kevinkin

The Finns have looked at this in detail and have passed ideas along to NATO over the years. Too much to copy-paste so here is the article and one passage below. Sounds a bit familiar to the war at hand. It will be interesting to see what new forms the UA comes up with the next 4-5 months. 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/lessons-from-the-winter-war-frozen-grit-and-finlands-fabian-defense/
Perhaps some of the most useful insights into this unique way of war can be gleaned by perusing the writings of Finnish veterans later recruited as winter warfare advisors for the U.S. Army. In their view, it was not sufficient to adapt to a harsh geography. Rather, the goal should to develop new forms of operational art that enable one to leverage that same geography against an ill-adapted foe. ....
Strategists in Helsinki still plan for an in-depth defense of their homeland, with the aim of drawing any potential invader into the hinterlands where they would be ground down by small units equipped with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), lightweight artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). While American strategists have only just begun to rediscover concepts of archipelagic defense, Finnish planners have long developed sophisticated operational concepts around the defense of their many narrow inlets and small islands that incorporate a mixture of mine warfare assets, underwater listening posts, fast attack craft, and coastal jaeger units armed with anti-ship missiles and mortars.
With almost the entirety of its territory falling under the coverage of advanced Russian air defense systems, Helsinki has adopted an equally pragmatic attitude toward the defense of its airspace. Rather than choosing to engage in a fruitless competition for air dominance, the Finnish Air Force focuses on redundancy and survivability: dispersing air strips, practicing emergency highway landings, and erecting a highly mobile air defense grid.

The Finns have looked at this in detail and have passed ideas along to NATO over the years. Too much to copy-paste so here is the article and one passage below. Sounds a bit familiar to the war at hand. It will be interesting to see what new forms the UA comes up with the next 4-5 months. 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/lessons-from-the-winter-war-frozen-grit-and-finlands-fabian-defense/
Perhaps some of the most useful insights into this unique way of war can be gleaned by perusing the writings of Finnish veterans later recruited as winter warfare advisors for the U.S. Army. In their view, it was not sufficient to adapt to a harsh geography. Rather, the goal should to develop new forms of operational art that enable one to leverage that same geography against an ill-adapted foe. ....
Strategists in Helsinki still plan for an in-depth defense of their homeland, with the aim of drawing any potential invader into the hinterlands where they would be ground down by small units equipped with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), lightweight artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). While American strategists have only just begun to rediscover concepts of archipelagic defense, Finnish planners have long developed sophisticated operational concepts around the defense of their many narrow inlets and small islands that incorporate a mixture of mine warfare assets, underwater listening posts, fast attack craft, and coastal jaeger units armed with anti-ship missiles and mortars.
With almost the entirety of its territory falling under the coverage of advanced Russian air defense systems, Helsinki has adopted an equally pragmatic attitude toward the defense of its airspace. Rather than choosing to engage in a fruitless competition for air dominance, the Finnish Air Force focuses on redundancy and survivability: dispersing air strips, practicing emergency highway landings, and erecting a highly mobile air defense grid.

Oh that is very good.  Mirrors a lot of what we have seen throughout this war.  I think the major western powers, primarily the west have viewed this as the "poor mans warfare".  However, clearly advances in modern technology have done something fundamental here. This sounds a lot like the corrosive-dispersed defense we have seen from the UA throughout; however, they did not need an archipelago or wicked terrain to tie it together. Even the Finnish approach to air power is mirrored here and sounds a lot like "parity-through-denial" the UA also seems to be able to practice.
What is really interesting is that the UA has demonstrated twice that one can execute a form of corrosive offence.  It looks different from traditional manoeuvre offensives but it clearly works.  I think the entire thing lines up with high-speed precise attrition (= corrosion) where you are able to effective attrit key connectors and nodes in an opponents operational system faster then they can replace them.

