Black Sea US formations

[ScoutPL]

Which indicates the Brits don't get much value for money, but yes the Turkish Armed Forces are pretty large, although of course they do have more uncertainty on their borders.

Not an expert on the Brit Armed Forces but I would bet their Navy is significantly more robust (and expensive) than the Turkish one, which would help account for the disparity between cost and boots on the ground (the water as it were). As far as armies go I am sure it goes back to the same old debate about quality vs. quantity. Plus the whole western idea of financial security, proper health care, pensions, etc can run costs up as well.

[John Kettler]

Shall be most interested to see how American players used to having all the high tech toys react when they find the opponent has all those capabilities, and a lot more we don't have (laser-guided rockets and cannon projectiles from 122-240mm), plus a major numerical advantage. See, for example, the BM-30 and its bag of tricks, to include SFW. We have no equivalent to the ARENA/SHTORA system. Nor do Abrams tanks go racing about protected by Relikt ERA. No CMSF player's ever faced Russian armor firing DU (in service since 1989). We have our drones, and they have theirs. They have DPICM and scatterable mines, too. Nor do we have a monopoly any longer in thermal sights, and we certainly have nothing like their family of gun-launched missiles usable against armor and helicopters. We may have Stryker MGS, but their Airborne units have the nasty Sprut SD, armed with the same 125mm gun/missile system found from the T-64 on. Nor do we have any counterpart for the new BMD families. We have the A-10; they have their Su-25, also combat proven to be a very tough and survivable CAS bird. If air defense is modeled, then the U.S. and NATO players shouldn't count much on air support, since the Russians have the most in depth air defenses on the planet for their ground forces--everything from highly capable MANPADS, through the 2S6 Tunguska, Tor, Buk and beyond. I could go on and on, but I think I've made my point.

This game should force a fundamental mind reset for American and similarly equipped NATO players. Such a clash of forces would be highly lethal, and that's without factoring in insurgent activities.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ScoutPL]

John,

Having come up in the late 80's/90's I am very familiar with the "awesomeness" of the Russian (Soviet) war machine. They have always touted equipment that is designed around a very different doctrine than western armies. And since it looks, smells and sounds different, some folks are led to believe it might somehow be superior. But historically that hasn't been the case. The last fifty years are full of all sorts of examples of armies using warsaw pact equipment and doctrine getting their butts stomped by other armies using western equipment and doctrine. And I think most historians and military theorists would agree that every time it came down to the quality of the soldiers, crews, tankers, etc rather than the gadgets. An experienced, well trained, professionally led and adequately equipped force will almost always prevail over an extremely well equipped, numerically superior conscript force led by the politically ambitious.

My fear is that the Russians will move toward a smaller, more professional force. If that ever happens than they could become a real threat. They are still a very real threat that has to be respected and any fight with them would be very lethal. But any modern war is. That's why, hopefully, all of this will remain in pixel format for the rest of man's history.

[ScoutPL]

Also, the US military has put a lot of energy into shedding the COIN mentality it has been locked into the last 10 years. Our publications and forums look a lot like they did in the 90's, post cold war. Everyone is trying to predict what the next big fight might look like and the doctrine is melding into a hybrid that tries to cover all contingencies. Which is a pattern that has served us well in the past.

All of our current training scenarios (those still not focused on Afghanistan) pit our forces against a "near-peer" hybrid threat that includes most if not all of the threats you outlined above. We are even going back and realigning our brigades and arty assets within the divisions to look more like 1995 in order to become more "conventionally" focused.

The real linchpin though is cost. It will always be the bane of a professional force in a democratic society. See the above post for how we have traditionally dealt with that challenge.

[Sequoia]

In my off hand opinion, I'm thinking US in-game small unit leaders should have some leadership value advantages over Russian because the past 12-13 years would have conferred some sort of experience to the US. On the other hand though, perhaps COIN experience is entirely inapplicable. I also don’t know how much of the supposed Soviet era inflexibility remains in the modern Russian army.

