What is maneuver warfare?

[ASL Veteran]

I can't seem to get Steve's quote about convincing the enemy to leave an important location on his own to work on this post, but I wanted to dwell on that thought. I haven't followed the whole thread .. so I am only addressing that point.

A good commander can convince the enemy to abandon a defensive position on his own ... and this can be done at CMs level Dr Brian. I actually do it all the time.

A not so recent example of how to get a defender to decide to leave a location on his own would be when the Americans got the British out of Boston during the revolution. When Washington placed his batteries on the heights overlooking the bay, these cannons could threaten the British fleet with continuous bombardment (we lacked the powder, but the British didn't know that). The British (after storming Breed's Hill) elected to leave Boston all on their own because of the threat the American batteries posed to the British fleet. Boston did not need to be stormed by a frontal assault. The Americans forced the British out because the British situation became untenable due to the threat to their fleet. Now the British could have elected to stay in Boston, but a commander will normally attempt to preserve his force if staying in a location is clear to be a loser of a proposition (Adolf Hitler excepted of course).

Is this maneuver warfare? I don't know. I am only commenting on the idea that direct use of force is not necessary to acheive a military goal. Simply occupying a threatening location can achieve the same thing. This principle can be applied at CMs level, just with individual clumps of trees or houses rather than whole cities or armies. Push one defending squad out of a certain house and the whole defense may be compromised. Conversely, the defender must identify key pieces of terrain when considering his defense. He must also be able to identify the importance that their loss has on their defenses and plan accordingly.

[Guest Big Time Software]

ASL Vet wrote:

Is this maneuver warfare?

Not quite. It is the desired OUTCOME of maneuver warfare. The actual maneuver in your example was to get the guns up on the hill. This may or may not have caused the British to pull out. If, for example, the British had a spy that told them the guns had no powder, I think it is safe to assume the Brits would have stayed in Boston. And most likely they would have mounted a counter attack to knock out the guns BEFORE they became a real threat. So the theory of maneuver warfare, in this case, had a highly desirable result (i.e. no need to storm Boston). Even if the British did stay it could have had some other larger impact (i.e. British diverting forces from New York at a critical time).

And as this example illustrates, the theory of maneuver warfare is not new at all.

This principle can be applied at CMs level, just with individual clumps of trees or houses rather than whole cities or armies.

Quite true. The only option you do NOT have in CM is to simply bail out and attack a differnet day with different troops if you can't find that Breed's Hill type move to pull off. This of course would mean that either the attacking player isn't very creative, or the defending player is.

Steve

[CavScout]

Originally posted by ASL Veteran:

A good commander can convince the enemy to abandon a defensive position on his own ... and this can be done at CMs level Dr Brian. I actually do it all the time.

A not so recent example of how to get a defender to decide to leave a location on his own would be when the Americans got the British out of Boston during the revolution. When Washington placed his batteries on the heights overlooking the bay, these cannons could threaten the British fleet with continuous bombardment (we lacked the powder, but the British didn't know that). The British (after storming Breed's Hill) elected to leave Boston all on their own because of the threat the American batteries posed to the British fleet. Boston did not need to be stormed by a frontal assault. The Americans forced the British out because the British situation became untenable due to the threat to their fleet. Now the British could have elected to stay in Boston, but a commander will normally attempt to preserve his force if staying in a location is clear to be a loser of a proposition (Adolf Hitler excepted of course).

Is this maneuver warfare? I don't know.

No. It was threat of "attrition" by gun fire that made leaving the city an option for the Brits. If the Brits didn't fear attrition they would have stayed put.

[ASL Veteran]

Originally posted by CavScout:

No. It was threat of "attrition" by gun fire that made leaving the city an option for the Brits. If the Brits didn't fear attrition they would have stayed put.

Interesting comment. The threat of attrition existed prior to the batteries being located in a threatening position because the entire American army was camped outside of Boston and could have attacked, and attrited, the British force at any time. So the threat of attrition alone did not force the evacuation.

A 'infamous' example of an attack by attrition would be when Burnsides took over command of the Union Army for his one brief campaign. I forget the name of the battle, but he just kept on sending his troops up this hill and got his army annihilated in an attempt to attrit his enemy. I believe Verdun is a classic case of attack by attrition too. Falkenhayne never intended to break through the French lines. His objective was to kill French troops.

