What is maneuver warfare?

[CavScout]

"Sure deception and surprise are not exclusive to maneuver warare, but winning battles by avoiding combat IS ideal maneuver warfare."

This assumes you can win without combat. This is an "ideal" maneuverist wish for but I doubt it is grounded much in reality.

Cav

[Blackhorse]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by CavScout:

"Dan Bolger regales us with an entertaining and powerful assault against the proponets of maneuver warfare, advising them to "strike their tents and reture to write their memoirs."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Speaking of Bolger, if you ever get a chance read his book, Dragons at War It is superb.

[Bobbaro]

Manuever Warefare seems an unfortunant phrasing as it lends to confusion with simple fire and manuever- or even (God forbid) complex fire and manuever. The indirect approach seems to better embody the concept, although it lacks the ring of an adequate catch phrase satisfying to the ear.

Human nature being what it is, I doubt that the indirect approach can be institutionalized. Put it in the book and the book shall become a weapon in the hands the practitioner of the art. From my observations of human nature there are more mentalities that have to lean on a formula than those who can write or rewrite the formulas. Military promotion is not always based on war making capabilities.

In a mass military we gotta have a book in order to know what to expect from the formula followers. We gotta use 'em, because we just can't count on enough of the other kind. Besides, how else would you keep such a massive organization coordinated and moving at all?

Make it a thourough, well thought out book and a such a formula dependent fellow can probably do pretty well with proper training and decipline. Attrition warfare carried out by such a person properly led, equipped, and supplied is likely to go fairly well. Formulas do serve. You can not make a person brillient. You can put such brillience as he has to work. He might even get inspired or have the sense to listen to inspiration on occasion and do or at least try something spectacular. Hopefully successfully. In warfare sometimes once is enough.

Competence and fine intellegence does not of itself intail brillance. Brillance in warfare is not always recognised off the battlefield. Sometimes the best that can be done is to look for tamer forms and hope that it carries across the line of departure. It does not always do so. The human is a complex thing. Even failure does not always predict the loser. Some have said that being lucky is better.

Blackhorse has described his efforts to encouage those who could profit from applying the indirect approach. Such mentoring and leadership is probably the best that will be done in that direction. Personal example and encouragement are the best teachers. Whether the pupils will benifit depends upon their nature. After hearing a certain amount indicating negative factors growing in our military, it is a bit reassuring to hear from such as Blackhawk, that there are still warrior minded officers around.

I suspect if the institutional boys get a hold of the concept (or any concept)at the direction of a farseeing leadership, they will petrify it. Too often the competant warrior is pinned between lesser examples of the military art. Especially in peacetime. Enough survive war in the safety of the rear to server as future infection.

But a real warrior can put a book to use regardless. Even the institional minded book writers can count on getting some things right as long as there enough warriors arround and heard to salt to soup.

[russellmz]

i took the idea of Hill 302 and made a scenario with some small modifications. the americans have to get past/capture Hill 302 and use Highway 101 to get off the map. i'm still modifying it so be gentle in your reviews.

be sure to play as the americans first, as i have a few surprises in store for you.

this is geocities so you may need to right-click and choose "save as..."

http://www.geocities.com/russellmz/images/combatmission/Hill-302.zip

issues that i had trouble solving:

1. are the americans too powerful?

2. is the americans goal of exiting going to be too easy to accomplish despite my little surprises?

3. is the objective flags going to confuse the ai??

notes:

if you are german playing germany(hopefully after you played as the americans), make sure not to miss any german forces that may be in odd places.

be sure to tell me what's wrong and what's right.

hope you have fun...

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"They had their chance- they have not lead!" - GW Bush

"They had mechanical pencils- they have not...lead?" - Jon Stewart on The Daily Show

[This message has been edited by russellmz (edited 10-16-2000).]

[Bastables]

As Hugh Laurie would say, “Manoeuvre warfare? Bollocks more like!”

Sorry could not resist.

