SVT-40 Over-Availability

[LukeFF]

Thank you, Jason.

On a side note, the SVT-40, while advanced for its time, was not an ideal rifle for mass employment. For one, it employs a gas system that has to be set just right with a special wrench. Lose that wrench and, once the gas system becomes clogged, it becomes a very fancy bolt-action rifle. For another, it has a lot of internal parts, some of which can be easily lost when field-stripping it (such as the operating rod springs). Finally, there is also the documented problems with its accuracy (more of an issue when employing it as a sniper, but an issue nonetheless). Add it all up, and the M91/30 becomes a much more attractive alternative when needing to arm large masses of troops. 

All that said, it's a fun rifle to shoot on a relaxing range day, though I loathe cleaning it.

[John Kettler]

Those of you wishing to learn how the Russians used their paratroopers during WW II would be well advised to read then Army LT COL David M. Glantz's excellent November 1984 study THE SOVIET AIRBORNE EXPERIENCE, Combat Studies Institute Research Survey No. 4, United States Army Command and General Staff College. While it's great that you can download it free online, the paper version is better in that there are lots of foldout maps. Unlike, say, his Kursk book, back then he wrote in a much clearer manner, perhaps because he had someone actively supervising his work.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/glantz.pdf

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

JK - sure the Glantz study is a classic.  Unfortunately, it is mostly focused on the actual use of the Russian airborne in true airborne operations, whether small early drops in support of infiltration missions in the first winter, or the later cross Dnepr drops.  He also covers the early doctrinal development stuff and some special uses in small numbers for intel and partisan support and so on.  In other words, if it used a parachute, he covers it.  If instead it used an infantry formation with an airborne designation, he barely does.  He makes only the most passing mention of the waves of airborne used as ground units, their transformation to Guards Rifle Divisions, and so forth.  Once they've made any such change, he isn't interested.

It would be like writing about the US airborne in WW II and covering Sicily, Normandy, and Market-Garden, but leaving out the battle of the bulge because the men went there on trucks.  Except worse, because the Russian airborne force spent most of the war fighting that way, and very little of it conducting parachute drops.

It is still worth reading, to be sure.  But it is far from being true coverage of the arm or branch of service, or the full history of the formation ever designated "airborne".

[kevinkin]

Don't you think Glantz intentionally left out airborne as ground troops since their contribution was far less unique in that role? TOEs aside. So the focus was on airborne's intended role and any lessons to be learned for the conduct of the Cold War. He was still in the Army and probably wrote what he was commissioned research . That being said, if someone has a source detailing Soviet airborne's role in ground operations in winter battles ('41-42) we can used that to help produce new scenarios with the just out Winter Mod. I wonder if Soviet airborne should be treated as relatively elite (think so) in the ground role as we do with US PARA. We would have loved to have seen more on it's use as line infantry in the document above. But, well, it never made it in. 

Kevin

Edited January 15, 2016 by kevinkin

[JasonC]

Kevin - yes, Glantz's interest was clearly to inform US cold war officers, who would be steeped in the lore of US airborne history from WWII as a matter of course, what the Russians did with their own airborne during WWII.  But the thing is, that interest just isn't remotely the same as knowing the institutional role and history of Russian airborne infantry formations in the whole war.  If a historian of the German FJ covered Eben Ebel and Crete but never mentioned Cassino or the St. Lo campaign or the clearing the Scheldte fighting or the role of FJ divisions in the bulge or the HG Panzer division at Gela or in Italy, would they "get" what that branch of service did?  They would not.  Editing everything they ever did according to whether it involved a parachute amputates most of the history of the arm.  Affairs of two battalions in early 1942 will get 40 pages because there was silk involved; actions of ten divisions a year or two later will get 3 sentences, if that, because none was.

Edited January 16, 2016 by JasonC

[kevinkin]

I guess it depends on what the historian is researching - a unit history or a operational technique like vertical envelopment. Both are worthy but do not overlap necessarily.

OK .. sorry to side track the thread.

Keivn

  

[c3k]

Interesting about Soviet Airborne roles. In Kursk, several Soviet Airborne divisions were used much as JasonC stated: as fire-brigades, or solid backstop reserves. Elite (picked?) men, who were "solid" and wouldn't collapse. (In as much as that description could apply to men in combat.) 

The original question, the relative availability of the SVT-40 and how CMRT portrays it, still seems to be open. The consensus seems to be that it should be seen less often? As to accuracy, why are so many of them (propaganda photos?) shown with scopes?

(Brevity due to thumb-typing)

Ken

[DMS]

Yes, there are too many SVTs in squads. But many of Soviet divisions never had full strength and platoons and squads were half-sized. And soildiers used to take better weapons from their wounded or killed comrades, so ratio of auto weapons in units was more than stated in documents. Up to 50%. That matters to SMGs in first place, but to SVTs also.

Existing in-game SVT ratio would be good for exellent equipment option.

[DougPhresh]

Glantz also talks about the VDV in Stumbling Colossus and Colossus Reborn. His book on the subject, Soviet Airborne Forces, is a classic and expands on his earlier work, talking about pre-war doctrine, wartime experience, and the Cold War shift to include mechanized and air-mobile forces.

 

[kevinkin]

Would there be any reason not to treat the WWII Soviet airborne - even those that never jumped - as elite forces for scenario design? 

