ikalugin

You mean on the BMD platform? Huh, I guess I should tell the MoD TTT/TTZ writers who canned the obj-195 amongst a bunch of other UVZ toys, instead of following the UVZ lobbey (or Omsk lobbey with say Burlack). Calling T15 unoriginal would have been a good idea, if you have looked into the history of development of compatible vehicles in the USSR, but hey, claiming that they have just rotated the chassis is easier. The issue is not that they are inadequate to that task (or that they are not funded enough) - it is that complex arms programs can take a long time to get completed. Have you tried: https://lostarmour.info/ by any chance? Not that it would be accepted I guess, after all: Does make the loyalists look bad.

Indonesians know what they are doing. They have been using BMP3F for a while now and as I have said BT3F is better as an amphib vehicle than it's daddy - BMP3F. And BMP3 itself was born out of the amphib tank project: The rear exit doors that everyone hates are there due to the rear engine placement, that improves the vehicle balance (balances out heavier front armour etc) and thus it's amphib and paradrop capabilities.

Know your enemy and know yourself...... People mindlessly retweeting SJWs (even though they are meant to be mil-technical ppl) is a bit tiresome though.

Heh, I find twitter useful.

I think this is just (re)discovering a cool capability and giving it a marketting spin. Counter-IR aerosols have been around for a long time now (and not only on grenades for vehicles). There is work on giving them anti-radar capabilities too, but I do not recall those rounds being mass fielded.

You mean aerosoles? Counter IR aerosoles existed since, like, Shtora (in the form of on vehicle launchers). That is one of the three major components to it, with sensors and jammers. In fact many customers drop the jammers and just keep sensors and the launchers.

Err, now I am a bit lost as to what to discuss, would you drop a topic? I may go to sleep soon though, 0001 local. I can drop some (low tier methodology wise WIP) pics here: Sadly it got canned by the editor so I never refined the comparison methodology, but, boy is bean counting fun.

I wonder if this thread would get nuked or if we have a chance to return to military-technical matters.

As to the internal stability within the LDPR, sure there were murders on both sides, but I guess they all get attributed to Putin's sedition, as would those nice gentlemen:

That is a weak defense, I would suggest watching Pozner to that end, for example here: Though I guess considering how US destroyed arms control starting with the ABM treaty and finishing now with exit from the Iran deal even if there was a formal treaty it would not have helped. As to propaganda - I am well aware that some of local admins have a poltical agenda so seeing simplistic "Russia bad" "Russia collapse" narratives is not surprising to me. Note who drove this thread into politics

Yes, we are well aware of the western narrative, I guess this has been argued here, with de-classified/leaked transcripts of relevant discussions cited. But, hey, this has already turned into "Russia bad" thread, with predictions on how Russia is going to collapse/whatever, I wonder if anyone made those predictions back in say 2014 or 2015.

Err I am unsure if I would like to continue in this thead, as it has turned political and may get nuked. "DNR and LPR are a bunch of thugs who couldn't manage their own bank account if it weren't for Russia." You really shouldn't underestimate the locals, or the local Ukrainian issues. About the resilience of Russia and our strategy, you can find more here: https://frivarld.se/rapporter/drivers-of-russian-grand-strategy-2/ As to the strategic vs tactical - essentially every political action Russia does in Ukraine is strategic in nature, if we are talking about military matters, as it forms the military-political level, from which military-technical level and military strategy comes.

Cheap is relative, in this case to other options Russia has (ie occupation of Ukraine) and to our capability to sustain current strategy. While our forces in Russia do indeed deter Kiev loyalists from doing anything too exciting, it is the locals who are actually fighting the war currently and to that end they have built up relevant institutions such as equipment repair/maintenance, officer schools, etc. Considering the scale of their efforts it is unwise to under estimate them and reduce the whole situation to Russian intervention.

Kipp back in 2014 on the topic of the LDPR forces.

