JonS Posted September 20, 2012 Share Posted September 20, 2012 when properly maintained That's kind of the point though, isn't it? Actually, that's only part of the point. Even a properly maintained T-II (or even a properly maintained T-I) is still a very heavy, very large thing to move about. Every tank needs regular maintance from Sherman to Tiger, if that maintance isnt done they all breakdown from normal wear and tear. I have read US reports of Shermans breaking down because of improper maintance cause blamed on crew who was in operations the entire time & never had a chance to do maintance. T-34-85s broke down in large numbers on road marches, the Shermans track shoes had a longer lifespan then the T-34-85s engine. Seriously? You're comparing maintenance of Tigers to Shermans and T-34s?That's like comparing a PIAT to a 17-pr (or an MTB to a BB, or a ME-109 to an ME-262). Yes; they're both anti-tank weapons (or warships, or fighter a/c), but in this case the differences are more important than the similarities. tl;dr: my skateboard will break down if I don't maintain it. So what? 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
PzKpfw 1 Posted September 20, 2012 Share Posted September 20, 2012 That's kind of the point though, isn't it? Actually, that's only part of the point. Even a properly maintained T-II (or even a properly maintained T-I) is still a very heavy, very large thing to move about. Seriously? You're comparing maintenance of Tigers to Shermans and T-34s?That's like comparing a PIAT to a 17-pr (or an MTB to a BB, or a ME-109 to an ME-262). Yes; they're both anti-tank weapons (or warships, or fighter a/c), but in this case the differences are more important than the similarities. tl;dr: my skateboard will break down if I don't maintain it. So what? Jon i'm saying that all AFVs need routine maintance to stay running, if that maintance is kept the AFV keeps running. Ie, can you tell me what part of an Tiger Es regular crew maintance was more a work load then say the crew of a Shermans, oil, gas, track, wps maintance, that took so much longer, then Allied tanks crew maintance, i'll be happy to look at it, as i have looked into trying to find daily maintance routines on all WW2 tanks, so far i have squat other then FMs that dont reflect actual practices in the field. I want to know why, an Tiger would be down longer on reg maint thats it. So far all i have is ppl telling me they;d be down longer or implying they could not be maintained operationaly etc, Regards, John Waters . 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JonS Posted September 20, 2012 Share Posted September 20, 2012 can you tell me what part of an Tiger Es regular crew maintance was more a work load then say the crew of a Shermans, oil, gas, track, wps maintance, what? that took much longer then Allied tanks. Sure: The part where they have to try and find some fuel. And some oil. And some grease. And some spare parts. Oh; and some tools. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
PzKpfw 1 Posted September 20, 2012 Share Posted September 20, 2012 Sure: The part where they have to try and find some fuel. And some oil. And some grease. And some spare parts. Oh; and some tools. Ahh ok thx Jon exactly what i thought you'd say . Regards, John Waters 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JasonC Posted September 20, 2012 Share Posted September 20, 2012 Pz I - working out the bugs in the *motor* does not equal drive train becomes mechanically reliable. It never really did for the II, in my estimation. As for again citing theater wide operational figures, um, we've all read Jentz, it isn't an accomplishment and doesn't settle anything. As I mentioned, theater wide readiness figures don't tell you whether they have 80% runners because no units are engaged or despite their being so. For that you have to go down to the unit level and ask what happens to runners when they are actually committed to combat. And then what one sees is that runners drop to 25% of strength within about 4 days. If the unit, now having the bulk of its strength in the shops, is in addition not in heavy action, but is in the line, then you see runners stabilize around 50% of strength, as some come out of those shops daily to replace those going into it. But again, only when not in heavy action, does the readiness figure for a Tiger battalion with actual frontage and actually engaged, stay even at 50%. Put them in heavy action or move the front on them, and it falls off again steeply, just like the initial commitment periods. For example, 102SS in Normandy records only 3 TWOs clear to the end of July. But 2 days after actually entering combat its operational rate went from near perfect (for those arrived) to 40%, and 4 days in to 30%. This was with most of a company still out of the calculations as still on trains. Its typical actual field strength when in serious action was 30% of the tanks on strength, and when the front went quiet it recovered to 50% of tanks on strength in about a week. 101SS goes from 82% runners before going into action to 25% of original strength, 30% of remaining strength, after 4 days in action. On two later occasions of heavy action its runners fell to 0 and 1 tank respectively. 