Kaunitz

Sorry for the triple post, but here is one last addition that might prove usefull: an up-to-date (June 2nd!), highly detailed contour map (10 m intervalls):
http://garmin.opentopomap.org/ 

For CMx3: 
Crouched run. Some way of moving faster than the crawl while keeping a relatively low profile.  A new target order exclusively for throwing grenades (while staying prone/in cover, if possible). In close assault situations, you don't want your riflemen to stand up and go "peng, peng, peng!". You want them to go "boom!" An easier way (requiring fewer clicks) to make soldiers stay prone but NOT withhold their fire. Right now, the way to go is to use a "hide" command in combination with a 360° target arc (which in turn, means that you can't fine tune the facing/usage of cover). Also, the hide command reduces spotting capabilites (soldiers go through "hide" tasks, not just idle and spotting).

I really hope we will see some improvement in regards to defensive features at some point in the future. But somehow I doubt it, given that many people don't seem to have any problem with it. I wonder whether this may also be linked to the preference of Meeting Engagements in H2H games? I rarely ever see people pick fortifications anyway.
The fact that infantry dies like flies despite all your best, terrain-fiddly efforts to work around the problem is becoming a major deal breaker for me personally. It sucks the enthusiasm right out of me when it comes to map-creation. Infantry simply depends on using the protection provided by terrain. In CM, protection by terrain doesn't work that well as there is a lack of properly working defensive structures and issues with soldier placement (make good use of cover without completely ignoring LOS), which I understand must be a pain in the **** to code. This lack of staying power for infantry makes it quite hard to simulate real engagements. 
Sometimes I wished we could just paint abstract levels of "small arms + shrapnel protection for infantry" areas on selected action-squares of the map (directional would be ideal...). I'm a big fan of the ballistic model in the game, but I think it reaches its limits when every single cm counts, which is the case if we're talking about cover for infantry. Elevating or depressing 8x8m areas is not a sufficient mean to create cover for infantry and is also extremely fiddly and unreliable. The implementation "abstract protection modifiers" would just swipe away all the fiddlyness with one god-sent blow. No more worrying about unreliable soldier placement, no more worrying about overexposed soldiers (also: soldiers deciding switch from prone to kneel every now and then...), no more worrying about lack of LOS if the soldiers are not overexposed.
/rant mode off

I still don't believe in trenches. Here is a short test video to back up my opinion: 
Explanation: I set up 27 guys in some trenches (which had a bit of zig-zag in them to stop shrapnel?). Originally, I wanted to test different calibres of arty. But after testing the 81mm mortars, I felt there was no need to continue the test with heavier calibres. Admittedly, I placed the target for the 2x2 mortars perfectly on the trenches, and I set the strength and duration of the fire mission to "max" (but this would only speed things up). The first test in the video demonstrates what happened to units who had no orders to remain prone ("hide"), but instead kneeled: Out of the 27 men, 21 were casualties, only 6 survived. Many of the casualties were inflicted by the buggy "run to the crater" behaviour: In the middle of the artillery barrage, troopers leave the trenches to seek cover in craters. But as I zoom in, you can see that most casualties were still inflicted in the trench itself. The second test in the video uses the same setup (27 men in trenches versus 4 81mm mortars). Results were almost the same - 19 casualties, 8 survivors. 
 
(video will be available shortly)
No, I don't believe that trenches are working properly. The trench is by far too wide. When hit by artillery, it's only a matter of a few seconds before the shells hit right into the trenches. Therefore, the currently available trenches offers almost no protection against artillery (which ought to be their primary purpose).  
 
@RockinHarry
Hehe, the trench looks nice. I came up with something very similar for my Gerbini map (picture: http://community.battlefront.com/topic/125278-highlanders-the-battle-of-gerbini/?do=findComment&comment=1747980). But the problems described above in my short test still remained.
I'm curious about that scenario of yours, given that you also seem to pay a lot of attention to defensive works. I'm really tempted to buy CM:BN for it. ...
 

I believe the problem is the same as for the other fortifications? It seems to be impossible to make features sink into the ground/terrain mesh. Take a look at the current trenches: they protrude from the ground, which of course, is not how they're supposed to work. In my opinion, fortifications are really the one major thing that is not handled well by Combat Mission games, and it makes infantry die like flies, especially to indirect fire and direct HE fire. While the mechanics do work as you'd expect, with ground stopping shrapnel effects, any attempt to recreate foritifcations by messing with elevations is rather futile, as the action spots come at a size of 8x8 meters (a depression of such a big size does not offer protection from arty), can't be camouflaged and also the troopers' placement within the depression is a roll of dice.
Ideally, dugouts/trenches/pits should have these characteristics: 
1) They should not be visible for the opponent in the terrain/ground mesh and have an excellent "hiding value" themselves, so that they're only discovered when you're right on them.
2) They should increase the hiding-value for units positioned in them (i.e. provide concealment).
3) They should be deep and narrow with sharp edges. The width of the trench is directly linked to the protection it provides against indirect fire. Every meter counts.
4) Troops inside the trench should position themselves in a way that exposes them as little as possible (head + raised weapon), while at the same time gives them good lines of sight (assuming that the surrounding terrain is flat...). 