[Saferight]

This game should force a fundamental mind reset for American and similarly equipped NATO players. Such a clash of forces would be highly lethal, and that's without factoring in insurgent activities.

I think you hit it on the head John. Russia's military is a foe that should not be scoffed off. Without going nuclear it would be a brutal large scale all out war with each side having different counters for the others strengths. It should make for a very entertaining game.

[ScoutPL]

Sequoia: Unfortunately the combat experienced NCOs you are talking about are quickly moving up in rank or leaving the force. As the ratio of units deploying and seeing actual active combat grows smaller the pool of combat experience will decline sharply as well. And forget company grade officers. Even now there is a large percentage of LTs and CPTs without any combat awards. Actually, you could probably just get rid of the entire Green, Veteran, Crack etc ratings for a modern CM, at least until a later module or update. Neither side would have available what we would consider a veteran or crack organization in CMBN.

[John Kettler]

Gunhappy42,

It took me a long time to come to grips with the very Russian (Prince Potemkin's maskirovka to please his love, Catherine the Great) peep show approach to conning foreign observers and their own people. Things started to become clearer to me when I read that the cruiser SVERDLOV at the Coronation Day Review at Spithead in 1956(?) put on a show of naval mastery that left even the experts gasping, but it later emerged that the entire ship's complement was naval officers.

I'll also freely admit the few snippets and stills I saw of Operation Dneiper practically unhinged me, but as Suvorov/Rezun comprehensively exposed, it not only was another, and titanic, peep show, but one which severely affected Red Army combat power by wearing out vast numbers of AFVs to put on the show. This was because their AFVs' operational lives are incredibly short relative to ours.

And I still have to consciously remind myself that those now readily available scenes of Russian tanks racing about and flying through the air at arms shows; slalloming about the Poligon, too, are all put up jobs. The threat analyst in me, though, has to consider the worst case possibilities, but I now get that there is simply no way Russia, tank for tank, can possibly outperform our highly trained crews. The very nature of their military system prohibits it. There was a significant downsizing of the Red Army starting under Ogarkov, done specifically to finance a shift to a smaller, more high tech force. Would say the military-technical side has exploded since, but, barring some trained personnel retention initiatives, it's still pretty much the same Red Army of the Cold War.

As for no Veteran or Crack organizations, you obviously haven't kept up with Elite Navy SEALs! Combat and operational experience out the wazoo, and not just in the known combat zones. The Army's Night Stalkers and the Air Force's Combat Controllers would also be in that category. I do agree, though, with your general statement.

Regards,

John Kettler

[db_zero]

Interesting discussion. I find it hard to believe NATO or the US would directly engage in a land war in Russia. I could see American forces engaging in Korea, ME or perhaps Taiwan.

It also seems like with the range and lethal nature of modern weapons some changes in the scale of the game engine may be in order?

[ScoutPL]

John,

Ack all. I am always reminded of the little bobble inside of a bobble inside of a bobble when thinking of the Russian mindset/peep show. Lots of bluster, a hard headed determination to be perceived as the baddest guy on the block, but with their fingers crossed behind their backs in hopes no one calls their bluff. Historically, you can see it in just about every other gov't under their significant military/political influence as well.

As far as US SOF go, while they do have a better chance of maintaining their more experienced personnel (they often offer financial incentives to stay), their quality degrades just as anyone else's without real world experience. Plus taking down a building in the middle of the night defended by amateurs armed with less than "high tech" gadgetry or shooting a few pirates from the deck of an assault ship, hardly qualifies you for stopping a Russian MRR. Not to take anything away from those guys, they are the very best at what they do and recently have racked up a lot of experience (some good, some bad) but they probably wouldn't have a whole lot of impact in a Black Sea type scenario.

db zero: Just playing devils advocate but I am pretty sure there were plenty of US mil analysts making the same argument in 1917 and 1939. Our agreements with foreign nations have always been the catalyst for sucking us into other nation's conflicts.