503 goes to 9 runners the evening of its 2nd day in action. After a week of refit and a change of sector it is back up to 50% runners - then it fights for real again and that falls to 30%. You can get 80% theater wide figures even when that is the reality at the unit level, if you just have another company of newer IIs arriving and not in action, and then another battalion still on trains, and another one reforming to take replacements, etc. All the inactive units and portions left out of battle show 80-90% readiness, but it doesn't mean that a Tiger battalion in the front line can actually field 36 to 40 Tigers every day. You just don't find that. Only at the moment of first commitment, and only for a day or two tops. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JonS Posted September 20, 2012 Share Posted September 20, 2012 Ahh ok thx Jon exactly what i thought you'd say . That's just off the top of my head Aside from that, which is easier and cheaper to maintain: a Toyota Camry, or a Porsche 959? Why? 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
sburke Posted September 20, 2012 Share Posted September 20, 2012 That's just off the top of my head Aside from that, which is easier and cheaper to maintain: a Toyota Camry, or a Porsche 959? Why? A Porsche 959 - because if you can afford one, you can afford to have your butler take it to the shop and you can probably right it off as a company expense. The person who has the Camry has to pay for it themselves and take the day off, which they probably can't afford.... See I am learning from watching the campaigns. Spin baby. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
PzKpfw 1 Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 The text Jason posted on Stavelot actualy covers two battles, from what i can tell concering Kampgruppe Knittel, & Kampfgruppe Piper. Knittle was attempting to retake Stavelot elements of Jurgen Wessels 1st. co. s.SS.501 drove into the villageand ran into elements of the 30th ID. 3 Tiger II, with Wessel's 105 in the lead. 105 took a rifle grenade to the mantlet, Wessel ordered his driver to reverse down the narrow street, and he did smashing right through a building burying the tank and forceing Wessel to abandon 105. (Wessel had served with Wittman in the east & west). The remaining 2 Tiger II, 131 & 133 moved West to join Kg Knittle. Then moved to Trois Ponts to cover Kg. Knittle. 133 was disabled in the middle of the narrow lane on 22.12.44 by US AT gun, supporting Knittles failed attack on Stavelot. Kg. Piper had 6 Tiger II of which gave the US 3rd Armored Division a hard time trying to recapture La Gleize and eliminate German positions north of the Ambleve river. Only 2 of the 6 Tiger II were able to ford the Ambleve river, & get to Wanne. 4 Tiger II were lost to AT guns, mines, and no fuel. The 2 Tiger II moved to Ligneuville. (one of these was 222, prolly the most famous/photographed Tiger II in the Ardennes). 1, Tiger II participated on the attack on Stavelot on 19.12.44 attacking with several PzKpfw IV towards the entrance to Stavelot across the bridge. The attack failed, and the tanks withdrew towards Wanne, the US troops blew the bridge an hour later. The only air attack i can find on s.SS.501 Tiger IIs was when parts of Mobius's 2nd Co was on 18.12.44 when a few Tiger II carrying Fallschrimjager from FJR 9 were strafed, no damage was done to the Tiger II's but their Fallschrimjager passengers suffered casualties. Regards, John Waters 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
PzKpfw 1 Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 Concerning 503 what 2 days are you refering to in Normandy?. 503's first combat was on 11.07.44 23 Tiger operational 3rd Co destroyed 12 Shermans, and captured 2 in a counterattack from COUBERVILLE to COLOMBELLES. one of the Shermans was used as a recovery vehichle. 13.07.44 - 32 Tiger operational. 16.07.44 - 40 operational. 17.07.44 - 39 operational. 18.07.44 - 32 operational. (Goodwood). Ater this operational stays at 20 tanks while 2nd Co refits with Tiger II @ Mailly Le Camp. Until it drops to 14 operational on 28.07.44. 29.07.44 - 15 operational. 01.08.44 - 13 operational. According to 503's war diary 'operational' means 'battle ready'. Regards, John Waters 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
LukeFF Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 One of the reasons Chris Wilbeck points to in Sledgehammers (a very good read BTW) for the large number of Tigers abandoned is that the Germans never designed an adequate recovery vehicle for it. Using another Tiger to tow a disabled Tiger was (officially) prohibited, due to the high chance that you'd end up with 2 disabled Tigers. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
