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Russian Use of TRPs in Afghanistan


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Here is a riveting example of what the Russians were able to do with a half battery (3 guns) of D-30 122 mm howitzers, three TRPs, a seismic sensor and MET data only. No observed fire at all. At night!

 

Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan CALL Publicaction #98-17

 

by Mr. Lester W. Grau
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

This article first appeared in the 
May-June 1997 Field Artillery Journal

 

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/arty/arty.htm

 

Artillery ambush

 

The Soviet gunners used towed artillery, such as the D-30 122mm howitzer, MT-12 100mm antitank guns and vehicle-mounted antitank guided missiles to provide base camp security as well as to protect outposts and government installations. Artillery observers, usually located on high ground, found targets and adjusted fire during the day. At night, target acquisitions and engagements were difficult, but Soviet reconnaissance employed their "Realii-U" seismic sensor system to detect unobserved targets. The Realii-U is a seismic motion detector which allows the operator to determine the number and type of objects moving near it. The Soviet planners used the Realii-U to aid in the defense, monitor the security zone and to support the artillery ambush.24

artyamb.gif

 

Figure 1
 - Artillery Ambush. The Russians used the 
Realii-U
 seismic motion sensor to detect unobserved targets. Shown here is an actual plan for such an ambush. Fire concentrations were plotted (110, 111 and 112) along a Mujahideen supply trail out of view from the observation post (OP). When the 
Realii-U
 detected enemy movement, the Russians fired the concentrations.

 

A D-30 122mm howitzer platoon leader conducted a successful artillery ambush inFebruary 1986 near the town of Talukan in the northeast province of Takhar. Lieutenant V. Kozhbergenov installed the Realii-Usensor near a Mujahideen supply trail that he could not directly observe from his platoon observation post. (Figure 1) He then plotted three artillery concentrations (110, 111, and 112) along the trail and computed the firing data for each. The concentrations were spaced 100-150 meters apart. The platoon leader plotted his concentration 111 at the narrowest part of a valley. He then periodically used the DMK assault meteorological set to calculate the Meteo 11 report to adjust his data (the Meteo 11 report is good for an hour).25

 

At night, the Realii-U operator reported that some 10-15 people, two trucks and five pack animals were passing through concentration 112. The platoon leader ordered "Fire Mission". His gunners stood by their pieces. As the Mujahideen approached concentration 111, the gunners fired a volley into concentration 111. Then, the first piece switched to fire concentration 110 and the third piece switched to fire concentration 112. Number two gun continued to fire on concentration 111. The platoon expended twelve rounds and killed two Toyota trucks, four pack animals and six men as well as destroying small arms and ammunition.26

 

Something to seriously think about, right?

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler

 

Edited by John Kettler
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Edit..........................

Something to seriously think about, right?

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler

In what context John?

 

The US was doing basically the same thing back in the 60s along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Our game takes place in 2017, there are far more sophisticated mechanisms in place to establish fire missions on unobserved targets. Plus in today's world who is actually unobserved?

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yeah i have to agree. this really has nothing to do with.. anything. if anything this should be general discussion or cm:a.

and Nidan you know better than anyone here we did a lot better than that in Nam. Arc Light strikes anyone? ;)

Ammonia detectors?

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If I'd been a Viet Cong the second I saw Napalm (or Puff the Magic Dragon for that matter) I would've defected and chu hoi-ed my pajama wearin' *** all the way to Idaho. Those dudes were some tough little scrappers with iron cojones.

 

 

Mord.

Edited by Mord
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If I'd been a Viet Cong the second I saw Napalm (or Puff the Magic Dragon for that matter) I would've defected and chu hoi-ed my pajama wearin' *** all the way to Idaho. Those dudes were some tough little scrappers with iron cojones.

 

 

Mord.

Sure they were tough, in their way of thinking,  the VC were fighting for the freedom of their country, North Vietnamese were fighting to reunite their country, artificially divided by meddling Westerners. They saw it as elephants versus grasshoppers. All the USA saw was Red.  We never seem to learn the lessons of popular uprisings, even though we fought one against the English. Since we are talking about Afghanistan, how long have the Mujahideen been fighting against various colonial powers? Yet they are still fighting.

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Not my words, but yours.

 

The country was not always Islamic, granted the Mujahideen are relatively new players, but yet the people in that region have been fighting forever, against who really doesn't matter at this point in time.

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Afghanistan has not really been a country as we know one to be. My in depth knowledge of its history is limited. They have been a highway from Asia to Europe for centuries. Never really establishing a national identity. We should have beat feet after crushing the Taliban. We just love nation building.

 

I'll try the book, thanks.

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Especially true on random interlopers. I never did Afghanistan but there's more than a few accounts of US/NATO troops showing up and being taken for Soviet forces (as I have to wonder if some Soviet troops were seen as simply the English returned).

 

The distinction between foreigners is pretty limited out in the tribal areas.  

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LukeFF,

 

I put it over here because it stands in night and day contrast to slow even with TRPs Russian artillery in CMBS and because it was the first time I ever read any report of Russian artillery exhibiting such a tremendous level of flexibility, never mind at the half battery level. Offhand, I know of no way that could be done in CMBS, and we're talking mid 80s for the referenced artillery ambush! During WW II, the British 25 pounder battery used to split fire and cover two targets, but that battery was eight guns. Here, we start with three, shoot the first concentration on the primary TRP, then, while continuing the first concentration with one gun, the remaining two each shoot at a separate TRP. I've never encountered anything like that before, certainly not in Russian field artillery firing standard HE, as opposed to Grau's account of the precision fire mission vs a Muj cave position using laser guided 240 mm mortar fire from a single 2S4.  

