King Tiger

[Fenris]

Slightly OT but stumbled across this film the other day... What struck me was the hugeness of the Jagd Tigers. I mean I knew they were big but seeing them with with the crew on them puts it in perspective...

-F

[Vark]

So the Russians use all means available to recover Is II's, but crew them with people who bail after a shot is fired at them? Or, does it mean that they bail after the first hit?

Fenris, what struck me about that clip, was the speed they got up to, always thought they were ponderous beasties.

[ArgusEye]

Since we're talking about Tigers and Stalins,

From Thomas L. Jentz’s Panzertruppen Vol. 2

P216

The September 1944 issue of the Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen included a report from a Tiger-Kompanie that knocked out numerous Josef Stalin tanks in a short period:

. . . . The Kompanie commander made the following observations that were derived from their experience in fighting Josef Stalin tanks:

1. When a Tiger appears, most Josef Stalin tanks turn away and attempt to avoid a firefight.

2. In many cases, the Josef Stalin tanks let themselves engage in a firefight only at long range (over 2000 meters) and also only when they themselves are in favorable positions on the edge of a woods, village, or ridge line.

[...]

That Jentz character needs to look at his translations. There are some details that irk me. The original text of the list from the NBdPzT goes:

1. Bereits beim Erscheinen der "Tiger" drehen die meisten "Josef Stalin" ab und versuchen sich den Feuerkampf zu entziehen.

2. Die "Josef Stalin" lassen sich in vielen Fällen nur auf einen Feuerkampf auf größere Entfernungen (über 2000 m) ein und auch nur dann, wenn sie selbst in Randstellung stehen.

3. Die feindlichen Besatzungen neigen dazu, sofort beim ersten Beschuß auszubooten.

4. Die Sowjets sind bestrebt, gerade den "Josef Stalin" auf keinen Fall in unsere Hände fallen zu lassen und versuchen mit allen Mitteln, den Panzer abzuschleppen oder zu sprengen.

5. Auch der "Josef Stalin" läßt sich abschießen, wenn auch ein Durchschuß frontail auf weitere Entfernungen nicht so ohne weiteres zu erzielen ist (eine andere "Tiger"-Abteilung meldet aus dem Osten, daß die "Josef Stalin" frontal nur auf Entfernung unter 500m vom "Tiger" durchslagen werden können).

6. Es ist anzustreben, den "Josef Stalin" in der Flanke bzw. im Rücken zu fassen und im zusammengefaßten Feuer zu vernichten.

7. Weiterhin darf der Feuerkampf gegen "Josef Stalin" nicht unter Zugstärke aufgenommen werden. Einsatz einzelner "Tiger" bedeutet ihren Verlust.

8. Es hat sich als zweckmäßig erwiesen, nach Erzielen des ersten Treffers den "Josef Stalin" durch Beschuß mit Sprenggranaten zu blenden.

Which actually translates to:

1. Already at the first appearance of the "Tigers", most of the "Josef Stalins" turn away and try to extract themselves from the firefight.

2. The "Josef Stalins" allow a firefight in many cases only at longer distances (over 2000m), and also only when they themselves are in hull down positions.

3. The enemy crews are inclined to bail out immediately at the first shot being fired.

4. The Soviets strive that precisely the "Josef Stalin" in no event be allowed to fall in our hands, and try with all means to tow the tank away or to blow it up.

5. Also the "Josef Stalin" allows for itself to be shot off, even though frontal penetration at greater ranges is not achieved offhand (another "Tiger"-Abteilung reports from the East, that the "Josef Stalin" can only be penetrated frontally from ranges below 500m by the "Tiger").

6. It is worth to strive to take the "Josef Stalin" in the flank or the back, and to destroy it in interlocking [cross]fire.

7. Furthermore is the firefight against "Josef Stalins" not to be allowed to be engaged in below Zug strength. Application of single "Tigers" means their loss.

8. It has proven effective to blind the "Josef Stalin" through bombardment with high explosive projectiles after the first hit.

Details, I grant you, but one is a grog or one is not.

