BletchleyGeek

Bil, excellent AAR as always
You are the best source that BF has as to how to promote and showcase these games.
I always enjoy that fact that you put out there a clear description as to what you are tactically thinking and trying to accomplish.
And your tactical skills seem to reward you better in the modern battlefield over the WWII one.  
You generally get no second chances or much luck on the modern battlefield. Death is easy and quick and each decision is rewarded with that or success in a very few moments.
thanks for your efforts as always
I will go back to the shadows now

Happy Birthday, America.
In other news, the rest of my week may calm down enough for me to post another installment. Working consecutive 12-hour days isn't very conducive to one's hobbies.

Technology’s Contribution to the End of Trench Warfare
In the spring of 1918 four years of positional, attritional, trench warfare on the Western Front in France and Belgium suddenly came to an end. Over the final eight months of the war offensives by both the Germans and the Allies were able to achieve advances measured in miles per day, where previously miles per month had been considered good progress.1
A range of factors lay behind this return to semi-open warfare2; the cumulative effects of years of blockade on Germany, the release of large German forces from the Russian Front, political decisions that affected the size of the British armies in France, and a renaissance in infantry tactics and organisation.3 Overlaying this was a range of new technologies that restored the Principle of Surprise to the battlefield, and changed the style of war waged on the Western Front.4
From 1914 through to the end of 1917 both the Germans and the Allies faced the same fundamental problem: defensive firepower generated by well handled artillery and machine guns that exploited intelligently designed and constructed defences and obstacles could slow down an attacker long enough to ensure that sufficient reserves – travelling on the dense road and rail net of Western Europe – would arrive on any given battlefield before the attacker had been able to make a breakthrough. As a result, operations became very slow and deliberate wearing-out exercises, fought over small areas at extraordinary cost. For example, the Somme and Verdun in 1916 resulted in roughly 2 million casualties between them, although very little ground changed hands.5
The tactical and operational problem, then, was to find a way to surprise the enemy and speedily breach the entire depth of his defensive zone before reserves could arrive, and then to hold ground won against counter-attacks. It was recognised by 1917 that in order to do this all elements of the enemy’s defensive scheme – especially obstacles, MGs, and artillery – had to be neutralised swiftly and simultaneously.6 However, each part of the defence required a different solution – and different technology – to be overcome before surprise could be restored.
Many technologies contributed to ending the stalemate, such as improved warships, submarines, and antisubmarine warfare. These all played their part in weakening the land armies, but their direct effect on ground operations is hard to assess. Four key areas of technological development contributed directly to opening up the Western Front. These were artillery, aircraft, tanks, and infantry firepower.7
The way all nations used their artillery in 1914 was relatively unsophisticated. Communications were almost invariably by voice, most shooting was by direct lay, and the overall aim was destruction of the enemy immediately to the gun’s front. Over the following four years the effectiveness of artillery firepower increased out of all recognition, largely on the back of new technology. Improved communication equipment meant that guns could be controlled indirectly, which improved their survivability and therefore long-term usefulness.8 Understanding, measurement, and control of variations between individual guns, ammunition lots, and the effects of weather meant that targets could be accurately engaged without prior adjustment.9 A range of new ammunition natures and fuzes provided commanders with the ability to tailor fire to the particular effects they desired; smoke could be used to shield men moving in the open by blinding defenders;10 gas was used to create confusion and considerably hamper command and control;11 high explosive with graze fuzes could smash enemy positions, equipment, and men. Advances in target detection and survey, combined with the better measurement of ballistics, meant that targets far to the rear – most importantly the enemy’s artillery – could be engaged with confidence.12 At Amiens the British counter battery programme was so effective that
… hostile artillery was insignificant and several enemy batteries were captured with the muzzle covers still on the guns, showing that the detachments had failed to reach their positions.13
Taken together these artillery technology innovations meant that specific results could be achieved on selected elements of the enemy’s defensive infrastructure, and be achieved quickly for a high degree of surprise. By 1918 artillery was being used in incredibly large, complex, and sophisticated fire plans to surprise, confuse, destroy, and defeat the enemy.14
Aircraft started the war as reconnaissance platforms and it was in this role that they served most usefully.15 The primary role of fighter aircraft was to protect friendly reconnaissance assets – including balloons – or to drive off those of the enemy.16 Over the course of the war the type and nature of reconnaissance conducted changed considerably. Early in the war reconnaissance was primarily by direct observation and verbal reports. By 1918 photographic surveys of the entire front were routine.17 These surveys would be compiled into large mosaics, and then minutely examined and compared to previous surveys to identify new positions, equipment, dumps, routes, and other items of interest.18 A significant proportion of this effort was dedicated to improving the accuracy and effectiveness of friendly artillery, especially its ability to engage enemy artillery.19 In that sense, improvements in aerial technology became improvements in the artillery system.20 Aerial reconnaissance was also used to assist other arms – photo mosaics of frontline trenches were invaluable for planning attacks and determining the enemy’s intentions.21 By 1918 wireless sets were being installed in aircraft, allowing them to report information to frontline units in near-real-time.22 Night time did not provide security, since aircraft equipped with flares enabled observation of the enemy at any time.23
Air power was also developed to intervene directly in the land battle. Both sides increasingly employed squadrons to attack ground targets with machine guns and bombs.24 This role exploited the inherent flexibility to quickly and unexpectedly concentrate firepower where it was needed – attacking pillboxes, anti-tank guns, and reinforcements, as they revealed themselves during the course of a battle. In this role, too, the use of wireless greatly assisted the speed with which ground attack aircraft could intervene on the battlefield.25 Compared to the artillery the weight of munitions delivered by WWI ground-attack aircraft was modest.26 However, its immediacy – and novelty - meant that airborne firepower was seen as a valuable addition.27