[Guest Big Time Software]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>For attrition-type orders where a Company Commander is told "Take and hold Hill 312", it doesn't make much diffference, but for maneuver warfare where the commander's intent rather than terrain objectives should guide the Company Commander's actions, this is a major missing element in the game. As a matter of fact, this may be the main impediment to maneuver warfare and encouragement towards attrition warfare tactics in CM.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Utter and absolutely BS

This is a tactical level game Henri. What you are talking about is Operational level choices made by higher up echelons of command. What you see at CM's level are those orders being carried out by the players. If I am wrong tell me, Henri, how would you deal with this situation in a game setting:

You are the company commander ordered to take a bridge. Specifically, your orders read "Captain, take your company and assigned assets, secure the railroad bridge over the Schwift River by 10:00 hours, and hold out until releived. It is the ONLY bridge in the sector and the river is not crossable by any other means.

In your opinion, if I understand you correctly, the company commander should be able to bypass the bridge because this is the propper way to conduct "manuever"? In other words, "gee, assaulting that bridge would be rather dumb. I will just disregard my orders, load up my men, drive through the phaselines of 2 divisions and simply drive over the bridge that the neighboring Corps has already secured. That would be so much easier".

My point is, junior level formations do not just roam around the country side side stepping every enemy position it encounters. At some point they have to join battle with the enemy. And when they do, their ability to manuever (in your narrow and misplaced definition of the word) is over and done with. They can pull back and try some other place the next time, or avoid the battle to begin with, but at some point they will have to fight. And when they do, they will have to fight over the terrain in front of them.

In the real world, at somepoint the battlefield will be nailed down. This is what tactical wargames (CM or any other one for that matter) are designed to simulate. The time for lofty concepts of manuever happen before and after, but not during. At least not during the roughly 40 minutes of battle CM simulates.

Henri... it is you that has the definition of manuever confused as it applies to tactical level warfare. Of course, if you ignore all the professional soldiers here, along with their sources and understanding of the very same ones you cite, I guess you could be right. But I'll go with the real experts on this one

Steve

[jackhammer]

I'm so sick and tired about hearing all the BS about maneuver warfare. I've read all the books mentioned in this thread, and to quote CAVSCOUT, they all suffer from Whermacht penis envy. They drone on about how all wars can be won by driving "around" your enemy, "indirect approach" and a lot of other nonsense. Yes maneuver is important but at some point you have to fight. I can't remember who said it but someone once said that in a war between fairly evenly matched opponents there are no shortcuts to victory. All these MW proponents constantly rave about germany's attack on france in 1940. Well, contrary to currently to the legend the panzers had to do some fighting to get across the meuse. The 9th army put up a decent fight considering that they consisted on 2nd rate troops. It took good 'ole attrition warfare in the form of massed stuka attacks to get von kleists panzers across. Another thing to think about is that if the germans had been better equiped for attrition warfare ( i.e. higher production levels ealier in the war) they might have won. I strongly recommend Bolger's article in the MW handbook. He manages to debunk alot of commonly held myths that MW lovers hold.

[jackhammer]

This is for anybody who isn't quite sure what "wehrmact penis envy" means. If you read any book or article on MW they writer almost always uses examples from the german campaigns of 1939-1941 as "evidence". France 1940 is their favorite example. The premise is is that if the US army would just adopt the german tactics and doctrines that governed these lightning victories than we could be the ubermilitary of the world. Also MW proponents love to use german expressions to convey MW tenets. For example instead of saying "mission tactics" they'll say "aufragstactiks" (sp). Instead of " focus of efforts" or " main effort" they"ll say "schwerepunkt"(sp). I guess they figure the concepts sound more authoritative in german than in english. That, my friends, is a little explanation for the disease most MW'ers seem to be afflicted it with!

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by CavScout:

This assumes you can win without combat. This is an "ideal" maneuverist wish for but I doubt it is grounded much in reality

Cav<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have quoted cases where this has actually happened, and there are others, so it IS grounded in reality. No one claims that it can always or often or usually be done, quite the contrary.

Henri

[This message has been edited by Henri (edited 10-16-2000).]