Oh... I remember quite a lot of players and designers alike muttering about the limited value of the forts in the game. No idea on preference on H2H/ME though.
 
I guess you didn´t have discovered my animation mod files yet? It´s not that oftenly the terrain that makes ptroopers die like flies, it´s also quite often some the inappropiate single ptroopers behaviors when it comes to stances and show a quite unnecessary target to the enemy! Have a look here, just in case:
 
Think BFC had to make some trade offs for the various ptroopers behaviors, also related to their particular roles within a squad/team. They got to observe, shoot, get into cover, move, maintain C2, all that the same time, ever evaluating against possible threats and their own relation to them. I don´t want to be a coder in BFC team and I gladly have no coding skills at all.

Cheers @Bil Hardenberger for starting a new AAR - an actual AAR this time.
The map looks way smaller than previous episodes - what are the engagement ranges like? Well under 1,000 meters I would say. Was this map selection intentional or a QB thing?

Hello Gentlemen
I had hoped to delay the announcement of this until the new CMMODS site was 100% finished and all the mods uploaded however due to circumstances I am pulling the announcement forward to... well now.
After recent discussions between GreenAsJade and Battlefront it has been decided to relocate the CMMODSIII site to fall under the umbrella of The Few Good Men where The Proving Grounds and The Scenario Depot already reside. 
To this end work has begun on moving the modifications currently hosted at CMMODSIII to their new home at CMMODS IV.  As you can imagine this is a major job and will take a few weeks.  CMMODSIII will remain open until the full transfer has taken place so for now I request that no new mods be uploaded to CMMODSIII. 
Within the next few days CMMODS IV will be opening the requests section for folk interested in becoming Creators (formerly Authors) and at this time the new upload process will be implemented.  This will be under the Instructions section of the new website but I will post in this thread to keep you all in the loop.
A few points about the new website worth mentioning... all files will now be held in cloud storage so even a catastrophic website crash will not impact any loss of modifications.  All files from the old CMMODSIII site will be relisted and recently with the help of @Erwin I have acquired approx. just shy of 300GB of modifications with quite a few that slipped through the net between the Repository and CMMODSIII transfer over 3 years ago.  So as you can imagine Im going to be very busy over the next few weeks.
Please do not subscribe to the new CMMODS IV just yet or you will be inundated with copious amounts of uploads... I think I uploaded over 100 today... you really don't want that many notification emails dropping in your inbox anytime soon!
In closing I want to thank Martin for all his sterling work over the years keeping CMMODS running and it's an honour to pick up the gauntlet where he left off.
Without further ado, here is the new site, still a work in progress but getting their quickly.  
http://www.thefewgoodmen.com/cm-mod-warehouse/
Regards
Bootie
@Battlefront.com
 
 

I really hope we will see some improvement in regards to defensive features at some point in the future. But somehow I doubt it, given that many people don't seem to have any problem with it. I wonder whether this may also be linked to the preference of Meeting Engagements in H2H games? I rarely ever see people pick fortifications anyway.
The fact that infantry dies like flies despite all your best, terrain-fiddly efforts to work around the problem is becoming a major deal breaker for me personally. It sucks the enthusiasm right out of me when it comes to map-creation. Infantry simply depends on using the protection provided by terrain. In CM, protection by terrain doesn't work that well as there is a lack of properly working defensive structures and issues with soldier placement (make good use of cover without completely ignoring LOS), which I understand must be a pain in the **** to code. This lack of staying power for infantry makes it quite hard to simulate real engagements. 
Sometimes I wished we could just paint abstract levels of "small arms + shrapnel protection for infantry" areas on selected action-squares of the map (directional would be ideal...). I'm a big fan of the ballistic model in the game, but I think it reaches its limits when every single cm counts, which is the case if we're talking about cover for infantry. Elevating or depressing 8x8m areas is not a sufficient mean to create cover for infantry and is also extremely fiddly and unreliable. The implementation "abstract protection modifiers" would just swipe away all the fiddlyness with one god-sent blow. No more worrying about unreliable soldier placement, no more worrying about overexposed soldiers (also: soldiers deciding switch from prone to kneel every now and then...), no more worrying about lack of LOS if the soldiers are not overexposed.
/rant mode off

No problem with on minute turns - any arbitrary line is going to be a compromise.
I do have a problem if the arc means that you spend 59 seconds of that minute holding fire against a new threat out of arc - a mistake, to be sure, but one that doesnt look all that plausible to me.
I use covered arcs a lot, but mostly for a limited set of reasons - 
Holding fire entirely. This happens all the time. This is fantasic with HQ units that need to be sharing C2 rather than fighting, scouts, etc. Usually these are small circular arcs, sometimes these are short directional ones for facing.
Ambushes and kill zones. Good when you get the chance.
Aiming tank turrets. In the odd situation where this is useful (coming around a building towards a known contact, for example), this can be the difference between winning or losing a tank duel. Saving a couple of seconds of turret traverse can be all it takes.
 
...that's about it for me. The downsides ("what if something goes wrong") otherwise outweigh the benefits for me.
 

