ikalugin

Meanwhile: - 42nd MRD appears to have been formed increasing the total number of standing divisions to 7 (5 MRDs and 2 TDs), with 10th TD still in formation. - you can see one of the parking lots for the MRD in Rostov area here:

Report and video: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3791800-voennyi-rasskazal-o-prychynakh-provala-na-svetlodarskoi-duhe Were they discussed here yet? From them it appears that the attack was conducted by Ukrainian Loyalist forces and failed.

Steve, your hypothesis only works if we assume that separatists intended to attain significant gains. Do you have evidence that this was their intention? You assume that Russia does something because you would do that, isn't that called projection? Not that it is bad, I just hope that you are aware of it. The article does not state that. DNC stuff is a political derailment that I warned you against.

There was a reform and a rearmament program post 080808 war, which specifically targeted comunications as one of the main problems.

"Building that system was needed and worked." But was it and did it? As I have said, in my opinion it is quite possible that the system did more harm (by allegedly providing intell to the adversery) than good (improving the fire control), if the report is to be believed.

Kavkaz-2016 - during that exercise a grouping made out of 4 Armies was moved the distance of up to 2500km with full deployment and use of Front level C4I means. "Наиболее масштабным мероприятием оперативной подготовки этого года стало стратегическое командно-штабное учение «Кавказ-2016». В ходе него проведены перегруппировки воинских частей четырех армий на расстояние до двух с половиной тысяч километров. Осуществлено полное развертывание систем управления объединений на новом театре военных действий. В итоге подтверждена способность органов военного управления эффективно руководить созданными группировками войск при возникновении угроз национальной безопасности на юге России." p.s. I guess this is just my own news thread now, heh.

As a side note. The reports for 2016 year are comming in. You may remember my claim about expansion of contract soldiers force. The plan for 2016 was increase from 352k to 384k (http://function.mil.ru/files/morf/2015-12-11_MoD_board_extended_session_RUS.pdf end of the year report) and it appears that the 384k objective was achieved (https://youtu.be/mYbmJ7g-n5M current data) Shoigu also states that this year 4 MRDs and 1 TD have been formed. I would make a more detailed post on the 3 reports, when the 2016 report is in and I have read it.

Now, this: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/danger-close-fancy-bear-tracking-ukrainian-field-artillery-units/ report is militarily interesting (please avoid political discussion here) in more than one way. For example: - that Ukraine lost over 80 percent of the D-30s. - that applications developed by amatures may have combat uses. - that same applications can be exploited by hostile cyber agents. p.s. I believe that this application was discussed here previously as a great achievement of Ukrainian croudfunding/croudsourcing/volonteer-work. If the report above is correct, it may have done more harm than good.

TBH I don't find this engagement interesting, as it appears to be a small scale positional skirmish over no-man's land (regardless of who initiated it and the legal status of Debaltsevo region), just like many other small positional skirmishes in the past.

And yet another military thread falls to political discussion.

Also, my (very basic) analasys implies compatable quality of Ukrainian troops. While the equipment problems are obvious (in terms of quality, as there is little to no trully new equipment being fielded by the Ukrainian Armed Forces) and could be accounted for in any calculations, it appears that in 2017 there may be problems with training and repairs if this social media statement (and other related news) is to be believed: as according to it, over 80 percent are allocated to paying the troop's wages and conducting basic maintenance thus leaving very little for repairs, training and procurement. p.s. if this turns out to be true, then Ukrainain Armed Forces may return to pre 2014 levels of combat capability due to the lack of training and manpower rotation in the near future. This is sort of ironic, as the Yanukovich era reductions were there to improve the Armed Forces capability via a decrease in the armed forces and reallocation of resources from maintaining the force to training it.