The Finns have looked at this in detail and have passed ideas along to NATO over the years. Too much to copy-paste so here is the article and one passage below. Sounds a bit familiar to the war at hand. It will be interesting to see what new forms the UA comes up with the next 4-5 months. 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/lessons-from-the-winter-war-frozen-grit-and-finlands-fabian-defense/
Perhaps some of the most useful insights into this unique way of war can be gleaned by perusing the writings of Finnish veterans later recruited as winter warfare advisors for the U.S. Army. In their view, it was not sufficient to adapt to a harsh geography. Rather, the goal should to develop new forms of operational art that enable one to leverage that same geography against an ill-adapted foe. ....
Strategists in Helsinki still plan for an in-depth defense of their homeland, with the aim of drawing any potential invader into the hinterlands where they would be ground down by small units equipped with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), lightweight artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). While American strategists have only just begun to rediscover concepts of archipelagic defense, Finnish planners have long developed sophisticated operational concepts around the defense of their many narrow inlets and small islands that incorporate a mixture of mine warfare assets, underwater listening posts, fast attack craft, and coastal jaeger units armed with anti-ship missiles and mortars.
With almost the entirety of its territory falling under the coverage of advanced Russian air defense systems, Helsinki has adopted an equally pragmatic attitude toward the defense of its airspace. Rather than choosing to engage in a fruitless competition for air dominance, the Finnish Air Force focuses on redundancy and survivability: dispersing air strips, practicing emergency highway landings, and erecting a highly mobile air defense grid.

The Finns have looked at this in detail and have passed ideas along to NATO over the years. Too much to copy-paste so here is the article and one passage below. Sounds a bit familiar to the war at hand. It will be interesting to see what new forms the UA comes up with the next 4-5 months. 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/lessons-from-the-winter-war-frozen-grit-and-finlands-fabian-defense/
Perhaps some of the most useful insights into this unique way of war can be gleaned by perusing the writings of Finnish veterans later recruited as winter warfare advisors for the U.S. Army. In their view, it was not sufficient to adapt to a harsh geography. Rather, the goal should to develop new forms of operational art that enable one to leverage that same geography against an ill-adapted foe. ....
Strategists in Helsinki still plan for an in-depth defense of their homeland, with the aim of drawing any potential invader into the hinterlands where they would be ground down by small units equipped with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), lightweight artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). While American strategists have only just begun to rediscover concepts of archipelagic defense, Finnish planners have long developed sophisticated operational concepts around the defense of their many narrow inlets and small islands that incorporate a mixture of mine warfare assets, underwater listening posts, fast attack craft, and coastal jaeger units armed with anti-ship missiles and mortars.
With almost the entirety of its territory falling under the coverage of advanced Russian air defense systems, Helsinki has adopted an equally pragmatic attitude toward the defense of its airspace. Rather than choosing to engage in a fruitless competition for air dominance, the Finnish Air Force focuses on redundancy and survivability: dispersing air strips, practicing emergency highway landings, and erecting a highly mobile air defense grid.

The Finns have looked at this in detail and have passed ideas along to NATO over the years. Too much to copy-paste so here is the article and one passage below. Sounds a bit familiar to the war at hand. It will be interesting to see what new forms the UA comes up with the next 4-5 months. 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/lessons-from-the-winter-war-frozen-grit-and-finlands-fabian-defense/
Perhaps some of the most useful insights into this unique way of war can be gleaned by perusing the writings of Finnish veterans later recruited as winter warfare advisors for the U.S. Army. In their view, it was not sufficient to adapt to a harsh geography. Rather, the goal should to develop new forms of operational art that enable one to leverage that same geography against an ill-adapted foe. ....
Strategists in Helsinki still plan for an in-depth defense of their homeland, with the aim of drawing any potential invader into the hinterlands where they would be ground down by small units equipped with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), lightweight artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). While American strategists have only just begun to rediscover concepts of archipelagic defense, Finnish planners have long developed sophisticated operational concepts around the defense of their many narrow inlets and small islands that incorporate a mixture of mine warfare assets, underwater listening posts, fast attack craft, and coastal jaeger units armed with anti-ship missiles and mortars.
With almost the entirety of its territory falling under the coverage of advanced Russian air defense systems, Helsinki has adopted an equally pragmatic attitude toward the defense of its airspace. Rather than choosing to engage in a fruitless competition for air dominance, the Finnish Air Force focuses on redundancy and survivability: dispersing air strips, practicing emergency highway landings, and erecting a highly mobile air defense grid.