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Bobbaro:

Manuever Warefare seems an unfortunant phrasing as it lends to confusion with simple fire and manuever- or even (God forbid) complex fire and manuever. The indirect approach seems to better embody the concept, although it lacks the ring of an adequate catch phrase satisfying to the ear.

.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I totally agree; it is not clear to me why proponents did not keep Liddell-Hart's term of "The Indirect Approach", which is much clearer and which does not require having two meanings for the word "maneuver".

Henri

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Utter and absolutely BS

If I am wrong tell me, Henri, how would you deal with this situation in a game setting:

You are the company commander ordered to take a bridge. Specifically, your orders read "Captain, take your company and assigned assets, secure the railroad bridge over the Schwift River by 10:00 hours, and hold out until releived. It is the ONLY bridge in the sector and the river is not crossable by any other means.

In your opinion, if I understand you correctly, the company commander should be able to bypass the bridge because this is the propper way to conduct "manuever"? In other words, "gee, assaulting that bridge would be rather dumb. I will just disregard my orders, load up my men, drive through the phaselines of 2 divisions and simply drive over the bridge that the neighboring Corps has already secured. That would be so much easier".

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

A commander versed in Maneuver Warfare would not usually give orders of the type that you cite above, and the stupid reaction that you characterize has not been proposed by anyone.

An example of the type that you mention is discussed in detail in Lind's book, showing how a Company Commander should interpret the INTENT of his commander's orders, and adapt his attack to the situation. In one exercise of Lind's book, a Company Commander is told to block a road access, but when he gets there, the situation has changed, and as Lind explains, the thing to do is not to mindlessly hold the hill, but to attack a nearby mortar battery or a weakly protected HQ in the vicinity before the enemy can react to the danger.

And there ARE cases where the thing to do is to follow orders, even if they are not as flexible as they should be.But just suppose that in your example, the Company arrives on the scene and find that the enemy is not trying to take the bridge, but is building a pontoon bridge a quarter of a mile down the river, and the pontoons are snaking down the road nearby and the Germans are unaware of his arrival. What should the Company commander do? Follow orders and sit on the bridge?

Keep calling my statements "pure and utter BS" if you like, but don't expect me to remain polite about your own for very much longer...

Henri

[CavScout]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

I have quoted cases where this has actually happened, and there are others, so it IS grounded in reality. No one claims that it can always or often or usually be done, quite the contrary.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You are not seriously contending that Germany won France without fighting are you? That's where you "quoted" example was from.

[CavScout]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

A commander versed in Maneuver Warfare would not usually give orders of the type that you cite above, and the stupid reaction that you characterize has not been proposed by anyone.

An example of the type that you mention is discussed in detail in Lind's book, showing how a Company Commander should interpret the INTENT of his commander's orders, and adapt his attack to the situation. In one exercise of Lind's book, a Company Commander is told to block a road access, but when he gets there, the situation has changed, and as Lind explains, the thing to do is not to mindlessly hold the hill, but to attack a nearby mortar battery or a weakly protected HQ in the vicinity before the enemy can react to the danger.

And there ARE cases where the thing to do is to follow orders, even if they are not as flexible as they should be.But just suppose that in your example, the Company arrives on the scene and find that the enemy is not trying to take the bridge, but is building a pontoon bridge a quarter of a mile down the river, and the pontoons are snaking down the road nearby and the Germans are unaware of his arrival. What should the Company commander do? Follow orders and sit on the bridge?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It depends entirly on higher's mission. IF his orders were to prevent an enemy crossing he might want to attack the pontoons but if his mission was to secure the bridge for his own unit's crossing he could, by going off on an attack, disrupt a higher movement.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Keep calling my statements "pure and utter BS" if you like, but don't expect me to remain polite about your own for very much longer...

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Are you suggesting that maneuver warfare would be orders with out objectives?

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by jackhammer:

I'm so sick and tired about hearing all the BS about maneuver warfare. I've read all the books mentioned in this thread, and to quote CAVSCOUT, they all suffer from Whermacht penis envy. [snip]

It took good 'ole attrition warfare in the form of massed stuka attacks to get von kleists panzers across. .<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

If you had paid attention to what you read, you would have seen that one of the tenets of maneuver warfare is that when you hit, you should hit hard, which is what the GErmans did. It is a gross distortion of Maneuver Warfare to characterize it as "driving around" and of avoiding combat.