[ArgusEye]

The American's ace up the sleeve' was thier tank chemical smoke shell. The Germans really really didn't like American smoke. At the least it was a mere annoyance, at most it could make the interior of a tank virtually uninhabitable, especially if the engine was running and drawing in air. This was only of utility if the opponent was within smoke shell range, it wasn't much use when the Tiger was out beyond 2000m. There are reports of tankers, by late war, keeping an all-purpose smoke round 'up the spout' and of ready racks being 1/3rd smoke rounds - hard as that may be to believe.

Given the rather well-designed anti-chemical-warfare filter systems on the Tigers I and II this is rather surprising.

[Vanir Ausf B]

1. When a Tiger appears, most Josef Stalin tanks turn away and attempt to avoid a firefight.

So CMBB had it right after all. Damn. I was looking forward to the East Front game.

3. The enemy crews lean toward evacuating their tank immediately after the first shot is fired at them.

[ArgusEye]

Bear in mind that this is from a German tank corps newsletter, and might be a bit on the encouraging propagandistic side.

[PzKpfw 1]

Argus:

As to the grog refrence i'm kinda stumped that you dont seem to know who this Jentz character is 8P.

As to the translation, i understand why he did it the way he did, your translation has words in context that we would never use them in ie, 'strive', 'precisely' etc. while Jentz's text takes nothing away from the original text, and makes it easier to understand for english readers.

Regards, John Waters

[MikeyD]

Or, does it mean that they bail after the first hit?

I've heard of Churchill crews doing the same, Sherman crews, even Merkava crews! I suppose all you need to do is help pull the charred remains of one crewmember out of a brewed-up vehicle and you tend to be a bit jumpy after that.

[ArgusEye]

From what I've been able to find, it was also doctrine for Stug crews to bail immediately upon getting hit with something that looked like it might be able to penetrate. The rationale seems to be that spotting, aiming and killing an opponent who has you ranged and in the crosshairs was going to take too long, and crews are worth more than a chance to keep the machine. I'm sure it wasn't any different for tanks.

Add to this that the escapability of the IS2 had a very bad reputation with its crew due to stiff locking levers and ill-fitting hatches that tended to seize shut when shocked, and you can see why they would be quick to bail.

PzKpfw 1, I do know of the works of mr. Jentz, but I could not hold back some disdain upon this translation work. He went out of his way to turn Randstellung into something else than "hull-down", for instance. When inferring meaning from foreign sources, it is important to stay as close as possible to the original, lest artefacts of translation creep into the statement. Another is the original expressing that one should switch to HE after the *first* hit, not the *first few*.

If I came across as ignorant of mr. Jentz' work, I plead incapability to express myself in English. It isn't my mother tongue.

[Vanir Ausf B]

To most grogs casting aspersions towards Jentz is akin to cursing God.

[JasonC]

I rather agree with Andrew H - the King Tiger simply never was that effective a weapon system in the field, quite unlike the Tiger I. And no, it wasn't simply facing better late war opponents. The weight of the tank made routes for it problematic and the drive train was rubbish. They M-killed themselves in about 80 miles, often as not.

As for how the US dealt with them in the bulge, here is how it went at Stavelot, where the US 30th infantry division shut the door behind Peiper, despite a company of King Tigers being there - with infantry - to hold said door open. Didn't work out that way, and here is the bill of particulars as to how the 30th did it.

(Stavelot, 30th ID attack that cut the road behind Peiper)

"On the slope north of the town a platoon of 3-inch towed tank destroyers from the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion made good use of positions above the Germans to knock out a brace of Mark VI tanks... (Apparently this was 1 platoon of 4 KTs)"

That is, 4 3 inch towed ATGs, firing from cover and high ground, knocked out a whole platoon of KTs with flank shots, without any loss to themselves.

Then "ten hostile tanks, returning in haste from Trois Ponts, counterattacked."

(Evidently the rest of the KT company)

But "Before the German tanks could make headway, planes from the 365th Fighter Group, reinforced by the 390th Squadron (366th) and the 506th Squadron (404th), plunged in, crippled a few enemy vehicles, and drove the balance to cover...

