrain (speed, ground conditions, types of terrain, etc.). Simple example is that a Sherman tank is more manuverable than a King Tiger, but less than something like a M29C Weasel. Light infantry, or infantry mounted on horses, is more manuverable than infantry that rellies upon lots of non-motorized assets for its firepower.

2. Operational - this takes into considderation things that are outside of CM's scope. Basically, the capability of a rather large formation (say, Regimental or Divisional) to move from point A to B. An infantry division that has enough trucks to transport all of its companies is far more manuverable than one that only has enough for 1/3rd.

3. Strategic - the ability for huge formations (Corps, Armies, etc) to traverse great distances with ease. This has more to do with logistics as the base speeds have been determined by factors above. This means the better the supply system and its current ability to meet the needs of its formations, the more manuverable it is. A division that is totally motorized is not manuverable if it does not have enough fuel or spare parts.

In CM, the only one of these three that is relevant is #1. The other two are outside of its scope.

Steve

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Lorak:

Nice post.

Obviously This scenario would have absolutly NO flags, the only points are for exit/non-exit. This battle would be perfect for a Human-Human battle. Not sure how the AI would handle a straight exit map.

thoughts?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually I'm a bit surprised that no one has thought of doing this for human vs human games; as you say, the objective flag business seems to be necessary for AI play since it is extremely difficult to program AI with vague objectives that depend on context.

This is precisely where so far ALL artificial intelligence falls on its face, when context has to be taken into account. But there is no obvious reason why a scenario designer could not make a human vs human scenario of the kind you describe.

Henri

[Speedy]

I have always considered maneuver warfare to be the concept of winning a battle through maneuver.

Or to put in another way maneuvering your forces into a battle winning position before engaging the enemies main force. Winning the battle through maneuver as opposed to firepower.

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Work is the curse of the drinking class.

[IntelWeenie]

I doubt that there has been any modern war that has been completely fought by maneuver. It is only one aspect of warfighting and depends heavily on the object of the war at the strategic level and the equipment and terrain at the tactical level. Since CM only deals with tactics, I'll ignore the strategy.

Any good NCO or officer will tell you that there are 2 parts to fighting a battle: fire and maneuver. In nearly all circumstances, you cannot have one without the other. You must take the enemy under fire to attain freedom of movement and you must maneuver to maximize the effectiveness of your fire. One could argue that the best way to win a war is by manuevering without having to fire a single shot, but that's damn near impossible to do.

I think Steve has a good point. Manuever is not done soley for the sake of moving around, but to occupy and use key terrain to one's own benefit (and to the detriment of the enemy). Hills, crossroads, towns, etc. are all examples of terrain that is key to maneuver.

Positional warfare on the other hand is totally opposite of maneuver. It is seige or trench warfare. It is fire without maneuver. Too boring for a game, IMHO.

What does all this mean?

I feel that CM definitely models maneuver warfare on a tactical level.

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Cats aren't clean, they're covered with cat spit.

[ScoutPL]

The last few posts point out the flaws in your argument pretty well Henri. It rankled me when you brought this argument in our last debate but I let it slide.

The concept of Maneuver Warfare as your two favorite authors dealt with it (interesting that they didnt bother to define it) deals with maneuver on a much larger scale than what is addressed in CM. Airland Battle is a doctrine not a tactic. Be sure you can distinguish between the two. The example you offer about orders is actually the defintition of commanders intent. A commander tells his subordinate what he wants done (interdict movement on the road) rather then how he wants it done (take the hill). Its up to the subordinate's discretion exactly how he accomplishes the commanders intent.

Now a commander using some form of manuever to interdict the road rather then engaging in a costly fight to take the hill, might be a good example of using maneuver in a tactical setting, but not doctrinal. Air assaulting large units over the river and crossing it at numerous points with large combined arms forces at weakly defended areas might be an example of maneuver warfare on a doctrinal level.

[jlsimpson]

Take a look at this site Henri.

http://www.ibsitd.nb.ca/2rcr/quill5.html

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by ScoutPL:

The concept of Maneuver Warfare as your two favorite authors dealt with it (interesting that they didnt bother to define it) deals with maneuver on a much larger scale than what is addressed in CM. Airland Battle is a doctrine not a tactic. Be sure you can distinguish between the two. The example you offer about orders is actually the defintition of commanders intent. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sorry, you are wrong, the example I gave is a simple version of an example given in the book by Lind, where he discusses an example of "mission orders" just as this one regarding a hill in terms of orders given to a battalion, which is the top end of the scale of Combat Mission, not "a much larger scale".