If Maneuver Warfare is such BS as some here claim, why is it that they can only criticize it by putting up straw men and then tearing them down?

I raised a serious issue in this thread, and so far for the most part all I have seen from those who disagree with me is arguments calling upon ridicule and distortion of what maneuver warfare is.

I have said it before and I will say it again

1) Contrary to what some here claim, the US military HAS adopted maneuver warfare on occasion as its doctrinal basis (so it CANNOT b e just BS as some claim), and it has been continually opposed by some conservatives in the military. So quoting Colonel Blimp objections from supporters of attrition warfare is not surprising and doesn't add much to the discussion.

2) Although I don't have the first-hand experience to judge, serious writers like Leonhard have criticized the military for backtracking on their decision to adopt maneuver warfare as doctrine.

3) Contrary to what BTS claims, maneuver warfare does NOT apply only to higher operational levels than that depicted in Combat Mission, since most of the exercises in Lind's book were designed for Company Commanders and required decisions BY company commanders. What IS missing in CM that is found in real life is how the Company Commander's decisions are related to the intent of the orders received from higher levels, which it MIGHT be possible to model in pbem games, but which cannot be programmed in the present state of programming.

These are serious issues that cannot be dismissed just by calling them BS.

Although I appreciate the input of some of the military experts on this discussion, I am really disappointed with the generally low level of the arguments by some of the participants.

Henri

[IntelWeenie]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

If you had paid attention to what you read, you would have seen that one of the tenets of maneuver warfare is that when you hit, you should hit hard, which is what the GErmans did. It is a gross distortion of Maneuver Warfare to characterize it as "driving around" and of avoiding combat.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

It was maneuver warare in its purest form in the sense that the ideal of maneuver warfare is to achieve one's objective (in this case breaking out into the open behind enemy lines) without firing a shot, which is what Rommel achieved.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Will the real Henri please stand up? Which quote of yours defines manuever warfare?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

What IS missing in CM that is found in real life is how the Company Commander's decisions are related to the intent of the orders received from higher levels, which it MIGHT be possible to model in pbem games, but which cannot be programmed in the present state of programming.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Or maybe it has something to do with the fact that CM is a tactical level wargame and does not concern itself with "the big picture" from higher HQ.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

Although I appreciate the input of some of the military experts on this discussion, I am really disappointed with the generally low level of the arguments by some of the participants.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Do you include yourself since you don't seem to be consistent in your own statements?

I know this post comes across like a personal attack on Henri (it's not intended that way), but the above quotes when taken as "the whole enchilada" bug the bejeezus out of me. Don't accuse others of making bad arguments and "not getting it" when it seems you're in the same boat.

------------------

Cats aren't clean, they're covered with cat spit.

[This message has been edited by IntelWeenie (edited 10-16-2000).]

[CavScout]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

If you had paid attention to what you read, you would have seen that one of the tenets of maneuver warfare is that when you hit, you should hit hard, which is what the GErmans did. It is a gross distortion of Maneuver Warfare to characterize it as "driving around" and of avoiding combat.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Is it? You said:

"Sure deception and surprise are not exclusive to maneuver warare, but winning battles by avoiding combat IS ideal maneuver warfare."

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

If Maneuver Warfare is such BS as some here claim, why is it that they can only criticize it by putting up straw men and then tearing them down?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What "straw men"? People have pointed out some fallacies perhaps but hardly are using "straw men".

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

I raised a serious issue in this thread, and so far for the most part all I have seen from those who disagree with me is arguments calling upon ridicule and distortion of what maneuver warfare is.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Only because you seem to frame "serious" as agreeing with you.

As for "distortion" you at one time claim, "winning battles by avoiding combat IS ideal maneuver warfare" and then complain "tt is a gross distortion of Maneuver Warfare to characterize it as "driving around" and of avoiding combat"!