Aircraft also conducted resupply on a very limited scale in 1918, something that had never been tried before.28 In theory aircraft could leap over the shell torn and muddy battlefield to deliver supplies quickly and directly to where they were needed in order to sustain advances. Whilst useful, the long lead time required and the limited quantities of supplies that could be delivered meant that the impact of aerial resupply on operations in 1918 was modest.
The Somme, in September 1916, saw the battlefield debut of the tank. It had limited effect on that battle, and indeed throughout most of 1917 its effect was slight and drawbacks legion. Nevertheless, its potential was recognised. The Germans, due to their late start and stretched economy were never in a position to field effective tank forces.29 The French and the British, on the other hand, were each able to develop large armoured arms and employ hundreds of tanks on several occasions.
The tank’s great contribution to mobility in WWI was its ability to crush dense obstacle belts, and carry sufficient firepower to destroy enemy defensive positions left intact by the artillery. Using tanks to deal with wire and obstacles meant that obstacles could be left intact until an attack commenced, preserving surprise, and freed the artillery to engage other targets.30 The mobility and armour of the tanks meant they were able to bring their fire power to bear at accurately at close range, thus assisting the infantry forward.
Specialised models of tanks were produced to safely carry supplies, men, and drag wire for communications forward into the battle zone.31 As valuable as these niche technologies were, their effect was limited by the nature of the tanks themselves – hot, noisy, exhausting, prone to breakdown, short endurance – and the limited quantity of specialised models produced compared to the tasks required of them. These limitations also affected the battle tanks, denying them the opportunity for exploitation of their own success.32 Although the tanks were unquestionably useful in breaking the stalemate, the Germans demonstrated that similar results could be achieved without them in their spring 1918 offensives, while the British also found that significant success could be achieved without tanks in many of their attacks late in the year.33
Infantry battalions by 1918 had a distinctly modern look to them. Instead of a homogenous mass of 1,000 men, all armed with a rifle, attacking and defending en masse, they now routinely employed grenades, light and heavy machine guns, submachine guns, flame-throwers, mortars, and a variety of direct fire artillery.34
This range of weapons technology had created – and been created by – a demand for new infantry tactics. Using the new weapons and organised in small, self supporting units the infantry were able to in attack with each group working its way forward independently to flank, engage, and destroy enemy positions and achieve objectives.35 The new weapons also allowed the infantry to man positions with fewer men yet generate more firepower than previously.36
Along with these new technologies – sophisticated artillery, air power, tanks, and greatly increased infantry firepower – by 1918 there had been significant changes in the way forces were being employed. Both the Allies and Germans had come to realise that smaller, more flexible, independent and self-reliant units that were highly trained could, using infiltration tactics the new technologies and surprise, achieve better results on the attack while suffering fewer casualties.37
The success of these infiltration tactics was, however, dependant on another change. Infiltration tactics and flank attacks could only make headway where the enemy’s front wasn’t held continuously or strongly.38 The Germans had been thinning out their front lines in the face of increasing British artillery since the Somme in 1916, a practice that accelerated with the introduction by the British of their greatly improved artillery during Third Ypres in 1917.39
For the British, a similar change came as a result of the their own terrible losses suffered at Third Ypres.40 Politically motivated decisions were made to transfer several divisions from France to Italy, increase the length of front being held by the British, and tightly restrict the supply of replacements.41 All this meant that the British line in early 1918 was held much more thinly than before. In addition, the British had far less practice than the Germans at conducting defensive operations.42 The French had also suffered grievous losses in 1916 and 1917, and shared the British inexperience in defensive tactics.43 Furthermore, with Russia’s withdrawal from the war, Germany was able to transfer significant forces to the Western Front and concentrate overwhelming force at selected points. For example, The Germans concentrated 6,500 guns against the British for the opening of their offensive on March 21, 1918.44 This combination of thinly held lines, defensive inexperience, overwhelming mass plus new offensive tactics, and the new technologies to gain surprise, enabled the startling initial success of the German Spring 1918 offensives.
For various reasons the Germans had concentrated their best equipment and men in a relatively few special attack divisions.45 These divisions suffered heavy losses in their otherwise successful attacks,46 while the follow on forces – wholly untrained or equipped for the new attack techniques – fared even worse.47 Also, the Allied defences evolved quickly to decisively rebuff the new German tactics and technology at Arras in late-March and Reims in mid-July.48 When the German then lost the initiative they found themselves holding unprepared positions, over a longer front, and with fewer men who were on average of lower quality than before.49 This gave the Allies the opportunity to put their own new technologies, tactics, and organisations into effect to surprise the enemy. The confluence of these factors led to the spectacular victories at Hamel and Amiens.50 The subsequent Allied successes that won WWI were in turn enabled by the further progressive disintegration of the German Army, with successive positions being repeatedly broken open by the new technologies and techniques, in a spiralling cycle of success.
These thinner defences would nevertheless have been sufficient to halt the Allied advances had technology not changed over the previous years – in 1915 defences that were broadly comparable to those of mid- to late-1918 were sufficient to repulse all attacks. Similarly the well equipped but inexperienced Americans found that merely throwing new technology at the enemy without a sophisticated plan for employment could lead to disaster, as they discovered in several costly attacks.51
By 1918, then, the artillery was able to swiftly and effectively neutralise enemy defences, tanks could crush wire and obstacles and engage surviving strong points directly, while overhead the air force provided crucial intelligence, attacked point targets, and delayed reserves. This enabled the infantry to exploit surprise and swiftly and efficiently break into and through what would previously been impenetrable.52 However, these new technologies would have been unable to break the stalemate on the Western Front had they not been leveraged as part of a intelligent combined arms package, a package that also included new tactics, training, and organisations.53
 