Yes the book by Leonhard deals in the second half for the most part with criticism of the US Army's Airland battle doctrine, but in no way does either Lind or Leonhard nor any of the writers who have dealt with various aspects of the strategy of the indirect approach (which is essentially what maneuver warfare is) limit the concepts to any scale of battle, large of small.

As I expected, the responses to this thread show on the part of many a total misunderstanding of what maneuver warfare is about. It is NOT about movement, nor is it about gaining a better position for an attack, nor is it about mission orders, although all of those items can be involved.

And just for the record, the exercises given by Lind, although they are part of a larger division size battle, actuelly deal with specific orders at the platoon level!

Replying in detail to the above misconceptions would require more space that I care to take up for the moment, but let me just say that you and Steve are dead wrong when you claim that maneuver warfare is limited to the operational level, and others who identify maneuver warfare with movement are simply confused by the word "maneuver".

Henri

[Blackhorse]

The principles of war are:

Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity.

As defined in FM 100-5 (Operations) "Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force. It is used to exploit successes, to preserve freedom of action, and to reduce vulnerability. It continually poses new problems for the enemy by rendering his actions ineffective, eventually leading to defeat.

At all levels of war, successful application of maneuver requires agility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires designating and then shifting points of main effort and then considering application of the principles of mass and economy of force. At the operational level, maneuver is the means by which the commander determines where and when to fight by setting the terms of battle, declining battle, or acting to take advantage of tactical actions. Maneuver is dynamic warfare and rejects predictable patterns of operations."

FM 100-5 further addresses maneuver under the section entitled "Combat Power". The dynamics of Combat Power are Maneuver, Firepower, Protection, and Leadership.

"Maneuver is the movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver -or threaten delivery of- direct and indirect fires. Maneuver is the means of positioning forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, massed effects, and moral dominance. Successful maneuver requires anticipation and mental agility.

Commanders may achieve the effects of maneuver without movement by allowing the enemy to move into a disadvantageous position. Moving and positioning units during deployment to a theater and within a theater prior to operations are forms of maneuver if this movement gains a positional advantage and can influence the outcomes of battles and campaigns. Maneuver is rarely effective without firepower and protection. Maneuver keeps the enemy off balance, protecting the force. Maneuver continually poses new problems for the enemy, rendering his reactions ineffective, and eventually leading to his defeat.

The positional advantages and staying power gained by ground maneuver forces are unique and cannot be replaced by other means…Maneuver and firepower are inseperable and complementary dynamics of combat. Although one might dominate a phase of the battle, the synchronized effects of both characterize all operations. Their joint use makes the destruction of larger enemy forces feasible and enhances the protection of a friendly force."

I'm not sure what your point is Henri, but in my opinion, CM models these particular definitions of maneuver quite well. So well in fact that I recommend CM to almost every junior officer I talk to as a simple, inexpensive professional development tool.

[CavScout]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

Replying in detail to the above misconceptions would require more space that I care to take up for the moment, but let me just say that you and Steve are dead wrong when you claim that maneuver warfare is limited to the operational level, and others who identify maneuver warfare with movement are simply confused by the word "maneuver".

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

"Maneuver adherents refuse to be content with explaining a few pieces of the issue. Like all good social scientists, they seek to swallow the whole enchilada. One maneuver warfare manifesto explains it thusly: "Maneuver warefare addresses the spectrum of conflict from low to high intesnsity, and applies from the tactical through the operational to the strategic level of war. It is not bounded by the physical dimesnsions of land, sea, air or space, but views warefare as a multi-dimensionsal."¹"

"Maneuverists really do not have much to offer beyond their restricted area of interest, other than exhortations to apply a "maneuver mindset" to all pahses of war. How does one avoid enemy strength when forced to storm a bristling embassy complex full of hostages? How much initiative can be granted to a sumbmarine commander armed with nuclear weapons? Does knowledge of the operational level of war comfort a flier forced to hit a certain heavily defended Scud missile launcher to appease an American ally? Maneuver warfare thinkers' very few attempts go beyond their preferred narrow band of 1939-45 blitzkriegs have been predictably silly, much like trying to apply techniques of mid-19th century Yankee whaling to servicing a modern home aquarium."--Daniel P. Bolger. "Maneuver Warfare Reconsidered". MANEUVER WARFARE: An Anthology. Edited by Richard D. Hooker, Jr. (ISBN 0-89141-499-1)

Bolger has an interesting paper wish all should read if they can. My favorite line is:

Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, "Wehrmact penis evy."