(That is one answer to 10 KTs - 60 fighter bombers in half an hour. It won't kill them, though it did apparently immobilize or cause abandonment of a few, probably from bomb near misses or "jabo panic". But it sure convinced them to desist and get the heck out of Dodge City).

Then the next day it was artillery used to remove combined arms, stripping the tanks -

"Twice during the afternoon tank-led formations drove toward the town, but both times the American gunners dispersed the field gray infantry and the tanks decided not to chance the assault alone. It is not surprising that the German infantry gave over the field. The 118th cannoneers fired 3,000 shells into the assault waves..."

And by the end of that second day, with the US still in possession of the town -

"attached engineers had dynamited the Amblève bridge across which Peiper’s force had rolled west".

ATGs from ambush while they aren't looking; assymmetric HE war retaliation, from the air and from "surge" firing rates by field artillery, busted combined arms - all forced the KTs to stay clear of the US positions and make remarkably little trouble. Then a bit of explosive ensured even if they did get the place back (they didn't), it still wouldn't get fuel up to the spearhead.

That spearhead had the bridges blown in front of it, others wouldn't carry Panthers let alone KTs, had narrow, sunken roads blocked by lead Panthers KOed by tanks and ATGs sited to hit their flanks (at road bends etc), along with mines. The German heavies could "stopper" roads into their own position for a while, but the infantry net tightened around them through the woods, arty dropped on them constantly, supplemented by fighter bombers when the weather permitted, they clearly couldn't get anywhere and were soon dry of gas in any event.

Uberweapon, meet terrain. Lack of mobility is a much more important issue in a tank than tactical wargames make it seem, and the mobility doesn't just mean "able to roll 15 mph on a nice dry road". It means able to sustain operational movement and maneuver on a battlefield the enemy actively shapes and channels to M-kill your heavies.

[c3k]

"On the slope north of the town a platoon of 3-inch towed tank destroyers from the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion made good use of positions above the Germans to knock out a brace of Mark VI tanks... (Apparently this was 1 platoon of 4 KTs)"

FWIW, a "brace" of anything is precisely two.

[PzKpfw 1]

Well concerning mobility, here are we discussing it, or mechanichal reliability?, as the Tiger E, and Tiger II?. Mobility to me, means the tanks ability to cross terrain, overcome obstacles etc. In mobility the Tiger E and Tiger II were better then most German and OPFOR tanks in WW2. Their are numerous Allied reports on Tigers crossing bad terrain ie, mud & snow where Shermans etc, bogged down trying to follow.

Once the drive train problems were overcome and trained drivers Tiger II operational readiness increased to comparible rates with German tanks ie, German operational % returns show:*

31.05.44: Eastren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 84

PzKpfw V - 77

PzKpfw VI - 79

Westren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 88

PzKpfw V - 80

PzKpfw VI - 87

15.09.44: Eastren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 65

PzKpfw V - 72

PzKpfw VI - 70

Westren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 80

PzKpfw V - 74

PzKpfw VI - 98

30.09.44: Eastren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 65

PzKpfw V - 60

PzKpfw VI - 81

Westren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 50

PzKpvw V - 57

PzKpfw VI - 67

31.10.44: Eastren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 52

PzKpfw V - 53

PzKpfw VI - 54

Westren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 74

PzKpfw V - 85

PzKpfw VI - 88

15.11.44: Eastren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 72

PzKpfw V - 66

PzKpfw VI - 61

Westren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 78

PzKpfw V - 71

PzKpfw VI - 81

30.11.44: Eastren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 78

PzKpfw V - 67

PzKpfw IV - 72

Westren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 76

PzKpfw V - 71

PzKpfw VI - 45

15.12.44: Eastren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 79

PzKpfw V - 69

PzKpfw VI - 79

Westren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 78

PzKpfw V - 71

PzKpfw VI - 64

30.12.44: Eastren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 72

PzKpfw V - 61

PzKpfw VI - 80

Westren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 63

PzKpfw V - 53

PzKpfw VI - 50

15.01.45: Eastren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 71

PzKpfw V - 60

PzKpfw VI - 73

Westren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 56

PzKpfw V - 45

PzKpfw VI - 58

15.03.45: Eastren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 54

PzKpfw V - 49

PzKpfw VI - 53

Westren Front:

PzKpfw IV - 44

PzKpfw V - 32

PzKpfw VI - 36

Again this is tank by types operational % not total front totals of all tanks.

