LuckyDog

Awesome! Was that a Tommy gun at 3:02? I thought it would be a Sterling, but the way it was held, the magazine is down. To set expectations - Chieftain up to Mk9? So no Stillbrew or L23? Any chance of the Challenger I or Warrior? (Had to ask!)

Where tank design sits on the triangle of armour/speed/gun is allegedly dictated by national experience, but the terrain you deploy your tank is a critical factor in efficacy or the suitability of the design. Take the Panther vs. Sherman Firefly balance - I bet the Panther can KO a Firefly from further out; this is negated if the terrain is close. I've read that the Germans preferred the Panzer IV over the Panther in the boucage as the gun was shorter (maneuverability) and the penetration at closer range was sufficent. However, as @chuckdyke pointed out - being hit and not penetrated could still put the tank out of action. Lots of nuances! My preference would be for superior optics and gunnery for a first-round hit.

I thought this made a higher tank easier to hit, as you have more latitude for inaccurate rangefinding/estimation. However, as you pointed out, you should be hull down; in that situation, there is little difference in the turret heights.

Here is my “off the wall” bridge theory, which includes a ‘truck bomb’, special forces, and a missile! I’ve been meaning to post this for a while, but I can’t keep up reading all the great posts! The Ukrainians sent a special forces team in a truck or small van into Russia to the bridge area. The Brimstone missile (Brits again…) was shipped to the launch area using a remote control kayak (a picture was posted of one washed up on a beach). According to Wikipedia, a Brimstone is 110lbs and 5’11’’ – it should fit. The special forces team retrieved the missile and then started to monitor the traffic on the bridge and railway. I assume that Russian security is poor, given their front-line performance and that this is a rear area. This makes it easy to spot and log ammo trucks and fuel train schedules. Once they figured out the correct time, half the team assembled a launching box from innocuous metal sheets in the van and launched the missile. The other half of the team used a laser designator to light up the chosen truck - maybe from a kayak or the shore. If the train stops or goes in the same direction as the truck, it offers more latitude to hit the truck next to the train. The “air-burst” explosion above is the first stage detonation of the tandem warhead – the second stage was not captured on film due to the almost instantaneous detonation of the truck. Launching from the Russian side might allow them to exploit a hole in the AA defenses or cause enough extra delay in reacting to the threat to enable the missile to hit. As implausible as this may be, I love that the Russians do all the heavy lifting, bringing most of the explosives and oil to the party!

You've seen most of the video clips here but I have to give the Guardian credit for a fairly nuanced summary. Nothing that hasn't been discussed in depth but nice to see main stream media catching on https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2022/oct/05/how-the-tank-didnt-fail-in-ukraine-but-russia-did-video?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Other

I don't think that video is legit - the camera person seems to be standing where any return fire would come, and they are sheltering behind what looks like plywood. Or maybe they really are that inept!

The more I think about how this war has unfolded, the more confident I am that NATO anticipated this, and their actions were much less of a gamble than I had assumed. If you examine the best practices of NATO armies and look at the WHY of those practices, I think it is possible to forecast what will happen if they are not followed. Synthesizing information from experienced engineers and logistics branch members would reveal that maneuver would be limited and that delays caused by significant numbers of ATGM and MANPADS could critically shorten this window. The answers to the simple question set below could have forecast a lot of the issues we see: If there is a specific and demanding schedule for vehicle and equipment maintenance, what happens if not performed? How does that influence the readiness percentage? How many vehicles will break down per mile? How should you store munitions to ensure that they function? If not, how many will be dud, and how will it affect accuracy? If you do not conduct large-scale maneuvers, what happens to coordination and what kind of supply chain issues develop? Combine this information with endemic Russian corruption so that no one is doing quality assurance, and you have a perfect storm. IMHO the RU Army offensive will be limited as they don’t have the supplies and readiness to move. Moreover, they have effectively put a time limit on the conflict by pulling their training cadre to combat duty and limiting trained manpower for the future conscription cycles. Am I assuming too much based on retrospective knowledge? Would it be fair to expect NATO commanders to ask these types of questions? (Apologies if this was already covered)