Cav

1)Major David A Grossman, USA, and Captain Richard D Hooker, Jr., USA, "What is Maneuver Warefare?" The Maneuver Warfare Symposium Quarterly Newsletter (17Jan'91), p. 2. This is one of the best short summeries of maneuver warfare fundamentals.

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Deutsch sollte nie verlieren. Kampf-Mission muß das widerspiegeln.

[This message has been edited by CavScout (edited 10-15-2000).]

[Slapdragon]

One thing that should be understood about manuever warfare is that it is very complex, so complex that few people really learned it well, and those few were renowned for it.

This problem though posed a problem to commanders who thougtht outside the box: how to communicate maneuver warfare concepts. The war it often was was the designation of arbitrary objectives. Read Patton in his discussion of the Moselle campaign and you will hear his inner thoughts of how to swing the German defensive line and break a natural stalemate, but the orders issued to units like the 704th TD discuss fixed points that must be captured.

Now, the US Army in Moselle, like the German in France, had commanders who were very capable of thinking in manuever warfare, but the trick was to have competent commander who could achieve objectives, then set useful objectives.

[iggi]

Maneuver warfare. Trying to twist open a beer only to realise that you need a bottle opener. Ouch.

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Blackhorse:

As defined in FM 100-5 (Operations) "Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force.

Here is what Leonhard says about FM-100-5: "...all maneuver is not maneuver (pardon the expression). What Fm-100-5 was referring to as maneuver was simply the practice of racing units around the battlefield in order to rush into battle".For instance from your quote from FM-100-5:

"Maneuver is the movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver -or threaten delivery of- direct and indirect fires.

I think that this says it all. Maneuver warfare uses fire in order to allow movement, whereas attrition warfare uses movement to allow fire (Leonhard).

I'm not sure what your point is Henri, but in my opinion, CM models these particular definitions of maneuver quite well. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You are not alone in not getting the point, and yes, CM DOES model well the type of maneuver that you and FM-1---5 describe.

Henri

[This message has been edited by Henri (edited 10-15-2000).]

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by CavScout:

"Maneuver adherents refuse to be content with explaining a few pieces of the issue. Like all good social scientists, they seek to swallow the whole enchilada. [snip]

Bolger has an interesting paper wish all should read if they can. My favorite line is:

Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, "Wehrmact penis evy."

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks for posting this to show the quality of some of the arguments raised against maneuver warfare. Like all "new" ideas that rock the boat of conventional thinking, maneuver warfare has it vocal opponents. The nice thing about your post is that it proves that the ideas actually EXIST, which some of the participants in this forum might have come to doubt. To read seious replies to serious objections (as opposed to pooh-poohing the thing away as in the above )about Maneuver Warfare, one should read "The Art of Maneuver" by Leonhard.

here is part of the forward of Lind's book by Col. John C. Studt, USMC (ret),

"I served in 31 years of active duty witht the Marine Corps, saw combat in both Korea and Vietnam, and attended service schools from The Basic School to the National War College. Yet only toward the end of my military career did I realize how little I really understood the art of war. [snip]

But why all this from a civilian instead of a professional soldier? In fact, the entire movement for military reform is driven largely by civilian intellectuals, not military officers - one notable ewxception being retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd.[snip] Proposing significant changes is frequently viewed as criticism of superiors, since they are responsible for the way things are and borders on disloyalty if not insubordination."

"Maneuverists really do not have much to offer beyond their restricted area of interest, other than exhortations to apply a "maneuver mindset" to all pahses of war."

It has been known and forgotten since the time of Sun Tzu thousands of years ago that any valid theory of war must encompass "the whole enchilada".

Should one be surprised that Leonhard who says "...The developers of Airland Battle have flirted with maneuver but have been unable to shake off American traditions of the past" should have generated some animosities among the traditionalists among the military?

Henri

"What is this Paulus, you laugh? Is this some new kind of argument where you ridicule something instead of proving it wrong?" (Plato)

[Blackhorse]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

You are not alone in not getting the point, and yes, CM DOES model well the type of maneuver that you and FM-1---5 describe.