I guess it all depends on your definition of attrition. If attrition means both killing the enemy and the threat of killing the enemy, then a battle will always be a case of either attrition or the threat of attrition. Classes in tactics would be pretty simple then because it would consist of one sentence: "kill the enemy. Class dismissed". This seems to be a rather simplistic point of view to me.

Perhaps attrition is killing the enemy, and maneuver is putting yourself in the most advantageous position to kill the enemy. Using that rationale, maneuver and attrition coexist as good chums on the battlefield. Neither being effective without the other.

[TheDesertFox]

Interesting discussion so far, no question.

I think I give you some food for thought, because this quote IMHO pretty much hits the nail on the head. So please read closely and , as it is stated in the publication, take it to heart. Maneuver Warfare is a philosophy how to conduct warfare, it is nothing which can be done everytime on every level in every situation, but if it is done in every situation which allows it to be done it gives you quite some advantage, the foremost advantage in warfare...keeping the initiative. Because if you loose the initiative and become static , your first step into defeat is done.

And yes, some folks may have already guessed it, in Germany Nehring and Guderian were the "Brains" behind introducing this concept into their "Theorie der Panzerstrategie". Foremost Nehring, who was resposible for the "How to do it".

But here is the quote, enjoy reading:

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Chapter 4. "The Conduct of War"

[...]

MANEUVER WARFARE

The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. In order to fully appreciate what we mean by maneuver, we need to clarify the term. The traditional understanding of maneuver is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver in space to gain a positional advantage. However, in order to maximize the usefulness of maneuver, we must consider maneuver in other dimensions as well. The essence of maneuver is taking action to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy as a means of accomplishing our objectives as effectively as possible. That advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial. Especially important is maneuver in time-we generate a faster operating tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage. It is through maneuver in all dimensions that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.

Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.

Rather than wearing down an enemy's defenses, maneuver warfare attempts to bypass these defenses in order to penetrate the enemy system and tear it apart. The aim is to render the enemy incapable of resisting effectively by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion-his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole-rather than to destroy him physically through the incremental attrition of each of his components, which is generally more costly and time-con- suming. Ideally, the components of his physical strength that remain are irrelevant because we have disrupted his ability to use them effectively. Even if an outmaneuvered enemy continues to fight as individuals or small units, we can destroy the remnants with relative ease because we have eliminated his ability to fight effectively as a force.

This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On the contrary, firepower is central to maneuver warfare. Nor do we mean to imply that we will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We will concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the oppor- tunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes. Engaged in combat, we can rarely go wrong if we aggressively pursue the destruction of enemy forces. In fact, maneuver warfare often involves extremely high attrition of selected enemy forces where we have focused combat power against critical enemy weakness. Nonetheless, the aim of such attrition is not merely to reduce incrementally the enemy's physical strength. Rather, it is to contribute to the enemy's systemic disruption. The greatest effect of firepower is gen- erally not physical destruction-the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly-but the disruption it causes.

If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the cohesion of the enemy system, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which the enemy cannot function. By our actions, we seek to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and more quickly than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy must be made to see the situation not only as deteriorating, but deteriorating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.

Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. We seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late-until eventually he is overcome by events.

Also inherent is the need to focus our efforts in order to maximize effect. In combat this includes violence and shock effect, again not so much as a source of physical attrition, but as a source of disruption. We concentrate strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and in ways in which it will cause the greatest damage to our enemy's ability to fight. Once gained or found, any advantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly. We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness against which we will direct all available combat power. When the decisive opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion.

An important weapon in our arsenal is surprise, the com- bat value of which we have already recognized. By studying our enemy, we will attempt to appreciate his perceptions. Through deception we will try to shape the enemy's expectations. Then we will exploit those expectations by striking at an unexpected time and place. In order to appear unpredictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibit imagination and initiative. In order to appear ambiguous and threatening, we should operate on axes that offer numerous courses of action, keeping the enemy unclear as to which we will choose.