[John Kettler]

Gunhappy42,

You missed my point. Our Elite SpecOps warriors do have lots of experience and continue to accrue it. Vanishingly little of what they do, and where they do it, you'd be amazed, is ever reported, and it's not the successes. Those usually pass unremarked upon.

Until VP Biden ran his mouth at a cocktail party, for example, Delta, not the SEALs would've gotten credit for the UBL raid. It also took direct, unreported by the media, censorship of "Zero Dark Thirty" to prevent giving away the SEAL playbook--the how-to of operational planning, timelines, target mockup locations and more which would've jeopardized, for years, ops to come. As for combat, how about four SEALs vs hundreds of Taliban? There've been multiple encounters of this type. We've lost whole four man teams on occasion, but Taliban causualties have been astronomic by comparison. Talking hundreds in one fight, at times. There've been hot extractions which make Hollywood versions seem tame, too. Not exactly a few pirates!

Can, say, four SEALs directly stop an MRR? Doubtful. But what if Regiment and Division CPs go boom; if the ammo dumps (unbelievavly densely packed and not fire protected) go up in a spectacular, combat power eviscerating, display; if the 2S6 Tunguskas won't start, no matter what? What if the if cartridges start blowing up in the user's rifles and MGs; if within-own-lines jamming disrupts communication; if mobile CPs and artillery observation vehicles are taken out in rapid succession? How about delayed-action charges causing AFVs, ammo and fuel trucks to suddenly explode? These and more are all doable.

Organizations which don't encourage initiative tend to come unstuck when presented with unplanned for events, and decapitation type attacks offer particularly high leverage. As always, the enemy rear areas are rich pickings and upheaval there can take the steam out of an offensive in a hurry. Tunnels, bridges and other constrained locations also offer great possibilities for mischief.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ScoutPL]

Some thoughts:

(I make these comments strictly from a professional perspective and not with an ax to grind or in any way wishing to minimize the accomplishments of the forces you speak of. I have personal experience working with a few "teams" as well as people in my personal life who were actually members at some point in their careers.)

Hundreds of Taliban? How is that possible when most guys carry at most a couple hundred rounds? Marksmanship can count for a lot, but no one is good enough to make EVERY round count. And the slightest amount of suppression will burn through ammo super quick. Most of the casualties you refer to were probably inflicted by CAS, CCA, AC130, or arty. Is that attributable to a small teams Special Skills or perhaps just being in the fire when they thought they were in the pan (which happens all too often).

Most of these high casualty (on both sides) producing ops are the result of ops gone wrong, not successful ones. Stealth recon missions blown sky high with terrible loss when all that was needed was a commo relay team. A deficiency that everyone in the planning recognized but decided to disregard.

You are right that there are hundreds of successful ops that we never hear about. The key being we never hear about them. It is unfortunate that the ops that get the most attention and glamorizations are the ones that go horribly wrong. I don't know any SOF force that goes out looking to start a fight with a well armed enemy force that outnumbers it 100 to 1.

As far as spec ops on a conventional battlefield there are issues with that as well. For the most part today's SOF are heavily reliant on air support. That would require fairly sufficient air superiority. Probably not going to happen with a near peer opponent. SOF operators are expensive. To train and maintain. They shouldn't be thrown away on "behind the lines" missions that while maybe successful would offer little hope of escape or continuous ops. If we have control of the skies it would be more efficient to drop a bomb or capitalize that capability to help conventional forces to seize the initiative.

Once again, I am the first to agree SOF have their uses and missions. But it is easy, and it think most would agree, for them to be misunderstood and/or misused.

