FancyCat

Pro-Russians are claiming something was destroyed, and unless info or footage leaks, I doubt we will know for a good while whether this was successful or not. Honestly I expect Russian strategy to keep focus on hitting civilian and infrastructure as part of a strategy and if Russia wants to hit Ukrainian supply lines, I figure they need to clear AD as much as possible as well.

Seeking to take out AD is probably a decent strategy to be fair.

I think it's going for the Patriot batteries. A huge propaganda win is taking them out. Inversely, I wonder how much info NATO is gonna get from this.

Is this not common in the past too? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forty-Eighters

Khmelnytskyi, i saw a poster state that the attack came from Moldova airspace? Anyone have info about that? Was it merely a flyover by Russians over the country or perhaps from Transnistria launch?

Someone on twitter pointed out Wagner has explicit interest in showing MoD failures, whether or not they are true, Rybar is affiliated with Wagner no? Remember that as RU mil bloggers complain about the retreats.

or just propaganda video purposes?

I don’t think it’s anything except probing but it’s interesting nonetheless.

Bakhmut holds a lot of significance for Russia, might be better to only devote enough to force Russian reserves to be invested and then strike elsewhere instead of a attempt to encircle Wagner in the city.

Well, well right on time.

Ain't no way prig is gonna win against Putin, more powerful figures than him bow to Putin, and recall Girkin? He's still standing despite criticizing Putin. If anything I'm more wondering if this is just formalities, just window dressing criticism. Stuff that is for public consumption, or to satisfy groups like the hardcore nationalists without risk of actually bringing up someone to challenge Putin. Stuff like the noises about the FSB being cleared out never came true.

My concern isn't about a future NATO vs Russia conflict tho, that the Soviet Union had amassed this production for decades for, its about the concern of Russia out producing Ukraine enough to produce a outcome of stalemate that may be enough for China to opt to support with their actual massive production capacity in the event of a prolonged conflict. Realistically Russia does not need to prepare for NATO, not in the short or middle term, but focus on defeating Ukraine, with all the limitations and liabilities of Western support to Ukraine.

Thoughts about this?

The idea of partisans rising up and lack thereof is disappointing is a ridiculous notion, their value is in intelligence gathering. End of the day, satellites, and monitoring can only do so much, and much that is controlled by foreign powers, (and those foreign powers are terrified at "excessiveness") Ukraine of course will have their methods of intelligence gathering, and getting them killed when we have HIMARS firing at rear areas is silly as hell.

Mind you, significant money has been pledged or given to Ukraine, so the idea of Poland and U.S clashing needs more supporting data, end of the day, the money that flows to Ukraine that then is used to purchase or ramp up aid, a lot of it is from the U.S. End of the day, it is also preferred that Ukraine has not one significant backer, being the U.S but more. Actions like joint Polish-Ukrainian repair facilities or EU led action on artillery shells to Ukraine are essential for establishing broad support for Ukraine, should the U.S ever draw away from supporting Ukraine.

Isn't Melitopol the best option for a offensive? take it, you have rail supply from Zaporizhzhia. Push south from a point more easterly, you have Russians pushing reinforcements from both Melitopol and Mariupol no?

Eh, the U.S sent a fleet in 1805 to North Africa, due to shipping losses on American flagged ships. I've never been a fan of this supposed notion of the leased tiger following the independence of the country being the U.S chained to a pole by far seeing statesmen, when the reality is the U.S was not a world power, not close to being one, and decided to act accordingly. When acting against entirely faceable entities, Native American nations, etc, no less was the need for foreign movements "foreign expansion" reframed as manifest destiny.