winkelried Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 I think that we need understand at several different effects here: 1. We have two different sets of figures. On one hand the %-age of available tanks in combat ready condition. On the other hand absolute figures of tanks in this condition. Where the first figure gives us an indidcation of the quality of the vehicle AND the logistics chain the scond figure is of no use in a reliability discussion as long as the total number of vehicles are missing. AND the number of available vehicles can drop with total losses and returns to the factory (e.g. The 20 running tanks mentioned above could yield a very high availability %-age if the unit had just - for an example - 24 vehicles available) 2. The only figure which would give s a real insight into the battlefield reliability is the mean time between failure MTBF. In all figures we were looking at till now we are looking at a combined figure which is influenced by the mean time to repair MTTR. So e.g. missing spare parts would yield a lower number of available vehicles although we could not deduce the MTBF. 3. Then we have the fact that reserves and unit rotation adds a frther layer of opacity. Units were not always in battle. Often there was a lull where they would be able to refit. Interestingly enough i have seen extremely low readiness with units that were rotated out - probably the took everything into repair and would even do some maintenance. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JonS Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 Concerning 503 what 2 days are you refering to in Normandy? Figures from Zetterling (who in turn references Pz.Gr.West Ia Nr. 479/44 geheim von 18.7.44, Nachtrag zur Tagesmeldung 17.7.44, BA-MA RH 21-5/50 and OB West Ia Nr. 5814/44 g.Kdos, 19.7.44, T78, R313, F6265849) 16 July : 40 operational 17 July : 39 operational, 1 short term repair, 5 long term repair. 18 July : 9 operational 25 July : 20 operational, 8 short term repair 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
winkelried Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 Figures from Zetterling (who in turn references Pz.Gr.West Ia Nr. 479/44 geheim von 18.7.44, Nachtrag zur Tagesmeldung 17.7.44, BA-MA RH 21-5/50 and OB West Ia Nr. 5814/44 g.Kdos, 19.7.44, T78, R313, F6265849) 16 July : 40 operational 17 July : 39 operational, 1 short term repair, 5 long term repair. 18 July : 9 operational 25 July : 20 operational, 8 short term repair any indications on LTR and STR for 16 and 18? 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JonS Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 No, they're just noted as '?'. Same for LTR on the 25th. Working backwards, though, presumably there were at least 19 in LTR and STR on the 18th ([20+8]-9= 19). And, presumably, 5 in LTR or STR on the 16th. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
PzKpfw 1 Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 Figures from Zetterling (who in turn references Pz.Gr.West Ia Nr. 479/44 geheim von 18.7.44, Nachtrag zur Tagesmeldung 17.7.44, BA-MA RH 21-5/50 and OB West Ia Nr. 5814/44 g.Kdos, 19.7.44, T78, R313, F6265849) 16 July : 40 operational 17 July : 39 operational, 1 short term repair, 5 long term repair. 18 July : 9 operational 25 July : 20 operational, 8 short term repair Intersting as the WD on 18.07.44 shows 13 Tiger lost, 32 operational. On 01.08.44 it shows 29, Tiger in inventory, with 20 Tiger operational, & attched to the 21st Panzerdivision. With 3 Tiger in LTM. Unfoutenently 503's tank loss tabels are incomplete for July as the list inventory, loss, cause of loss, and how many tanks are in STM/LTM etc. In all of July 44 their are 0 entry' on any tanks in LTR, even the usual workshop returns are absent. The loss tabels only have 2 entries in July, 06.07.44 & 18.07.44 Regards, John Waters 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JasonC Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 Pz I - I notice that your readiness numbers for 503 conveniently skip from right before Goodwood to 28 July. But they reported 9 runners left on the evening of the 18th, down from 39 at dawn on the 17th. Then the later figures of 20 runners at the end of the month, 10 days later, are after they take delivery of 14 new Tiger IIs, but which are in the rear not at the front. They undoubtedly recovered from the 9 runner low after a day of heavy combat, but had nothing like 80-90% readiness at any time thereafter, of tanks actually in action in the field (as opposed to still arriving at rear area depots, but on the unit's listed strength). 