Once the problems with the Tiger E & Tiger B were worked out both maintained comparible operational rates to other German tanks as seen above. Also when proper maintance was done Tigers operated with very few breakdowns etc as evidenced by the Tiger ABT war diaries. Also i would add very few german HQs the Tiger Abt were assighned to understood how to correctly deploy or use Tigers. The war diaries are full of missuse by the higher ups along with objections to employments by Abt Cos that were ignored and cost Tigers and crews throgh impropper employment. As well as refusals to allow proper maintance stops, which caused more Tiger losses. When properly maintained & employed Tigers were a very effective force on the battlefield.

*See: Jentz Thomas L. Germany's Tiger Tanks. pp. 11-12.

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

Understood Argus i gathered english wasnt your 1st language. Hence my reply on Jentz's translation context. I use a German translator for German reports myself and have a habit of changeing some words the translator shows to words in english that more readily fit to our language so i do change them, although never hull only contextual if im useing the right word on how i change them for myself here.

Have you considered contacting Jentz? with your concerns he may have an explanation. Could be an edditing mistake to that wasnt caught in the proof reading, it covers 10 years of research in the 2 volumes.

Regards, John Waters

[ArgusEye]

I might contact the man, even if only to see how he treats remarks like this. For some reason I assumed he was beyond contacting. Thank you for the suggestion.

As to your list in your penultimate post: are those figures of 'runners' on the entire front?

[PzKpfw 1]

I might contact the man, even if only to see how he treats remarks like this. For some reason I assumed he was beyond contacting. Thank you for the suggestion.

As to your list in your penultimate post: are those figures of 'runners' on the entire front?

I'm not sure i seem to recall we had an email addy on him years ago but if i did its gone with everything else on my old HD years ago. Lost a lot of data in that crash 8(. The data is for operational percentage of tank returns, or runners as you refer to them for both fronts. Reminds me must cite that post.

Regards, John Waters

[ArgusEye]

If you can find the address, I'd love it if you could PM me.

Nice info on the runner numbers, by the way.

[TrailApe]

I think the point to remember is that the Western Allies didn't really bother to go mano a mano against the Tiger II's they just hit them with every weapon they had in the armoury and overan them. 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion turned up in Normandy, and whilst they did cause local problems, overall they did not effect the outcome by any appreciable amount. Some got mangled by heavy bombers, one got trapped in a shell hole, and one was rammed by a Sherman.

WARNING - WIKI QUOTES

"With the Invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, the 503rd was transferred to the command of Panzergruppe West. The first company was equipped with 12 Tiger II tanks. It was the first Pz.Komp to be equipped entirely with the Tiger II. The detachment fought well in combat against Allied tank forces during the battles around Caen. On the launch of Operation Goodwood, the 3rd company, which was based in Cagny, was caught in the preliminary bombing raids and completely wiped out, with bomb impacts powerful enough to turn even a 70-ton Tiger completely upside down. Only one Tiger was operational at the end of the day. During the first day of "Goodwood," the unit reported the loss of 13 tanks. On July 18, a remarkable incident took place when a M4 Sherman tank under the command of the Irish Guards Lieutenant Gorman rammed a Tiger II of the I/s.H.Pz.Abt 503 and disabled it.

On the next day the two remaining companies were in defensive positions around Cagny and helped to halt a British advance. The Wehrmachtsbericht reported 40 enemy tanks destroyed, many of them by the 503rd. At the end of July, the 3rd company received new Tiger II tanks. Heavy aerial attacks destroy most of the equipment of the Tiger II company. Only 2 "Kingtigers" were brought back to Germany, the tanks with turret number '314'/annelise and '323'. The 503rd, along with the Panzer-Lehr-Division's 316th Funklenk Panzer Company, were the only formations in Normandy to operate Tiger IIs. The 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion got Tiger II tanks in late August but they saw no action.

