ikalugin

Long story cut short - there is/was a lot of talk of improving the T90A fleet in the same manner the T72B fleet has been upgraded to the T72B3. In my opinion this is highly probable. Also, in my opinion this upgrade program would run separately from the initial Armata procurement.

Divisions are more manpower effecient per equipment. There are 4 new divisions (tank and motorised rifle) in the south-west axis in the process of formation. Divisions use about half the manpower of an equivalent (in tanks and IFVs) force in brigades. Considering that a standard Russian army type formation had 4 front line combat brigades, with 2 armies assighned to MD, this is a 100-200 percent increase in main weapon items in the south-western axis without accounting for other factors.

You have repplied after I have asked Or atleast that is how the forum shows it to me.

Steve, before I repply to your new post, did you read the 2nd one post edit?

I would try avoid political discussion (as it is toxic). The problem is that there would be only 48-96 hours between the political decision being made and invasion happening. The ability to do this comes from: change in posture. change in capabilities The former comes from redeployment of old units and formation of new ones. I have illustrated it on my original infographic. The later comes from the change in the overall force composition (more contract troops), unit structure (focused for rapid deployments) and from training. An example of this training was the movement of 65k troops (1+ VDV divisions, 6+ combat brigades of Ground Forces) over 72 hours (from units being alerted to the end of redeployment) across the distance of 3000km, mostly by rail road. You can read more here: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46133

Ratios and density (and relative depth and other factors) determine operational results, including relative losses. The combat unit or formation effectiveness is determined by relative losses. Thus the results of high intensity military operations are only weakly dependent on absolute strengths, especially those in manpower. The approach I see you use only uses manpower. Not only is this approach bad (as it does not lead to combat power comparison), it is misleading as the ratios (and combat power comparison) it provides is faulty, see the example I have used above where I have compared 10k troops with 3333 mosins against 10k troops in an MRD. If you plan to use absolute figures, they should be in units with given OOBs, as then you can get ratios and denseties (and all the other factors). I would not go into the political discussion (as it is toxic), my point was that your views on LDNR and Ukrainian force capabilities differ from mine radically. As an example - I would view the 2 LDNR operational commands as valid formations within the overall force.

About the scenarios. The land bridge scenario is not credible, as there is a bridge into Crimea under construction, morever it would generate lengthly open flanks with good road network penetrating said flanks. The LDNR support (ie where they are expanded to the entirety of their admin regions) is again not credible, as it does not benefit Russia in any way. The only scenario that I see as credible is about: destroying the Ukrainian state's ability to wage war. destroying/displacing Ukrainian leadership. creating a border buffer zone under pro-Russian control. In this scenario Russia would reduce the potential threat generated by the new Ukrainian regime. It also avoids any COIN operations, as we are not occupying any anti-russian regions or any regions at all for that matter. The current change of posture (with the build up) implies that this is the scenario we are preparing for. So far I am not aware of the relevant change in posture by Ukraine (or NATO), for example creation of the viable defensive groupings north/east of Kiev. Unless such change happens Ukrainian defense against massive russian invasion is not credible.

More on the force ratios and such: The Russian Forces infographic is in the works (and is more or less finished), but it is possible that it would not be released by itself due to the reasons stated above (ie - legal prosecution). Thus, sadly, you may have to wait untill the compehensive fictional scenarios (much likes the materials you can find here: https://ru.scribd.com/doc/312855400/Decisive-Action-Training-Enviornment-Version-2-2) are ready. The readily availiable direct combat units of the Ground Forces in potential invasion force meet Steve's creteria for "100k manpower" (in fact are exceeding that creteria by a good margin). The same units in the potential invasion force have a significant quantative (and to lesser extend qualitative) advantage in terms of equipment (for example 3/1 ratio in tanks) when compared to the entire Ukrainian Forces. The same units in the potential invasion force have a much better structure and placement - in cohesive units and well placed vs incohesive group of dispersed subunits enfixed in a vulnerable geographic region. p.s. Ukrainian airforce is about the only easy thing about Ukrainian Armed Forces - you can account flight worthy aircraft by number.

Missed that post. The problem is that we disageee on the specifics. From my point of view the absolute manpower figures are useless and the only way to discuss scenarios is to discuss them in force ratios and specific unit/formation set ups. The reasons for this I have outlined above. However in order to prove that point I need to write a long post, something I don't have the resources for now (but I will in the future). In my material about the Russian build up I have (in part) outlined likely Russian Armed Forces units that would participate in the operations. I assume that you are fammiliar with standard Russian OOBs. To make a legitimate scenario using that approach I need to write up the structure for Ukrainians as well, which is quite hard to. p.s. another problem is that we have radically different perspectives on the Ukrainian civil war in general, which leads to different views on, for example, capabilities of Ukrainian Armed Forces (and other relevant forces) and the separatist forces. In order to challenge those views I would need an objective factual base, which I am in process of collecting. p.p.s. in fact it is not even limited to Ukraine - same goes with, say, Georgia. General consensus is that Russia did not achieve numerical (or qualitative) superiority in Georgia (including the split off areas), much less introduce 80k troops into Georgia. Which makes me wonder, where did you get that 80k figure? Which units that 80k figure is made out of (units and subunits that have entered Georgia are known by their unit numbers)?

And that is where the "classical" western view was wrong, sadly it was not corrected with the new materials that became availiable in late 80s and early 90s. Classical Soviet view of the problem was a bolt out of the blue attack, after short (48-96 hours from the political decision being made) preparation. The reasons for this are simple - force density and engeniering/defensive preparation. Density (which would increase as both sides reinforce their groupings) has a non linear relationship with casualty rates (ie casualty rates grow faster than density), per same force ratio and other factors. Engeniering/defensive preparations are self explanatory, for example you should look at the time tables for the deployment of minor NATO members in NORTAG. as a p.s. The potential invasion force has well above 100k troops in the readily availiable direct combat units of Ground Forces alone.