Besides traits such as endurance and courage that all warfare demands, maneuver warfare puts a premium on certain particular human skills and traits. It requires the temperament to cope with uncertainty. It requires flexibility of mind to deal with fluid and disorderly situations. It requires a certain independence of mind, a willingness to act with initiative and boldness, an exploitive mindset that takes full advantage of every opportunity, and the moral courage to accept responsibility for this type of behavior. It is important that this last set of traits be guided by self-discipline and loyalty to the objectives of seniors. Finally, maneuver warfare requires the ability to think above our own level and to act at our level in a way that is in consonance with the requirements of the larger situation.

[...]

CONCLUSION

[...]

Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in and about war that should shape our every action. It is a state of mind born of a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism. It is a state of mind bent on shattering the enemy morally and physically by paralyzing and confounding him, by avoiding his strength, by quickly and aggressively exploiting his vulnerabilities, and by striking him in the way that will hurt him most. In short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves-a philosophy for "fighting smart."

cheers

Helge

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- The DesertFox -

Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net

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[Guest Big Time Software]

ASL Vet wrote:

Interesting comment. The threat of attrition existed prior to the batteries being located in a threatening position because the entire American army was camped outside of Boston and could have attacked, and attrited, the British force at any time. So the threat of attrition alone did not force the evacuation.

I think what CavScout meant was the threat of annihlation, which is the ultimate form of attriation, was a real possibility once the guns were seen up on the hill. The British might, but I am not sure were, afraid of suffering large casualites prior to this bold move by the Revolutionary forces. But once they were there, the thinking switched from "casualties" to "annihlation". Big difference as most forces have to worry about "light attrition", and are generally concerned about "medium to heavy attrition", but "complete attrition" is a situation that no commander wants to face.

Helge, thanks for the long post. The Marine Corps definition of Maneuver Warfare is one that I think everybody here can agree with. You strike with the most force in the weakest point, whenever possible, to achieve maximum effect for minimum losses. This is basic to pretty much any sane military thinker today. So none of this is really debated, including the concept that spacial aspects are not the only ones of concern to Maneuver Warfare.

At the heart of the debate is the part when fighting actually is engaged and how it should look. The Maneuver Warfare purist appears to think that no tough battles should be fought, only ones that are easy victories. Otherwise, you aren't practicing Maneuver Warfare but the more costlier Attrition Warfare.

People like myself feel that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Great Maneuvers must, but definition, yield overall much larger gains than losses. But that is in the final take on things, not necessarily at any one given point in the operation. To think that you can pull of great Maneuvers without some nasty battles at the tactical level, is fantasy land material. Obviously *if* it can be done, great. But it is not the only way. This is what the Marines have to say about this...

We will concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the oppor- tunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes. Engaged in combat, we can rarely go wrong if we aggressively pursue the destruction of enemy forces. In fact, maneuver warfare often involves extremely high attrition of selected enemy forces where we have focused combat power against critical enemy weakness.

This basically states that attrition is not to be avoided if it serves the higher purpose of Maneuver Warfare. An example might be to take a bridge, road, or other key feature, even if it is at high TACTICAL cost, so that by the time the operation is over the enemy is greatly reduced compared to friendly forces. So if you take that bridge for the loss of 2000 men (say, 50% of your starting force), but this bottles up 500,000 of your enemy... what would you do? Avoid taking that bridge because it didn't have enough "maneuvering" inherent in it? If you say "yes", the I really hope you are not in any position of military authority within an armed force that might be out there defending this country

So again... CM does not simulate the kind of "Grand Maneuver Warfare" being talked about because the scale is too small. This type of action happens at a much higher level of command. Still, the principles of Maneuver Warfare, at the tactical level, can still be applied realistically in CM.

Steve

[TheDesertFox]

Steve,

At the heart of the debate is the part when fighting actually is engaged and how it should look. The Maneuver Warfare purist appears to think that no tough battles should be fought, only ones that are easy victories. Otherwise, you aren't practicing Maneuver Warfare but the more costlier Attrition Warfare.

