Kraft

So I was a little wrong there. It seems all of 6th army was eventually destroyed.
In terms of forces involved - yeah all of the Soviet troops fighting in the city were conscripts - 62nd and 64th armies were reserve armies deployed that year. They did have fighting experience during Blau but it wasn't good experience - both armies were pretty much already decimated by the time they retreated to the city.
This is a complex question because many units were shifted around over months, and it can't be answered without going in depth. It's the reason why I'm committing to a Kursk campaign first instead of a Blau campaign.
The assault on the city began on September 13th 1942.
 
---------------------Troops trapped in pocket------------------------
6th army was composed of many late wave divisions:
1st wave - 44th ID (August 1939)
2nd wave - 71st ID, 76th ID, 79th ID (August 1939)
8th wave - 295th ID (February 1940)
12th wave - 113th ID (August 1940)
13th wave - 305th ID (November - December 1940)
18th wave - 384th ID, 389th ID (December 1941)
19th wave - 376th ID (March - April 1942)
100th Jager (July 1942 .. Eight days after Blau commenced)
3rd Motorized (October 1940)
60th Motorized (August 1940)
14th Panzer (August 1940 from the 4th ID)
16th Panzer (November 1940 from 16th ID)
24th Panzer (28th November 1941 from the 1st Cavalry Division .. The only cav div in the heer)
 
4th Panzer Army:
29th Motorized - Before 1940
20th Rumanian
---------------------------------------------------------------------
 
Tracking the strengths of units:
Soviet:



I'm not going to draw conclusions from all the data but if you look you can see decently sized Soviet divisions disappearing in a week. Many divisions were rebuilt on the spot. For the third picture you have Authorized/Actual strengths. It's hard to calculate totals when you're dealing with this.
 
I can't find any definite numbers on the Germans from September 13th because the staffwork was not the best afaik. This is important because we don't know what strength the Germans actually had when they entered the city. I do have 6th army's primary source documents in pdf form but I'm not sure where to look to find their "Iststärke" (Actual strength) numbers.
I have numbers for the later months but they are not very useful without an initial strength value.
For 24th October:

And mid November:

Sorry about the off topic post. I know this also doesn't conclude much. A serious in depth look is required on this topic.

Interview in german, automated subtitles not really great though
 
 
 

110th. russian assault being destroyed.
Some new footage, I think? Definetaly less cuts than whatever ends up on twitter I think. There will be another part showing all the casulties

110th. russian assault being destroyed.
Some new footage, I think? Definetaly less cuts than whatever ends up on twitter I think. There will be another part showing all the casulties

We critically need F-16. Problem of KABs have been becoming more and more dangerous month by month
This serviceman writes from Novomykhailivka, where Russian intensivley attack and drop many gliding bombs:
For the hour 17 KABs impacted, and I more and more looking for F-16 on the horizon 
Autumn photo of Novomykhailivka with two gliding bomb craters
The same serviceman: "Then [in Autumn] about 30 KAB were arriving for a day. More than 200+ bombs were dropped. No one di...k can't sit there. Two years Russians have been grinding it, the cities have fall, but Novomykhailivla still stood"

This is article of UKR OSINT group "Information resistance" (alas in UKR only) about number of KAB usage by Russians: https://sprotyv.info/analitica/taktichna-aviacziya-rf-rekordno-zbilshila-vikoristannya-kabiv/
According their information November of 2023 became a record month of KAB strikes - 1200 and one day - Nov 25th had daily record - 120 KABs. 
For the 10 day of February 2024 Russians aviation already dropped 460 gliding bombs. And this month can beat the previous record. Despite Russian gliding bombs don't have the same precisiosn like JDAM, but their quantity already turning to quality and our troops feel this on their own. 
Russian industry produce up to 50 gliding kits per day for FAB equipping. France is going to give us 50 AASM per month. Feel a difference...
The quantity of US JDAMs likely was also in dozens of bombs. And all they already dropped.  
 

Situation in northern part of Avdiivka became critical. Russians captured transport depo and now try to breakthrough to railway station (SE) and strongpoint around cafe "Brevno" (NW, yellow mark), guarding coke plant from the south.
General Tarnavskyi, commander OTUV "Tavria" wrote "we strenghthe the lines to hold back the enemy" - so no any words about withdrawal. If no happen something miraculous, Russians have all chances to cut Avdiivka on two parts and to block the coke plant.  
 

A tragedy in Kharkiv. Russian attacked the fuel storage in eastern part of the city with Shaheds, Three of eight reached own target and set on fire several tanks. Leaked burning fuel spread along the street and set on fire many private houses. Seven people burned alive in own houses  
You can see the scale of fire

In this house burned alive all family - the couple and three their children, boys seven, four and less one year old. The temperature was so huge that only ash left afer them...