The no targeting rule would be problematic in a non-infantry only battle since the various Target commands double as weapon selection commands. The TacAI tends to shoot HE at everything.
Well, why don't you tell us how you really think? 😄 I take it you have not played many QBs with completely unrestricted purchasing, particularly of the large or huge variety. If you did you would soon join the ranks of the broken-minded. The common refrain that the best OOB is a balanced OOB is not true in CM world, at least not in QBs where efficiency is paramount. Generally speaking, the way to achieve the most cost effective force is to purchase the smallest amount of infantry you can get away with then spend everything else on the best tanks available while completely ignoring artillery. There are a number of game mechanics that encourage this that I won't get into.
In the CM1 games there is a QB setting called Balanced that places limits on each unit type. It was the most popular QB type, at least in the ladders/clubs I was in. Placing limits on armor in particular is a fairly simple way to approximate the Balanced setting in CM2 QBs. It also has the virtue of being verifiable so it can be used with opponents you aren't sure can be trusted.

LOS calculation is a two-step process. The first is a simple LOS check from center of the action spot to the center of the other action spot. If this LOS check fails no unit in either action spot may spot each other and no further action is taken. If the center to center check passes then each individual soldier's LOS in that action spot can be checked against any point in the other action spot. In the former instance individual positioning within the action spot makes no difference, in the latter case it does.

I believe the problem is the same as for the other fortifications? It seems to be impossible to make features sink into the ground/terrain mesh. Take a look at the current trenches: they protrude from the ground, which of course, is not how they're supposed to work. In my opinion, fortifications are really the one major thing that is not handled well by Combat Mission games, and it makes infantry die like flies, especially to indirect fire and direct HE fire. While the mechanics do work as you'd expect, with ground stopping shrapnel effects, any attempt to recreate foritifcations by messing with elevations is rather futile, as the action spots come at a size of 8x8 meters (a depression of such a big size does not offer protection from arty), can't be camouflaged and also the troopers' placement within the depression is a roll of dice.
Ideally, dugouts/trenches/pits should have these characteristics: 
1) They should not be visible for the opponent in the terrain/ground mesh and have an excellent "hiding value" themselves, so that they're only discovered when you're right on them.
2) They should increase the hiding-value for units positioned in them (i.e. provide concealment).
3) They should be deep and narrow with sharp edges. The width of the trench is directly linked to the protection it provides against indirect fire. Every meter counts.
4) Troops inside the trench should position themselves in a way that exposes them as little as possible (head + raised weapon), while at the same time gives them good lines of sight (assuming that the surrounding terrain is flat...). 

Yes, it can be very useful. You can use if for ridge lines but also for getting men in place to perform buddy aid for troops in a difficult corner of an AS. If you find that your men will not buddy aid the poor bloke in the back left corner because they want to take cover in the opposite side, you can issue a slow move order to an AS that leaves the move order over the poor bloke. Add a 45s pause. At the end of the next turn your team will be part way through their move right over the poor bloke. Cancel the move order and they will stay there and most likely take care of him.

I believe the problem is the same as for the other fortifications? It seems to be impossible to make features sink into the ground/terrain mesh. Take a look at the current trenches: they protrude from the ground, which of course, is not how they're supposed to work. In my opinion, fortifications are really the one major thing that is not handled well by Combat Mission games, and it makes infantry die like flies, especially to indirect fire and direct HE fire. While the mechanics do work as you'd expect, with ground stopping shrapnel effects, any attempt to recreate foritifcations by messing with elevations is rather futile, as the action spots come at a size of 8x8 meters (a depression of such a big size does not offer protection from arty), can't be camouflaged and also the troopers' placement within the depression is a roll of dice.
Ideally, dugouts/trenches/pits should have these characteristics: 
1) They should not be visible for the opponent in the terrain/ground mesh and have an excellent "hiding value" themselves, so that they're only discovered when you're right on them.
2) They should increase the hiding-value for units positioned in them (i.e. provide concealment).
3) They should be deep and narrow with sharp edges. The width of the trench is directly linked to the protection it provides against indirect fire. Every meter counts.
4) Troops inside the trench should position themselves in a way that exposes them as little as possible (head + raised weapon), while at the same time gives them good lines of sight (assuming that the surrounding terrain is flat...). 

I also thought that if the Churchill was only 50 meters away, the crew must have heard the StuG? But then we don't know if the Churchill's engine was running, too? And then obsiovusly the Churchill crew must have been waiting, expecting to ambush any enemy vehicle that showed itself on the ridge. The decisive difference was obviously that the Churchills lacked infantry support. 
The StuG did not reposition to a secondary position, it just withdrew back behind the ridge to be safe from the other Churchills. So no proper shoot and scoot according to your definition, I'm afraid. How the other three Churchills were knocked out (the one close by by the StuG of another platoon; two others were a further 200 meters away, turrets pointing in another direction) is not described in detail. 
It's only in German and rather complicated to acquire via the Monte Cassino Foundation. Some of the book's contents (not the accounts of the actual action) strike me as uncritical/ideologically affirmative, as the author seems to have been a "proud" paratrooper, convinced of what he was doing. But on the plus side, the proceeds of the book's sale benefit the Monte Cassino Foundation. I became aware of the book during my research for my COII Catania/Primosole bridge scenario (https://forums.lnlpublishing.com/p/30089).