The Finns have looked at this in detail and have passed ideas along to NATO over the years. Too much to copy-paste so here is the article and one passage below. Sounds a bit familiar to the war at hand. It will be interesting to see what new forms the UA comes up with the next 4-5 months. 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/lessons-from-the-winter-war-frozen-grit-and-finlands-fabian-defense/
Perhaps some of the most useful insights into this unique way of war can be gleaned by perusing the writings of Finnish veterans later recruited as winter warfare advisors for the U.S. Army. In their view, it was not sufficient to adapt to a harsh geography. Rather, the goal should to develop new forms of operational art that enable one to leverage that same geography against an ill-adapted foe. ....
Strategists in Helsinki still plan for an in-depth defense of their homeland, with the aim of drawing any potential invader into the hinterlands where they would be ground down by small units equipped with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), lightweight artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). While American strategists have only just begun to rediscover concepts of archipelagic defense, Finnish planners have long developed sophisticated operational concepts around the defense of their many narrow inlets and small islands that incorporate a mixture of mine warfare assets, underwater listening posts, fast attack craft, and coastal jaeger units armed with anti-ship missiles and mortars.
With almost the entirety of its territory falling under the coverage of advanced Russian air defense systems, Helsinki has adopted an equally pragmatic attitude toward the defense of its airspace. Rather than choosing to engage in a fruitless competition for air dominance, the Finnish Air Force focuses on redundancy and survivability: dispersing air strips, practicing emergency highway landings, and erecting a highly mobile air defense grid.

I think the writer would agree with you. As long as the Brits used their resources properly reserving enough to defend against an unlikely crossing. Germany's fantasy quickly became a reality when they directed their resources at the wrong targets - civilians. The writer is drawing a similar conclusion with Russia wasting attacks on civilians. In either war, production was/is a limiting factor and a focus on either civilians or the battlefield did not/ will not matter in the end. However, a focus on military targets is more efficacious because, given sufficient support, populations can be very durable. 

Pretty good concise student article on the attrition war - missile exchanges vs costs and ultimate effects:
 https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/11/26/ukraine_can_beat_russia_in_the_bombardment_war_of_attrition_866862.html
AKA ... 
"It's the battlefield stupid". You can't get rid of Putin, or similar regimes, without giving Russia's elites the military catastrophe their deserve. The current missile war appears almost like a death wish. 
 
 

I think the writer would agree with you. As long as the Brits used their resources properly reserving enough to defend against an unlikely crossing. Germany's fantasy quickly became a reality when they directed their resources at the wrong targets - civilians. The writer is drawing a similar conclusion with Russia wasting attacks on civilians. In either war, production was/is a limiting factor and a focus on either civilians or the battlefield did not/ will not matter in the end. However, a focus on military targets is more efficacious because, given sufficient support, populations can be very durable. 

Pretty good concise student article on the attrition war - missile exchanges vs costs and ultimate effects:
 https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/11/26/ukraine_can_beat_russia_in_the_bombardment_war_of_attrition_866862.html
AKA ... 
"It's the battlefield stupid". You can't get rid of Putin, or similar regimes, without giving Russia's elites the military catastrophe their deserve. The current missile war appears almost like a death wish. 
 
 

Pretty good concise student article on the attrition war - missile exchanges vs costs and ultimate effects:
 https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/11/26/ukraine_can_beat_russia_in_the_bombardment_war_of_attrition_866862.html
AKA ... 
"It's the battlefield stupid". You can't get rid of Putin, or similar regimes, without giving Russia's elites the military catastrophe their deserve. The current missile war appears almost like a death wish. 
 
 

One guys opinion that is shared by others:
Simply put – again in cold, geopolitical terms – the war is destroying Russia so that it really can’t be described as a “near-peer” adversary, apart from its nuclear capabilities. 
Russia is isolated, broke, and relying on antiquated equipment. This war has destroyed the Kremlin in a way that even President Ronald Reagan’s spending in the 1980s failed to beat down the Soviet Union. At best, Moscow will be the capital of another Hermit Kingdom – one that was created due to a failed effort to restore former glory.
It is just too bad that Ukraine’s people had to pay to ensure that America won’t need to fear the Russian bear for at least another generation.
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/11/could-the-ukraine-war-turn-russia-into-north-korea/
 

I'm sixty years old and practically all my life I have been struggling with the phrase "WARCRIMES".
As I see it, war is by definition a crime and we humans ALWAYS commit horrible crimes during war, civil wars, uprisings, revolutions, conquests and even in peacetime.
Romans, Persians, Dutch, French, Spanish, Aztecs, Vikings, native -Americans, "Arabs", African tribesmen, Chinese, Russians, Japanese, German, and yes even Americans and Canadians and the British (and every other large group of humans), exploited, killed, maimed, tortured and executed their opponents. Be it real or suspected opponents, that is.
Most people, certainly in the West, have the illusion that war can be fought in a "rather clean way".
In my opinion the whole morality-stance on the "yes or no" execution of these Russian prisoners is a waste of time. It is a part of war and as long as we humans go to war, these combat-crimes will happen. I fact, it is a miracle that there are so much frontline-soldiers that DO NOT commit "warcrimes".
I do think there is a big difference between combat-crimes and noncombat-crimes, but if you really want to stop warcrimes, stop war.
 