How is this happening? Russian Armed Forces have relocated a number of brigades out of other areas to the Ukraine relevant areas over the past 3 years. Some of those brigades were used to form the new divisions. Currently there are 2 additional divisions under formation - the 42nd MRD and 10th TD. Now in addition to the divisions being formed, there are new brigades being formed, in place of the ones that were moved forward. Those developments mean that in 2017-2018 time frame the balance of forces in terms of combat units (regiments and brigades) would be different to the 2014-2015 balance of forces, as in addition to the old structure (as the old units are maintained via formation of replacement brigades) the all new units (divisions) are being formed. How is this growth possible in terms of manpower? It happened due to 3 simple causes: - growth of the Armed Forces via contract troops. - optimisation of manpower use, ie moving manpower from munitions disposal and base security to actually usefull roles. - greater manpower efficiency of the new formations. On the last point, let me illustrate it. The new divisions, having a 6 (3+1+1+1) regiment OOB are said to have their authorised manpower at 10k strong. The old BDE OOBs have between 4k and 5k per brigade. This means that a division, while having only twice the troops, has about 4 times as much combat power in it.

"со вчерашнего дня 150я мотострелковая дивизия приступила к выполнению задач по защите рубежей на юге страны" - Шойгу. translation: "From yesterday the 150th MRD began it's operation in defense of our southern borders." - Shoigu "Как отметил генерал армии Сергей Шойгу, в текущем году в Западном военном округе проведено около 100 организационных мероприятий, в том числе по завершению формирования двух [3-й и 144-й] мотострелковых дивизий, подразделения которых размещены в Белгородской, Воронежской и Смоленской областях. Дивизии полностью укомплектованы личным составом (70% — военнослужащие по контракту), а также оснащены современным вооружением, военной и специальной техникой. Созданы требуемые запасы материальных средств." - МО translation "As Shoigu has noted this year in the Western MD 2 [3rd and 144th] MRDs have been formed, subunits of which are stationed in Belgorod, Voronezh and Smolensk regions. The divisions received their full authorised manpower (70 percent - contract troops), modern weapons and equipment. The required stocks were also created" - Shoigu/MoD "1 декабря в Челябинской области начнёт учебный год недавно воссозданная [90-я] гвардейская Витебско-Новгородская дважды Краснознамённая танковая дивизия, для которой подготовлены новые директрисы, автодромы и тактические поля." - МО translation "On the 1st of Decembder the training year of the newly formed [90th] TD, formed in Chelyabinsk area, begins, training fascilities for it were built." - MoD "Впервые в составе 1-й гвардейской танковой армии Западного военного округа (ЗВО) в Московской области к занятиям по плану нового учебного года приступили два вновь сформированных полка [4-й гвардейской] Кантемировской танковой и [2-й гвардейской] Таманской мотострелковой дивизий." - МО translation "for the first time within the 1st GrdsTA of the Western MD, in the Moscow region, the training year was began by the two newly formed regiments of the [4th] MRD and [2nd] TD." - MoD If we compare that divisional force against the mechanized (and armoured) elements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: In total - 6 divisions: - 2 TDs (4th and 90th) - 4 MRDs (2nd, 3rd, 144th, 150th) between them: - 9-10 tank regiments (subject to the actual OOB of the 4th and 2nd) - 13-14 motorised rifle regiments (subject to the actual OOB of the 4th and 2nd) - 12 artillery and air defense regiments (6 of each) - other misc assets regimental OOBs and TO&E are standard Ukrainian Ground Troops appear to have: - 17th, 1st tnk BDEs - total of 2. - 53rd, 54th, 92nd, 93rd, 30th, 72nd, 28th, 14th, 24th mech BDEs - total of 9. - 56th, 57th, 58th, 59th mot BDEs - total of 4. - 55th, 26th, 40th, 44th artillery BDEs - total of 4. Considering how those units are roughtly compatable on paper if not in reality (except for mot BDEs, which are weaker than MRRs even on paper) you can see those 6 divisions alone have: - more artillery units. - more tank units. - compatable number of infantry units.

Back to post after a long absense. (I did not read the stuff that I have missed). In the next post I would get some updates on the whole new divisions story.

It is the internet. If you were looking for references - watch the film posted in the OP. At ~00.02.50-00.03.00 and from 00.28.30 they discuss this for example.

Update Troops moving into Crimea during the exercises: (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJXbdr_fkys) Troops conducting training: (https://youtu.be/--oAWlIcicg) Mobilisation of other state institutions during the exercise: http://stat.function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094234@egNews

MRSI can be achieved by pen and pencil using a 2S3. The networking of artillery and recon means happened since late 70s/early 80s with the introduction of Manevr and other command systems (which, with their desighn and production companies, died in early 90s).

