ikalugin

By this logic T14 is more real as Oplot, as more of them were built. Here is CAST reporting on two T90M contracts: https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3315325.html

In service T72B3 with Arena. How many APS equiped BTR-4s does Ukraine operate?

How many game relevant Oplots are in Ukrainian service?

Which T-90?

Atleast it is not the "we would be making 120 Oplots per year in 2017" story. Ukraine had 477/490 and the like for decades, recalling the Soviet and then Russian efforts to develop a new generation of MBTs, the current situation with new tank manufacturing in Ukraine (ie the Thai contract situation), I have my doubts about the plausibility of a new tank being developed and mass produced, even under the most favourable scenarios. But if you have something concrete on the new developments - that would be nice to see.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-01/state-department-backs-39-million-javelin-package-for-ukraine Apparently this would be separate of military aid.

100 T64BV m2017 would not be enough to arm the brigades, so the brigades have mixed equipment by that logic.

Nona&co have more potent ammo options, which are broadly comparable with 152mm classics. That is one of it's main selling points so to speak. This is achieved by having thinner walls in shells that use lower ballistics.

To be honest 120mm gun-mortars can be better, ie Nona and it's derivatives.

It is in Ukrainian, so Haiduk could provide a more accurate translation. So from top to down, nominal today USD (for a rough feel relevant to foreighn procurement in USD) for 2019 and 2020: - National security and defense council of ukraine 7350000, 1160000000 - Ukrainian MoD 424000000, 4240000000 -- Command and control 27200000, 27200000, -- Day to day activities, training, medical, veteran affairs 3440000000, 3470000000 -- procurement, modernisation and repair of equipment 702000000, 702000000 -- Housing 34700000, 34400000 -- Scrapping of ammo and arms, maintenance of warehouses 63000000, 63000000 - Special transport service 33100000, 38600000 - Military intelligence service 118000000, 118000000 - Ministry of internal affairs 3440000000, 3470000000 -- National guard 512000000, 514000000 -- EMRCOM 570000000, 573000000 -- Border guards 447000000, 449000000 -- Police 1220000000, 122000000 - Internal/counter intelligence service 399000000, 400000000 - External intelligence service 83700000, 83700000 - Secure communications and informational security service 121000000, 121000000 - VIP security service 55500000, 55500000 Note that Hrivna does appear undervalued and that wages in Ukraine are low, so the purchasing power of those funds in Ukraine may be higher than indicated by their nominal USD value.

That would work, though I wonder if there are hidden costs, ie with the now common practice of selling something for free but forcing the buyer to go with overpriced maintenance or whatever.

The promo clip is ok I guess. It is interesting to see that the "terrorists" have an Army sized formation, supported by air defenses and air power amongst other things, and which penetrated 150km into the depth of the defender.

ATGMs were never the Ukrainian Armed Forces weak point in my opinion. If Ukraine would have to pay for those imported weapons then there may be a problem, because they would be priced in USDs and not Hrivnas while the Ministry for Defense budget seems to stay around the same in nominal Hrivna as it was in 2019, ~102,5bn of the overall MoD budget, out of which ~17bn or ~0,7bn nominal USD seem to be planned for procurement, modernisation and repair of arms. While 700m USD could allow such procurement, this does seem to account for everything, so I would assume that buying domestic ATGMs may be the more cost effective option. And ofcourse I assume the best case scenario, where the funding is fully allocated and used efficiently.

Well, Center-2019 is quite interesting, with regimental scale VDV paradrop.

Yes, but because not all complexes are divizions (for example look at the S300V that Ukraine operates - there a system is called a divizion) calling complexes battalions is a bad practice and is misleading the reader in my opinion. Same applies to Russia etc ofc, which is why I tend to try to use clear cut terminology.

Battalion is a misleading translation because ЗРК=/=ЗРДН. And yesm sinlge Osa units would qualify too.

New model for the Okhotnik-B UCAV:

@Haiduk I am aware of this list (and the white book) and this is why a breakdown is important, as for example ЗРК could stand for anything between a MANPADS launcher to S300V SAM battery or S300PS SAM divizion. So without those breakdowns the figures are not quite all that usefull.

I think it would be fair to say that at this point the Ukrainain AFV production industry is both zombified via internal problems (ie corruption) and has it's lifeblood (workforce) drained (ie by Russian and Polish companies). But it would be nice to see agregate confirmed delivery figures on domestic orders over the past 5 years of new AFVs and for deep modernisation. While 100 upgraded T64BVs may sound impressive, they should be compared against either the opposing force or the VSU's own losses (79-175 lost?).

Sanctions were the least important factor in the recent economic downturn. I guess you know more about what is happening in Russian elites than the Russian elites themselves, heh. How did sanctions limit budget allocations to the military? Spending has been fairly stable in the past ~5 years.

Means that you can restrict the data provided etc. The verification measures were intentionally limited during the treaty write up due to the security concerns regarding other activities, this is why those provisions are in the treaty. Now you can argue that this weakens the verification regime, but this is how it was intended and writen.

Well this is where the test of logic comes into the game. For example if a US spacecraft with a prototype reactor has it's booster explode on the launch pad - would this be covered by security provisions? In my (and it seems fairly common legally speaking) reading of the treaty it will have the right to do so, in fact this is the kind of situation those provisions were writen into the treaty according to some of the authors I talked to - so the stations could not be used to collect intelligence data.

The treaty is there to cover tests of nuclear weapons. Unless you have a reasonable belief that this indeed was a nuclear weapon test (and I have not see any serious allegations to that end) this falls under those articles, as this was an event involving nuclear power plant of some sort, not a nuclear weapon explosion/test. The test of logic here would be: if a terrorist drives an aircraft into a nuclear power plant (on say a nuclear submarine) - would this be covered by the CTBT, as the event both produces an explosion and radioactive fallout? Plus, because US (and a bunch of other countries) did not ratify the treaty - it is not yet in force.

Sure thing. Source: https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treatytext.tt.html General provisions 7-8-9: 7. Each State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to this Treaty. 8. Moreover, all necessary measures shall be taken to protect the confidentiality of any information related to civil and military activities and facilities obtained during verification activities. 9. Subject to paragraph 8, information obtained by the Organization through the verification regime established by this Treaty shall be made available to all States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. I guess citing them as articles may have been misleading/incorrect.

Yea, seems like Russia went with articles 7-8-9 of the CTBT to preclude the use of those stations by foreighn powers for intelligence data collection.