Henri<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Henri,

There's no need to talk down to me. My point about not getting your point stems from some confusing sentences in your original post.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

I responded that it was something like the use of fire and movement to dirupt, dislocate and destroy the enemy, and others posted their own definitions.But this is not satsifactory, andI went back to the books.

Before I go on, I think that this is an important issue for Combat Mission - whether or not the principles of maneuver warfare can be applied in this game <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You further stated

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

according to Leonhard, although the US military in the 70's adopted the concept for its Airland Battle Doctrine, it bifurcated back to attrition warfare concepts, only the Marines sticking to the ideas.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Followed by the confusing[ part

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

let me finish with an example of why attrition warfare is difficult to accomplish in Combat Mission;<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

To me it seemed a contradiction. Were you saying CM couldn't model maneuver warfare? Were you saying it couldn't model attrition warfare? What exactly were you saying and what was your point?

And Henri, I do get it.

I first read Lind back in 1990. I believed the maneuver warfare he described was brilliant and forward thinking. In fact, I required the Maneuver Warfare Handbook as reading for all my lieutenants and held multiple OPD (Officer Professional Development sessions) concerning the topics raised in the MWH. In recent times, I have passed the concept of the Boyd Cycle and the OODA loop on to some members of this board.

I think you might be surprised at how much of what Lind describes actually does exist at the lowest levels in the Army.

In your Leonard quote, Leonhard is describing the Army of the 70's. Sorry, but the Army of the 70's adopted attrition warfare as its mantra. It wasn't until the early 80s that some paradigm breakers developed the concept of Airland Battle. This was buoyed by weapons systems that made Airland a feasible doctrine. Add to this a marked upswing in funding for individual and collective training and the opening of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California and you have en environment ripe for change. By the way, the NTC became the premier training environment for the new Airland Battle doctrine. I guarantee you Airland Battle was a radical departure from the old attrition of the 70s. Was it perfect? Probably not, that is why the Army has improved upon it and continued to develop and build upon its current doctrine.

So, I ask again, what is your point with this particular post on the CM board? Are you saying CM does not model maneuver warfare as described by Lind?

If that is your point, I can only ask you this. Why doesn't it for you? In my opinion CM can model anything you want it to. You just have to set the conditions.

For example, in CM battles, the player is missing some vital components, those being mission statement and intent from higher. In some CM battles, a player must take objectives. You being that player, you wouldn't understand why you have to take those objectives and why you can't just run around willy nilly kicking tail and taking names to gain fame and fortune. If you had your higher commander's mission and intent and his higher commander's mission and intent you might see how your mission fits in with the big picture. Perhaps that flag you are attacking is the planned location of the Divarty to support an attack the following day by an adjacent unit. In the current CM system, you just don't know. You have to mentally create reasons for attacking flags. Sometimes these reasons are obvious, sometimes they're not.

My response to this is either do away with flags (can be done easily in CM already using the parameters for battles) or to define logical reasons for attacking flags.

I'm currently in a multi-battle PBEM operation and there is NOT a flag in sight. We deliberately set it up so there were no flags (were you aware you could do that?). This operation covers three days and has a map the size of Texas. My mission is to destroy the enemy's first echelon defense to allow follow-on attacks to attack into the heart of Germany. I am attacking with a Battalion (+).

Where in that situation is there a problem?

[Henri]

Originally posted by Blackhorse:

There's no need to talk down to me. [snip] My point about not getting your point stems from some confusing sentences in your original post.

And Henri, I do get it.

I wasn't talking down to you, I was just pointing out that the concepts of maneuver warfare are somewhat difficult to understand, that most people do not understand it, and that the subject is full of confusion. That is why Leonhard spends a good part of his book explaining what maneuver warfare is NOT. I'm glad to see that you are familiar with the concepts and have read books about it, whcih at least should help avoid confusion about the meaning of terms.

My example was to try to explain in too brief a space the difference between attrition warfare and maneuver warfare with a simple example, but as pointed out, this example from Lind's book deals only with the concept of mission orders, and in no way covers all of maneuver warfare theory, which is difficult to do even in a 300-page book like Leonhard's.

In your Leonard quote, Leonhard is describing the Army of the 70's. Sorry, but the Army of the 70's adopted attrition warfare as its mantra. It wasn't until the early 80s that some paradigm breakers developed the concept of Airland Battle.