Strategic, operational, tactical levels are separate and distinct. Note how you discuss them. The US posture in Europe was not only caused by the political limitations, it was also caused by the lack of understanding of operational level (even US's own historical experiences, note how for ALB US lifted Soviet terminology), tactical bias (generated by the career paths and mil education system, misinterpretation of German experience) and technofetishism (all too common belief that a given technology would be the deciding factor). This began, in part, to change with adoption of the ALB and culminated in the ODS, where US and it's allies conducted a classical offensive operation with envelopment of the enemy force. Note that during the ALB era it was still shaped by the above factors, the love for technological solutions and the political limitations lead to US creating depth in defense not through manuever (though counterstrokes were considered to some extend) but through deep fires (assault breakers etc). As to Donbas - it is a fairly low cost operation sustained by locals, with their own officer schools and other such means. Projecting the operations there during early years of the crisis with some reported homeopathic (5-7 BTGs?) intervention onto any serious modern scenario is delusional in my opinion, considering the changes in the Russian peacetime force posture which lead to Armies being arrayed for contingencies in the region, with atleast two forward deployed divisions on the pre-2014 Russia-Ukraine border, either behind two LDPR corps or on the flank of the CTO forces.

Door weight scales with the door size as well. If there are no hydrolics (or other system) operating the door then there is nothing to go wrong in combat in that respect. Casemate is there to increase volume for bouancy and creature comforty. The doors work the same way on BTR-T.

Well that is a strawman if I ever saw one. I never mentioned anything about it being a death trap. I was only pointing out that this is a promotional material made to look cool (whatever that may be in the eye of the video's director), not to be final evidence towards any specific capability (or lack of). Going after the video in the way you are doing is just silly. Safety wise - considering the experience of the manufacturer in making amphib vehicles, increased internal sealed volume, decrease in dense weight (no turret or relevant ammo) I would say that it is a decent fording vehicle, better than previous IFVs.

Due to the cuts you do not even know if there were dismounts within the vehicle when it went into the water. So what are you going to complain about next, the use of non standard cammo? The use of RPD? Lack of heavy backpacks etc?

You can run some meeting engagements and hasty defenses I guess with forward detachments post breaktrhough. But the breakthrough, especially in 1944-1945 was not particularly fun for either side.

Rezun is a horrible source, you should discard anything he touched. The bulk of materials writen during the cold war era on Soviet tactics is not accurate, by the time the research was there to describe the Soviet tactics (much less operational level thinking) accurately the cold war ended and it no longer interested the western militaries, though from what I recall some of that research did make it's way into the1993 vintage British manuals. That said - some authors ie Grau (he still writes on modern Russian topics), Glantz, Armstrong etc did try to make a decent effort, you may be interested in their work.

I was talking about, for example, the infamous report they wrote on the Baltics. Not sure if your last sentence is question.

Aerosoles block IR and in some cases radar.

RAND (and other) wargames tend to make a significant mistake - they believe that the war would be fought over limited and odly specific terrain (ie various gaps), with limited forces (bundles of brigades), focused on tactical level (brigade and below) decision making wise. Incidentally that is also how CMBS shows the war in Ukraine. As the exercises, discussions and posture show - we plan to fight the war on the operational level, with significant forces, on broad TMAs. A good video on topic:

Not without a large scale war, however you would be welcome to look into the snap drills that we now conduct fairly regularly and which include moving random brigades around ~5500km by rail.

First of all - Soviet patern army does not require excellent NCO corps, because it is not built around said corps. This is reflected, for example, in how officer corps get trained in such a system. Second of all - Russia currently has more contract soldiers and NCOs than the consripted soldiers and NCOs, particularly in combat roles, where the bulk (around 2/3 manning) of Ground Forces units (ie across the board for line units) are now made out of the said contract soldiers and NCOs, many of whom were rotated through various combat deployments (ie aforementioned Syria). The transition has already, essentially, happened, you just seem to be living atleast 5 years in the past. Note that there are no "elite" small core forces made out of the contract soldiers and NCOs - they are now commonplace. Very much unlike what CMBS etc would imply, yes.