Bibliography
Bailey, J.B.A., Field Artillery and Firepower (London: Routledge, 2004)
Bidwell, Shelford and Graham, Dominick, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin Inc., 1985)
Brown, Ian M., “Not Glamorous, But Effective: The Canadian Corps and the Set-Piece Attack, 1917-1918,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Jul 1994), pp. 421-444.
Campbell, Christy, Band of Brigands: The First Men in Tanks (London: Harper Press, 2007)
Cook, Tim, “Dying like so Many Rats in a Trap: Gas Warfare and the Great War Soldier,” The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Winter 2002-2003), pp. 47-56
Corum, James S., ”The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan 1995), pp. 53-76.
Dupuy, T.N., Understanding War, (London: Leo Cooper, 1992)
English, John A., and Gudmundsson, Bruce I., On Infantry (Westport CT: Praeger, 1994)
Griffith, Paddy, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18 (Great Britain: Yale University Press, 2000)
Gudmundsson, Bruce I., On Artillery (Westport CT: Praeger, 1993)
Liaropoulos, Andrew N., “Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence – The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Apr 2006), pp. 363-384.
Lupfer, Timothy T., The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War, Leavenworth Papers No. 4 (Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, July 1981)
Marble, Sanders, The infantry cannot do with a gun less: The Place of the Artillery in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918, accessed via http://www.gutenberg-e.org/mas01, August 2003
NATO, Land Force Tactical Doctrine, ATP-35(B)
Palazzo, Albert P., “The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jan 1999), pp. 55-74.
Shimshoni, Jonathan, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), pp. 187-215.
Steel, Nigel, and Hart, Peter, Tumult in the Clouds: The British Experience of the War in the Air, 1914 – 1918 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997)
Stevenson, David, 1914 – 1918: The History of the First World War (London: Penguin, 2004)
Terraine, John, White Heat: The New Warfare 1914-18 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, 1982)
Travers, Tim, “The Evolution of British Strategy and Tactics on the Western Front in 1918: GHQ, Manpower, and Technology,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Apr 1990), pp. 173-200.
Travers, Tim, “Could the Tanks of 1918 have Been War-Winners for the British Expeditionary Force?” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jul 1992), pp. 389-406.
Van der Kloot, William, “Lawrence Bragg’s Role in the Development of Sound-Ranging in World War I,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Sep. 22, 2005), pp. 273-284.
 
