Centurian52

Sure tanks have been used as indirect fire support. But the continuous flow of video evidence of tanks used in the direct fire role supporting infantry, spearheading attacks and anchoring defenses is together with the fact that both sides specifically want tanks not just spgs is clear evidence they still very much have a role.
Tanks havent worked as effectively as expected for a variety of reasons.
- Tanks developed 40 years ago and last updated 20 years ago going up against current munitions
- An overall low training level
- Bad combined arms especially on the russian side
- Lack of short range air defense
 
That airpower hasnt worked as wed expect if NATO was involved also isnt exactly hard to explain.
- Both sides have fairly heavy air defenses
- Ukraine simply doesnt have many aircraft available
- Russia didnt really train and focus on SEAD which meant ukraines air defense stayed largely intact.
- So we have mutually denied airspace
 
 

The length of early muskets has a lot more to do with getting velocity out of bad powder and bad barrel matallurgy.
smoothbore barrels dont stabilize the round so they cant gaign accuracy and rifling already wirks with very short barles (an inch is enough). But early musktes with shorter barrels would have even less range or would need far more powder and would still be as heavy to withstand the pressure anyways.
 

The role of a tank is direct fire. Its essentially a great sensor with a 0 time delay precision artillery attached. And ukraine and russia are using them in the direct fire role. If they werent they wouldnt be asking for tanks but spgs which do the whole indirect fire far better.
were also seeing successful use of even just mraps for assaults and for the charkiv offensive they have been essential in quickly taking lots of ground once the line had been broken.
 
Tanks have always taken heavy casualties in combat. But the alternative to using them has been firing artillery shells in such quantities that it wasnt sustainable with even the entire worlds production capacity dedicated to war and still taking infantry casualties at a rate unsustanable for most modern developed nations.
 

I don't think the Ukrainians are close to getting everything right. They are also understandably reluctant to just broadcast there problems on twitter, at least usually. The larger problem is that NATO has been way to standoffish about attaching observers to Ukrainian units. So WE are missing a lot of things we shouldn't be
There was a long post about this a month ago. Put on twitter by Constantine. I just can't seem to get back to it in the time I have to look. The thing I recall very specifically is that all of a certain Ukrainian unit's training had been for offense/assault, and that this was huge problem when they had to go on the defensive. The other thing that has been brought numerous times is that drones are omnipresent on the Ukrainian battlefield, and that western training has not caught up with this fact. In particular learning how not to be spotted by drones is EXTREMELY important.

Since horses have been used for war there has been a constant struggle for predominance between infantry and cavalry (and initially chariots) where on some occasions the infantry has predominated and on other occasions the cavalry has predominated. Infantry are slow, difficult to maneuver but usually very solid. Cavalry is much more mobile, easier to maneuver, and can have appreciable shock power that can be applied at the most favorable point.
Even in cases of clear predominance of one of the forces (in the case of infantry, the Macedonian Phalanxes, the Roman Legions, the Swiss pikemen or the Spanish Tercios; in the case of the Cavalry, the Byzantine and Persian Cataphracts, the medieval knights or the Mongolian cavalry) it has always been necessary for every army to have elements of the arm that do not predominate.
After the Second World War and the mechanization of modern armies, everything de facto became cavalry, that is, mobile, fast units with great shock and maneuver capabilities. Even the infantry became de facto dragons. For this reason, the traditional foot infantry had to rediscover the Phalanx, in this case exchanging the traditional pikes for all types of increasingly sophisticated anti-tank weaponry and tactics to minimize the advantages of the new and predominant "heavy cavalry" forces (armored units and mechanized infantry units, i.e. dragoons)
Even in the 16th century, when the Tercios of pikemen and harquebusiers, that is, the infantry, dominated the battlefield, light and heavy cavalry were necessary. Although tactics changed and adapted to each situation over time, the need for fast, shock units continued even today. Horses were used at the time, but as soon as something better became available (tanks, trucks, APCs, etc.), they became mechanized forces. That's why I don't think the tank or armored units are dead. They are the modern cavalry whose functions (shock, movement and maneuver) have never disappeared. Some of the means used may change (perhaps UGV), but there will still be what cavalry has functionally been for centuries, and even millennia.
And here comes the other point, I do not believe that the war in Ukraine is a preview of what World War III would be like. It seems more like the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) to me. Modern and cutting-edge weapons were used, but the SCW was not a preview of World War II. Everyone drew conclusions (the Germans for example  that tactical aviation was essential and that they did not really need specialized strategic air forces), but they were not necessarily always correct. And hence the surprise caused by the German Blitzkrieg. Few people expected it.
Russia may be acting with its traditional incompetence, and Putin's failure to use his traditional numbers advantage by not mobilizing may be misleading. Ukraine is unfortunately NOT NATO, nor does it have in any way the resources that NATO has. It lacks air and naval superiority, its doctrine is different (like the Russian one, it is an artillery army), it has more men only because Putin has not carried out a real mobilization yet, but in almost everything else it was or still is inferior. Western aid, the wear and tear suffered by the Russian incompetence and the Ucranian hard work, the lack of early mobilization of all Russian resources, and the use of new weapons such as drones, have allowed the gap between both armies to be closed, but Ukraine is somehow still fighting a poor man's war.
In my opinion, believing that a next war fought by NATO would be the same as the one being fought in Ukraine seems to me to be a mistake, and I think  that sometimes the analysis is being taken too far, generalizing what are sometimes particular cases, as sometimes happened in the case of the Spanish Civil War too.