 The question remains. What idiot filled with a fuel tanks, encircled by houses in 40 km from the border?  

I find it interesting that instead of creating a propaganda piece for americans to consume with simple talking points, he spends it on a  repetition of his bent-history lesson starting in 900AD.

I am not arguing for attrition or maneuver.
My point is, if a change is needed in leadership/innovation and a non-political decision needs to be made who is best to replace what makes him the best pick? 
Obviously we dont know enough inside details among the generals for a fair assesement but I am also questioning whether this was a non-political decision with that aim to begin with.
But I also dont want to slander with the little information I have which is why I deleated my original comment.

To be fair, I do not know how much of this defense was up to him and how much it came politically "hold at all costs". Same with the counteroffensive which I think after week 2 should/would have been called off but I am 100% certain this was politically not seen as an option.
As for Bakhmut there are many reasons why street fighting evened the playing field between wagner convict mobs and defenders. Personally I have never seen so many dead defenders in russian channels than during the city fighting, especially including Soledar and afterwards, even if I 'account' for this being the biggest battle of the war, towards the end I would say it was 1:1 dead for both sides (not overall)
Trying to supply this nightmare over a road that several times fell into enemy hands and caused dozens of vehicles to be picked off didnt help. Maybe associating him with this is wrong, as it may have been a political decision to hold but I dont see how this grinder and his repuation in any way makes him a better candidate to solve the issues under shell shortage, russian ewar, fortifications/minefields, endless russian assaults and lack of vehicles/...
We will see.

I am not arguing for attrition or maneuver.
My point is, if a change is needed in leadership/innovation and a non-political decision needs to be made who is best to replace what makes him the best pick? 
Obviously we dont know enough inside details among the generals for a fair assesement but I am also questioning whether this was a non-political decision with that aim to begin with.
But I also dont want to slander with the little information I have which is why I deleated my original comment.

I find it interesting that instead of creating a propaganda piece for americans to consume with simple talking points, he spends it on a  repetition of his bent-history lesson starting in 900AD.

This is a misunderstanding of russia.
He was pulled *exactly* because everyone should see that putin is the big dog who can make people dissapear in foreign countries, remove them from ballots, or drop them out of windows. There was and is never any attempt at being subtle when you suicide reporters with several shots to the back of the head.
Making it fail because not reaching pathetic number of signatures just to drive home the point

Once upon a time, they wasted infantry brigades all the way to Berlin.
in a war of attrition, and with little or no aid from the USA, the fog of war here is thick and heavy.

This is a misunderstanding of russia.
He was pulled *exactly* because everyone should see that putin is the big dog who can make people dissapear in foreign countries, remove them from ballots, or drop them out of windows. There was and is never any attempt at being subtle when you suicide reporters with several shots to the back of the head.
Making it fail because not reaching pathetic number of signatures just to drive home the point

Several days ago UKR social media shared scandal video, where servicemen of Dnipro city special purpose police regiment (former riot police "Berkut") rejected to execute an order, transferring them to National Police brigade "Liut' " ("Rage")
Moreover, personnel of the regiment became to speak typical pro-Russian stamps and insult the chief deputy of Dnipro police directorate, who came to them with the order, naming him "Maidan scum". Policemen cried "You have no right to dispose our lives!", "The law doesn't say we have to go at the war!", "We reject to execute this criminal order", We paid our debt to our state, when we defended it on Maidan under Molotov coctails!", "You can go at the war yourself!"
Acording to the law any force structure during martial law is a part of Defense Forces and have to execute orders as well participate in combat if this need. 
The video caused the tsunamy of the hate - police, like courts and prosecutors considered by Ukranian society as more corrupted structures, which defends not a law, but thoise who have a money.  By the way many servicemen in these special purpose police units (from 50-70 in the company to about 250-300 in regiment) are former "Berkut" servicemen, which were restored by court in service with support of former minister of internal affairs Arsen Avakov. Most of these units continue to be a carriers of anti-Maidan moods. Also there are many conflicts between them and AFU servicemen on checkpoints in the rear. You can see on the photo - the servicemen are very tough bulls, not 50 y.o. tired riflemen in trenches. They in perfect physical conditions, but for them easily to show own strenght and power defending interersts of corrupted system and to chase granmas, trading apples near transport stops, than go at the war. Many of them consider themselves as untouched caste and many of new guys, who came to these units quicly become the same dumb buffalos. So, society returns them the same hate, like in 2014.   
Despite many policemen and retired policemen enlisted to volunteer police battalions and regimnets, which in 2023 were united in "Liut' " assault brigade, police have a reservation from sending to frontline to AFU. But they can be transferred to this brigade, subordinated to National Police.
Today leadership of National Police issued a reaction - Dnipro special purpose police regiment will be disbanded. All staff wiil be moved to "Liut' " brigade. Who will reject to transfer will be fired from police service and will receive mobilization summon to AFU. Let see how this ends. Many people believe these pro-Russian scum just will pay money to military medical commitee in order they "found" many deceases and recognized them unfit for service
  