The severely depleted 503rd managed to escape the horrors of the Falaise Pocket and was engaged in a fighting withdrawal to the German border. In late August the detachment was pulled from the line for a complete refit with Tiger IIs."

So brown trouses time for the allied tankers that came up against them, but in the big picture they were not war winners by any means.

[PzKpfw 1]

The aneqdotal info from the Ardennes shows tanks being killed from amubush, hitting minefields,being bombed, hit by arty, etc in the Ardennes. I would like to see any WW2 tank Sherman, T-34-85, IS-2 M26 etc, or 'ubertank' survive in those same conditions.

The Germans were not channeled into kill zones they had no choice but to use the roads that was one of the main weaknesses of Wacht am Rhein planning and it was feared what would happen, & it did happen, being forced to take the road networks. The inability to go off road at that time of winter with the ammounts of snow in the Ardennes, would have hampered any forces ability to use 'mobility' to negotiate kill zones.

SS-Pz.Abt.501 that operated with Piepers 1st SS Pz. Div Kampfgruppe had 45 Tiger II on 15.12.44 At the end of operations on 15.01.45 had 31 Tiger II, 18 operational, and had lost 14 as total write offs from enemy fire or abandoned/unrecoverable.

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

War diary excerpts s.Pz.Abt.503 from June/August 44:*

18.07.44:

Start of Operation "Goodwood" with one of the most disasterous air-strikes by 2100 bombers. The 3rd company is hit and has one burnt out tank (unteroffizer Westerhausen) TIGER 313 (oberfeldwebel Sachs)is turned over by a close impact. Of 8 opertational tanks put into action again, only 6 manage to take defensive position near the park where several enemy tanks are congregated there. All guns lack zeroing! 2 TIGERs (Feldwebel Muller and Feldwebel Schonrock) are knocked out, presumably by friendly 8.8 cm anti-aircraft guns in position at CAGNY. The enemy is defeated completely. Afterwards only 1 TIGER of the 3rd company is still operational. By noon, the 1st company and the 1st battalion of PR 22 have several tanks operational again.They counterattack along the road TROARN - CAEN in the direction of DEMOUVILLE, but have to leave the town again. TIGERs 101 and 111 are knocked out. Company commander's tank 100 falls into a bomb crater and cannot be recovered. 2nd company, scarely hit by the bombardment, counterattacks north-west of TROARN and stops the enemy advance their.

In the late afternoon, the 1st and 2nd companies are concentrated near MANEVILLE and relocated into the area of FRENOUVILLE. They stop further enemy attacks to the south-east on road CAGNY - VIMONT. TIGER 122 collides with a SHERMAN and is knocked out afterwards. During this day the battalion knocks out 40 tanks.

*See: Schneider, Wolfgang. Tigers in combat. vol. 1 pp.164, 165.

Regards, John Waters

[JasonC]

PzI - by "mobility" I mean actual operational mobility, as in a battalion of tanks can be sent into action and left there, moving itself to fighting locations, fighting in all terrains and weathers encountered, moving with the front in either direction when the front moves, navigating all obstacles the terrain and enemy presents as well as other arms, and remaining mobile through all of the above.

I don't mean rolling down a smooth highway at 15 mph for one short road march, or crossing one field without bogging.

And the record of Tigers was very poor in this respect.

As for trying to determine such things with theater-wide operational tank counts, the drawback of that method is it assumes the beasties are actually being used in comparable ways, and they weren't. If you follow the tank readiness figures for individual battalions *in action*, not aggregates for all units anywhere *in theater*, this becomes clear. Because individual battalions are frequently holding a whole company out of action in order to have some runners the day after tomorrow, and soon have another whole company in the shops. Meanwhile some formations will be held off the line entirely, again to have anything actually ready the following week. Track a company (or less frequently, full battalion) actually committed to action and watch what happens to its runner count. They never write the things off, but they rapidly have 4 runners a day actually in the field.