How can there be "distortion" when your own position is so confusing?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

I have said it before and I will say it again

1) Contrary to what some here claim, the US military HAS adopted maneuver warfare on occasion as its doctrinal basis (so it CANNOT b e just BS as some claim), and it has been continually opposed by some conservatives in the military.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

And being "occasionaly" used doesn't make something the "end all" for fighting wars. It is the insistance that maneiver warfare is the "only" way you need to fight that is contended.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> So quoting Colonel Blimp objections from supporters of attrition warfare is not surprising and doesn't add much to the discussion.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

So basicaly, anyone who disagrees with your postion is somehow inferior? So professionals, military and civilan, who disagree are not worthy of adding to this discussion?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

2) Although I don't have the first-hand experience to judge, serious writers like Leonhard have criticized the military for backtracking on their decision to adopt maneuver warfare as doctrine.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Of course when you get to choose who is "serious" and who isn't, it makes it easy to "debate"...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

(SNIP)

These are serious issues that cannot be dismissed just by calling them BS.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What? Like you do with the critiques of maneuver warfare?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Although I appreciate the input of some of the military experts on this discussion, I am really disappointed with the generally low level of the arguments by some of the participants.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Perhaps if you came of the high horse you'd feel better.

Cav

------------------

Deutsch sollte nie verlieren. Kampf-Mission muß das widerspiegeln.

"Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, "Wehrmact penis evy."--D. Bolger

[Spook]

If you'll pardon my ignorance here, CavScout, is that last word in the "Maneuverist" quote supposed to be "envy" or is actually "evy" (by which I don't know WTH "evy" is)?

[This message has been edited by Spook (edited 10-16-2000).]

[Blackhorse]

Henri,

On page 79 of the Art of Maneuver Leonard gives us the characteristics of Maneuver Warfare according to him.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Maneuver warfare theory de-emphasizes, but does not ignore, force ratios and loss rates. Numerical superiority in battles, campaigns, or wars takes on a minor role; local superiority is somewhat more important. But the maneuver-warfare practitioner seeks to use other dynamics to overcome—even exploit—his own numerical weaknesses if necessary.

Maneuver theory emphasizes movement, craft, and the human dimension of war. Above all, it glorifies defeating the enemy through means other than attacking his strength. Specifically, maneuver theory seeks the following, in descending order.

(Blackhorse: So far so good)

1. Preemption: defeating or neutralizing the enemy before the fight has begun

(Blackhorse: If this is what you are complaining about, then let it be known this occurs echelons above the CM scale. If this is your argument, then pack up CM and put it away, as the maneuver warfare has occurred already making the CM battles needless)

2. Dislocation: rendering the enemy’s strength irrelevant by removing the enemy from the decisive point, or—preferably—by removing the decisive point from them.

(Blackhorse: This requires combat, the clash of arms, and battle)

3. Disruption: Neutralizing the enemy by successfully attacking or threatening the center of gravity.

(Blackhorse: Again, this requires two enemies fighting in combat.)

Maneuver warfare, according to the concept of functional dislocation, employs the dialectic of combined-arms theory whenever possible in battle in order to fight the enemy where and when he is weak, and present him with a series of tactical dilemmas.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

So, you see, Leonard admits that at the tactical level, Maneuver Theory emphasizes the use of combined arms (pg 91) in what he calls the Combined Arms Theory. He goes on in that section to site several specific examples and explanations of why combined arms are necessary and why they need to be understood. He breaks the Combined Arms Theory down into three principles.