This topic deserves to stay up high in the list of topics (no sticky topics here?)! So I thought I could add an interesting account I've come upon, cited from Joseph Klein, Fallschirmjäger. Piniere der 1. Fallschrimjägerdivision im Italienkrieg", p. 89 (poor translation by myelf ^^). The author - who was a platoon leader in the parachute-engineer ("Fallschirmjägerpionier") battalion -  narrates his encounter with a troop of Churchill tanks at Termoli in early October 1943. I found it interesting as it is an example of both "info sharing" and "shoot and scoot".
Context: He and his men stumbled into 4 Churchills when they peeked over a sharp ridge. The clostest tank was only at a distance of 50m and the tanks had to be taken out quickly as they were overlooking the path of approach of their unsuspecting fellow platoons. The author also mentions that they had no Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck ("Ofenrohre") with them. They had captured enemy AT guns, but were reluctant to use them as they had no experience with them. They also couldn't knock the tank out with grenade bundles ("geballte Ladungen") as there was no cover to approach the tanks safely. However, the company of the author was supported by StuGs. His platoon also had a StuG (of some short-barreled variant) at hand, which had to do the job: 
"Due to its inflexibility, our StuG was at a disadvantage against the British tanks. It had no turret, so the whole vehicle had to be turned in order to aim. Also, the short-barreled gun posed some problems*. We hurriedly discussed our options with the StuG-crew. [The author goes on to assert the truth of the incredible story, he also points out that the StuG crewmen - of the 16th tank division - were veterans from the eastern front and their StuG's two (?!) gunbarrels were marked with 8-10 rings, indicating the number of their kills] First, we directed our StuG to the left side of the road which offered better concealment. Then one guy went to peek over the ridge to spot the enemy tank and indicate the line of collimation/direction to the target to another guy, who acted as a grain on which the StuG could orient itself. Finally our StuG was ready. It would need drive up the ridge in a straight line. The StuG's low silhouette was handy in this situation, as only ca. 50cm would need to be exposed to the enemy tank-gunner. As they had also considered the angle to their target, the StuG's crew had depressed their gun to the maximum - it looked as if it would fire into the ground. One of our squad-machine guns and some riflemen would trigger the action by abruptly opening fire at the vision slits in order to dazzle the enemy tank. [details about the position of the MG and riflemen...]
Then we got started: Shortly after the MG started to bark, and rifles and machine-pistols started to fire, the StuG's engine roared as it made its short approach to the crest of the ridge, followed by the dry "bang" of the StuG's gun. The Churchill tank was ablaze. It had been taken totally by surprise. As planned, its crew had been distracted by the machine gun and rifle fire, so they were unaware of the more serious threat. But I can't rule out that perhaps the machine gun and rifle fire had also had some effect on the crew inside the tank. We all rejoiced and were so excited that we almost forgot about the second enemy tank and threw our arms up in the air. [the StuG had withdrawn back behind the crest immediately after its shot] 
 
----------
* "...wobei die kurzen Stummelrohre ihrer Kanone nur wenig Ausschlag und Richtungsmöglichkeiten auf das Ziel geben konnten" ???

Yeah...now that you say I saw all your varied hedge and bocage combos in some pics already.
With regards to tank ditches I prefer the mod method as one can create  the classical ones this way. No odd & hard to recognize terrain alterations and WYSIWYG.
Regarding sunken roads and ditches, the pixel troopers dislike sloped terrain unless it provides some crested cover. Otherwise the games AI puts them to places where they can spot and shoot at the enemy as required. That´s the way it´s programmed and no way to change that basic behavior. There´s just that little trick by letting them move in column and slow "move" mode and stop/pause the current order. They´ll remain there until unpaused again, but otherwise it´s not really of much use actually.
Another trick of mine is placing crater terrain in an AS where I like the AI to move ptroopers individually. Craters is amongst the game AI´s most prefered cover terrain, even before foxholes sometimes. Seven tiny craters is sufficient most the time, the more if you´d like craters not so visible. One can even predict some the random crater placements if taking into consideration that each crater-click on the map turns them about 15° for the follow up one.