Footnotes
1 British forces advanced some seven miles in five months over the course of the Somme Offensive in 1916. On 8 Aug 1918 at Amiens the British advanced eight miles in one day. Stevenson, David, 1914 – 1918: The History of the First World War (London: Penguin, 2004), pp.409, 426.
2 Terraine, John, White Heat: The New Warfare 1914-18 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, 1982), pp.321-322.
3 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.399. Griffith, Paddy, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18 (Great Britain: Yale University Press, 2000), p.89. Travers, Tim, “The Evolution of British Strategy and Tactics on the Western Front in 1918: GHQ, Manpower, and Technology,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Apr 1990), p195. Brown, Ian M., “Not Glamorous, But Effective: The Canadian Corps and the Set-Piece Attack, 1917-1918,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Jul 1994), p.443. Shimshoni, Jonathan, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), p.205.
4 Dupuy, T.N., Understanding War, (London: Leo Cooper, 1992), p.6. NATO, Land Force Tactical Doctrine, ATP-35(B), p.1-3. Travers, GHQ, emphasises the importance of surprise.
5 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.162.
6 Bidwell, Shelford and Graham, Dominick, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin Inc., 1985), pp.129-130. Gudmundsson, Bruce I., On Artillery (Westport CT: Praeger, 1993), pp.88, 91-93. Marble, Sanders, The infantry cannot do with a gun less: The Place of the Artillery in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918, accessed via http://www.gutenberg-e.org/mas01, August 2003, Chapter 4 – “Preparing the Attack, Part II:1917-1918”, sub-chapter “1918: Amiens”.
7 Liaropoulos, Andrew N., “Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence – The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Apr 2006), pp. 377.
8 Bidwell, Firepower, pp.12, 68, 141-143. Marble, The Infantry, Chapter 2 – “Background through the end of 1914”, sub-chapter “1914: The test of battle”.
9 Marble, The Infantry, Chapter 5 – “The “Counter Blaster” and Counter-Battery Work”, sub-chapter “1917: The Problems Solved”.
10 Griffith, Battle Tactics, pp.140-141.
11 Terraine, White Heat, p.295. Stevenson, 1914-1918, pp.446-447. Cook, Tim, “Dying like so Many Rats in a Trap: Gas Warfare and the Great War soldier,” The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Winter 2002-2003), pp.49-40, 51, 52
12 Terraine, White Heat, p.308. Stevenson, 1914-1918, pp.446-447. Bailey, J.B.A., Field Artillery and Firepower (London: Routledge, 2004), p.142. Van der Kloot, William, “Lawrence Bragg’s Role in the Development of Sound-Ranging in World War I,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Sep. 22, 2005), pp.281-282. Palazzo, Albert P., “The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jan 1999), pp. 68-72.
13 Terraine, White Heat, p.307, quoting General Birch.
14 Gudmundsson, On Artillery, pp.90-95, 99-100. Stevenson, 1914-1918, pp.375-376. Bidwell, Firepower, p.134.
15 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.446. Steel, Nigel, and Hart, Peter, Tumult in the Clouds: The British Experience of the War in the Air, 1914 – 1918 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997), p.334.
16 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.191.
17 Griffith, Battle Tactics, pp.137, 157. Bidwell, Firepower, p.103.
18 Bidwell, Firepower, p.103.
19 Bidwell, Firepower, pp.102-104. Marble, The Infantry, Chapter 5 – “The “Counter Blaster” and Counter-Battery Work”, sub-chapter “1917: The Problems Solved”.
20 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.192. Griffith, Battle Tactics, p.157.
21 Bidwell, Firepower, p.103.
22 Steel, Tumult, p.334. Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.191.
23 Steel, Tumult, p.319
24 Steel, Tumult, pp.315, 317, 334, 335, 339. Terraine, White Heat, pp.289, 304. Bidwell, Firepower, pp.143-144. Travers, GHQ, pp.193-194. Campbell, Christy, Band of Brigands: The First Men in Tanks (London: Harper Press, 2007), p.358. Corum, James S., ”The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan 1995), pp. 54-56.
25 Bidwell, Firepower, pp.144-145.
26 For example at Amiens, on 8 Aug 1918, a total of 750 aircraft from the RAF were involved, each able to drop some hundreds of pounds of bombs per day. By contrast, the British employed about 2,000 pieces of artillery, each able to fire over a ton of shells per hour. Stevenson, 1914-1918, pp.192, 305, 307, 444-445.
27 Bidwell, Firepower, pp.144-145. Travers, GHQ, p.180.
28 White Heat, p.311. Tumult, p.335. During the siege of Paris in 1870-71 small quantities of items, including letters, were spirited out of the city by balloon, but that clearly wasn’t a supply operation. “$238,625 for mail from Prussian Siege”, The Dominion Post, Wellington, 9 April 2009.
29 Campbell, Band of Brigands, p.380. Terraine, White Heat, p.286.
30 Griffith, Battle Tactics, p.164. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp.142, 148. Travers, GHQ, pp.192-193. Marble, The Infantry, Chapter 5 – “The “Counter Blaster” and Counter-Battery Work”, sub-chapter “1917: The Problems Solved”.
31 Campbell, Band of Brigands, p.389. Bidwell, Firepower, p.137.
32 Terraine, White Heat, p.303. Campbell, Band of Brigands, pp.389, 393. Stevenson, 1914-1918, pp.189, 444. Bidwell, Firepower, pp.137-138.
33 Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p.145. See Travers, Tim, “Could the Tanks of 1918 have Been War-Winners for the British Expeditionary Force?” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jul 1992), pp.389-406 for a backhanded acknowledgement of this point.
34 Bidwell, Firepower, p.127. Gudmundsson, On Artillery, p.83. Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.186. English, John A., and Gudmundsson, Bruce I., On Infantry (Westport CT: Praeger, 1994), p.28.
35 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.193. Griffith, Battle Tactics, p.97. Lupfer, Timothy T., The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War, Leavenworth Papers No. 4 (Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, July 1981), pp.40, 42.
36 Bidwell, Firepower, p.140.
37 Terraine, White Heat p.291. Griffith, Battle Tactics, pp.96-99. English, On Infantry, pp.22-23, 28-29. Bidwell, Firepower, p.132. Lupfer, Dynamics of Doctrine, p.40.
38 Griffith, Battle Tactics, pp.63, 195.
39 Terraine, White Heat p.220. English, On Infantry, pp.25-26. Lupfer, Dynamics of Doctrine, p.35.
40 There were 244,897 British casualties over 100-odd days at Third Ypres, Terraine, White Heat p.291.
41 Griffith, Battle Tactics, pp.89, 218. Stevenson, 1914-1918, pp.404-406.
42 Stevenson, 1914-1918, pp.402.
43 The French continued to crowd front line trenches until Reims, 15 July 1918. Gudmundsson, On Artillery, p.95. Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.423.
44 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.399, 408. This was more guns than the British held in all of France. Comparable concentrations were achieved for subsequent attacks.
45 In principle advanced attack techniques and tactics were available to the entire BEF, Griffith, Battle Tactics, p.194. For streaming of German Army see Terraine, White Heat pp.279, 280. English, On Infantry, p.29 and note 30, p.34. Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.400.
46 The Germans suffered such high casualties among the specialist assault troops in their attacks in March and May that they were unable to continue attacking. Similarly, the British suffered 250,000 casualties during The Hundred Days. However, casualties per mile of advance had dropped precipitously since 1916, and even 1917. Terraine, White Heat p.324. Campbell, Band of Brigands p.397. Travers, GHQ, p.189.
47 Terraine, White Heat p.287. Stevenson, 1914-1918, pp.411-412, 413. Griffith, Battle Tactics, p.60.
48 Stevenson, 1914-1918, pp.411, 423. Terraine, White Heat pp.288, 299.
49 As 1918 progressed, the average quality of the German Army continued to decline, Gudmundsson, On Artillery, p.102. Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.416.
50 Campbell, Band of Brigands, p.386. Stevenson, 1914-1918, pp.425-427.
51 For example the disastrous attack by 301st US Tank Battalion and 27th US Infantry Division on 27 September 1918, Campbell, Band of Brigands p.395. Also the US fiasco at the Meuse-Argonne, also in September, Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.430.
52 General Monash commented that Hamel was “all over in 93 minutes”, Terraine, White Heat, p.314. Campbell, Band of Brigands p.384 for Hamel, and p.386 for Amiens. The crossing of the St Quentin Canal on 29 September 1918 was carried out with great dash and success, Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.431. Overall casualties suffered by the British during The Hundred Days were comparable to Third Ypres, but the results achieved were incomparably greater, Campbell, Band of Brigands p.397, Terraine, White Heat p.323, and Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.442.
53 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.447.
... back to contents

MINUTE 14
M1 #2 moved into the hollow next to the little hill in BP1 in order to overwatch the Gate to Valhalla with the hopes that the Leopard that was moving in that direction would come under its guns.  What it spotted instead was a Marder moving next to the farm ahead of the tank.  The Marder spotted the Abrams first and opened fire with its cannon taking out the turret mounted MG, but it was not a fair fight…
 
The M1 then immediately spotted the Leopard, which does not look like it sees the Abrams… the turn ended before my tank could reload.  I hate when that happens.  (see item 1 below)  

Some artillery spotting rounds are falling next to Hill 42.0 so I have moved my M3 platoon back a bit and loaded any infantry nearby. 

As time expired one of the Warriors moving through the field came into view near the Water Tower, it started to fire cannon rounds at T-90 #2 which was elevating its gun and taking aim as time expired!  (see item 2 below) 

The Warrior rear door opened as the clock ran out... hopefully, if the T-90 can actually make the kill, it will also take out most of the infantry in the back.