 

Dude, I think we were born a century too early:
 

One guys opinion that is shared by others:
Simply put – again in cold, geopolitical terms – the war is destroying Russia so that it really can’t be described as a “near-peer” adversary, apart from its nuclear capabilities. 
Russia is isolated, broke, and relying on antiquated equipment. This war has destroyed the Kremlin in a way that even President Ronald Reagan’s spending in the 1980s failed to beat down the Soviet Union. At best, Moscow will be the capital of another Hermit Kingdom – one that was created due to a failed effort to restore former glory.
It is just too bad that Ukraine’s people had to pay to ensure that America won’t need to fear the Russian bear for at least another generation.
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/11/could-the-ukraine-war-turn-russia-into-north-korea/
 

One guys opinion that is shared by others:
Simply put – again in cold, geopolitical terms – the war is destroying Russia so that it really can’t be described as a “near-peer” adversary, apart from its nuclear capabilities. 
Russia is isolated, broke, and relying on antiquated equipment. This war has destroyed the Kremlin in a way that even President Ronald Reagan’s spending in the 1980s failed to beat down the Soviet Union. At best, Moscow will be the capital of another Hermit Kingdom – one that was created due to a failed effort to restore former glory.
It is just too bad that Ukraine’s people had to pay to ensure that America won’t need to fear the Russian bear for at least another generation.
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/11/could-the-ukraine-war-turn-russia-into-north-korea/
 

Nothing wrong with piling on I'll say. 😉

Counter-C4ISR is definitely the way to go long term. And it will be a back and forth technical fight. But the troops this cold morning just want to swat the flies out of the sky right now. Kinetic destruction of these unmanned assets will require investments in training and hardware. Perhaps they will always be a last line of defense if other counter measures fail. 
So here is a some maneuvering to keep the reactor under tacit Russian control - perhaps.
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/1-top-russian-official-warns-121212946.html
Other stories on the net speak of major fighting in that sector.
 
 
 

Sorry if this was posted already. It's from late September. But still a good read today:
https://www.ausa.org/publications/reflections-russias-2022-invasion-ukraine-combined-arms-warfare-battalion-tactical
Drop a few BTGs in a fishbowl and they do OK. Drop them in a pond, not so OK. Ground forces need to be able to organize to fight in either. Russia did not organize its units to fight in a pond. Perhaps they had dreams of expeditionary warfare projecting Moscow's interests overseas with light formations. I read at one point that a division commander fights with their battalions and is expected integrate them into a force with one purpose. Russia drop a bunch of pawns on the board to be gobbled up by an Ukrainian queen. Having no tradition of Auftragstaktik, recon pull warfare is near impossible to pull off having a blind bunch of BTGs unable to work together. 
The same holds true for the opposite side of this idea: negative aspects of warfighting in small theaters can be quickly overcome, thereby hiding potentially deleterious structural problems with force structure, warfighting doctrine and strategies. This appears to be part of the problem plaguing Russian armed forces in Ukraine—its vaunted BTG is floundering in Ukraine today. False positive “lessons learned” and bad habits acquired in 2014–2015 are hindering Russian land forces operating throughout Ukraine today. 
Aside from bad habits, the Russian BTG’s structure and support network is maximized for small theater warfare, not medium or large theater warfare. Its small stature, ad hoc structure and detachment from its organic C2 and sustainment networks makes it a problematic force design for medium or large theater warfare. Given the Russian Army’s performance in Ukraine thus far, it is not a stretch to suggest that the BTG is the wrong formation for the war. However, as Ukraine closes the door on Moscow’s forces, pushing them closer to Russia, especially in the Donbas and in the areas proximal to Crimea, one should expect the BTG to fare better than it has throughout the war. This is because those BTGs will be operating on smaller battlefields, more comparable to those on which they found success in 2014–2015. 