And I would return to my original work. My points was that the attack on Ukraine can happen with little to no preparation. It appears that the stuff I need to show: - peacetime locaiton of relevant Russian (and Donbas) forces on unit (formation) by unit (formation) basis, their strength and training and not the vague manpower figures. - speed with which those units can be brought to bear with relevant evidence (ie data from exercises, relevant calculations) - locations of relevant Ukrainian forces on uniit by unit basis, their strength and training and not the vague manpower figures. - possible operational scenarios with depths, force ratios, playthroughs and what not. Did I miss anything? p.s. the reason why I plan to do force comparisons bases on units vs manpower is because manpower is not representative of the combat power - 10k people with 3333 mosins does not have the same combat power as a modern motorised rifle division. p.p.s. the final product may take form of a hypotheoretical scenario with the names (and a number of other details) changed, to avoid legal prosecution.

As a note to the previous post. (I appologise for the style, I have some minor health problems at the moment and could not sleep, sleep depravation leading to a marginal degration of my cognitative ability) The problem with the absolute figures is that they only provide force density, without providing the force ratio (with the defender's strength not stated). This means that we cannot discuss the likely outcomes of operations using absolute figures for one side. The problem with the use of manpower figures is that it does not represent the combat power of sides, the obvious example would be using manpower for a mechanized force made out of combat units without accounting for rear services (and other such troops) and comparing it to the manpower of a non mechanized force with rear services and units that are not combat effective (low readiness due to training or spatial dispersion), especially in a low force density operational area. Hence, if you plan to use absolute figures, a much better way (in my opinion) would be to count combat units and formations (ie how many manuever units of a given strength the sides have), major equipment items in those units and formations (ie arty and tank ratios)

You are giving forces: 1) in absolute figures. 2) in manpower figures. And not in ratios. Sorry to nit pick, but can you please answer my answer and state the ratios? p.s. we can discuss the state of Ukrainian Armed (and other relevant) Forces later, as I would provide relevant materials. For now we can talk in relative numbers (ie ratios). If you are willing to share such materials (TOEs, unit positioning and strength) yourself, feel free to do so and base your arguments on them.

A quick comment, Steve, what kind of force ratio (in the first and second operational level echelons, when compared to the defender's overall force) do you believe is sufficient to conduct offensive operations, in the attack from the cold scenario? I would note that the scenario: - has a low operational density of forces. - the bulk of defender's forces are in well known locations and are enfixed. - the attacker's mobile grouping sits on the operational flank of the defender's primary force concentration. (I won't go into the air war, initial salvo exchange or the quality of troops just yet).

Current posture change already generates that threat. Evidence: entire Ukrainian force lacks numerical superiority in major equipment items (ie tanks) over the potentially hostile forces close to (and in case of LDNR forces - inside) the pre 2014 borders. This means that, with the low theatre force density, a potential adversary can conduct offensive operation from peace time positions, without preparations. Without the change of Ukrainian (and NATO) peace time posture this threat would persist. p.s. the above argument was based on my infographic and tank figures provided by you earlier in this thread. My infographic is actually very conservative, for example there is evidence that one of the MRDs I have marked close to Ukrainian pre 2014 border is actually a TD with an additional detached motorised rifle brigade in close proximity. Then there are follow on forces to consider.

On a related note, what would be the political trigger for NATO deployment to Ukraine in your opinion? Same regarding the indirect support.

Thanks for the information. I would think about it. The problem is that due to the change in posture the delay between the political decision and invasion would be days, not weeks or months. I would illustrate this point in further materials, as well as exercise materials (such as suprise readiness check results). I would make a longer post at a later point.

Thanks. The obvious question is - how would NATO (and US specifically) get 2 months warning? What would be the political conditions for such a deployment? What are the other NATO forces? Where the US forces would come from?

Yea, the build up is not targeted at Baltics, it is targeted at Ukraine (like I have said earlier). This makes me wonder, which NATO assets are availiable for operations in Ukraine within the relevant time frame? How fast can they respond and what are the political conditions for their use?

This is because there was very little Baltics specific build up. The new stuff was: - expansion of a motorised rifle regiment in a brigade, which is ongoing. - formation of a new corps command for better C2. Otherwise the infographic shows the change in posture. p.s. there may be some inaccuracies in the map, as it was made out of open sources and a lot of stuff is still in progress. I would try to make a more comprehensive "Russian Armed Forces" map at some later point.

Heh, it got removed, here you go with the copy:

Below you can find the first infographic, about Russian build up, ie new units, relocated units, expanded units. Although it is in Russian it uses standard NATO symbols, so it should be accessable to non Russian speakers: http://de-la-mitrio.livejournal.com/297124.html Further work is in progress, but slowly. Feel free to ask any specific questions.

Meanwhile, as I get distracted by work and have little time to write up the articles: "Знаковым учением в прошлом году стало СКШУ «Центр-2015». О его ходе и результатах в СМИ говорилось много, поэтому главком посчитал нужным лишь сообщить, что в ходе учения были сформированы из запаса 6 общевойсковых соединений в 14 субъектах Федерации. Три соединения из этого числа совершали марши на большие расстояния комбинированным способом (до 5 тысяч км)." Old news, about the Center-2015 exercise. 6 units were formed from reservists. 3 of them marched for long distanced (up to 5000km).

sleep management is a sighn of being a pro.

Derp. I really should sleep sometimes.