This topic deserves to stay up high in the list of topics (no sticky topics here?)! So I thought I could add an interesting account I've come upon, cited from Joseph Klein, Fallschirmjäger. Piniere der 1. Fallschrimjägerdivision im Italienkrieg", p. 89 (poor translation by myelf ^^). The author - who was a platoon leader in the parachute-engineer ("Fallschirmjägerpionier") battalion -  narrates his encounter with a troop of Churchill tanks at Termoli in early October 1943. I found it interesting as it is an example of both "info sharing" and "shoot and scoot".
Context: He and his men stumbled into 4 Churchills when they peeked over a sharp ridge. The clostest tank was only at a distance of 50m and the tanks had to be taken out quickly as they were overlooking the path of approach of their unsuspecting fellow platoons. The author also mentions that they had no Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck ("Ofenrohre") with them. They had captured enemy AT guns, but were reluctant to use them as they had no experience with them. They also couldn't knock the tank out with grenade bundles ("geballte Ladungen") as there was no cover to approach the tanks safely. However, the company of the author was supported by StuGs. His platoon also had a StuG (of some short-barreled variant) at hand, which had to do the job: 
"Due to its inflexibility, our StuG was at a disadvantage against the British tanks. It had no turret, so the whole vehicle had to be turned in order to aim. Also, the short-barreled gun posed some problems*. We hurriedly discussed our options with the StuG-crew. [The author goes on to assert the truth of the incredible story, he also points out that the StuG crewmen - of the 16th tank division - were veterans from the eastern front and their StuG's two (?!) gunbarrels were marked with 8-10 rings, indicating the number of their kills] First, we directed our StuG to the left side of the road which offered better concealment. Then one guy went to peek over the ridge to spot the enemy tank and indicate the line of collimation/direction to the target to another guy, who acted as a grain on which the StuG could orient itself. Finally our StuG was ready. It would need drive up the ridge in a straight line. The StuG's low silhouette was handy in this situation, as only ca. 50cm would need to be exposed to the enemy tank-gunner. As they had also considered the angle to their target, the StuG's crew had depressed their gun to the maximum - it looked as if it would fire into the ground. One of our squad-machine guns and some riflemen would trigger the action by abruptly opening fire at the vision slits in order to dazzle the enemy tank. [details about the position of the MG and riflemen...]
Then we got started: Shortly after the MG started to bark, and rifles and machine-pistols started to fire, the StuG's engine roared as it made its short approach to the crest of the ridge, followed by the dry "bang" of the StuG's gun. The Churchill tank was ablaze. It had been taken totally by surprise. As planned, its crew had been distracted by the machine gun and rifle fire, so they were unaware of the more serious threat. But I can't rule out that perhaps the machine gun and rifle fire had also had some effect on the crew inside the tank. We all rejoiced and were so excited that we almost forgot about the second enemy tank and threw our arms up in the air. [the StuG had withdrawn back behind the crest immediately after its shot] 
 
----------
* "...wobei die kurzen Stummelrohre ihrer Kanone nur wenig Ausschlag und Richtungsmöglichkeiten auf das Ziel geben konnten" ???

This topic deserves to stay up high in the list of topics (no sticky topics here?)! So I thought I could add an interesting account I've come upon, cited from Joseph Klein, Fallschirmjäger. Piniere der 1. Fallschrimjägerdivision im Italienkrieg", p. 89 (poor translation by myelf ^^). The author - who was a platoon leader in the parachute-engineer ("Fallschirmjägerpionier") battalion -  narrates his encounter with a troop of Churchill tanks at Termoli in early October 1943. I found it interesting as it is an example of both "info sharing" and "shoot and scoot".
Context: He and his men stumbled into 4 Churchills when they peeked over a sharp ridge. The clostest tank was only at a distance of 50m and the tanks had to be taken out quickly as they were overlooking the path of approach of their unsuspecting fellow platoons. The author also mentions that they had no Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck ("Ofenrohre") with them. They had captured enemy AT guns, but were reluctant to use them as they had no experience with them. They also couldn't knock the tank out with grenade bundles ("geballte Ladungen") as there was no cover to approach the tanks safely. However, the company of the author was supported by StuGs. His platoon also had a StuG (of some short-barreled variant) at hand, which had to do the job: 
"Due to its inflexibility, our StuG was at a disadvantage against the British tanks. It had no turret, so the whole vehicle had to be turned in order to aim. Also, the short-barreled gun posed some problems*. We hurriedly discussed our options with the StuG-crew. [The author goes on to assert the truth of the incredible story, he also points out that the StuG crewmen - of the 16th tank division - were veterans from the eastern front and their StuG's two (?!) gunbarrels were marked with 8-10 rings, indicating the number of their kills] First, we directed our StuG to the left side of the road which offered better concealment. Then one guy went to peek over the ridge to spot the enemy tank and indicate the line of collimation/direction to the target to another guy, who acted as a grain on which the StuG could orient itself. Finally our StuG was ready. It would need drive up the ridge in a straight line. The StuG's low silhouette was handy in this situation, as only ca. 50cm would need to be exposed to the enemy tank-gunner. As they had also considered the angle to their target, the StuG's crew had depressed their gun to the maximum - it looked as if it would fire into the ground. One of our squad-machine guns and some riflemen would trigger the action by abruptly opening fire at the vision slits in order to dazzle the enemy tank. [details about the position of the MG and riflemen...]
Then we got started: Shortly after the MG started to bark, and rifles and machine-pistols started to fire, the StuG's engine roared as it made its short approach to the crest of the ridge, followed by the dry "bang" of the StuG's gun. The Churchill tank was ablaze. It had been taken totally by surprise. As planned, its crew had been distracted by the machine gun and rifle fire, so they were unaware of the more serious threat. But I can't rule out that perhaps the machine gun and rifle fire had also had some effect on the crew inside the tank. We all rejoiced and were so excited that we almost forgot about the second enemy tank and threw our arms up in the air. [the StuG had withdrawn back behind the crest immediately after its shot] 
 
----------
* "...wobei die kurzen Stummelrohre ihrer Kanone nur wenig Ausschlag und Richtungsmöglichkeiten auf das Ziel geben konnten" ???