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JasonC Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 Winklereid - "Interestingly enough i have seen extremely low readiness with units that were rotated out - probably the took everything into repair" Or were taken out of the line because that was the state of the tanks. I don't disagree with your comments, the context of mine was that you cannot look at a theater wide readiness count and conclude that portion of tanks *in action* are really available, and especially cannot conclude that similar numbers for two classes of vehicles, used very differently, imply equal reliability in the field. The sign of a low reliability tank is never that it show 20% theater wide readiness. They won't use a tank that unreliable that "hard". It shows as a high "decay rate" in action, back into the repair categories. But subunits will be held out of action to compensate, because the operators of the unit require something in action. Runners in action divided by tanks on strength would be the correct figure, for a unit or theater wide. But this requires tracking the "in action" part, and a tank just being in running status does not tell you that. A tank can be in running status 200 miles behind the front where it just got off the trains from the factories - but those won't keep the tanks actually in action, in action longer. If anyone wants to argue the opposite position, what they need to find and show is a unit of heavy tanks committed to actual combat, therefore with accompanying tactical reports of their use and effect, that continue to show a high portion of the tank count in the "running" category and engaged, days into the action. And I've looked, and it just doesn't happen with the heavies. The runner count drops off a cliff the moment they are committed - 2-4 days - and if they are lucky climbs back to half if the front gets quieter. Tanks do a lot of their work after that point, don't get me wrong. The servicers milk a lot of effort out of them, and cycle tanks out of the shops as others go into it. The commanders limit effort to what the unit can sustain, plus a little, and as a result the unit evaporates much more slowly when it has a large stock in the repair categories. It is balancing two rates at that point, not radioactive decay. Also, much of that cycling into repair is enemy action, not just mechanical issues. But both matter and they compound each other. Nothing forces a tank to be pushed to its mechanical limits like actual combat use. It is the acid test. We know from the low rates of TWOs that mechanical issues are a more important portion of the total for the heavies than for typical medium tanks (though some of that reflects greater effort and unwillingness to write off a more expensive asset, much of it reflects heavy tanks in repair being more likely to have broken themselves than to have been broken directly by the enemy). Anyway... 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
PzKpfw 1 Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 Pz I - I notice that your readiness numbers for 503 conveniently skip from right before Goodwood to 28 July. But they reported 9 runners left on the evening of the 18th, down from 39 at dawn on the 17th. Then the later figures of 20 runners at the end of the month, 10 days later, are after they take delivery of 14 new Tiger IIs, but which are in the rear not at the front. They undoubtedly recovered from the 9 runner low after a day of heavy combat, but had nothing like 80-90% readiness at any time thereafter, of tanks actually in action in the field (as opposed to still arriving at rear area depots, but on the unit's listed strength). Realy Jason? you may want to go back to page 6, and read what i posted from 503's war diary. And Jason yesterday you posted 503 had "3" runners. after 2 days. As we see that was not accurate either. 503 had 32 Tiger on 18.07.44 by 20.07.44 it drops to 29 Tiger in inventory, it remains 29 in inventory until 01.08.44 the only thing that changes is the operational #, which holds at 20 until 28.07.44 When operational drops to 14, then 15, 'runners' on 29.07.44, then 13, 01.08.44. It wasn't 20 it was 13, that was my mistake, i tried to edit it but was to late. Regards, John Watres 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ArgusEye Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 Comparing Tigers to other tanks' running numbers doesn't make a lot of sense anyway. Tigers were breakthrough tanks par excellence, and were meant to be stuck in the heart of the fighting. If they weren't getting beat up, they weren't being used. A Tiger wasn't just another type of tank doing tank business. There were StuGs supporting infantry, tanks to thrust through the weak points in the enemy lines, and the Tigers for when you were all out of weak points. And they were pretty good at it. Of course, this is all in principle. Application of the above principles was long gone when the Tiger B showed up. There were no longer integrated command structures making such task definitions possible, and the initiative needed was lost forever. Instead of being the tool for the short hard fights, they ended up being the only thing to throw against the enemy initiatives. A task they were singularly unsuited for. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