1. The Complementary Principle

2. The Dilemma Principle

3. The Alcyoneus Principle

As examples of the principles, he provides the following from pg. 93-109 of The Art of Maneuver

The Complimentary Principle

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The complementary principle states that by combining the various combat arms into a single organization, we can compensate for each arm’s weakness through another arm’s strength. Hence, if my infantry have tanks nearby, they can rely on their brother arm to provide the rapid. Lethal armor-piercing fires they need. Likewise, the tanks need not fear the close terrain if their companion infantry are securing their move for them…this point will apply to all three parts of the dialectic—this relationship among the arms is not confined to today’s technology or organizations. Combined -arms warfare has been employed since antiquity, and although the weapons of the future will change, the synergism achieved through the combination of arms will not.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Dilemma Principle

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>When employed correctly, the various combat arms serve to complement each other with respect to the enemy…In our example, we attack with a task force of both tanks and infantry. If the enemy tanks choose to remain fixed in hull-down positions in order to duel with our tanks, then our infantry will maneuver from position to position and threaten to launch a close infantry assault—a prospect every tanker fears.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The The Alcyoneus Principle

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Based upon Greek mythology, Alcyoneus was unbeatable except when not standing on the home soil of his country. Hercules upon learning this, picked the giant up and carried him into a different land and slew him. The Alyconeus principle is all about moving our foe into terrain in which he is most vulnerable…maneuver warfare theory abhors the idea of taking on enemy tanks where and when they are strong. On the contrary, it focuses on fighting scenarios that are unfair. We want to catch those tanks in terrain on which they cannot possibly win…Rather, we want to defeat enemy systems with un-like systems in terrain that maximizes our advantage and puts the enemy at a disadvantage.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

All this sounds completely reasonable and remarkably similar to my own Army experience in both combat and training environments. In fact, there is nothing in the above statements I disagree with. So, where is the disconnect and why do I disagree with you? It is because of your interpretation of maneuver warfare. I go back to your hanky-waving point. That is more an indictment of French ineptitude than of German maneuver brilliance. German maneuver brilliance in that situation would have had the Germans suddenly appear in Paris while every Frenchman was rushing to fill the void north of the Maginot line. In the hanky waving situation (if it ever really did happen. I’ve been on tanks and can flat out tell you hankies, much less huge flags are damn near impossible to make out, especially in the French countryside…but I digress) the Germans took a gamble and it paid off. The consequences could have been much more severe had they been facing a half-way competent opponent.

Now then, back to your point and CM and Maneuver Warfare.

CM models the combined arms and tactical level very, very well. It has no way of modeling the operational or strategic levels, as it is not an operational or strategic level game. Everything your heart desires out of CM is possible.

Just out of curiosity,

1. Does this argument spring from the Gamey issue?

2. What is your experience and background? (It often helps to know who one is talking to).

[This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 10-16-2000).]

[CavScout]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

If you'll pardon my ignorance here, CavScout, is that last word in the "Maneuverist" quote supposed to be "envy" or is actually "evy" (by which I don't know WTH "evy" is)?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Spelling SNAFU!

[Guest Big Time Software]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Although I appreciate the input of some of the military experts on this discussion, I am really disappointed with the generally low level of the arguments by some of the participants.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You shouldn't talk about yourself like that Henri, as not EVERYTHING you have stated here is at a "generally low level"

The problem with the way you argue is that you assume a very high and lofty position (i.e. you are right and everybody else is wrong). In the process you belittle and at times insult people that have done nothing more than express a different opinion than yours, even if it is from first hand experience and better supported by documentation. You rather poorly support your own arguments, then claim you have cited infallible "examples" which are often either irrelevant or at best open to different interpretation. When these examples are either challenged or in some way countered (no matter how honestly and politely), you neatly dodge and sidestep the critical analysis. When the other side rightly calls foul, you then claim that they are attacking you in some personal way and use this as a further excuse to remove yourself from introspection. I have seen you do this several times now, so the pattern is rather well established.

You are probably going to take this as a personal attack, but that is not the intent. The purpose of the above is to try and explain why it is that when you get into a "serious debate" it winds up like this thread has. It is VERY frustrating having a debate with someone who shows little desire to think about what is being discussed.