Steve raised the question about what is the tipping point and when will we recognize it? At this point, the RU forces still have these simplistic options: 1) advance, 2) dig in, or 3) retreat. Which is the tipping point? I don’t think while they can exercise option one, advancing, we are at the tipping point. Putin may believe that he can advance based on the information received. RU army/State exhibit a lack of psychological safety at all levels, resulting in poor decision-making. Leaders don’t get accurate information in unsafe environments – symptoms include padding of numbers at all levels, and a lack of critical thinking (no one challenges the leader’s ideas - someone mentioned groupthink many pages ago). Their false information traps the high command; the only option is to follow Putin’s unrealistic directives or face the consequences. Does the RU army have any more serviceable kit to send to Ukraine? If you look at factors like the egg box ERA we have seen or civilian trucks, you have to wonder. If they could cannibalize equipment, they did, and this is the best they can do. Can they trust Xi enough to move their working equipment from the far east? They can certainly send more warm bodies, but morale is an issue. I think advancing shortens the time to the tipping point. It takes a lot of ammo, fuel, communication, and intel – and I’m not sure the RU forces have much of any of these. It also stretches their supply lines and makes them more vulnerable When they stop moving, the RU army perception will change. The current UKR ambushes have left the RU army without a defined front line, which requires resource allocation from aggressive operations to a 360-degree defense - effectively moving the mindset from hunter to hunted. The lack of psychological safety is critical at a tactical level and is already demonstrable with the abandoned equipment. How long will enlisted soldiers risk their lives when they know their commanders don’t care about them, cannot provide leadership, and cannot provide the tools they need? I know there is a lot more to this, but IMHO, the tipping point is when the RU army stops advancing. I think they will stay immobile until someone realizes that they don’t have the ability to exercise option three, retreat. Then things turn desperate for Putin, which is not a good place and won't lead to rational decisions.

The impression I got from the Gulf War 2 exhibit at Bovington Tank Museum was that the slat armour on the Warriors was doing a pretty good job of catching incoming RPGs - they cited a case where 14 (I think) were removed from the slats on on vehicle! They didn't mention what happened if it hit the slat directly and detonated. I have no idea of how representative this was of reality.

Great video! Which mods did you use (if any)? Thanks!

Let us know what you chose to do and what happened! I'm hooked!

I had numerous problems in Courage and Fortitude where mortar units had been killed and their supporting team had mortar ammo, but refused to share it with other units. Whose side were they on?!

Shame about the lack of ammo - it could be a nice edge!

Stuart Hills "By Tank into Normandy" was a good personal account, and John Buckley's "British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944" was a great read. The latter does a good job of analysing the design decisions taken in previous years, what the tactical doctrine was and what really did it mean for the British/Canadian/Polish tankers when they came up against the Panzers in Normandy.

My suggestion is that broken troops should not count as holding an objective if enemy troops are within 50 yards. IMHO the broken troops are not combat effective.

But wait, order now and you'll also receive a tin mug and a genuine can of 1944 vintage bully beef... Operators are standing by.

I started playing realtime and then realised that I have a tendency to really focus on one area of the battlefield and missed what was happening elsewhere. I don't think it makes it any less realistic (as Umlaut said, we are not there in the game!) and it makes it more fun. To me, the game is more akin to directing a film, than a simulation of 'being there' as a commander.

How about a 'dig in' command, which allows the squad to construct fox holes on the fly, but dramatically reduces their observation levels until completed? These ad hoc fox holes would not be camouflaged, so they would be easier to spot.

It's a shame that you cannot swap or combine the tank crews. I had a couple of instances in CMSF where I had a full crew who bailed out from a destroyed tank and a partial crew in an intact tank (usually the commander was dead), and I really wanted to swap them. If Battlefront could allow us to swap crews it would be appreciated! I have read plenty of anecdotes where commanders swapped tanks so they could still lead and on the radio net.

My granddad was in the Royal Artillery, went through a lot, but I never heard him him say any worse than bugger. He passed through New York on his way back from the pacific and made comment on the foul language the dockers used! Now what he said around me and what he used with his mates, was I'm sure a different case.

How about "Non domestic forces (who may have Bren tripods) and some more Krauts".

I summarise this from what I remember of John Buckley's excellent book "British Armour in Normandy": Shermans tended to have a worse reputation for burning in regiments which stored additional ammo in the tank, rather than just the standard load. The wet stowage certainly helped, but either way it wasn't a petrol/gas versus diesel issue. The kill ratio of Sherman's to PZ IVs might well have been 3/4 to one when the Allies advanced, but when the Germans mounted a counterattack the numbers were reversed – even for Panthers, as they had thinner side armour. The Germans also used low smoke charge, increasing the chance of getting a second shot off. On another note, I think the book also mentions the use of artillery delivered WP on to the defending German tank, which sometimes lead to the crew abandoning the tank when it got sucked in the ventilation system!

Indeed Sir, I was not!

So there might be a difference in hot sandy conditions, in combat condtions and with less frequent maintenance. In say a place like Syria?....

OverVolts - did you know which processes are using the CPU cycles? I have had this problem with Vista and found it was the windows indexer. I have also had issues with the prefetch cache and "Superfetch". If you look in task manager and then right click on the offending process, you can see which of the associated services are contributing to the problem. I hope this helps!