[John Kettler]

Gunhappy42,

Points taken. As for casualties inflicted, two things apply. The SEALs don't spray and pray. They deliver precisely aimed fire, typically no more than two rounds per target. The only time you're likely to see anything like the ammo expenditures you take as normal would be in an ambush delivered by the SEALs or when breaking contact. Nor did I say that the SEALs were using ordinary weapons. They've got some remarkable highly advanced conventional weapons and as well as other toys which you'd expect to find in military SF. It's absolutely true that SEALs can and do whistle up things like AC-130s (which don't always operate in permissive environments and didn't from their inception) and even B-52s, but there are also things like the Night Stalkers' MH-60 DAP (the choice for a hot extract) they bring to the party which can deliver absolutely awesome firepower in their support, in far from benign conditions, too. Insiders characterize the firepower it can deliver as "unsurvivable." Here's why.

Misuse of such units has been a big problem. SpecOps should augment conventional forces, not the other way round, but this became a big enough deal magazine articles were written about it.

SpecOps are rapiers, where regular forces are more like warhammers and battleaxes.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Skwabie]

Right... I'm off to watch Act of Valor.

[ScoutPL]

OK, last comment, feel free to reply but we are getting into territory that is way out of bounds of CM here.

Precision marksmanship is the way to go when clearing a room when following a breaching charge or flashbang. Its required to clear confined spaces when the possible presence of friendlies exists. Its even a good way to go in a more open environment when the opportunity exists. But when the bad guys are firing machineguns and RPGs at you, that is steadily deteriorating your cover, you just aren't going to be able to take that 2-3 seconds required to acquire a target in your optical sights, check your breathing and squeeze. That's when you go to the hard sights on top of your optics and hope for the best, with a relative decrease in your marksmanship. The key here is the hostile fire coming back at you. No amount of conditioning, practice, or training can alleviate the physiological changes your body undergoes when confronted with that much threat/adrenaline.

Once again, not disparaging the SOF community, just trying to paint a picture behind the snazzy press releases and Hollywood shootout glamour. Training and experience will give you the ability to react quicker, more efficiently, and more calmly than your average person. High physical conditioning will bring you a lot of advantages as well. But is a SEAL really going to be that much better at scaling a mountainside in eastern Afghanistan than an Afghan? NO. Anyone who has operated with the Afghans will agree with that simple answer. So the physical will only take you so far.

The real discriminator is heart and motivation. Which a lot of SOF personnel have in spades. Unfortunately, I believe, due mostly to the hype behind their organizations and their willingness to embrace it, they become victims of their own confidence. The SEALs are particularly bad at falling to this mindset. The first indicator is the amount of reading material, movies, documentaries, etc that is available that is either written by, with, or with the cooperation of former/current SEALs. I can think of two prominent books about SFOD - one on its history pre 911 and one on leadership written for the business community by a former commander. I don't think anyone could accurately argue that the SEALs are executing more high profile missions than SFOD relative to size (the SEALs are a bigger organization overall). What explains all of that press vs quiet professionalism except perhaps a chest beating mentality and a lack of discipline? I don't know, it all falls in the category of things that make you go hmmm.

The SEALs have a reputation within the community of being rather "risk assessment" averse, which is validated by their history. SEAL team drowns off Grenada in 1983 due to rough seas. SEAL team becomes mass casualty event when they try to assault across a tarmac against automatic weapons in Panama, 1989. There are a few examples in GWOT (mostly in Afghanistan where the environment was less forgiving than Iraq) of the same mentality causing them to overreach.

We could get into the debate of whether you want the type of soldier who is going to overreach in these units, but like most debates it would become circular and is really just based on personal opinion. Based on my experience servicemen will sacrifice everything for their buddies. That's very noble and deserving of all the praise and laurels we as a society can provide. But its the leadership's responsibility to make sure the sacrifices are kept to a minimum. That can be a challenge when you believe your own hype.

[Buzz]

"The key here is the hostile fire coming back at you. No amount of conditioning, practice, or training can alleviate the physiological changes your body undergoes when confronted with that much threat/adrenaline......The real discriminator is heart and motivation..... servicemen will sacrifice everything for their buddies. That's very noble and deserving of all the praise and laurels we as a society can provide. But its the leadership's responsibility to make sure the sacrifices are kept to a minimum. That can be a challenge when you believe your own hype."

Expressed very well Gunhappy42.