Damn is this thread still going strong?  A real tactics and warfare thread?  The anti-Peng?  Well done guys.

At the operational level; sure. But at the intimate tactical level (you know, the level that CM deals with), minefields were kind of a non event. They explain why particular actions were fought where they were fought, but they didn't really influence the actions themselves.
SNIPE was fought 'on the far side' of the devil's garden, not in it.
8th Armd Brigade's inept reproduction of the Charge of the Light Brigade was 'on the far side' of the devil's garden, not in it.**
Tel el Eisa was fought ... actually, nowhere near minefields.
Alam Halfa was fought on the near side of the minefields.
Ruweisat Ridge (battle no.s 1 through to about 6 or 7) was fought before the minefields were a thing.
El Mrier didn't feature minefields.
etc.
There was some fighting for defensive positions on the night of 23 Oct, but those were mostly walkovers (= boring from a CM perspective). Most of the opening night consisted of extended lines of infantry plodding forward behind barrage lines across 2-3km of rocky desert in the dark, hoping like hell they didn't step on any 'slpodies. There were numerous platoon-company sized actions during that night to reduce defended localities, outposts, and listening posts (which could make for some interesting byte-battles), but as a designer there would be no play value in simulating the approach plod through the garden. Just cut to the good bit where the contact actually occurs. Then there is no need for breaching, and no need for artillery even since the barrage has buggered off into the distance.
All of which is to say that a tactical level look at Alamein without breaching is at least as do-able as a tactical level look at OVERLORD without gliders or landing craft.
 
** in the process clearly demonstrating that armour has been obsolete since October 1942!

Minefields, and the breaching of same, were a MAJOR element of El Alamein. That is probably the only battle in the North Africa campaign most people can name.🫣

Hey mate, 
If you need any more information about the active war, let me know. I might also be able to provide some lesser known information about the low intensity conflict from 2014-2022. I've got a few contacts currently in the country and several others who have left, but all of them spent a significant amount of time in Ukraine before and during the invasion. I'm not really sure what exactly you are looking for, but if you need info on something specific, shoot me a DM with questions and I'll send you back any info I've got. If I don't have any information, I'll ask my contacts and see what they know.

I'm thinking of making a detailed study of this war. And I mean the entire war, from the very beginning, starting in 2014. I have a mountain of sources for everything that has happened since February 24, 2022 (most of them provided, at one point or another, by the How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get thread (I've dropped out of that thread for now since I can't keep up, but one day I'm going to read every single page and follow every single link on that thread)). But I'm not really sure where to start looking for sources on everything that happened from 2014-2021. At least I wasn't sure where to start looking, until I remembered the massive knowledge base that exists on this forum. The more detail the better, but anything is better than nothing. The entire period is of interest to me, even the low intensity years. If you find interesting information about the prelude to events in 2014 feel free to post that too.