This topic deserves to stay up high in the list of topics (no sticky topics here?)! So I thought I could add an interesting account I've come upon, cited from Joseph Klein, Fallschirmjäger. Piniere der 1. Fallschrimjägerdivision im Italienkrieg", p. 89 (poor translation by myelf ^^). The author - who was a platoon leader in the parachute-engineer ("Fallschirmjägerpionier") battalion -  narrates his encounter with a troop of Churchill tanks at Termoli in early October 1943. I found it interesting as it is an example of both "info sharing" and "shoot and scoot".
Context: He and his men stumbled into 4 Churchills when they peeked over a sharp ridge. The clostest tank was only at a distance of 50m and the tanks had to be taken out quickly as they were overlooking the path of approach of their unsuspecting fellow platoons. The author also mentions that they had no Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck ("Ofenrohre") with them. They had captured enemy AT guns, but were reluctant to use them as they had no experience with them. They also couldn't knock the tank out with grenade bundles ("geballte Ladungen") as there was no cover to approach the tanks safely. However, the company of the author was supported by StuGs. His platoon also had a StuG (of some short-barreled variant) at hand, which had to do the job: 
"Due to its inflexibility, our StuG was at a disadvantage against the British tanks. It had no turret, so the whole vehicle had to be turned in order to aim. Also, the short-barreled gun posed some problems*. We hurriedly discussed our options with the StuG-crew. [The author goes on to assert the truth of the incredible story, he also points out that the StuG crewmen - of the 16th tank division - were veterans from the eastern front and their StuG's two (?!) gunbarrels were marked with 8-10 rings, indicating the number of their kills] First, we directed our StuG to the left side of the road which offered better concealment. Then one guy went to peek over the ridge to spot the enemy tank and indicate the line of collimation/direction to the target to another guy, who acted as a grain on which the StuG could orient itself. Finally our StuG was ready. It would need drive up the ridge in a straight line. The StuG's low silhouette was handy in this situation, as only ca. 50cm would need to be exposed to the enemy tank-gunner. As they had also considered the angle to their target, the StuG's crew had depressed their gun to the maximum - it looked as if it would fire into the ground. One of our squad-machine guns and some riflemen would trigger the action by abruptly opening fire at the vision slits in order to dazzle the enemy tank. [details about the position of the MG and riflemen...]
Then we got started: Shortly after the MG started to bark, and rifles and machine-pistols started to fire, the StuG's engine roared as it made its short approach to the crest of the ridge, followed by the dry "bang" of the StuG's gun. The Churchill tank was ablaze. It had been taken totally by surprise. As planned, its crew had been distracted by the machine gun and rifle fire, so they were unaware of the more serious threat. But I can't rule out that perhaps the machine gun and rifle fire had also had some effect on the crew inside the tank. We all rejoiced and were so excited that we almost forgot about the second enemy tank and threw our arms up in the air. [the StuG had withdrawn back behind the crest immediately after its shot] 
 
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* "...wobei die kurzen Stummelrohre ihrer Kanone nur wenig Ausschlag und Richtungsmöglichkeiten auf das Ziel geben konnten" ???

This topic deserves to stay up high in the list of topics (no sticky topics here?)! So I thought I could add an interesting account I've come upon, cited from Joseph Klein, Fallschirmjäger. Piniere der 1. Fallschrimjägerdivision im Italienkrieg", p. 89 (poor translation by myelf ^^). The author - who was a platoon leader in the parachute-engineer ("Fallschirmjägerpionier") battalion -  narrates his encounter with a troop of Churchill tanks at Termoli in early October 1943. I found it interesting as it is an example of both "info sharing" and "shoot and scoot".
Context: He and his men stumbled into 4 Churchills when they peeked over a sharp ridge. The clostest tank was only at a distance of 50m and the tanks had to be taken out quickly as they were overlooking the path of approach of their unsuspecting fellow platoons. The author also mentions that they had no Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck ("Ofenrohre") with them. They had captured enemy AT guns, but were reluctant to use them as they had no experience with them. They also couldn't knock the tank out with grenade bundles ("geballte Ladungen") as there was no cover to approach the tanks safely. However, the company of the author was supported by StuGs. His platoon also had a StuG (of some short-barreled variant) at hand, which had to do the job: 
"Due to its inflexibility, our StuG was at a disadvantage against the British tanks. It had no turret, so the whole vehicle had to be turned in order to aim. Also, the short-barreled gun posed some problems*. We hurriedly discussed our options with the StuG-crew. [The author goes on to assert the truth of the incredible story, he also points out that the StuG crewmen - of the 16th tank division - were veterans from the eastern front and their StuG's two (?!) gunbarrels were marked with 8-10 rings, indicating the number of their kills] First, we directed our StuG to the left side of the road which offered better concealment. Then one guy went to peek over the ridge to spot the enemy tank and indicate the line of collimation/direction to the target to another guy, who acted as a grain on which the StuG could orient itself. Finally our StuG was ready. It would need drive up the ridge in a straight line. The StuG's low silhouette was handy in this situation, as only ca. 50cm would need to be exposed to the enemy tank-gunner. As they had also considered the angle to their target, the StuG's crew had depressed their gun to the maximum - it looked as if it would fire into the ground. One of our squad-machine guns and some riflemen would trigger the action by abruptly opening fire at the vision slits in order to dazzle the enemy tank. [details about the position of the MG and riflemen...]
Then we got started: Shortly after the MG started to bark, and rifles and machine-pistols started to fire, the StuG's engine roared as it made its short approach to the crest of the ridge, followed by the dry "bang" of the StuG's gun. The Churchill tank was ablaze. It had been taken totally by surprise. As planned, its crew had been distracted by the machine gun and rifle fire, so they were unaware of the more serious threat. But I can't rule out that perhaps the machine gun and rifle fire had also had some effect on the crew inside the tank. We all rejoiced and were so excited that we almost forgot about the second enemy tank and threw our arms up in the air. [the StuG had withdrawn back behind the crest immediately after its shot] 
 