winkelried Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 I don't disagree with your comments, the context of mine was that you cannot look at a theater wide readiness count and conclude that portion of tanks *in action* are really available, and especially cannot conclude that similar numbers for two classes of vehicles, used very differently, imply equal reliability in the field. Fully agree with this one. That's why i tried to give the problem a structure. looking at your argumentation i think there is a fourth point to add: 4. we need to analyse the cause for a total loss or a tank going into repair: was it battle damage (inflicted by the enemy) or technical (mechanical) failure (inflicted through abuse or complex technology). 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
c3k Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 Germans never did master the art of using tank-carriers to avoid wear and tear. They DID use rail transport for theater-wide movement, but anything else meant the tank had to drive there. That's a LOT of wear and tear on complex machinery which was pushing the envelope for the period. The drop-out rate on road marches was horrendous by modern standards. The lack of spares did not help. The above is meant to show how non-combat losses could be significant. (The Panther Brigade(s) march to Kursk is an extreme example. But all German tanks, even PzIV's and III's suffered from this deficit.) 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
John Kettler Posted September 21, 2012 Share Posted September 21, 2012 c3k, And how! Many here will find Guderian's PANZER LEADER to be quite informative on this matter, even when most of the force was Panzer Is and IIs, and it was peaceful (the Anschluss). I could hardly believe what I was reading about the disintegration of the Panzer force on what was basically an administrative move, not an armored assault. As for tank retrievers, I believe the Germans had them in the Panzer Werkstatt Kompanien (Panzer Workshop Companies), but had nowhere nearly enough to actually move armor in any strength at all. For that matter, neither did we that I know of. Our tank retrievers retrieved tanks, hauled M-Boats for Patton's Navy unit (Boat Two) and were pressed into service carrying giant loads of ammunition to the front. I can't think of a single instance in which armor formations were moved long distances operationally by them in support of combat action. Regards, John Kettler 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
PzKpfw 1 Posted September 22, 2012 Share Posted September 22, 2012 Germans never did master the art of using tank-carriers to avoid wear and tear. They DID use rail transport for theater-wide movement, but anything else meant the tank had to drive there. That's a LOT of wear and tear on complex machinery which was pushing the envelope for the period. The drop-out rate on road marches was horrendous by modern standards. The lack of spares did not help. The above is meant to show how non-combat losses could be significant. (The Panther Brigade(s) march to Kursk is an extreme example. But all German tanks, even PzIV's and III's suffered from this deficit.) Soviets had the same problem, i read of a T-34-76 Brigada that drove 300km, and got chewed out that they should have waited for rail transport, reason given was excessive wear on the tracks, and using something like half the tracks life, on a needless road march. It was a priority for T-34-85 to use rail transport on medium to long range deployments cause of its engine problems. Regards, John Waters 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
winkelried Posted September 22, 2012 Share Posted September 22, 2012 I can't think of a single instance in which armor formations were moved long distances operationally by them in support of combat action. even during the cold war we didn't have enough of those in a lots of armies in Europe. Rail and road movement was the normal case. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
winkelried Posted September 22, 2012 Share Posted September 22, 2012 worked a bit on loss causes and found this (maybe somebody can fill in the missing bits - or provide an example for the western front): schwere Panzerabteilung 503 Oct 44 to May 45 on the Eastern Front: initial strength 50 Tiger II, lost 50, replacements 2, returns to factory 2 losses: 1 technical defect (burned out) 9 enemy action 16 blown up by own troops (12 in April 45 alone due to missing spare parts) 8 lost when maintenance company was overrun 12 blown up at capitulation 4 unaccounted for. during this the unit claimed to have destroyed 1'700 vehicles. does anybody have indications on readiness during the same period? 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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