No, they did not (there is a lot of myth around the Battle of Agincourt, but suffice it to say that the successful employment of archers against knights in one battle did not portend the successful employment of archers against knights in every subsequent battle). Granting it's a bit ambiguous when knights stopped being knights, but they were going strong for at least another century after Agincourt (if a "knight" is "a warrior in service to a lord", then it was the professionalization of armies that rendered knights obsolete), and expensive heavy cavalry of some kind continued to be in use right up to the beginning of the 20th century.
Sure, but it's also cheaper than a platoon of infantry. And the machine gun didn't stop cavalry from proving their worth in 1914. At least in the British army, which had a sensible doctrine for how to use cavalry in the early 20th century (they almost always fought dismounted, unless a particularly tempting target for a charge presented itself). The British retreat from Mons would have been a lot more difficult if they didn't have a cavalry rearguard. They were admittedly pretty useless during the static warfare phase from late 1914 to early 1918 (they could still fight just as effectively as infantry, but without contributing mobility they were basically just more expensive infantry). But they proved their value again when mobility was restored in 1918. What killed cavalry once and for all wasn't the machine gun, but the realization (in the interwar period) that mechanized units could perform every mission that a cavalry unit could perform, but better.
Pikes were used alongside muskets for centuries (the "pike and shot" era is a fascinating period). They ceased to be of any value when bayonets were invented. The bayonet essentially allowed every last soldier to be both a musketeer and a pikeman, eliminating the need to bifurcate the infantry into two roles. As a side note, though no one reputable has ever told me so, I strongly suspect this is why muskets are so absurdly long by the 18th century (with the butt on the ground, the muzzle will reach up to your shoulder, and with the bayonet attached it will be about as tall or taller than you are). They are specifically designed to be a hybrid firearm/polearm. They are far longer than it makes any sense for a firearm to be, while being well short of the optimal length for a polearm. But they are about the perfect compromise length between a firearm and a polearm.
 
I don't think I strongly disagree with anything in the rest of your post. I think we both agree that the tank isn't dead yet, but it's on the way out the door. I think it's further from the door than you do, and that it's on the way out for different reasons. 

No, they did not (there is a lot of myth around the Battle of Agincourt, but suffice it to say that the successful employment of archers against knights in one battle did not portend the successful employment of archers against knights in every subsequent battle). Granting it's a bit ambiguous when knights stopped being knights, but they were going strong for at least another century after Agincourt (if a "knight" is "a warrior in service to a lord", then it was the professionalization of armies that rendered knights obsolete), and expensive heavy cavalry of some kind continued to be in use right up to the beginning of the 20th century.
Sure, but it's also cheaper than a platoon of infantry. And the machine gun didn't stop cavalry from proving their worth in 1914. At least in the British army, which had a sensible doctrine for how to use cavalry in the early 20th century (they almost always fought dismounted, unless a particularly tempting target for a charge presented itself). The British retreat from Mons would have been a lot more difficult if they didn't have a cavalry rearguard. They were admittedly pretty useless during the static warfare phase from late 1914 to early 1918 (they could still fight just as effectively as infantry, but without contributing mobility they were basically just more expensive infantry). But they proved their value again when mobility was restored in 1918. What killed cavalry once and for all wasn't the machine gun, but the realization (in the interwar period) that mechanized units could perform every mission that a cavalry unit could perform, but better.
Pikes were used alongside muskets for centuries (the "pike and shot" era is a fascinating period). They ceased to be of any value when bayonets were invented. The bayonet essentially allowed every last soldier to be both a musketeer and a pikeman, eliminating the need to bifurcate the infantry into two roles. As a side note, though no one reputable has ever told me so, I strongly suspect this is why muskets are so absurdly long by the 18th century (with the butt on the ground, the muzzle will reach up to your shoulder, and with the bayonet attached it will be about as tall or taller than you are). They are specifically designed to be a hybrid firearm/polearm. They are far longer than it makes any sense for a firearm to be, while being well short of the optimal length for a polearm. But they are about the perfect compromise length between a firearm and a polearm.
 