"Fat drone" with something powerful blows up Russian position in ruines of the buildng.
Operator says "mr. Serhiy (Sternenko), thank you, we received your uranium ammunition, already use it"
 

This woman is an angel, who help to defend Avdiivka. She is a citizen of this town. She supplies FPV drones, anti-drone EW and many other stuff for guys who defend this town. Her crowdfunding campaignns already brought hundreds of drones to defenders. But with lack of shells and under endless enemy attacks the need in FPVs, thermal sights, EW, drone detectors are huge. 
If anybody wants to help Avdiivka defense - you can donate to her. Her goal for next batch of drones, EW and sights is 100 000 $
PayPal:  yana.statna21@gmail.com 
 

I think there is more than enough evidence that Russian officers do learn. I mean, just read @Haiduk s latest posts. Since we all like our historical comparisons, this is like WW1. In the first half year or so casualties were enormous because neither side knew how to deal with the new battlefield realities. Both sides continued to feed bodies into the meet grinders with frontal assaults afterwards. That doesn't mean they didn't learn but that it took time to learn the lessons and to find solutions - and how to deal with what lessons the other side learned.
Sure, Russian officers don't seem to be the most... intellectually flexible type but evidently they do learn. Question is, do they lean fast enough to complete with Ukraine (who apparently have difficulties of there own) As @The_Capt keeps telling us this is about which side leans faster, institutionalizes it and manages to convert those lessons into advantages on the battlefield.

And with the defence/denial domination, the other presumption of mobile defence is also weakened - you cannot count on getting back the land you retreated from. For the Ukrainians, in the time period between the Kherson counteroffensive and today most of the tactical retreats have turned into permanent loss of land.
The Russians have a better record of recovering lost ground but only because they are willing to waste an infantry brigade conquering a small village.

https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/on-the-brink-examining-ammo-shortages?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1565454&post_id=141397066&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=22ez99&utm_medium=email
"For several months, our team avoided discussing publicly internal issues to prevent potential Russian exploitation for propaganda. However, as these problems become increasingly visible and publicly acknowledged, we've chosen to openly discuss them."
"As Russian forces persist in pressuring Ukrainian troops in Avdiivka, it is becoming evident that the fall of Avdiivka is not a matter of if, but when. "
"The suggested plan for Ukraine in 2024 is to dig in and construct fortifications to minimize territorial and human losses. Unfortunately, this appears to be the only viable, albeit "forced," plan for Ukraine in 2024 unless substantial foreign aid is received and radical mobilization measures are implemented. While this plan is logical, it is not an ideal option."
"The problem of adequately staffing military units has existed for a long period. Most individuals have been engaged in combat for nearly two years, undergoing rare and non-systematic, short rotations that are insufficient for a full restoration of their physical and, more importantly, mental well-being."
"Although Ukraine urgently needs mobilization efforts to not only replace hundreds of thousands of individuals engaged in combat but also to establish new offensive capabilities, multiple problems are undermining these efforts that many media outlets and analysts prefer to avoid discussing."
"The reputation of certain Ukrainian generals has plummeted to the point where they are now likened to Russian counterparts known for deploying careless frontal assaults. This situation is exacerbated by the lack of accountability for such failures or misguided approaches."
"Our team has been informed about escalating tension between the Presidential office and the Commander-in-Chief, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, for over a year, although it has only recently come to public attention."
 

Mobilisation needs to happen sooner rather than later. Not acting because its unpopular is just brushing issues under a rug until the issue spills out and someone pays for it, either because mobilised dont get full training to hurry them to the front or formations that are spent and need rest having to stay despite worsening performance and dropping morale because russia outnumbers everywhere in men, machine and ammo.

Mobilisation needs to happen sooner rather than later. Not acting because its unpopular is just brushing issues under a rug until the issue spills out and someone pays for it, either because mobilised dont get full training to hurry them to the front or formations that are spent and need rest having to stay despite worsening performance and dropping morale because russia outnumbers everywhere in men, machine and ammo.

Mobilisation needs to happen sooner rather than later. Not acting because its unpopular is just brushing issues under a rug until the issue spills out and someone pays for it, either because mobilised dont get full training to hurry them to the front or formations that are spent and need rest having to stay despite worsening performance and dropping morale because russia outnumbers everywhere in men, machine and ammo.

Mobilisation needs to happen sooner rather than later. Not acting because its unpopular is just brushing issues under a rug until the issue spills out and someone pays for it, either because mobilised dont get full training to hurry them to the front or formations that are spent and need rest having to stay despite worsening performance and dropping morale because russia outnumbers everywhere in men, machine and ammo.