 

Nidan1 and Sublime,

 

I know full well about "wiring" the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Operation Igloo White), to include the ammonia sniffers the NVA learned to defeat by hanging buckets of urine in the trees. But the Russians were using what seems to be, based on the target classifying level of detail it supplied to the owning battery, a vastly more sophisticated sensor system than what we used in Vietnam. That artillery ambush is like nothing I've read of anywhere. Maybe the US has been doing this sort of thing for a long time, but wasn't in FM 6-20 Fire Support in the early 80s. I say that with great confidence, having read it cover to cover. I think the account is highly germane and quite eye-opening to someone used to looking at Cold War Russian artillery use in terms of the norms and expending hundreds of rounds per fire mission. 

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler

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John your point is well taken, and the Ho Chi Minh Trail operations involved more aircraft than artillery anyway.

 

However is your point to push BFC to improve Russian arty targeting times in the game by pointing to an account that is over thirty years old and not quite substantiated. 

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I know full well about "wiring" the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Operation Igloo White), to include the ammonia sniffers the NVA learned to defeat by hanging buckets of urine in the trees. But the Russians were using what seems to be, based on the target classifying level of detail it supplied to the owning battery, a vastly more sophisticated sensor system than what we used in Vietnam. That artillery ambush is like nothing I've read of anywhere. Maybe the US has been doing this sort of thing for a long time, but wasn't in FM 6-20 Fire Support in the early 80s. I say that with great confidence, having read it cover to cover. I think the account is highly germane and quite eye-opening to someone used to looking at Cold War Russian artillery use in terms of the norms and expending hundreds of rounds per fire mission.

 

We didn't do it because by and large after Vietnam, we recognized the fidelity on sensors only targets was pretty limited.  The utility of the sensors themselves was not discarded, however it moved from being sufficient for targeting, to a system the scouting community refers to as "queuing" which is simply the progression from wider coverage but lower fidelity sensors, to narrow focus high fidelity sensors.

 

So think GSR>Sesmic/other unmanned sensor>airborne optics>ground optics>scout eyeballs>scout sneaking up, poking it with a stick before stealing whatever goodies the observed element has, because that's what scouts do.  Given the strength of the observation fires or actions may occur at any part of the queuing process, however this is pretty asset dependent (so going cold war style, a Lance missile would likely be dumped on a Division sized GSR signal, while tube artillery will virtually never be employed without at least mechanically assisted human eyes on positively identified targets).

 

As to the topic at hand, the sort of TRPs practiced in Afghanistan are likely just that, ones practiced, rehearsed and possibly even fired at to be registered.  The kind of TRPs we see in CMBS are a lot closer to someone crunching the numbers 10-20 minutes before the battle kicks off, but not to the point where the battery has practiced firing at any/all/separate ones at the same time.   

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We didn't do it because by and large after Vietnam, we recognized the fidelity on sensors only targets was pretty limited. The utility of the sensors themselves was not discarded, however it moved from being sufficient for targeting, to a system the scouting community refers to as "queuing" which is simply the progression from wider coverage but lower fidelity sensors, to narrow focus high fidelity sensors.

As a side note, a couple of my buddies from grad school had been involved in developing a new advanced seismic sensors under a DOD grand. Their goal was to develop a system for identifying not only the general type of target, but even such small details as its weaponry. I have no idea how far such experiments have progressed; but I did get an impression that such sensors wereto be used for advanced warning, rather than targeting (as you correctly point out). Interestingly enough – my buddies (who had very little military expertise, but rather PHD degrees in physics and engineering had mentioned that they saw the Russians and Israelis as their primary competitors in that realm.

As to the topic at hand, the sort of TRPs practiced in Afghanistan are likely just that, ones practiced, rehearsed and possibly even fired at to be registered. The kind of TRPs we see in CMBS are a lot closer to someone crunching the numbers 10-20 minutes before the battle kicks off, but not to the point where the battery has practiced firing at any/all/separate ones at the same time.

Agreed. The TRP techniques described in the OP’s article do certainly have a place in a counterinsurgency conflict where you are likely to have “free-fire” zones at certain areas and set times. However, I am not so sure that such procedures have a place in high-paced maneuver engagements (a-la BFBS) where large volumes of friendly, enemy, and civilian vehicles would travel around the roads and pathways in large groups at any given time.

Edited by DreDay
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Guys I was a unattended ground sensor specialist for a few years back when I was in the 82d. They are in fact a nifty piece of technology and were used regularly on every battalion sized operation with one 3 to 6 man team attached. We would jump in, move to whatever location,hand emplacement sensor strings and any required relays, then reenter our lines and co locate by the bn s-2 and feed him contacts, often these would be used for fire missions. Our emplacement patrols might be on foot ( we carried the heaviest rucks in division and operated well forward of the Feba) or mounted with the scout platoon. We also had a number of joint missions with SF.

Today every BCT has a ground surveillance platoon as part of the surveillance troop so they are still in use. ( IIRC using REMBASS II) So it's not outside the realm of possibility that these might make a nifty tool in the CM toolbox.

So John thanks for posting this, it brings back memories.

Los

Edited by Los
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They're goodish.  

 

In COIN: The big issue with any unattended type sensor is that they tended to get discovered pretty quick.  The enemy knows the terrain well enough, and there were enough eyes on us that placing the things secretly usually did not happen, while the battle space was also well populated enough that the sort of data UGS delivered was not always that helpful (the same trails used by badguys to smuggle things we didn't want getting into sector were also the same trails used by folks smuggling things we didn't care about, kids taking a short cut, random goats, etc etc.

 

They're more useful in high intensity type conflicts, as then it's meeting on ground generally less well known to all parties, and less full of neutral traffic.  Still generally not considered enough information to fire on, but enough to trigger ISR or other observation type assets to check it out.

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