I don't think I strongly disagree with anything in the rest of your post. I think we both agree that the tank isn't dead yet, but it's on the way out the door. I think it's further from the door than you do, and that it's on the way out for different reasons. 

No, they did not (there is a lot of myth around the Battle of Agincourt, but suffice it to say that the successful employment of archers against knights in one battle did not portend the successful employment of archers against knights in every subsequent battle). Granting it's a bit ambiguous when knights stopped being knights, but they were going strong for at least another century after Agincourt (if a "knight" is "a warrior in service to a lord", then it was the professionalization of armies that rendered knights obsolete), and expensive heavy cavalry of some kind continued to be in use right up to the beginning of the 20th century.
Sure, but it's also cheaper than a platoon of infantry. And the machine gun didn't stop cavalry from proving their worth in 1914. At least in the British army, which had a sensible doctrine for how to use cavalry in the early 20th century (they almost always fought dismounted, unless a particularly tempting target for a charge presented itself). The British retreat from Mons would have been a lot more difficult if they didn't have a cavalry rearguard. They were admittedly pretty useless during the static warfare phase from late 1914 to early 1918 (they could still fight just as effectively as infantry, but without contributing mobility they were basically just more expensive infantry). But they proved their value again when mobility was restored in 1918. What killed cavalry once and for all wasn't the machine gun, but the realization (in the interwar period) that mechanized units could perform every mission that a cavalry unit could perform, but better.
Pikes were used alongside muskets for centuries (the "pike and shot" era is a fascinating period). They ceased to be of any value when bayonets were invented. The bayonet essentially allowed every last soldier to be both a musketeer and a pikeman, eliminating the need to bifurcate the infantry into two roles. As a side note, though no one reputable has ever told me so, I strongly suspect this is why muskets are so absurdly long by the 18th century (with the butt on the ground, the muzzle will reach up to your shoulder, and with the bayonet attached it will be about as tall or taller than you are). They are specifically designed to be a hybrid firearm/polearm. They are far longer than it makes any sense for a firearm to be, while being well short of the optimal length for a polearm. But they are about the perfect compromise length between a firearm and a polearm.
 
I don't think I strongly disagree with anything in the rest of your post. I think we both agree that the tank isn't dead yet, but it's on the way out the door. I think it's further from the door than you do, and that it's on the way out for different reasons. 

I think you're being sarcastic, but honestly a more detailed fire-panning interface would be awesome. Are you sure you're talking to the audience you think you're talking to?
Also, based on what we're seeing in this war, obstacles and breaching ops clearly are a requirement. At least if you want something that can accurately simulate warfare. And that is what I want. If it wasn't, I'd be playing Starcraft.

No, they did not (there is a lot of myth around the Battle of Agincourt, but suffice it to say that the successful employment of archers against knights in one battle did not portend the successful employment of archers against knights in every subsequent battle). Granting it's a bit ambiguous when knights stopped being knights, but they were going strong for at least another century after Agincourt (if a "knight" is "a warrior in service to a lord", then it was the professionalization of armies that rendered knights obsolete), and expensive heavy cavalry of some kind continued to be in use right up to the beginning of the 20th century.
Sure, but it's also cheaper than a platoon of infantry. And the machine gun didn't stop cavalry from proving their worth in 1914. At least in the British army, which had a sensible doctrine for how to use cavalry in the early 20th century (they almost always fought dismounted, unless a particularly tempting target for a charge presented itself). The British retreat from Mons would have been a lot more difficult if they didn't have a cavalry rearguard. They were admittedly pretty useless during the static warfare phase from late 1914 to early 1918 (they could still fight just as effectively as infantry, but without contributing mobility they were basically just more expensive infantry). But they proved their value again when mobility was restored in 1918. What killed cavalry once and for all wasn't the machine gun, but the realization (in the interwar period) that mechanized units could perform every mission that a cavalry unit could perform, but better.
Pikes were used alongside muskets for centuries (the "pike and shot" era is a fascinating period). They ceased to be of any value when bayonets were invented. The bayonet essentially allowed every last soldier to be both a musketeer and a pikeman, eliminating the need to bifurcate the infantry into two roles. As a side note, though no one reputable has ever told me so, I strongly suspect this is why muskets are so absurdly long by the 18th century (with the butt on the ground, the muzzle will reach up to your shoulder, and with the bayonet attached it will be about as tall or taller than you are). They are specifically designed to be a hybrid firearm/polearm. They are far longer than it makes any sense for a firearm to be, while being well short of the optimal length for a polearm. But they are about the perfect compromise length between a firearm and a polearm.
 
