ikalugin

To be honest through going for the 120mm gun-mortars (Nona derivatives) we are getting the 152mm class bang down to battalion level if this wasn't already done by allocating full sized, if old (2S3) 152mm guns. An interesting fact - the 2S3 152mm gun has the performance of the ML-20, which was considered сorps-army level asset when it was developed.

I think it is important to diffirentiate between the standard practice of using the units to generate BTGs (essentially splitting them apart in wartime into independent commands) vs generating temporary mission orientated task forces or detachments, such as forward detachment, flanking detachment, forward guard, etc, which operate within the overall mission and intent of their parent unit or formation. p.s. the idea of forward detachment is not knew, it was used not only in WW2 but before then, as you always could use a force to secure key points or routes in advance of the main forces, to fix defending enemy forces until the main forces arrive (or bypass) etc.

You are describing that ad-hoc division/corps level formation built out of incomplete brigades above, as well as decribe the problems it had. If Ukraine is traing to fight the battle with full sized brigades acting as part of a larger force then Ukraine is on the right path I would say. While Vostok-2018 was played out mostly with commands and their staffs and so on (instead of life units), it may still provide an interesting insight into the scale of any potential "big" operation in Ukraine.

I fear that after the Kiev loyalist efforts to first encircle then split away the separatist forces via application of ad-hoc division/corps structures made out of brigades failed the Ukrainian (and not only Ukrainian) military thinkers made the wrong conclusion, that smaller formations would work better in such a war. However in my opinion it has shown the contrary - that the ad-hoc division/corps formations Ukraine had were insufficiently large, did not have the proper C4ISR, did not have the means (fires, remotely deployed minefields etc) to cover the spaces between the units, their flanks and rear. Which means that if Ukraine wants a force capable of conducting an operation properly what it should do is try to form, co-train etc some sort of better division/corps structures, possible army structures, capable of operating at great range (depth) and speed, not to divolve their forces into means of generating BTGs. As to the Russia vs NATO this strongly depends on the specifics of a scenario. In the scale of the Ukrainian "big" war deployment of reasonable NATO forces (up to say 2 armoured divisions) may be decisive on tactical level, but less significant on operational and strategic level, especially depending on how those are actually deployed. For a fictional example I would recall the use of US VII corps in the Red Army by Peters.

P.s. The two large scale offensive operations of the post cold war era (ODS, OIF) were classical manuever operations using envelopment and pierce through methods. If Ukraine prepares for the "small" war using the current experience in Donbas then it may run into the same problem Georgia did in 2008.

This is called tactical bias and is one of the problems such conflicts create. While indeed it is unlikely that we would see "WWII style" battles in the future, after all the deep battle has been superceded by the non linear battle in the past half century, the old truth of strategic->operational->tactical is still there and the "big" war between adversaries would result in manuevers by large scale forces (in our case - Armies). In such a war building your force around generation of tactical groupings would make it less efficient at the higher levels. For example if you build your brigades to generate (be split into) self sufficient BTGs (or divisions generate brigades, etc) instead of fighting them as a unified force you loose the synergy unified forces offer and the internal flexibility on each level. As such, in my opinion, it is much better to build brigades to generate mission orientated task forces (forward detachment, flanking detachment etc) in their interest or in the interest of the above level than to build brigades to generate (be split into) self sufficient BTGs or other such groupings below their level.

Yes, in the "big" war we can expected much more massed (and deep) fires (inlcuding the use of airpower by both sides), more assertive ECM usage, large scale manuevers by army sized groupings and their units within a non-linear battles. Small scale artillery use, small unit tactics, positional warfare experience etc may be useful in some ways, but very harmful in others. Use of many forms of organisation, such as the battalion tactical groups, would no longer be useful, etc.

The conflict in the Donbas may provide false experience for a large scale war.

The fires are called in by the forward based artillery officer, not the manuever unit commander. As such I am not sure how the above is applicable. Incidentally this is why you get separation between commander's vehicles and senior officer's vehicles down to battery level, one moves with the troops, the other stays with the guns. Such direct and competent control of arty, all other things being the same, allows for faster fires.

But historically Ukraine never recovered after the break up of the Soviet Union and did badly under every administration, so I would not be optimistic for either option. If anything I believe that Poroshenko, with the external help, would be able to keep his seat, which is why there is re-newed interest in Zelensky's backer. https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_cd&hl=ru&dl=ru#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_pp_kd&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:AZE:ARM:BLR:GEO:KAZ:KGZ:LTU:LVA:MDA:RUS:TJK:TKM:UZB:UKR:EST&ifdim=region&hl=ru&dl=ru&ind=false GDP per capita inflation and purchasing power adjusted. If anything you can view it as a smaller, poorer version of Russia as any problems you may think Russia have (ie HIV epidemic) Ukraine would also have it.

This is a semi dead forum. So probably a lot.

(as this thread is now doomed probably) Yes, it seems like Zelensky is the popular candidate, if unlikely to win.

Local admin has an agenda to challenge -Russian narratives- and a strong confirmation bias. If you want to discuss the politics behind this crisis you should consider doing it elsewhere, especially if your position is not pro-Kiev.

It is interesting to see how in addition to the 3rd, 144th divisions on the border, 150th, 2nd, 4th, 42nd, 90th divisions in the send operational echelon we appear to be building two more in the Southern MD. Those existing divisions alone would have 21-28 front line regiments between them, without accounting for brigades in the region. The positioning is also interesting, 3rd is sitting on the flank of the CTO forces and 150th behind the bulk of separatist forces.

Fortunately it does not seem like there would be any major action prior to the 21st.

Same engine as the big Sukhoi fighters.

https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/6205134interesting statement by Shoigu: - 394k contract servicemen in the force - in each regiment and brigade 2/3 battalions (BTGs?) are formed out of contract servicemen, 1/3 made out of conscripts is held de-facto in reserve - 136 such BTGs are held at combat readiness at any point in time - the force is manned to 95-100 percent

https://thebulletin.org/2019/02/russia-may-have-violated-the-inf-treaty-heres-how-the-united-states-appears-to-have-done-the-same/ https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/navy-missile-defenses-in-eastern-europe-could-push-back-against-russia-cno-says-1.567918 Arms control is dying, I have few hopes for the new START extension. Back to the topic of Iskanders, the primary A-A killer would be Kinzhal (MiG-31 deployed ALBM) not Iskander, with Kinzhal now being on pad alert in case there is a need to hit A-A sites (or other time urgent high value targets) promptly.

The issue here is with delays that can be caused by politicians which would nulify the usefulness of a quick response force if it doesnt have actual combat formations in it. To be honest I think the cause for the current situation is simple - the meat of the Western armed forces is being cut while staff officers and HQs remain or multiply.

Sukhoi did research square nozles back in the day.

Atleast it doesnt seem to make any obvious errors ie not represent the Northern MD.

Well unless you do the build up in peace time, in case a decision to go to war would be made in the future, and regularly train for such a contingency. Something that the Russia did over the past years with the newly formed divisions and rebased/newly formed brigades and other units.

And removed certain weapons that were not fielded.

That was some quality necromancy.

In Russia you can apply to such alternative service, but in practice few choose it, as you need to make an effort to show that you absolutely cannot serve in the regular service. To be honest I think that the hybrid system is the way to go for Russia, as it: - allows to fill the non combat roles with mediocre conscripts who do just fine in them. - allows to scout talent for the contract troops. - allows to generate reservists.