Maciej Zwolinski

Kofman in his latest podcast which is focused on drones proposed a reason, why it is significantly more difficult to use drones in support of a go forward maneouvre. He says that Russian ECM is effective and droning Russian defensive positions requires operating within the umbrella of ECM emitters emplaced in the RUS  trenches, where drones will work significantly worse. He says that the drones really can shine when engaging units which are on the offensive and have left the ECM cover.
Kofman in general praises Russian ECM and for example, he says that GPS guided munitions have been generally degraded. Excaliburs are left unused in some units, and Ukrainians are asking for GMLRS with DPICM warheads which may still do damage despite the missile being spoofed by ECM and going off course.

Kofman in his latest podcast which is focused on drones proposed a reason, why it is significantly more difficult to use drones in support of a go forward maneouvre. He says that Russian ECM is effective and droning Russian defensive positions requires operating within the umbrella of ECM emitters emplaced in the RUS  trenches, where drones will work significantly worse. He says that the drones really can shine when engaging units which are on the offensive and have left the ECM cover.
Kofman in general praises Russian ECM and for example, he says that GPS guided munitions have been generally degraded. Excaliburs are left unused in some units, and Ukrainians are asking for GMLRS with DPICM warheads which may still do damage despite the missile being spoofed by ECM and going off course.

Kofman in his latest podcast which is focused on drones proposed a reason, why it is significantly more difficult to use drones in support of a go forward maneouvre. He says that Russian ECM is effective and droning Russian defensive positions requires operating within the umbrella of ECM emitters emplaced in the RUS  trenches, where drones will work significantly worse. He says that the drones really can shine when engaging units which are on the offensive and have left the ECM cover.
Kofman in general praises Russian ECM and for example, he says that GPS guided munitions have been generally degraded. Excaliburs are left unused in some units, and Ukrainians are asking for GMLRS with DPICM warheads which may still do damage despite the missile being spoofed by ECM and going off course.

Kofman in his latest podcast which is focused on drones proposed a reason, why it is significantly more difficult to use drones in support of a go forward maneouvre. He says that Russian ECM is effective and droning Russian defensive positions requires operating within the umbrella of ECM emitters emplaced in the RUS  trenches, where drones will work significantly worse. He says that the drones really can shine when engaging units which are on the offensive and have left the ECM cover.
Kofman in general praises Russian ECM and for example, he says that GPS guided munitions have been generally degraded. Excaliburs are left unused in some units, and Ukrainians are asking for GMLRS with DPICM warheads which may still do damage despite the missile being spoofed by ECM and going off course.

Kofman in his latest podcast which is focused on drones proposed a reason, why it is significantly more difficult to use drones in support of a go forward maneouvre. He says that Russian ECM is effective and droning Russian defensive positions requires operating within the umbrella of ECM emitters emplaced in the RUS  trenches, where drones will work significantly worse. He says that the drones really can shine when engaging units which are on the offensive and have left the ECM cover.
Kofman in general praises Russian ECM and for example, he says that GPS guided munitions have been generally degraded. Excaliburs are left unused in some units, and Ukrainians are asking for GMLRS with DPICM warheads which may still do damage despite the missile being spoofed by ECM and going off course.

Where did you get the idea? They were very effective as tactical bombers, only vulnerable to interceptors due to low speed. Where the enemy air cover was absent or not effective, StuKas worked very well. 

Where did you get the idea? They were very effective as tactical bombers, only vulnerable to interceptors due to low speed. Where the enemy air cover was absent or not effective, StuKas worked very well. 

Where did you get the idea? They were very effective as tactical bombers, only vulnerable to interceptors due to low speed. Where the enemy air cover was absent or not effective, StuKas worked very well. 

I think the "joke" becomes more apparent in the context of the Soviet Union, when huge part of books, films and art was specifically about Wehrmacht being the worst enemy of the Russian man. And in order to underline the heroism of the Russian man, sometimes (particularly at the beginning of those films/books) the German soldiers were portrayed as extremely well trained killing machines, while the Soviets as victims and well meaning, self-sacrificing amateurs with basic weapons. And of course the atrocities of the Werhmacht and Waffen SS were played up.
So the symbolic message of painting a Waffen SS divisional symbol on a tank or a helmet I would read like a combination of <<Russians, I hate you, I am your worst nightmare, I am a superior soldier and a human being in general, your weapons are no match for mine, and I will take revenge on you with horrible deeds straight out of "Go and See">>.  I have no doubts it may be an attractive message for a soldier in this war. Obviously, a hard sell to someone watching news in the West. 
 

For an army in the time of peace, that reasoning makes a lot of sense. However I do not think that a country fighting an existential war would be so picky, if the nationalists actually follow their ideology and volunteer for service. And values such as machismo and hatred for the foreign enemy may actually translate into high combat morale, being more valuable than the ability to easily get along with women or sexual minorities. There is a lot of literature about people becoming good soldiers in war often being poor soldier material for a regular peacetime army.

There is no better use for far right elements than to draft them into the army and let them fight some other nation. They are supposed to like it.