I don't think I strongly disagree with anything in the rest of your post. I think we both agree that the tank isn't dead yet, but it's on the way out the door. I think it's further from the door than you do, and that it's on the way out for different reasons. 

No, they did not (there is a lot of myth around the Battle of Agincourt, but suffice it to say that the successful employment of archers against knights in one battle did not portend the successful employment of archers against knights in every subsequent battle). Granting it's a bit ambiguous when knights stopped being knights, but they were going strong for at least another century after Agincourt (if a "knight" is "a warrior in service to a lord", then it was the professionalization of armies that rendered knights obsolete), and expensive heavy cavalry of some kind continued to be in use right up to the beginning of the 20th century.
Sure, but it's also cheaper than a platoon of infantry. And the machine gun didn't stop cavalry from proving their worth in 1914. At least in the British army, which had a sensible doctrine for how to use cavalry in the early 20th century (they almost always fought dismounted, unless a particularly tempting target for a charge presented itself). The British retreat from Mons would have been a lot more difficult if they didn't have a cavalry rearguard. They were admittedly pretty useless during the static warfare phase from late 1914 to early 1918 (they could still fight just as effectively as infantry, but without contributing mobility they were basically just more expensive infantry). But they proved their value again when mobility was restored in 1918. What killed cavalry once and for all wasn't the machine gun, but the realization (in the interwar period) that mechanized units could perform every mission that a cavalry unit could perform, but better.
Pikes were used alongside muskets for centuries (the "pike and shot" era is a fascinating period). They ceased to be of any value when bayonets were invented. The bayonet essentially allowed every last soldier to be both a musketeer and a pikeman, eliminating the need to bifurcate the infantry into two roles. As a side note, though no one reputable has ever told me so, I strongly suspect this is why muskets are so absurdly long by the 18th century (with the butt on the ground, the muzzle will reach up to your shoulder, and with the bayonet attached it will be about as tall or taller than you are). They are specifically designed to be a hybrid firearm/polearm. They are far longer than it makes any sense for a firearm to be, while being well short of the optimal length for a polearm. But they are about the perfect compromise length between a firearm and a polearm.
 
I don't think I strongly disagree with anything in the rest of your post. I think we both agree that the tank isn't dead yet, but it's on the way out the door. I think it's further from the door than you do, and that it's on the way out for different reasons. 