The Warrior platoon that was last spotted moving past HILL 32.9 has dropped off my radar completely… I have no contacts at all for this formation. (see item 3 below) 

Looks like it could be a very interesting next turn, coming up are the following highlights:
The M1A1SA #2 versus Leopard 2A4 faceoff.       The T-90 #2 versus Warrior IFV faceoff Plus, I am moving the BMP-3s 1st Platoon forward in the hopes of spotting that Warrior platoon that disappeared past Point 32.9 A couple Javelin teams will arrive in their firing positions looking to kill something Oh, and after next turn, the final reinforcements arrive! Don’t go anywhere!
1st Platoon BMP-3s getting ready to move to hulldown positions: (see item 3 above) 

BP1: (see item 1 and 4 above) 

MINUTE 13
M1 #2 had a tight cover arc covering the position the Challenger was moving into and had a 20 second pause to give it time to spot and fire before withdrawing.  I know now that those tanks can kill mine with ease, so I am taking few chances.
The enemy Challenger turned the corner and stopped, then took aim and fired at M1 #1, which if you remember last turn was already dead… though its crew had survived.. well after this hit and another I think from the other Challenger the crew was cut in half and only two survivors crawled out of the stricken tank. 

But then M1 #2 got a good firing solution and put a SABOT right into the Challenger’s front turret…  double wow… it shrugged off that hit without any noticeable damage.  Good news is that this Challenger never spotted mine before the Abrams pulled back into safety.

One of the Leos moved out of its position and appeared to be moving towards… the Ruined Farm… now renamed the Gate to Valhalla... keep sending them that way buddy.

The HQ tank from the T-90 platoon spotted a Marder breaching a stone wall near Farm 001 and was spotted in return.  The T-90 took several cannon rounds and returned one of its own, which... missed of course.  Will any Syrian vehicle get a kill in this game?  It’s looking doubtful at this point. 

The Warrior platoon that was heading toward Farm 002 has at least three vehicles moving beyond it, two of them (maybe only one with the second in support) appears to be heading through the field toward OBJ SAPPHIRE, a third has moved into the gully that leads into OBJ DIAMOND. 

I had already started to reorient one of the T-90s to cover the water tower area and the field beyond.  T-90 #2 will pull into position next turn to overwatch this field in front of Farm 002.

A little misunderstanding for sure   The fighters I have in Dumayr were never going to withdraw, they are digging in and absorbing the attacks Baneman is throwing at them.  What I am doing now is attempting to move my other irregular force into Dumayr to make him redeploy and break up the strength of his attackers. 
Thanks Miguel.  I appreciate the kudos.

From your previous post I got the impression that you were considering to withdraw from Dumayr altogether. In this update you are describing a pretty offensive plan for the forces there and in the monastery. Was I reading too much in your last post, or some datum from the latest reply suggested to try and go for a backhand blow in Dumayr?
Excellent materials @Bil Hardenberger thinking of the amount of time I think you invested in those waters my eyes. Very nice material to read while on holidays

MINUTE 5
Team 2’s ATGM that was in flight last turn missed high again… I think all the incoming fire threw off their aim so they missed both of those shots and in my opinion that is a realistic result.  Baneman opened up on them with several Scimitars this turn, however the team was able to pull back over the ridge no worse for wear.  The AT-7 is still partially deployed, an advantage of moving just one action spot, resetting will take far less time.  They do have three missiles left... next time I use them I need to find a better, more keyholed position, preferably away from the prying eyes of those damned Fenneks.
One lucky SOB (composite image to show the missile's path):

The BMP 2 is now re-manned and I will be moving them toward a firing position next turn to attempt to engage a Scimitar further in depth.

LAV-25 4 moved into a keyhole position and at the end of the turn spotted, fired at and penetrated the Scimitar near the ruined farm (Weapon Mount penetration).  I don’t think it is knocked out yet, so next turn I will be pouring it on.  The Fennek right next to it spotted my hulldown LAV almost immediately and fired a salvo of grenades, but they went long.  Damn that thing has amazing optics.  Drives home that I need to take them out as quickly as I can.  The Scimitars in comparison do not seem to spot my units very well at all. 

At the end of the turn the LAV-AT attached to Team 2 got a firm spot on the Fennek near the ruined farm.  It was taking aim as the turn ended.  I doubt they will miss like the AT-7 team did, fingers crossed.  Killing the Fenneks is now a priority task.

The dismounted recon platoon is closing in on OBJ GARNET.  They are looking for a covered route to move towards the enemy positions.

At Farm 002 the Fennek that dismounted last turn remounts.  That vehicle is useless without its crew and loses all the advantages its optics give him, guess he realized that.
In DUMAYR, Baneman continues to throw his teams forward.  I am going to abandon my positions near the Monastery and move my fighters to South DUMAYR and let them join the fight for that objective. 
The Monastery and Village Charlie are not as important as DUMAYR and I’d like to concentrate against the unit he has engaged there and eliminate it.  With a little luck he could find himself squeezed between my two irregular forces.  Team 1’s BMP-2 will be providing some support fire into the enemy held buildings across from my teams in an attempt to reduce some of the pressure. 

In other news, my Advance Guard arrived in the AO.  I am actually wishing I had another five minutes for the recon battle... it is just now starting to develop and get interesting.  With my Advance Guard will also come his… and he can deploy his forward far faster than I, so could, in theory achieve fire superiority before I can get into position.  KT-2 does provide the highest ground in the AO so that is an advantage for me... but it will be tricky bringing my combat power to bear without exposing them.  I also expect a linear artillery barrage on KT2 in the near future... maybe before the main body arrives so I need to prepare for that as well.

Advance Guard
I have five turns before the main body arrives so I would like to commit the Advance Guard to action as soon as possible.  My intent is to attrit the enemy recon force and the enemy Advance Guard to such a degree that when the main bodies arrive I will have a leg up.  I feel like the battle in EA1 is the key to this battle.  Whoever wins that fight will have freedom of maneuver.