Or take the case of the Tiger I battalion committed to the Anzio counterattack (the 508th). They detrained 125 miles from the front, and had to get there by road march. In Italy. In February. 60% of the tanks broke down before they made it to the front.

The underlying problem was simply the strain that the huge weight of the vehicles put on the weakest links in the drive train - putting the horsepower onto the ground and trying to do it evenly enough to not snap something in half, inside that set of mechanical linkages. No they never really solved it. Yes the best maintenance practices and lots of off-line time for it could mitigate the problem, but then there was a war on and they pretty much never got to use them that way. Despite this, the Tiger I was a highly successful combat system. There is precious little evidence the Tiger II was.

[JasonC]

As for Pz Is comments about the "unfair" conditions in the Ardennes, um, if they had tried any of it anywhere else with a better road net they never would have had any local odds or surprise and would have gone nowhere for that reason. Yes the terrain was horrible for tanks. Kind of the whole point in attacking in the sector, as the only place left thin.

Nor is this anything particular to Tigers - it is a broader point about human intelligence and combined arms mattering more than technical specs of specific weapon systems. Armies are adaptive and soldiers are intelligent, and they do not fight "fair". They exploit their long suits and avoid the other guy's trumps. A Tiger II standing on the defense on a forest road is certainly trump against any tank support to an attack up that road, and that is useful - but in a minor way. It just means infantry flanks the position through the woods, or artillery fires 3000 rounds a day, or 60 fighter bombers at a time fly over, or engineers blow a few bridges and lay a few mines.

Here is what it doesn't mean - dozens of Shermans charge a KT platoon in defilade like so many clay pigeons, with big "please shoot me" signs taped to their turrets.

[Sgt Joch]

JasonC summarizes the problem well (for the Germans that is ).

I also saw a report in Panzertruppen, vol 2. about a unit of 14 Tiger I's which drove from Rome to Anzio and back in may 1944 (about 120 km total) and lost 12 tanks to complete mechanical breakdown. That is basically one breakdown every 10 km on dry roads.

[winkelried]

the operational readiness for tiger tanks could be pretty high depending on the logistical situation. on the western from it was between 70 and 80% from June 44 to September 44. Then dropped to between 60 and 70% until it reached again 80% in the eve of the battle of the bulge. The readiness was still between 70 and 80% till January 45. it then fell to 50% in March 45.

BTW the readiness of the tiger was almost on the same level as the Panzer IV and higher than the Panzer V. (Source Jentz).

Looking at these figures readiness wasn't that bad either. The is always anecdotal evidence to show extremes. E.g. the 11. Panzer marched from Loriol to Lyon (130 kms) without loosing a single tank of those remaining after the battles at Montélimar. Although i think the maintenance companies were pretty strained at keeping the tanks rolling.

[PzKpfw 1]

The Tiger E suffered from 3 problems initialy:

-Improprely sized breaks.

-Leaking seals/gaskets

-Drive train

The drive train was made for a 40ton vehichle. the breaks, & gasket/seal problems were all fixed. *Also the 1st Tiger E produced (Fgst Nr 250001) with motor Nr 46052 was only run 25km by Henschel before going to Kummersdorf. It ran exactly 52km @ Kummersdorf before a blockage in the steering gear. 2 more motors were installed Nr 46051, Nr 46065 from July 1st - July 8th both failed, The 4th motor Nr 46066 ran from July 13 - August 3rd 1942 1046km without a breakdown, by March 31 1943 it had run 5623km, by July 31 1943 7736km. Proveing that once teething troulbles were worked out & propr maintance done The Tiger E was reliable.

Jason the % of tanks operational shows that the Tiger was on par with the PzKpfw IV and equal or better then the PzKpfw V on all fronts Abt, Co etc. In otherwords this is the percent ready for combat in those same Bns you mention.

Lets look at tank AFV strength in the west 15.12.44 - 15.01.45, compare to the West % i posted earlier. Operational AFVs in ()'s.**

15.12.44:

Stug - 598 (410)

PzKpfw - IV 503 (391)

PzKpfw V - 471 (336)

PzKpfw VI - 123 (79)

Total tank/Stug = 1,695

Total tank/Stug operational = 1,216.