No, they did not (there is a lot of myth around the Battle of Agincourt, but suffice it to say that the successful employment of archers against knights in one battle did not portend the successful employment of archers against knights in every subsequent battle). Granting it's a bit ambiguous when knights stopped being knights, but they were going strong for at least another century after Agincourt (if a "knight" is "a warrior in service to a lord", then it was the professionalization of armies that rendered knights obsolete), and expensive heavy cavalry of some kind continued to be in use right up to the beginning of the 20th century.
Sure, but it's also cheaper than a platoon of infantry. And the machine gun didn't stop cavalry from proving their worth in 1914. At least in the British army, which had a sensible doctrine for how to use cavalry in the early 20th century (they almost always fought dismounted, unless a particularly tempting target for a charge presented itself). The British retreat from Mons would have been a lot more difficult if they didn't have a cavalry rearguard. They were admittedly pretty useless during the static warfare phase from late 1914 to early 1918 (they could still fight just as effectively as infantry, but without contributing mobility they were basically just more expensive infantry). But they proved their value again when mobility was restored in 1918. What killed cavalry once and for all wasn't the machine gun, but the realization (in the interwar period) that mechanized units could perform every mission that a cavalry unit could perform, but better.
Pikes were used alongside muskets for centuries (the "pike and shot" era is a fascinating period). They ceased to be of any value when bayonets were invented. The bayonet essentially allowed every last soldier to be both a musketeer and a pikeman, eliminating the need to bifurcate the infantry into two roles. As a side note, though no one reputable has ever told me so, I strongly suspect this is why muskets are so absurdly long by the 18th century (with the butt on the ground, the muzzle will reach up to your shoulder, and with the bayonet attached it will be about as tall or taller than you are). They are specifically designed to be a hybrid firearm/polearm. They are far longer than it makes any sense for a firearm to be, while being well short of the optimal length for a polearm. But they are about the perfect compromise length between a firearm and a polearm.
 
I don't think I strongly disagree with anything in the rest of your post. I think we both agree that the tank isn't dead yet, but it's on the way out the door. I think it's further from the door than you do, and that it's on the way out for different reasons. 

I wonder how many times the tank has to die before it finally dies? Sorry, but I gotta stick up for the tank here. Maybe it is dead, but I haven't been convinced of it yet (of course I also think the battleship took longer to become obsolete than some people, so my opinion may have limited value).
From the combat footage I've seen it looks like the tank is still playing a useful role. The Ukrainians still want tanks (I doubt they would want them if they didn't have a use for them). And I still find tanks to be a valuable part of my own forces in CMCW, CMSF2, and CMBS (for what that's worth (even with the war on CM is still one of my biggest windows into what modern warfare is like)).
Mechanized maneuver warfare might be dead. But the tank predates mechanized maneuver warfare (armies were building them by the thousands even before the Germans plugged them into a maneuver warfare doctrine). So while there's probably no maneuver warfare without the tank, it doesn't necessarily follow that there is no tank without maneuver warfare. The key thing that the tank provides is direct firepower. It will become obsolete either when direct firepower becomes irrelevant or something else does a better job of providing direct firepower. Perhaps the tank will become obsolete when UGVs start providing armored direct firepower (or maybe we'll just call those "unmanned tanks"). I think technology is moving in that direction, so (assuming that you think of a gun-UGV as something other than just an unmanned tank) the tank's days probably are numbered. But that number hasn't reached zero yet.

I think you're being sarcastic, but honestly a more detailed fire-panning interface would be awesome. Are you sure you're talking to the audience you think you're talking to?
Also, based on what we're seeing in this war, obstacles and breaching ops clearly are a requirement. At least if you want something that can accurately simulate warfare. And that is what I want. If it wasn't, I'd be playing Starcraft.

No, they did not (there is a lot of myth around the Battle of Agincourt, but suffice it to say that the successful employment of archers against knights in one battle did not portend the successful employment of archers against knights in every subsequent battle). Granting it's a bit ambiguous when knights stopped being knights, but they were going strong for at least another century after Agincourt (if a "knight" is "a warrior in service to a lord", then it was the professionalization of armies that rendered knights obsolete), and expensive heavy cavalry of some kind continued to be in use right up to the beginning of the 20th century.
Sure, but it's also cheaper than a platoon of infantry. And the machine gun didn't stop cavalry from proving their worth in 1914. At least in the British army, which had a sensible doctrine for how to use cavalry in the early 20th century (they almost always fought dismounted, unless a particularly tempting target for a charge presented itself). The British retreat from Mons would have been a lot more difficult if they didn't have a cavalry rearguard. They were admittedly pretty useless during the static warfare phase from late 1914 to early 1918 (they could still fight just as effectively as infantry, but without contributing mobility they were basically just more expensive infantry). But they proved their value again when mobility was restored in 1918. What killed cavalry once and for all wasn't the machine gun, but the realization (in the interwar period) that mechanized units could perform every mission that a cavalry unit could perform, but better.
Pikes were used alongside muskets for centuries (the "pike and shot" era is a fascinating period). They ceased to be of any value when bayonets were invented. The bayonet essentially allowed every last soldier to be both a musketeer and a pikeman, eliminating the need to bifurcate the infantry into two roles. As a side note, though no one reputable has ever told me so, I strongly suspect this is why muskets are so absurdly long by the 18th century (with the butt on the ground, the muzzle will reach up to your shoulder, and with the bayonet attached it will be about as tall or taller than you are). They are specifically designed to be a hybrid firearm/polearm. They are far longer than it makes any sense for a firearm to be, while being well short of the optimal length for a polearm. But they are about the perfect compromise length between a firearm and a polearm.
 