Kevin  

[JasonC]

kevinkin - they were selected personal, and trained, but since they were formed in waves of 10 divisions at a time, they had first combats, they were not all veterans or something.  Some performed well in their first engagements, but that doesn't mean they weren't green in the technical sense of unblooded and not yet experienced at WWII combat.  They would have higher unit quality as an average than other new Russian divisions, sure.  But they were not elite the way some veteran commando units are elite, in the sense of highly selected for expertise out of already highly accomplished veterans.

[DougPhresh]

I can see some similarities between the VDV and Morskaya Pekhota. There is the doctrine established pre-war, the reality of that falling short of expectations during the reforms and purges leading up the 1941, units being entirely destroyed during Barbarossa and rebuilt, and wild variations in the performance of individual units and to an extent their role and TO&E for the duration of the war.

Some Naval Infantry and VDV units were experienced and capable combat formations that were skillfully used in their intended role, but many were not. 

[kevinkin]

So I guess at best a well lead and motivated group consisting of a mixture of vets and regulars .... to put them in CM RT terms. 

Thanks,

Kevin

[GhostRider3/3]

 

There are way too many SVT-40s in Red Thunder.  It was a 1941 weapon, most of them actually made prewar and the large plants switched away from them by the end of the spring of 1942.  With other prewar SVT-38s added, there were only 1.67 million Russian semi autos made through the end of the war.  In comparison, there were 8 million SMGs (6 million PPsH and 2 million PPS-43) and over 20 million Mosin Nagants (wartime production 17.5 million, but also millions on hand prewar.  Total production of Mosins back to pre WW I era is 37 million rifles, making it the most common firearm in history by a long way).

Most of the SVTs were fielded in the prewar army or in the mobilization waves that trained during 1941 and reached the front by December.  Production was less in 1942 (the large plants all switched to simpler Mosin production to maximize output in terms of weapon count) and field losses very high, far higher for small arms for the Russians, through the fall of 1942, than at any other time for them, or for any other army in history.  There therefore would not have been many left even in mid 1943, let along mid 1944 at the time of  Bagration.  Low level production was not replacing losses, it was only allowing continued use in specialized roles like designated marksman and sniper rifles.  Production ceased completely in January 1945.

As a whole war average, out of 100 men equipped with small arms only 5 or 6 would have SVTs, 28 or so would have SMGs, and 67 would have Mosins.  And that mix would be weighted more heavily away from the SVTs and toward the SMGs in the summer of 1944.  The notion that the Bagration era force would have any increased quantity of semi autos as a late war upgunning development is just completely wrong.  Upgunning instead took the form of more LMGs per company and especially many more SMGs, including full SMG formations (in the mech arm especially), and more SMGs per platoon in the line rifle formations.

Say JasonC  say will they implement this weapon The MKb 42(H)?  Supposedly it was mostly issued primarily to the Eastern Front from 1942 until the Stg44 was developed.  Is this correct, or would they still be in too small of numbers?

[JasonC]

GhostRider - those were just the development version sturmgewehrs, pretty much.  Only 10,000 made.  They wouldn't need to add a new item, just allow a rare trickle of them before the fielding date for the true mass production item later in the war.  Basically it was just field trials to find any bugs and work them out.

[Ts4EVER]

They were used on the Northern Part of the Eastern Front mostly (around Leningrad), so maybe if a thus themed expansion is ever done they could be put in together with the PPS42.

[snarre]

if you talking mkb 42 . all of thous was sendet to around stalingrad. i had long talking whit one frend from germany ho studying war history. 

[Ts4EVER]

Well that friend still has some studying to do, considering Stalingrad was largely over in February 1943 and the frontline tests started in April.

[snarre]

https://books.google.de/books?id=_BJgKhwD2o4C&pg=PT50&lpg=PT50&dq=mKB+42+demjansk&source=bl&ots=pmTixucNTL&sig=kK_iR2iYr-cjuUxzLEZ4V1b9d20&hl=de&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJ0pL4r8fKAhVExQ8KHWkJC-IQ6AEIHDAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

there is link for about info mkb 42

[Ts4EVER]

That is an urban legend. Note how that book doesn't cite any scientific sources except undefined "knowledgeable people". The only material evidence for this wild story is this museum specimen they mention and where they even admit the serial number proves the weapon was not used there. Add to that the logical improbability of air dropping an experimental weapon using a new cartridge into a dangerous pocket...

The MKB42 trials are well documented, including reports by units using them. They started in April 1943, a full year after this alleged incident. You will not find that kind of info in a book like the one linked though, which seems to be pop-scientific pulp marketed towards the gun obsessed American underclasses.

[JasonC]

Ts4Ever - first on early used of Sturmgewehr's, complete agreement.  

But second on gun obsessed Americans, I can assure you it is in no way limited to any "underclasses".  

Guns aren't cheap, and neither is blowing $100 an hour worth of ammo at the range...  

[Ts4EVER]

Sorry if I didn't make clear the satirical intent of that line, I just wanted to find a funnier way to say that the source is not reputable.

[LukeFF]

Sorry if I didn't make clear the satirical intent of that line, I just wanted to find a funnier way to say that the source is not reputable.

Well, you failed in that miserably.

[c3k]

Wow. Now you've got a LOT of gun-obsessed Americans angry with you. Not a good move.   (Second smiley just to make sure.  )

Forums are notorious for failing to properly convey subtle communications..