Per definitionem....yes, BUT as everything it has to be seen in perspective. This Maneuver warfare purist will be sacked if he isn´t able to reach his objective in time. It doesn´t count how you fullfill your mission, if you fullfill your mission. If you can do it with maneuver warfare...fine, if you can´t and have to use other tactics....equally fine, BUT if you refuse to take your objective, because you can´t take it with maneuver warfare you have been in command for the longest time being. People have to realize that doctrine, may it be called this or that is nothing more than a guidance for the commander. It is the option of the commander to use it if applicable and if it is promising success, but it is also the option of the commander to refuse using doctrine if other ways have to be taken to avoid, let´s say losses or because he simply has no freedom of choice because of time constrains or because his sector simply doesn´t allow using a strict doctrinal approach. There is no good and bad decision there only is an appropriate decision.

To think that you can pull of great Maneuvers without some nasty battles at the tactical level, is fantasy land material.

100% agreement here. Most people seem to have a problem realizing that in reality most often there is a big diference between how something is desired to be done and how it actually can be done.

Avoid taking that bridge because it didn't have enough "maneuvering" inherent in it?

Definitively not. Everybody who would do so better should do his homework again. Back to school please !

the principles of Maneuver Warfare, at the tactical level, can still be applied realistically in CM.

Agreed again, as it can be applied in other tactical level wargames, too.

Helge

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Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate!

- The DesertFox -

Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net

WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

I don't know a lot about manuver warfare, and can't even claim to have understood every post in this thread (some of which I haven't read since October), but, it seems to me that manuver warfare, or quasi-manuver warfare, could be best simulated in CM in battles where the victory conditions require you to exit one edge of the board.

An exit requirement gives the attacker the most freedom to determine how to achieve his objective, and the greatest ability to force a defender to displace. (In a standard attack-defense scenario, it is much harder to force a defender to displace because the ways of attacking a specific on-map VL are small in number. Not to say it can't be done, though). Exit VL's also permit greater use of feints; this is not so much the case with fixed VL's because there's not as much latitude for deception because, once again, the VL's are fixed. Of course, I don't want to overstate the point, as you certainly can convince a defender to commit his reserves to the wrong place, waste artillery, etc.

As an example, if a defender in an exit game was entrenched in a strong position overlooking most of the battlefield, and a clever attacker found a way to move offboard out of sight of this formidible force (perhaps by advancing down a weakly defended gully that led offmap and was out of LOS of the Formidible Force), the defender would be forced to displace to stop the attackers.

Now it would probably not be the case that the attacker could escape offboard with no casualties, but certainly fighting a defender who was no longer in his entrenchments and who my be required to actually attack the attacker should lead to a much better outcome than directly confronting the defender.

[ASL Veteran]

I think this portion of the Marine definition of maneuver warfare is the most relevant:

"Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. We seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late-until eventually he is overcome by events."

Note that this definition does not require the maneuver force to avoid combat in order to achieve its goals. It simply means that the maneuver force is maintaining the initiative and keeping the opposing force off balance. This principle can be applied at CMs level - and I am sure that many CM players have felt helpless playing a tough opponent who always seems to have his stuff in the right place at the right time.

[Guest Kinch]

I think Leonhard pretty much sumed up maneuver warfare on page 19 of his book. There are two forms of warfare: attrition and maneuver. Attrition seeks to defeat the enemy by the destruction of his mass. Maneuver warfare seeks to defeat the enemy through means other than the destruction of enemy forces. These forms can exist on the tactical operational strategical and grand strategical level. Leonhard does not claim that either method is prefered, he outlines the differences and focuses on Manuver warfare in the book. For countries that can not afford large armies nor stomach heavy losses in combat, manuver warfare is prefered. However, other counties may decide that attrition warfare will provide the best and surest way to obtain their national aims. Even then, at the tactical and operational level, a mixture or attrition and manuver techniques might be used. In manuver warfare the focus can be on anything other the enemy's mass. What is can be is outlineed in part in Leonhard's book. Most techniques fall under Premption, dislocation, and disruption. The notion of avoiding the enemy's source of strength and attacking their critical vulnerability is also discussed. A general may determine that the enemy's vulnerabilty lay in the quality of their troops and attack them frontally to engage as many as quick as possible. The general "maneuvers" against the enemy's quality which results in their defeat. The ememy's mass was indeed engaged, but the general focused on troop quality not simply the enemy mass. Since manever warfare can result in the destruction of the enemy mass it is really comes down to what the was initially focused on in war planning.

- Kinch