I don't think I strongly disagree with anything in the rest of your post. I think we both agree that the tank isn't dead yet, but it's on the way out the door. I think it's further from the door than you do, and that it's on the way out for different reasons. 

I think you're being sarcastic, but honestly a more detailed fire-panning interface would be awesome. Are you sure you're talking to the audience you think you're talking to?
Also, based on what we're seeing in this war, obstacles and breaching ops clearly are a requirement. At least if you want something that can accurately simulate warfare. And that is what I want. If it wasn't, I'd be playing Starcraft.

That all sounds very truthy. But at no point in time has that ever been how anything works. Anti-tank munitions have always been far cheaper than the tanks they are meant to destroy. If you ever have an anti-tank munition that is more epensive than a tank, you don't have an anti-tank munition. There is a fancy name for this actually. It's the shot exchange problem, and it has been plaguing air defenses throughout this war as they struggle with decisions over whether or not to expend an expensive missile to shoot down a cheap drone (in fact this is the driving factor behind the big comeback that anti-aircraft guns have made, since they can shoot down cheap drones without expending ammunition that is more valuable than the drone). So no, cheap ways of killing tanks do not render tanks obsolete. Cheap ways of killing anything has never rendered anything obsolete.
And I should remind everyone that the tank losses in this war are not remotely unprecidented (no one mentioned heavy losses recently, but I think the number of tanks destroyed is a large part of why so many people seem to think the tank is obsolete). Tanks have taken extremely heavy losses in every single conventional war they have ever participated in (I'll admit that they haven't taken heavy losses in many guerilla wars as far as I'm aware). The Isrealis lost around 400 tanks in just the two weeks of the Yom Kippur War. The Germans lost around 25,000 tanks in WW2, with the combined US and British tank losses being about the same, and Soviet tank losses being over 80,000. Yes, this war is an order of magnitude smaller than WW2, but tank losses have also been about an order of magnitude smaller. As far as I can tell tank losses in this war have been about on par with WW2 when you adjust for scale.
I think I am in agreement with Steve that what is likely to render tanks obsolete in the near future is gun armed UGVs. The services that a tank provides on the battlefield are still essential. But once something comes along that can do a better job of providing those services, such as a UGV, the tank will no longer be required. So I think once a country somewhere adopts a gun-variant of a UGV the tank will be obsolecent (and fully obsolete once that gun UGV has been produced in sufficient quantities). When that happens it will not be Javelins or Lancets that rendered the tank obsolete, but a better direct-fire asset. Even when UGVs do render manned tanks obsolete, I'm still not sure that it won't be entirely appropriate to think of them as unmanned tanks.

I think you're being sarcastic, but honestly a more detailed fire-panning interface would be awesome. Are you sure you're talking to the audience you think you're talking to?
Also, based on what we're seeing in this war, obstacles and breaching ops clearly are a requirement. At least if you want something that can accurately simulate warfare. And that is what I want. If it wasn't, I'd be playing Starcraft.