There is no better use for far right elements than to draft them into the army and let them fight some other nation. They are supposed to like it.

"Madiar is a homo"

On a more serious note, one of the few things which could explain this refusal to surrender which sometimes borders on madness is the belief that Russia will eventually win and all prisoners will be repatriated like von Pannwitz' Cossacks and will meet a similar fate to the repatriated von Pannwitz Cossacks.
That, or those particular soldiers who refuse to surrender are guilty of attrocities and are afraid of Ukrainian revenge more than anything.

"Oh BTR of the lake, tell me your wisdom: how to get the hell out of here?"

"Oh BTR of the lake, tell me your wisdom: how to get the hell out of here?"

For a couple of months already Kofman has been commenting about drones being one more thing which is more helpful on the defence than on the attack. This may be one element of it, the attackers being the side which moves more.

If the speculations about the reasons for Zaluzny's removal are to be believed, it was rather the other way round. Zaluzny was rumoured to be pushing for new round of mobilisation, and Zelensky to be refusing it because of the mobilisation's unpopularity.

I think he means that technically speaking, Russia will probably never exactly run out of war material, because before that happens it will reduce consumption/exposition to risk when faced with a shortage. Therefore one can not just draw a graph with one line representing average production, the other average consumption and at the point where they meet, the Russian army will stop firing guns or have no more tanks. He says this in all his podcasts in particular whenever ammo production is discussed, so I am fairly confident this is what is meant here as well.
And whereas the Russians can decide to reduce the firing rate/usage rate pretty much at will, they cannot increase the production rate by will alone, therefore the replacement rate is the more objectively observable variable.
 

I think he means that technically speaking, Russia will probably never exactly run out of war material, because before that happens it will reduce consumption/exposition to risk when faced with a shortage. Therefore one can not just draw a graph with one line representing average production, the other average consumption and at the point where they meet, the Russian army will stop firing guns or have no more tanks. He says this in all his podcasts in particular whenever ammo production is discussed, so I am fairly confident this is what is meant here as well.
And whereas the Russians can decide to reduce the firing rate/usage rate pretty much at will, they cannot increase the production rate by will alone, therefore the replacement rate is the more objectively observable variable.
 

I think he means that technically speaking, Russia will probably never exactly run out of war material, because before that happens it will reduce consumption/exposition to risk when faced with a shortage. Therefore one can not just draw a graph with one line representing average production, the other average consumption and at the point where they meet, the Russian army will stop firing guns or have no more tanks. He says this in all his podcasts in particular whenever ammo production is discussed, so I am fairly confident this is what is meant here as well.
And whereas the Russians can decide to reduce the firing rate/usage rate pretty much at will, they cannot increase the production rate by will alone, therefore the replacement rate is the more objectively observable variable.
 

I think he means that technically speaking, Russia will probably never exactly run out of war material, because before that happens it will reduce consumption/exposition to risk when faced with a shortage. Therefore one can not just draw a graph with one line representing average production, the other average consumption and at the point where they meet, the Russian army will stop firing guns or have no more tanks. He says this in all his podcasts in particular whenever ammo production is discussed, so I am fairly confident this is what is meant here as well.
And whereas the Russians can decide to reduce the firing rate/usage rate pretty much at will, they cannot increase the production rate by will alone, therefore the replacement rate is the more objectively observable variable.
 

I think he means that technically speaking, Russia will probably never exactly run out of war material, because before that happens it will reduce consumption/exposition to risk when faced with a shortage. Therefore one can not just draw a graph with one line representing average production, the other average consumption and at the point where they meet, the Russian army will stop firing guns or have no more tanks. He says this in all his podcasts in particular whenever ammo production is discussed, so I am fairly confident this is what is meant here as well.
And whereas the Russians can decide to reduce the firing rate/usage rate pretty much at will, they cannot increase the production rate by will alone, therefore the replacement rate is the more objectively observable variable.
 

I think he means that technically speaking, Russia will probably never exactly run out of war material, because before that happens it will reduce consumption/exposition to risk when faced with a shortage. Therefore one can not just draw a graph with one line representing average production, the other average consumption and at the point where they meet, the Russian army will stop firing guns or have no more tanks. He says this in all his podcasts in particular whenever ammo production is discussed, so I am fairly confident this is what is meant here as well.
And whereas the Russians can decide to reduce the firing rate/usage rate pretty much at will, they cannot increase the production rate by will alone, therefore the replacement rate is the more objectively observable variable.
 

I think he means that technically speaking, Russia will probably never exactly run out of war material, because before that happens it will reduce consumption/exposition to risk when faced with a shortage. Therefore one can not just draw a graph with one line representing average production, the other average consumption and at the point where they meet, the Russian army will stop firing guns or have no more tanks. He says this in all his podcasts in particular whenever ammo production is discussed, so I am fairly confident this is what is meant here as well.
And whereas the Russians can decide to reduce the firing rate/usage rate pretty much at will, they cannot increase the production rate by will alone, therefore the replacement rate is the more objectively observable variable.