30.12.44:

Stug - 676 (335)

PzKpfw IV - 550 (345)

PzKpfw V - 451 (240)

PzKpfw VI - 116 (58).

Total Tank/StuG = 1,793

Total Tank/StuG Operational = 978

15.01.44:

StuG - 716 (340)

PzKpfw IV - 594 (330)

PzKpfw V - 487 (221)

PzKpfw VI - 110 (64)

Total Tank/StuG = 1,907

Total Tank/StuG operational = 955.

s.Pz.Abt.508 & Anzio below are war diary entries:***

12.02.44 - The 1st company starts its road march to the ANZIO-NETTUNO bridgehead (mountainous terrain, serpentines). 1 tank (Feldwebel Nagel) of the Funklenk company catches fire and explodes. Some days later the battalion recieves a replacement tank.

14.02.44 - First employment of the 1st company near APRILIA. 2nd company arrives in ROME.

15.02.44 - The battlion is attached to the 26nd Panzerdivision and assembled as a second echelon formation with Panzergrenadierregiment 9.

16.02.44 - 4 tanks support, for the first time, forces near ANZIO. Due to muddy terrain. the tanks are forced to stay on the narrow roads and the attack does not reach its first objective (road no. 82).

19.02.44 - The 2nd company relocates into the area of APRILIA. Panzerkompanie (Fkl) 313 is intergrated as the 3rd company by order AHA I (2) Nr. 932/44 g.Kdos.

20.02.44 - Employment of a platoon (oberfahnrich Neuerburg, shot to death by rifle fire) near APRILIA. Schwere Panzerjagerkompanie 653 (ELEFANT) is subordinated.

21.02.44 - Oberleutnant Stein knocks out 3 SHERMANs which penetrated the front line.

22.02.44 - The attack with Fallschirmpanzerdivision HG is stopped by a heavy artillery barrage.

24.02.44 - The 3rd company destroys 17 US tanks.

28.02.44 - The 2nd company moves to the landing zone via ALBANO - ARICCIA - GENZANO - CISTERNA.

29.02.44 - Offensive against bridgehead heading for ISOLLA BELLA (4 TIGERs are knocked out, several TIGERs hit mines). Heavy artillery brings the attack to a halt. 32 tanks operational.

What are you baseing that Tiger IIs when properly maintained required any more down time then any other tank?. Every tank needs regular maintance from Sherman to Tiger, if that maintance isnt done they all breakdown from normal wear and tear. I have read US reports of Shermans breaking down because of improper maintance cause blamed on crew who was in operations the entire time & never had a chance to do maintance. T-34-85s broke down in large numbers on road marches, the Shermans track shoes had a longer lifespan then the T-34-85s engine.

Those theatre wide operational %s were exactly what was used to plan operations etc. they were complied from all Panzer Divisons strength returns on the dates listed. I can also break them down to PR, Abt etc.

I never said 'unfair' those are your words, re-read what i posted improper deployment in not understanding how to employ a Tiger Abt. & no ones arguing the road stoppage etc, of course a tank can be flanked especialy in the Ardennes and isolated tanks with thin Inf screens. Concerning the Ardennes offensive as a whole it was a mistake, with no realistic chances of success anyway. The other choice was use the forces for an assault in the east,which was not going to succeed their either, they just would have had better terrain to operate in.

Yes the Tiger E was a succesful tank only after its teething problems were fixed, same goes for the Panther, and in the end The Tiger IIs problems were worked out as well, but it was never in service as long as the Tiger E either. Then their are crew reports on the Tiger II that praise its mobility, protection & firepower etc. All in all it was a success, as no tank was going to turn the tide anyway.

*See: Jentz Tom, Doyle Hillary, Sarson Peter. TIGER I, Heavy Tank 1942 - 1945. p.18

**See Jentz Thomas L. Panzer Truppen. p.202.

***See: Schneider Wolfgang. Tigers In Combat vol 1. p.375

Regards, John Waters