Leonhard's book was published in 1991, and while admitting that the Army has taken steps to adopt maneuver warfare, he accuses the military of backtracking dangerously.He discusses the Gulf War in detail (a whole chapter) and denies the idea that it was fought according to the tenets of maneuver warfare:

"I offer the following analysis inthe spirit of professionalism that gave rise to our successes;and if I criticize, I do so without aiming at any of the fine soldiers with whom I was privileged to serve."

About the 1990's army, Leonhard writes: "but since the doctrine's introduction in 1982, it has succombed to the irresistible pull of American warfighting traditions back toward attrition theory." Lind's book dates however from 1985, so I don't know what he would have said about the military of the '90's. To say the least, there is not unanimous agreement that since the 1980's the US military has adopted the doctrine of manuever warfare without reservation.

So, I ask again, what is your point with this particular post on the CM board? Are you saying CM does not model maneuver warfare as described by Lind?

I have agreed in a previous post on this thread that it should be possible to make human vs human battles that could be fought according to the tenets of manuever warfare.

My contention was that any flag-based wargame disallows to a great extent maneuver warfare, because it forces a battle into channels according to the tenets of attrition warfare.

Let me ilustrate this and discout a couple of counter-arguments with the following.

1) The recon is already carried out in CM, which is why recon doesn't work well in the game.

I say this is begging the question, because no battalion or company commander would send in his men against an enemy knowing only that the enemy force is about equal in force to his, and that they are about 2 km away, without information on their location and composition, information which is generally not available in Combat Mission.

2) Maneuver warfare does not apply to CM, because it deals only with operational concepts for a higher level than that modeled in CM (not your point of view, but that of BTS).

All of the detailed examples in the book by Lind deal mostly with decisions that must be made by a Company Commander. True, this is ALWAYS in the context of a larger mission for a division or battalion, which is missing in CM, and which raises serious issues about realism in the game.

For attrition-type orders where a Company Commander is told "Take and hold Hill 312", it doesn't make much diffference, but for maneuver warfare where the commander's intent rather than terrain objectives should guide the Company Commander's actions, this is a major missing element in the game. As a matter of fact, this may be the main impediment to maneuver warfare and encouragement towards attrition warfare tactics in CM.

I hope that these perhaps too brief comments help to clarify what my point is. If not, I can always try again.

Henri

[Guest MantaRay]

Maneuver warfare is where I get in my Tiger Maus, go in continous circles, while firing as fast as I can until I run out of gas. Upon that happening, I order my elite Pioneers squad to push. Sadly at this point in the battle, I have usually run out of ammo, so i have to send my gunner out to find petrified prarie dogs, you know... the tugsten ones.

Now you see the difficulties in my German doctrine, and to think we almost won the war with these moderized tactics. Guderian, eat your heart out!!!!

Ray

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by MantaRay:

Maneuver warfare is where I get in my Tiger Maus, go in continous circles, while firing as fast as I can until I run out of gas. [snip]

Ray<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I know you probably mean this as humor, but consider the case where Rommel had his tank commanders wave white handkerchiefs as his tank battalion rolled unmolested right through French lines. Although about as "gamey" as it can get , this is maneuver warfare in its purest form: if it follows rules for combat, it is not maneuver warfare!

Henri

[Blackhorse]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

consider the case where Rommel had his tank commanders wave white handkerchiefs as his tank battalion rolled unmolested right through French lines... this is maneuver warfare in its purest form: if it follows rules for combat, it is not maneuver warfare! <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Innovative? Yes. Audacious, bold, daring, and ballsy as hell? Yes.

Maneuver warfare in its purest form? No...How do you come up with that? Is anything audacious considered maneuver warfare? I ask you, where was Rommel going? What was his mission? Was he racing to the Meuse River Crossing? Was that crossing considered an objective of his and was this hanky- waving fake surrendering a means to get to the objective? If so, I hardly see it as anything more than traditional warfare carried out by a very creative commander.

[Guest MantaRay]

I do not buy Rommels action as MW. Rather maybe a better classification might be termed, Deceptive Warfare.

I remember from my time in the service that anyone wanting to surrender, would promptly throw down their weapons BEFORE surrendering. Anyone NOT promptly discarding said weapon would likely be taken out.

Truthfully that is the first I have heard of Rommels action, and any force who lets a Battalion of AFV's roll through unmolested deserved to have whatever fate perscribed.