MoD news items on the check up (note, this is not a regular exercise, so it is fairly representative of what you would get in the "bolt out of the blue" attack scenario): Exercises begin: http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12093710@egNews Multiple BDEs of Southern MD participate: http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094009@egNews http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094069@egNews Movement of units for distances of ~2000km by transport and for the distances of ~500km by themselves: http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094066@egNews http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094068@egNews http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094105@egNews Movement of units out of Central MD for the distances over of 2500km into the Southern MD: http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094138@egNews Deployement of two army commands: http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094214@egNews The Central MD stuff is very important, because Central MD forms the 2nd operational echelon for the Ukraine scenarios with it's 2nd CAA and because the deployement time achieved in such a snap readiness check is relevant to Ukraine scenarios.

Despite the changes in DNR/LNR Armed Forces status since Debaltsevo local comunity does not take them seriously. Hence it was omited. Otherwise - they have 2 army groupings made out of brigades. p.s. this round table may be of interest: (https://youtu.be/cJwFWDvF8VU) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJwFWDvF8VU) Especially statements by the retired officers, who had experience in commanding large formations during Soviet times.) Note, how Ukrainians in some of their materials view the LNR/DNR forces as elements of regular Russian Armed Forces, for example here: http://www.cacds.org.ua/en/activities/879 While I do not agree with the statement, in my opinion the LNR/DNR forces are usable within the likely, CMBS relevant, scenarios.

redundant post

The force Russia has availiable for an operation in Ukraine in CMBS relevant time frame. - Crimean grouping. - VDV and other centrally managed highly mobile assets. - 3 TDs, 3 MRDs, 1 Tnk BDE, 14 MR BDEs of Ground Forces. Those troops are availiable while retaining coverage of other critical strategic axis (Arctic, Baltics, Caucasus, Central Asia, Far East). - other supporting units of Ground Forces which have to be accounted for in the calculus, but we would drop them for now. While the VDV (and other centrally managed highly mobile) and Crimean forces are fairly well known here, the Ground Forces grouping is interesting. The grouping has: - 14 MR BDEs and 12 MR regiments. - 1 Tnk BDE and 12 Tnk regiments. In terms of composition this gives us (assuming known standard OOBs and TO&Es): - 6*10k+15*5k=135k manpower in the combat units of Ground Forces alone (ie not accounting for other units or services). - 14+12=26 "large" tank battalions (40 tanks each) and 3+36=39 "small" tank battalions (31 tanks each) (for a total of ~2250 tanks in those battalions). - 78+13=91 motorised battalions of all types (on IFVs and APCs) (ballpark figure would be ~3700 APCs and IFVs in classical roles, more if we account for specialist roles). - no less than (this assumes 1 battalion per BDE) 39+18=57 artillery battalions (divizions) (ballpark figure would be no less than 1000 artillery pieces). Then there are dedicated artillery, combat engeniers, chemical (those guys handle flame throwers) troops. p.s. recent exercises (Center-2015, snap drills in 2015, snap drills in 2016 including the currently ongoing one I have mentioned above) imply that this entire force would be availiable 48-96 hours from the political decision being made by the CINC with 24 hours of covert preparation (transmission of orders, initiation of movement), 24-72 hours of overt preparations (movement of units out of their basing areas into the attack).

For that matter, did anyone see any good western materials about the (most recent) exercises? I can post russian articles on that topic.

This is coupled with the rail road troops exercise. The rail road troops: - created 3 bridges over Volga. - as well as the troops load on/load off points and relevant tracks. - all of this was done in a short time frame. Armoured train is there as a rear security measure.

(I just came from SPA in Evian to view the sights in ROK) Did I miss anything non political? (to be quite honest, I didn't read this thread on my extended holiday b/c TLDR) To add some military content: As a reminder, in the Center 2015 we have practiced moving large force (division+) over long distance (over 3000km) in a short time frame. Now we are conducting the large exercise in the south-western axis. The premise of the exercise is the same: - alerting multiple units and formations. - moving them across significant (Ukraine relevant) distances quickly. - conducting local exercises in unfammiliar area. Declaimer - "alert" footage is done separately from the actual movement of units out of their basing areas and after that happens.

The boxes house radar, which measures external ballistics of the rounds fired to improve accuracy, as well as to transmit data to guided rounds in flight.