That all sounds very truthy. But at no point in time has that ever been how anything works. Anti-tank munitions have always been far cheaper than the tanks they are meant to destroy. If you ever have an anti-tank munition that is more epensive than a tank, you don't have an anti-tank munition. There is a fancy name for this actually. It's the shot exchange problem, and it has been plaguing air defenses throughout this war as they struggle with decisions over whether or not to expend an expensive missile to shoot down a cheap drone (in fact this is the driving factor behind the big comeback that anti-aircraft guns have made, since they can shoot down cheap drones without expending ammunition that is more valuable than the drone). So no, cheap ways of killing tanks do not render tanks obsolete. Cheap ways of killing anything has never rendered anything obsolete.
And I should remind everyone that the tank losses in this war are not remotely unprecidented (no one mentioned heavy losses recently, but I think the number of tanks destroyed is a large part of why so many people seem to think the tank is obsolete). Tanks have taken extremely heavy losses in every single conventional war they have ever participated in (I'll admit that they haven't taken heavy losses in many guerilla wars as far as I'm aware). The Isrealis lost around 400 tanks in just the two weeks of the Yom Kippur War. The Germans lost around 25,000 tanks in WW2, with the combined US and British tank losses being about the same, and Soviet tank losses being over 80,000. Yes, this war is an order of magnitude smaller than WW2, but tank losses have also been about an order of magnitude smaller. As far as I can tell tank losses in this war have been about on par with WW2 when you adjust for scale.
I think I am in agreement with Steve that what is likely to render tanks obsolete in the near future is gun armed UGVs. The services that a tank provides on the battlefield are still essential. But once something comes along that can do a better job of providing those services, such as a UGV, the tank will no longer be required. So I think once a country somewhere adopts a gun-variant of a UGV the tank will be obsolecent (and fully obsolete once that gun UGV has been produced in sufficient quantities). When that happens it will not be Javelins or Lancets that rendered the tank obsolete, but a better direct-fire asset. Even when UGVs do render manned tanks obsolete, I'm still not sure that it won't be entirely appropriate to think of them as unmanned tanks.

That all sounds very truthy. But at no point in time has that ever been how anything works. Anti-tank munitions have always been far cheaper than the tanks they are meant to destroy. If you ever have an anti-tank munition that is more epensive than a tank, you don't have an anti-tank munition. There is a fancy name for this actually. It's the shot exchange problem, and it has been plaguing air defenses throughout this war as they struggle with decisions over whether or not to expend an expensive missile to shoot down a cheap drone (in fact this is the driving factor behind the big comeback that anti-aircraft guns have made, since they can shoot down cheap drones without expending ammunition that is more valuable than the drone). So no, cheap ways of killing tanks do not render tanks obsolete. Cheap ways of killing anything has never rendered anything obsolete.
And I should remind everyone that the tank losses in this war are not remotely unprecidented (no one mentioned heavy losses recently, but I think the number of tanks destroyed is a large part of why so many people seem to think the tank is obsolete). Tanks have taken extremely heavy losses in every single conventional war they have ever participated in (I'll admit that they haven't taken heavy losses in many guerilla wars as far as I'm aware). The Isrealis lost around 400 tanks in just the two weeks of the Yom Kippur War. The Germans lost around 25,000 tanks in WW2, with the combined US and British tank losses being about the same, and Soviet tank losses being over 80,000. Yes, this war is an order of magnitude smaller than WW2, but tank losses have also been about an order of magnitude smaller. As far as I can tell tank losses in this war have been about on par with WW2 when you adjust for scale.
I think I am in agreement with Steve that what is likely to render tanks obsolete in the near future is gun armed UGVs. The services that a tank provides on the battlefield are still essential. But once something comes along that can do a better job of providing those services, such as a UGV, the tank will no longer be required. So I think once a country somewhere adopts a gun-variant of a UGV the tank will be obsolecent (and fully obsolete once that gun UGV has been produced in sufficient quantities). When that happens it will not be Javelins or Lancets that rendered the tank obsolete, but a better direct-fire asset. Even when UGVs do render manned tanks obsolete, I'm still not sure that it won't be entirely appropriate to think of them as unmanned tanks.