Ray

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Blackhorse:

Innovative? Yes. Audacious, bold, daring, and ballsy as hell? Yes.

Maneuver warfare in its purest form? No...How do you come up with that? Is anything audacious considered maneuver warfare? I ask you, where was Rommel going? What was his mission? Was he racing to the Meuse River Crossing? Was that crossing considered an objective of his and was this hanky- waving fake surrendering a means to get to the objective? If so, I hardly see it as anything more than traditional warfare carried out by a very creative commander.

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It was maneuver warare in its purest form in the sense that the ideal of maneuver warfare is to achieve one's objective (in this case breaking out into the open behind enemy lines) without firing a shot, which is what Rommel achieved. Instead of asking himself what are the rules for breaking through enemylines, Rommel asked himself what was the best way to throw the enemy off balance to get through his lines with the best economy of resources.

This was typical of Rommel who seemed to have a bottomless bag of tricks to befuddle the enemy, but he rarelyrepeated the same maneuver twice.

Rommel's charging of enemy lines with all guns blazing was another unconventional technique that he developed to a fine art, and although it appears on the surface like pure attrition warfare to charge headlong into the enemy, Rommel did it in France because he guessed correctly that it would reduce casualties because the enemy would not expect it and would become totally dislocated by the speed and surprise of the action -and he was right. If he had fought on the Eastern Front, he certainly would not hafve tried that against the Russians after 1942

Sure deception and surprise are not exclusive to maneuver warare, but winning battles by avoiding combat IS ideal maneuver warfare.

Henri

[Blackhorse]

Major Jeffrey Cowan, USAF summarizes Colonel Boyd's theory on maneuver warfare in his well written Master of Military Studies thesis, located here: http://www.defense-and-society.org/FCS_Folder/boyd_thesis.htm

Of particular interest is Major Cowan's summation concerning Boyd's thoughts on attrition and maneuver warfare.

"Boyd contended that maneuver warfare could be used at all three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical, but in reality it is largely applied operationally. Boyd did not imply that maneuver warfare was a substitute for attrition warfare on the tactical level, because at the tactical level there will be a significant amount of attrition warfare encountered. Boyd explained that attrition would be the result of maneuver, and so would " … uncover, create, and exploit many vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence many opportunities, to pull an adversary apart and isolate remnants for mop-up or absorption."

[This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 10-15-2000).]

[CavScout]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

Thanks for posting this to show the quality of some of the arguments raised against maneuver warfare.

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Henri I guess only those that agree with you are of "quality", eh? General John Galvin, USA (Ret.) doesn't think it is not of quality.

"Dan Bolger regales us with an entertaining and powerful assault against the proponets of maneuver warfare, advising them to "strike their tents and reture to write their memoirs."

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Like all "new" ideas that rock the boat of conventional thinking, maneuver warfare has it vocal opponents.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Of course not all "new" ideas are good and sometimes they deserve to have vocal opponents.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> The nice thing about your post is that it proves that the ideas actually EXIST, which some of the participants in this forum might have come to doubt. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No doubt. Maneuver warfare, according to some, is suppose to cover all aspects of warfare but as some point out it doesn't.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

To read seious replies to serious objections (as opposed to pooh-poohing the thing away as in the above )about Maneuver Warfare, one should read "The Art of Maneuver" by Leonhard.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

So "serious" is those that agree?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

(SNIP)

But why all this from a civilian instead of a professional soldier? In fact, the entire movement for military reform is driven largely by civilian intellectuals, not military officers - one notable ewxception being retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd. [snip] Proposing significant changes is frequently viewed as criticism of superiors, since they are responsible for the way things are and borders on disloyalty if not insubordination."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I respect civilan and military views, so no explination needed for me.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

It has been known and forgotten since the time of Sun Tzu thousands of years ago that any valid theory of war must encompass "the whole enchilada".<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Of course you miss the point, saying that something encompasses the "whole enchilada" and actually doing it are two different things.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Should one be surprised that Leonhard who says "...The developers of Airland Battle have flirted with maneuver but have been unable to shake off American traditions of the past" should have generated some animosities among the traditionalists among the military?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

"...maneuver warfare, while an important components of the operational art, cannot exsist devoid of its counterpart--firepower."--James McDonough, "The Operation Art: Quo Vadis?"

Cav

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Deutsch sollte nie verlieren. Kampf-Mission muß das widerspiegeln.

"Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, "Wehrmact penis evy."--D. Bolger