Now... on to some more concrete examples of sidestepping the issue...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>A commander versed in Maneuver Warfare would not usually give orders of the type that you cite above, and the stupid reaction that you characterize has not been proposed by anyone. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

How can anybody that claims to have read about WWII come to this conclusion? The example I cited could be lifted out of any campaign from 1939-1945 a thousand times over. It happened and happened often. Why? Because more often than not the commander in the field has to deal with reality and not lofty theories. Yes, if the commander can find another VIABLE way to achieve the same goal, using maneuver instead of direct confrontation, he would be a poor commander if he didn't exercise it. But what you are saying here is that if a commander comes up against determined resistance he should pull back and, no matter what, go some place else where there is less resistance. Sorry, but this only works as a rule in the land of make believe.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>An example of the type that you mention is discussed in detail in Lind's book, showing how a Company Commander should interpret the INTENT of his commander's orders, and adapt his attack to the situation.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

In my example the "intent" was clear and to the point -> take that bridge. Those were the orders. How to take it and then defend it would often be left up to the company commander, or at least the battalion commander, but there would be *NO* option to follow a path of action that would not lead to the capture and holding of the bridge. A court martial would be waiting if the commander decided to do something else.

Whether you like it or not, Company commanders do not have the flexibility to disobey the "intent" of the orders. If they are ordered to take a bridge or a town, they are ordered to take that bridge or that town. HOW they do it is up to them, but they can not opt to avoid the objective because they lack the critical knowledge necessary to determine if the orders from their superiors make sense in the big picture. This is called "the chain of command" and the lower down you get, the less freedom of action you have. And it is like this for very good reasons. As I said, a company does not have the luxury of being able to go wherever it likes. It has a sector of front and it had better stay in that sector otherwise you are left with nothing but chaos.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In one exercise of Lind's book, a Company Commander is told to block a road access, but when he gets there, the situation has changed, and as Lind explains, the thing to do is not to mindlessly hold the hill, but to attack a nearby mortar battery or a weakly protected HQ in the vicinity before the enemy can react to the danger.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

And what if that hill had the enemy's forward observers for its divisional artillery. And that artillery was raining death and destruction upon a neighboring unit. So according to the way you interpret Lind the Company Commander could say to himself "gosh, that is a pretty tough order we received. Hmmm... well, it would be much easier to wipe out this tiny little formation over here that isn't causing anybody any problems. So I think I will order my men to do that instead of what we were ordered to do. That way I can tell my grandchildren what a great commander of maneuver warfare I am." In bet this is NOT what Lind was saying, but it is in fact how you have interpreted it.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>But just suppose that in your example, the Company arrives on the scene and find that the enemy is not trying to take the bridge, but is building a pontoon bridge a quarter of a mile down the river, and the pontoons are snaking down the road nearby and the Germans are unaware of his arrival. What should the Company commander do? Follow orders and sit on the bridge?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I give a concrete and realistic example and you make up your own "what ifs" to avoid a direct and practical challenge to my example. Well Henri, two can play at that game. The Company sits and guards the bridge as ordered because the neighboring company is holding the stretch of river that the enemy (who in my example was supposed to be on the defensive) is building the pontoon bridge. The Company might detach some assets to help the neighboring company (like one of its MMGs), but it will ensure that the bridge remains defended because the enemy could attack it with some other force at any time. Company's do not operate in a vacuum, so my counter example would most likely be the case. Reality is a lot broader than one company vs. one enemy company.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Contrary to what some here claim, the US military HAS adopted maneuver warfare on occasion as its doctrinal basis (so it CANNOT b e just BS as some claim), and it has been continually opposed by some conservatives in the military. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Nobody is saying that maneuver warfare is not practiced, nor that it is BS. However, it CAN NOT be successfully put into practice in accordance with the vacuum of academic theory that you have constructed. That is what I and others are trying to point out here.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Contrary to what BTS claims, maneuver warfare does NOT apply only to higher operational levels than that depicted in Combat Mission, since most of the exercises in Lind's book were designed for Company Commanders and required decisions BY company commanders.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Once again, you have totally missed the boat on this. I never said, and never will say, that maneuver warfare does NOT apply to company level combat. What I did say, and others have pointed out, that at some point the options for maneuver have been exhausted and battle must be joined. And that is what a Tactical wargame, like CM, simulates. This is something you have neatly sidestepped thus far, and instead have tried to obscure the real point with statements like the one below.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>What IS missing in CM that is found in real life is how the Company Commander's decisions are related to the intent of the orders received from higher levels, which it MIGHT be possible to model in pbem games, but which cannot be programmed in the present state of programming. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What you are asking for is an Operational layer to a Tactical wargame. But why stop there? Why not just add a Strategic layer and a National layer as well. That way you could start at the source, which is rooted in industrial and political policies (like developing long range bombers and fighters), then carry that over to large scaled military decisions (like invading France), simulate the decisions for where Armies were deployed, determine the composition of the Corps for each sector all the way down to the squad level, and finally let the player make decisions at all levels so as to make sure that D Company of this or that unit is ordered about in the best possible way under the theory of maneuver. Sounds like a great Tactical wargame, I can't wait to play it...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>These are serious issues that cannot be dismissed just by calling them BS.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, I called your literal interpretation and utter lack of application to realistic situations as "BS". So I do not dismiss the theories and their pratical application, only how you have interpreted them.