----------
* "...wobei die kurzen Stummelrohre ihrer Kanone nur wenig Ausschlag und Richtungsmöglichkeiten auf das Ziel geben konnten" ???

This topic deserves to stay up high in the list of topics (no sticky topics here?)! So I thought I could add an interesting account I've come upon, cited from Joseph Klein, Fallschirmjäger. Piniere der 1. Fallschrimjägerdivision im Italienkrieg", p. 89 (poor translation by myelf ^^). The author - who was a platoon leader in the parachute-engineer ("Fallschirmjägerpionier") battalion -  narrates his encounter with a troop of Churchill tanks at Termoli in early October 1943. I found it interesting as it is an example of both "info sharing" and "shoot and scoot".
Context: He and his men stumbled into 4 Churchills when they peeked over a sharp ridge. The clostest tank was only at a distance of 50m and the tanks had to be taken out quickly as they were overlooking the path of approach of their unsuspecting fellow platoons. The author also mentions that they had no Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck ("Ofenrohre") with them. They had captured enemy AT guns, but were reluctant to use them as they had no experience with them. They also couldn't knock the tank out with grenade bundles ("geballte Ladungen") as there was no cover to approach the tanks safely. However, the company of the author was supported by StuGs. His platoon also had a StuG (of some short-barreled variant) at hand, which had to do the job: 
"Due to its inflexibility, our StuG was at a disadvantage against the British tanks. It had no turret, so the whole vehicle had to be turned in order to aim. Also, the short-barreled gun posed some problems*. We hurriedly discussed our options with the StuG-crew. [The author goes on to assert the truth of the incredible story, he also points out that the StuG crewmen - of the 16th tank division - were veterans from the eastern front and their StuG's two (?!) gunbarrels were marked with 8-10 rings, indicating the number of their kills] First, we directed our StuG to the left side of the road which offered better concealment. Then one guy went to peek over the ridge to spot the enemy tank and indicate the line of collimation/direction to the target to another guy, who acted as a grain on which the StuG could orient itself. Finally our StuG was ready. It would need drive up the ridge in a straight line. The StuG's low silhouette was handy in this situation, as only ca. 50cm would need to be exposed to the enemy tank-gunner. As they had also considered the angle to their target, the StuG's crew had depressed their gun to the maximum - it looked as if it would fire into the ground. One of our squad-machine guns and some riflemen would trigger the action by abruptly opening fire at the vision slits in order to dazzle the enemy tank. [details about the position of the MG and riflemen...]
Then we got started: Shortly after the MG started to bark, and rifles and machine-pistols started to fire, the StuG's engine roared as it made its short approach to the crest of the ridge, followed by the dry "bang" of the StuG's gun. The Churchill tank was ablaze. It had been taken totally by surprise. As planned, its crew had been distracted by the machine gun and rifle fire, so they were unaware of the more serious threat. But I can't rule out that perhaps the machine gun and rifle fire had also had some effect on the crew inside the tank. We all rejoiced and were so excited that we almost forgot about the second enemy tank and threw our arms up in the air. [the StuG had withdrawn back behind the crest immediately after its shot] 
 
----------
* "...wobei die kurzen Stummelrohre ihrer Kanone nur wenig Ausschlag und Richtungsmöglichkeiten auf das Ziel geben konnten" ???