I will try to target my mortars on KT1 if possible.
The T-90SA platoon will be quickly moving over the bridge to support the LAVs that are engaging the enemy recon elements and to be in a central position in order to react to where they are needed.

The BMP-3 platoon will disembark their infantry and then the vehicles will move en-masse to the north edge of the KT2 ridgeline.  I want them to engage the enemy with their ATGMs, if possible one part of the enemy force at a time.  I would love to eventually get them down to the plain between KT1 and KT2 to take the fight to the enemy but that might have to wait for the main body to arrive.

The dismounted infantry platoon will move down the gully and move toward the river.  Once close they will await orders.  My intent with them is to drive as deep as possible under cover toward the river, and cross it if possible to support the irregulars in DUMAYR.  It will take a few turns for them to get moving as they need to disembark, split, remount one of the teams to allow the BMP-3s to operate at full efficiency, and only then can they head out.
Can't wait to play with these guys:

Once the BMP-3s arrive at the ridgeline I will pull the LAV-ATs from the teams they are supporting and attach them to the BMP-3s.  The Syrian Recon Platoon dismounted elements will remain where they are for now and continue their dismounted recon and harassment role.  The BMP-2 #2 will be moving to join its brother so they can cooperate as a team, mainly against the enemy DUMAYR irregular fighters. 
Next turn I will include a SITMAP to show all friendly and enemy unit positions (known and suspected).

MINUTE 4
Team 2’s AT team finished setting up its AT-7, aimed at the Scimitar near the ruined farm and let fly… the missile just skimmed the turret but hit the ground well beyond…

…immediately the accompanying Fennek spotted the team and fired a few volleys of grenades at this team.  None hit, but the grenades were churning up the ground as they moved closer and closer toward the end of the turn. 

The AT team fired a second missile that is still in the air at the end of the first turn.  I will be pulling them out of the line next turn... hopefully they get out okay… if not, that’s okay too as long as he loses the Scimitar.  I’m on the edge of my seat…

Neither of my vehicles in this team got a spot this turn... I will be pulling the BMP out of the line next turn in order to re-mount one of the scout teams as noted last turn.  The LAV-AT will stay where it is for now, I expect Baneman will move a vehicle or two next turn near the ruined farm, and that might help the LAV-AT spot one or both of them.
Team 1’s BMP did pull off the line this turn, and will now wait for the Recon Platoon leader team to remount next turn.

The Fennek at Farm 2 dismounted this turn and entered the buildings.  It does not look like he wants to push beyond the farm at this point... he is happy to sit in place and provide support fire with the Scimitar towards my UNCONs near the Monastery.

Two of the four LAVs in my reaction force will be moving forward into keyhole positions next turn, hoping to get a spot or two on a Scimitar or Fennek.  This movement is in preparation for my Advance Guard which is just one minute out. 

The dismounts from this platoon are starting to move out on a route reconnaissance toward OBJ GARNET.  The other two LAVs are being held back in reserve.

In DUMAYR, Baneman is pushing his irregulars hard toward mine and it continues to cost him.  My teams are going to get critical on ammo very soon though, so he might be able to get an advantage.  I am switching my teams in this area to control their own fire.  I should have noticed the small amount of ammo they carried from the start.  I’ll try to provide them some support by fire from my positions near KT2, but to be honest, the action in DUMAYR is a side-show right now and I am not intent on pushing forward at all there.
My final Technical did extricate itself, so that will help some and it is moving to the sound of guns in DUMAYR-North.

PIR:  Will the enemy militia/fighters attempt to seize DUMAYR?  His assault is picking up steam, but it has cost him a lot of casualties to this point. I estimate he has lost 9 or 10 fighters (maybe one or two more) to 3 of my own. PIR:  Where are the enemy Technicals?  I finally get some contacts on his technicals, they are presently located near the built up area at the western most bridge.

MINUTE 3
I think Baneman must be starting to get spots or at least contacts on KT2 because his movement has started to stall…

It appears he is primarily focused on the UNCONs around the Monastery and DUMAYR.  At least two Scimitars have opened fire on my irregulars outside the Monastery…

…he has started to push towards my UNCONs on the edge of the north boundary of the town.  For now I am letting him come... he has lost at least five men and probably more while I have taken two casualties in this action. 

I lost the technical that was dismounted last turn to enemy Scimitar fire this turn.  Not much I could do about that, they were left exposed on the road to Baneman’s movements and there was little I could do about it... well I could have moved them turn one, and that’s on me.  I will try to extricate the last vehicle, but I will be very lucky if they can pull out and into safety before getting hit too.  Best to not factor it into my plans moving forward.
One Scimitar did area fire (light) at the crest of Hill 42, nothing was there at this point. 

By the end of the turn I did have two DRTs close to the crest, but still on the reverse slope.  These from Team 2.  The BMP has successfully reversed into a hulldown position. 

Team 1’s AT team has moved into position and was still deploying its AT-7 at the end of the turn… it did end the turn with two enemy vehicles in view. 

The AT-7 team has spots on the two vehicles near the Ruined Farm:

The BMP and the LAV-AT have moved into positions on the crest but have yet to spot anything... and I have no clue whether they were spotted moving into their hulldown positions.

PIR:  Will the enemy recon attempt a recon in force down AA1?  After three minutes it appears there are only the two vehicles (Scimitar and Fennek) on this route for now.  I am officially calling it a Route Recon only, at least for now.  PIR:  Will the enemy recon attempt a counter-recon operation?  After three minutes this does not appear to be his intent. PIR:  Will the enemy recon force take up overwatch positions at KT1?  After three minutes of action it appears like my opponent is indeed putting most of his Scimitars into overwatch positions oriented towards KT2. Analysis:  It appears that Baneman has formed a couple of two vehicle teams (one Scimitar paired with one Fennek), one of these teams is on AA1 at Farm 002, and the other pair is near the ruined farm. 
PIR:  Will the enemy militia/fighters attempt to seize DUMAYR?  It does appear like he has this intention, and seems to be throwing a large irregular force into capturing the town. PIR:  Will the enemy militia/fighters attempt to seize the Monastery?  There has been no sign of enemy activity near the Monastery, but it is early and I have no eyes on the other side of the compound.  It is too early to make a determination on this question. PIR:  Where are the enemy Technicals?  After three minutes there has been no sign of these vehicles. GAMEPLAY NOTE:   I am worried about my BMPs... after some reading on the forums it appears that it is best practice to leave at least one other individual in the BMP so someone can man the leader’s seat.  I have dismounted all of my BMP teams so each is only left with a two man crew which is substandard... I will pull them out of view and remount one team in each at the earliest opportunity.  Of course that’s going to have to wait until next turn as I have already returned the file.