OK Henri... one question for you:

"Henri, in your theoretical game that allows Operational decisions to be determined and acted upon by Tactical level units, what would the average battle look like compared to the ones in CM?"

The answer to this question will be quite interesting, especially if there is no answer

Steve

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by IntelWeenie:

Will the real Henri please stand up? Which quote of yours defines manuever warfare?

Neither of them, they are not a definition of maneuver warfare but aspects.There is no contradiction between using fire in order to facilitate maneuver and then to hit hard when you finally hit. No one ever claimed that the objective of maneuver warfare consisted of avoiding combat when necessary. The opposite of maneuver warfare is attrition warfare, not combat.

Do you include yourself since you don't seem to be consistent in your own statements?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

There is no inconsistency in mny statements. The supposedly contradictory example that you gave is ludicrous, and only shows that you don't understand what maneuver warfare is (no insult intended).

I know this post comes across like a personal attack on Henri (it's not intended that way), but the above quotes when taken as "the whole enchilada" bug the bejeezus out of me. Don't accuse others of making bad arguments and "not getting it" when it seems you're in the same boat.

Read the above posts CAREFULLY, then either show me where I said that when entering combat, less than the amount required should be used, and show me where I said that combat should always be avoided, or please apologize to me.

Henri

[CavScout]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

Read the above posts CAREFULLY, then either show me where I said that when entering combat, less than the amount required should be used, and show me where I said that combat should always be avoided, or please apologize to me.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

"..winning battles by avoiding combat IS ideal maneuver warfare."

[Blackhorse]

I would also like to submit this follow-up written by William S. Lind in Maneuver Warfare, an Anthology 1993 Presidio Press.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In Desert Storm, the American ground forces, Army and marine Corps, on the whole practiced maneuver warfare. There were certainly exceptions: for example, we had in effect the 1st German Marine Division and the 2nd French Marine Division, in terms of the styles each employed. But the overall picture suggests the ship has come onto the new course, even if it has a long journey ahead of it before it is safe in a maneuver warfare harbor.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[iggi]

Can you clarify Henri what exactly CM is missing? I'm getting bogged down in interpretations of maneuver theory.

Remember the scope of a CM battle is 40 min or so.

Example, I have to go to work now, I have 30min before I leave, it will take me 20 min to shower and get dressed, with 10 min to have a cup of coffee. Not to much time to maneuver.

Gotta go!

[IntelWeenie]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

Read the above posts CAREFULLY, then either show me where I said that when entering combat, less than the amount required should be used, and show me where I said that combat should always be avoided, or please apologize to me.

Henri<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

OK, Here it is a second time:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

It was maneuver warare in its purest form in the sense that the ideal of maneuver warfare is to achieve one's objective (in this case breaking out into the open behind enemy lines) without firing a shot<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Of course I am assuming that the phrase "purest form" means that victory without combat is the main objective of what you call "maneuver warfare". Perhaps it would be better if you would clearly state what you consider "maneuver warfare" to be instead of lamenting that you don't have the time or desire to explain it to us.

BTW, what have I done that warrants an apology?

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