This topic deserves to stay up high in the list of topics (no sticky topics here?)! So I thought I could add an interesting account I've come upon, cited from Joseph Klein, Fallschirmjäger. Piniere der 1. Fallschrimjägerdivision im Italienkrieg", p. 89 (poor translation by myelf ^^). The author - who was a platoon leader in the parachute-engineer ("Fallschirmjägerpionier") battalion -  narrates his encounter with a troop of Churchill tanks at Termoli in early October 1943. I found it interesting as it is an example of both "info sharing" and "shoot and scoot".
Context: He and his men stumbled into 4 Churchills when they peeked over a sharp ridge. The clostest tank was only at a distance of 50m and the tanks had to be taken out quickly as they were overlooking the path of approach of their unsuspecting fellow platoons. The author also mentions that they had no Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck ("Ofenrohre") with them. They had captured enemy AT guns, but were reluctant to use them as they had no experience with them. They also couldn't knock the tank out with grenade bundles ("geballte Ladungen") as there was no cover to approach the tanks safely. However, the company of the author was supported by StuGs. His platoon also had a StuG (of some short-barreled variant) at hand, which had to do the job: 
"Due to its inflexibility, our StuG was at a disadvantage against the British tanks. It had no turret, so the whole vehicle had to be turned in order to aim. Also, the short-barreled gun posed some problems*. We hurriedly discussed our options with the StuG-crew. [The author goes on to assert the truth of the incredible story, he also points out that the StuG crewmen - of the 16th tank division - were veterans from the eastern front and their StuG's two (?!) gunbarrels were marked with 8-10 rings, indicating the number of their kills] First, we directed our StuG to the left side of the road which offered better concealment. Then one guy went to peek over the ridge to spot the enemy tank and indicate the line of collimation/direction to the target to another guy, who acted as a grain on which the StuG could orient itself. Finally our StuG was ready. It would need drive up the ridge in a straight line. The StuG's low silhouette was handy in this situation, as only ca. 50cm would need to be exposed to the enemy tank-gunner. As they had also considered the angle to their target, the StuG's crew had depressed their gun to the maximum - it looked as if it would fire into the ground. One of our squad-machine guns and some riflemen would trigger the action by abruptly opening fire at the vision slits in order to dazzle the enemy tank. [details about the position of the MG and riflemen...]
Then we got started: Shortly after the MG started to bark, and rifles and machine-pistols started to fire, the StuG's engine roared as it made its short approach to the crest of the ridge, followed by the dry "bang" of the StuG's gun. The Churchill tank was ablaze. It had been taken totally by surprise. As planned, its crew had been distracted by the machine gun and rifle fire, so they were unaware of the more serious threat. But I can't rule out that perhaps the machine gun and rifle fire had also had some effect on the crew inside the tank. We all rejoiced and were so excited that we almost forgot about the second enemy tank and threw our arms up in the air. [the StuG had withdrawn back behind the crest immediately after its shot] 
 
----------
* "...wobei die kurzen Stummelrohre ihrer Kanone nur wenig Ausschlag und Richtungsmöglichkeiten auf das Ziel geben konnten" ???

This topic deserves to stay up high in the list of topics (no sticky topics here?)! So I thought I could add an interesting account I've come upon, cited from Joseph Klein, Fallschirmjäger. Piniere der 1. Fallschrimjägerdivision im Italienkrieg", p. 89 (poor translation by myelf ^^). The author - who was a platoon leader in the parachute-engineer ("Fallschirmjägerpionier") battalion -  narrates his encounter with a troop of Churchill tanks at Termoli in early October 1943. I found it interesting as it is an example of both "info sharing" and "shoot and scoot".
Context: He and his men stumbled into 4 Churchills when they peeked over a sharp ridge. The clostest tank was only at a distance of 50m and the tanks had to be taken out quickly as they were overlooking the path of approach of their unsuspecting fellow platoons. The author also mentions that they had no Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck ("Ofenrohre") with them. They had captured enemy AT guns, but were reluctant to use them as they had no experience with them. They also couldn't knock the tank out with grenade bundles ("geballte Ladungen") as there was no cover to approach the tanks safely. However, the company of the author was supported by StuGs. His platoon also had a StuG (of some short-barreled variant) at hand, which had to do the job: 
"Due to its inflexibility, our StuG was at a disadvantage against the British tanks. It had no turret, so the whole vehicle had to be turned in order to aim. Also, the short-barreled gun posed some problems*. We hurriedly discussed our options with the StuG-crew. [The author goes on to assert the truth of the incredible story, he also points out that the StuG crewmen - of the 16th tank division - were veterans from the eastern front and their StuG's two (?!) gunbarrels were marked with 8-10 rings, indicating the number of their kills] First, we directed our StuG to the left side of the road which offered better concealment. Then one guy went to peek over the ridge to spot the enemy tank and indicate the line of collimation/direction to the target to another guy, who acted as a grain on which the StuG could orient itself. Finally our StuG was ready. It would need drive up the ridge in a straight line. The StuG's low silhouette was handy in this situation, as only ca. 50cm would need to be exposed to the enemy tank-gunner. As they had also considered the angle to their target, the StuG's crew had depressed their gun to the maximum - it looked as if it would fire into the ground. One of our squad-machine guns and some riflemen would trigger the action by abruptly opening fire at the vision slits in order to dazzle the enemy tank. [details about the position of the MG and riflemen...]
Then we got started: Shortly after the MG started to bark, and rifles and machine-pistols started to fire, the StuG's engine roared as it made its short approach to the crest of the ridge, followed by the dry "bang" of the StuG's gun. The Churchill tank was ablaze. It had been taken totally by surprise. As planned, its crew had been distracted by the machine gun and rifle fire, so they were unaware of the more serious threat. But I can't rule out that perhaps the machine gun and rifle fire had also had some effect on the crew inside the tank. We all rejoiced and were so excited that we almost forgot about the second enemy tank and threw our arms up in the air. [the StuG had withdrawn back behind the crest immediately after its shot] 
 
----------
* "...wobei die kurzen Stummelrohre ihrer Kanone nur wenig Ausschlag und Richtungsmöglichkeiten auf das Ziel geben konnten" ???