Someone I recall saying Ukraine has time on their side, I disagree then and now. At the prior time, I argued that economic devastation of Ukraine multiplies as time goes on. Now, I want to mention international outcomes, as the war drags on, the calculus for intervention in support of Russia increases favorable for Russia. Take for example, the notion that NATO is seeking to sap Russian strength via Ukraine, and that idea that is best achievable over a drawn out slugfight. I've already pointed out how this does not help the West as much as one might first see, but I want to emphasize now the danger of a prolonged fight with a economically damaged Ukraine being supported by the West. One, the longer the conflict lasts, the more Ukraine must rely on the West for economic, military support, at some point we will hit the cold war stock limit and like Russia, hunt around, and use new equipment for Ukraine. Same applies economically, Russia has economic levers, and the recent Saudi-Iranian detente, OPEC+ cuts illustrate that whatever our levers for the Middle East, our allies there have no reason to accommodate the West economically. China is keen to stay on the sidelines lest it is given major blowback for supporting the loser in the war, but if Russia shows ability to stalemate, Chinese support can and I believe will increase, especially if the West decides on prolonging the conflict thru not trying to achieve a knock out blow. Chinese industrial power has not been activated to support Russia and to be frank, I don't want China wondering if they want to test out mass vs precision via Russia as a useful proxy. Better to give Ukraine what it needs to achieve decisive results. Whether it's fear of being too bold in supporting Ukraine, or keen not to "escalate", if Putin is intent on winning a long term fight, like the short term fight, the West must show Putin he cannot win. Instead of conceding defeat and coming to the peace table, Putin doubled down. The small amount of tanks, IFVs, sure....Ukraine isn't ready to man more tanks....mehhh, im not going to pretend Ukrainians aren't familiar with Western equipment or ignore supply issues or whatnot but I think a significant political factor influences Western aid to Ukraine, and to suggest that this small number of tanks, IFVs, is enough or a full provision of the potential of the West, nah. Oh sure Gulf War, precision over mass, etc, etc, the Coalition amassed a massive military force to not just equal the Iraqi military, but amassed a numerical advantage. And of course valid reasons for restraint exist, including not spooking Putin but still, western support is way under what it could be. We should not be under illusions that Western aid is at even moderate limits reached. This concern for results for more aid as if the West has given it's all and is overburdened and not a smattering of the left overs is entirely political and not a reflection of western capability or potential.

I am unconcerned about Ukrainian grain drawing down Polish support, end of the day Ukrainian membership to the EU should be a long drawn out process of harmonization and integration, and protests and inter-national wrangling is part of such processes and speaks to the idea that Ukraine will get into the EU once the normal process concludes in like 15 years or whatnot. It's still muddy in Ukraine. Russia is still trying desperately to take Bakumut and now that it looks uncertain Russia can encircle, the decision to remain and fight it out for every corner of the city looks sound. For comparison, tho different wars, different times, consider the outlook of the Soviet defense of Stalingrad, at 35:00 you can see how little of the city is held by the Soviets, turned into multiple pockets very much backed into the Volga. Obviously we have no real idea of the Ukraine intent of a counter-offensive, but forcing Russia to commit to costly urban combat of personnel and equipment that could be used to blunt a offensive seems quite sound to me. I will echo those saying Ukraine will probably attempt to cut the land bridge between Crimea and the Donbas, if Ukraine gains the ability to choose to invade Crimea or attack into the Donbas, the ability to force Russia to supply either fronts via one rail/highway, will make further Ukrainian operations have more chance of success. There is risk of drawing Russian nuclear warnings increasing with all the Western cold feet potential with Crimea under potential invasion, but the ability to force Russia to prioritize either Crimea or Donbas is essential.

Let's not forget pure government contracting corruption. More defensive works means more opportunity to skim money. Happens anywhere, but this is Russia.

I've always been of the opinion that the West could keep using Russian gas, as long as military aid to Ukraine compensated for it. I mean, Ukraine still allows Russian LNG to flow to Europe thru its pipelines on its territory, in return for cash. And certainly no one can deny Poland's desire for Ukrainian victory. The main thing is balancing cutting off Russian exports while not damaging Western economies, which as the price of energy is globalized and traded freely, can result in headlines affecting pricing. Same thing informs my opinion about exports of Russian food supplies, sure, cutting off money to Russia is great, but the suffering from such actions on pricing on the global markets would cause increased instability. Same reason why the Black Sea grain initiative is vital for Ukraine and worldwide.

A small read on the clash of the MP church and Ukrainian government. I’ll point out that the author draws upon the fact from the RUSI report on the failing invasion, that the church was and probably remains an ideological stronghold of the “Russian world”. Quote: To quote a recent and excellent report by the British think tank RISU, “the one body of ideologically committed agents supporting the invasion was the Russian Orthodox Church. Beyond its efforts to support Russian information operations, its priests were widely recruited and run by the Russian special services and their monasteries and churches used as safe houses for equipment and personnel.” https://eastradar.substack.com/p/the-long-war-16

This is in response to awareness to that Pavel Filatyev, a paratrooper who fled to France with Gulagu’s assistance, was aware of Russian war crimes, yet did not include it in his book, nor mention it to the organization.