I wouldn't draw any conclusions from the YT videos. They are not representative because they always show successful attacks from the ambush positions. I haven't seen many videos where the missile missed or malfunctioned. So the ATGM porn present online has to represent only small fraction of the actual launches. Of course the're ATGM systems like Spike NLOS with a range over 20km designed to be fired at the targets BVR. But they are designed for the helicopters or some future tank destroyers, that would be networked with drones or other observation systems.

Having said this, I'd love to see a little bigger CM maps. They don't have to be 10x10km, but maybe 5x5km, something more suitable for mechanized combat. The current maps are great for infantry combat or WW2. For modern mech warfare - not so much.

Superimpose that red square over Objective 'Peter', and abstract the approach maneuver in the scenario editor, and you would have a CM Scenario.
Create one battle around Objective 'Parker', and another one around Objective 'Peter', and you have a CM Campaign.
Get it? The scenarios and campaigns present in the game provide for everything you would need to simulate this operation, with the exception of the approach march, and maneuver between objectives, which if you really wanted them, could also be added (in sections) into a CM Campaign.

Recon is an exercise that occurs at all levels of warfare. The horse is quite dead at this point, Erwin.

No need to lock it as far as I'm concerned, I'm enjoying the back and forth, and as far as banning goes, why would he do that?  I think you have been firm in your opinions but not really insulting or rude.
As for "maneuver", well it can't be pinned down to a simple definition in the tactical context, are we discussing individual unit maneuver or formation maneuver?  Neither requires a huge amount of space... even with the LOS at the NTC individual units and formations can perform maneuver warfare in very small areas in order to improve their position in regards to an enemy.  Though I would love to play easily and smoothly on larger maps I rarely feel confined on the CMSF maps.  The CMSF 2 BETA AAR map is 1.5 km by 2.3 km and it feels plenty large to me even for modern warfare.  Sure some vehicles will be able to fire diagonally across the map with no problem, but that is going to be a rare occurrence I think, and most fire exchanged so far has been around or less than 1000 meters.  Even between tanks.

Yeah, there's a reason I'm not getting too close to the soldier models.. still works in progress.
The TOW vehicle is a LAV not a Stryker as this is a USMC platoon and they'll feature in the commentary in a few turns or so.  How's that for a teaser?   

INITIAL SETUP, ORDERS, & INTENT
My intent with my opening moves is to get into position where I can observe the enemy entry point.  I don’t have enough combat power on the map to go toe to toe with Baneman yet, so for now I will get some Dismounted Recon Teams (DRT, pronounced Dirt) into Observation Positions (OP) and attempt to ascertain my opponent’s level of aggressiveness.  He could have upwards of eight Scimitar light tanks so might come into this one with a feeling of high confidence, or maybe not...  I need to answer the following Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR):
PIR:  Will the enemy recon attempt a recon in force down AA1? PIR:  Will the enemy recon attempt a counter-recon operation? PIR:  Will the enemy recon force take up overwatch positions at KT1? To counter these enemy vehicles I have created two AT teams each made up of one Syrian BMP-2 and dismounts, and one LAV-AT with TOWs.  The USMC LAV-ATs are there to support the BMPs and dismounts and hunt enemy recon vehicles as the opportunity arises. 
TEAM 1:

TEAM 2:

These teams will drive up the reverse side of the Hill 41-42 Ridge… the dismounts then will carefully, using cover, move to the crest and take up observation positions.  The ATGM team will deploy its weapon and try to get one or two enemy vehicles before displacing, if displacement is even possible.  The BMPs and the LAV-ATs will use shoot and scoot tactics to engage the enemy vehicles if possible.
Note that with this movement I am trying to keep to clear ground as much as possible to minimize the chance of bogging, and I am slowing to Move speed when crossing the stream.  Better safe than sorry.  I am also trying to mask my movement from Baneman's eyes as much as I can. 

The remaining LAVs in the Marine recon platoon will stay together and become my rapid reaction force.  They will eventually assemble in a centralized position behind the two AT teams and be ready to react to events.  I will remain flexible with them until my Advance Guard arrives in zone. 

The intent is to identify and attrit the enemy recon as much as possible prior to the Advance Guard arrival.
The irregular forces will also stay in position and wait a bit before acting.  They will be sending small teams out to reconnoiter the objectives.  The three technicals will remain in position until I get an idea on where the enemy irregulars are positioned and what their intent is.  Eventually I would like to send these vehicles to OBJ Ruby to give Baneman something to think about, but that will depend on events.
[Sorry I don't have any screenshots to show for these units yet.. had an issue with transferring all my images to Dropbox.  Next post will feature some of them]
 

METT-T
TERRAIN
The terrain for this operation is very complicated, it is crossed by canals, has a river obstacle and it is dominated by the heights at the northern end of the AO.  The following should give us a better idea as to what to expect and how to approach this fight.
GROUND CONDITIONS:  The ground underfoot is dry.
WEATHER:  The forecast for the next 24 hour period is hot with clear skies.
WIND DIRECTION & STRENGTH:  Winds are NW, strength light.
MAIN HEIGHTS:  KT1 and KT2 represent the main heights in the AO.  There are equally dominating heights on the southern end of the map but I suspect they will not play as large a role in this action as those at the north end primarily because our entry points are in the north and most action will probably revolve around those two pieces of key terrain.
LOWEST ELEVATION:  The areas of lowest elevation are:
The plain between KT1 and KT2 (identified as Engagement Area (EA) 1 on the map). The main valley that runs from below the heights in the north (KT1 and KT2) and the river. Canals, stream, and the river surrounding terrain in many cases offers low ground that can be taken advantage of. KEY TERRAIN: 
Key Terrain 1 (KT1):  From this area of high ground a unit can get eyes on a large part of the AO. Key Terrain 2 (KT2):  This area of high ground is probably the most important ground in the AO.  From its heights almost the entire AO can be observed.  It will be tough for an opponent to maneuver once these heights have a suitable amount of combat power on them. Key Terrain 3 (KT3):  The town of DUMAYR, with its three objectives is the main objective for this operation.  As an urban area, taking it could be costly so an early operation to seize this objective while it is lightly occupied could pay dividends.  This is probably the most defensible terrain in the AO. Click on the image to enlarge:

I apologize in advance for the negativity, but I find these "movie mode" screenshots hard to look at.
I do not think that they advertise the game very well.
Best regards,
Thomm

Better
P

I'm really looking forward to this  As William Wallace is meant to have said to his army before the battle of Falkirk:
"I have brought you to the ring, now dance if you can!"
 

For this game we wanted to show as much as possible, and yet provide an entertaining and challenging game.  We decided that each of us would take two nations, and some UNCONs and Fighters and duke it out man on man, steel against steel (or Chobham as the case may be)... the only constraint was that whoever chose the US would also have to field the Syrians as the US does come with some advantages (Javelins etc.).
I gave Baneman first choice and he went with his own folks, the UK and partnered them with the German Army.  He suggested that I, as an American should take the US, so what choice did I have?   
As for force purchases we adhered to the following:
These constraints will apply to EACH nation we choose (purchase must be 50-50): Light troops - one platoon of mounted recon (or light armored recon) or two platoons of dismounted recon Armor - either two tanks (1st class: M1, Leo, or Challenger) or one platoon of second class tanks (anything Syrian, Leo 1 (Canada) Infantry - either one company (mounted) or two companies dismounted troops Artillery - whatever comes with our purchased units, plus:  one battery of medium howitzers (one from each nation) UNCONs - will let George select and deploy for us No air We then sent our purchases to @George MC who provided a gorgeous map for us to fight on, and he set us up.. George also selected and setup the UNCON force for us and deployed them.. neither of us knew the force composition or the locations of our irregulars.  George identified key objectives for us also and really this game could not have happened without him.  So, THANKS GEORGE!!!
I will get into the details of my force pick and what I suspect Baneman is bringing to the party in a later post... should be interesting, this is a Meeting Engagement with the following forces arrayed against each other:
BANEMAN - UK and German - UNCONs including some Technical (gun truck) support) ME - US and Syrian - UNCONs including some Technical (gun truck) support) The next post will have some pictures.    I will show some map highlights and include a topo map that I am using to track the action in this battle. 
I will run through my METT-T analysis as quickly as I can in order to get to the action... the first of those posts will probably go up tonight.
Bil

Here it is folks.. the time has arrived for the CMSF2 BETA AAR.  I will be adding to this thread later today,, but wanted to get the thread started. 
My opponent?  My nemesis from the CMFB  BETA AAR, Baneman ,agreed to a rematch.  I really do owe him a more thoughtful game than I gave him the last time.  For those of you who are unfamiliar with that game, Baneman beat me rather soundly.  Hope that doesn't happen again!   
This game is well under way, we have completed 16 minutes of action, so there are a lot of turns to come in relatively quick succession and the Blood Board™ is filling rather alarmingly.  
For those of you who were following my "Lesson in Defense" AAR in the CMBN forum.. sorry about not updating that thread for a while, but I can really only do one of these at a time, and this one takes priority.,  Once I started this game it took up my full attention.
More anon.  Bil
 
LINKED CONTENT MENU:
OVERVIEW & SCENARIO PARAMETERS MAP ORIENTATION SCENARIO BRIEFING METT-T - MISSION METT-T - ENEMY METT-T - TERRAIN METT-T TROOPS METT-T TIME INITIAL SETUP, ORDERS, & INTENT MINUTE 1 MINUTE 2 MINUTE 3 MINUTE 4 MINUTE 5 MINUTE 6 MINUTE 7 MINUTE 8 and 9 MINUTE 10 MINUTE 11 MINUTE 12 MINUTE 13 MINUTE 14 MINUTE 15 MINUTE 16 TACTICS & BATTLE PLAN DISCUSSION MINUTE 17 MINUTE 18  

I know how good is my English.
Unusual parallels...
Of course they was. But... That myth about machineguns shooting at running soldiers is too primitive, stupid, hugely hyperbolised. That didn't happen in such way. Block units officers executed single men, if they refused to fight and agitated others to flee. They were not just behind the rifle units, but in the rear: at road intersections, towns. The scale of war was huge, millions men were involved, may be someone somewhere shot at the crowd, who knows. But showing it like a common event is false. Another myth in this movie, 1 mosins for 2 men... Yes, in 1941 RKKA had problems with small arms. But this means that platoons had only 2 mgs instead of 4. (In 1942 3 mgs, in 1943 - 6) Again, too stupid hypebole. May be somewhere conscripts were caught without arms by quickly advancing Germans, that happened in 1941. But that they were intentionally sent to combat without weapons... I hate such "creative" writers and movie makers.

This is extremely spicy.  I understand you don't know things such as computer basics so I won't blame you for not having good reading comprehension but that couldn't be more wrong.  I'm obviously referring to the people who don't like steam running on startup, lan play etc.  I've made no hint that Steve keeps away from steam for trivial misunderstandings.

Yes its incredibly difficult to check a box in the settings menu. This makes Steam one of the least user-friendly programs in the world.