And one opinion of the overall situation:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/russias-missing-peacemakers
A pessimistic outlook since the "realists" are not on board nor are willing to rise up against the "conservatives". A large part of the article is quoted below. But you have to ask: elites, either conservative or realists, are still just a fraction of the country. Can the rest of Russia's society peel away enough realists to make difference? And would freezing the kinetic war buy them time? I am afraid not. That status quo will not last long enough. The two nations will go back it again after the West pays more attention to things like inflation, climate change, and who will make the payoffs. Careers and money will be made. How many cycles can go on? The West thinks time is on their side and will advocate stopping to rest and rearm Ukraine. Russian thinks the West will become distracted and time is on their side. Is a new iron curtain being establish far to the east of the old one. And how many years did that one last? Not that surprising that it's becoming a war of wills. Perseverance is key.
NO WAY OUT
In Putin’s Russia, there are many ways to define defeat. For its military leadership, defeat is an accumulation of battlefield setbacks; for the nationalist hard-liners, it entails allowing Ukraine’s “anti-Russia” state to exist at all; and for the security services, it means losing a major Russian confrontation with the West. For the regular elites, it means anything that threatens their personal and political security. But for almost all of Russia’s main constituencies, including the realists, withdrawing Russian forces to their pre-invasion lines of control would meet their criteria. Such a move would not only mark the end of Russian influence over Ukraine but also usher in a humiliating new geopolitical reality for Moscow.
On Russian telegram channels, many Russians have implied that the West would insist on dismissing Putin as a part of possible agreement. Many conservatives believe that if Putin fell as a result of such a deal, his regime would eventually be followed by a more pro-Western government that would betray Russia’s strategic interests and allow the country to physically disintegrate. To put it simply, the Russian elite sees the war against Ukraine not as expansionary but as a war for self-preservation.
Many Russians believe that the collapse of the state would be followed by international criminal investigations, perhaps even a war crimes tribunal. This prospect frightens even Russian elites not involved in the fighting.
Despite the different interests in play, technocrats, security operatives, conservative nationalists, and business leaders are largely united in believing that Russia cannot lose, lest it result in the collapse of the regime on which they all depend.
But Moscow is becoming deeply divided on how to accomplish that task.
The growing chorus of realists, by contrast, has come to see that Moscow does not have the resources that it needs to win. Instead, they favor an approach in which Russia avoids more defeat by freezing the war where it is, digging defensive lines around their current positions and using reinforcements to stop the Ukrainian advance.
There is no one in the Russian elite who will support a Russian withdrawal to the country’s February 24 positions. It is possible, however, that the realists could publicly push for freezing the conflict in a temporary agreement with the West (sealed with Ukraine). First, however, they would need to overcome the radical hawks, who are ready to fight in Ukraine until the bitter end and who remain dominant in domestic political discourse. To do so, they will have to convince Putin to personally acknowledge reality and opt for a more sober approach to the conflict. But even if Putin gives up and admits that the best Russia can do is freeze the war, it will not assuage elite fears about Russia’s survival and territorial integrity in face of the West, which even the realists believe wants to subjugate Russia.
And unlike many of Russia’s elites, Putin believes that Ukraine is still doomed. His present personal goal is tactical—stopping Kyiv’s attacks, holding the line, and then waiting until the Ukrainian state collapses, which he believes is just a matter of time. Putin could even escalate, turning to nuclear weapons. Signaling to the realists that peace with Ukraine will not inevitably cause Russia to collapse is a dramatically challenging task. But it may be the only way to get the Kremlin to end its catastrophic invasion. Until then, even the realist elites have no choice but to bet on the strong state and the strongman.

Agreed. All of that can be achieved with the current level of western support. Or perhaps a modest increase.  But the weapons themselves will probably remain the same e.g. no M1s or long range missiles right now. A major question is the pace of operations that minimizes UA losses but does not drag on and on. That's above my pay grade even if we knew the correlation of forces that would be involved over the coming weeks. Just emphatically signaling the west is in for the long haul might actually save a lot of Ukrainian lives in the end.  

Agreed. All of that can be achieved with the current level of western support. Or perhaps a modest increase.  But the weapons themselves will probably remain the same e.g. no M1s or long range missiles right now. A major question is the pace of operations that minimizes UA losses but does not drag on and on. That's above my pay grade even if we knew the correlation of forces that would be involved over the coming weeks. Just emphatically signaling the west is in for the long haul might actually save a lot of Ukrainian lives in the end.  

I hope the same, but I don't think there's any level of sanctions that we could impose that would make Putin and his cronies submit. Or make Russians revolt against him.

Everything we are seeing coming from the West stems from the first principle of their post WW2 grand strategy: prevention of nuclear war and today the use of WMDs in general.
I think the assumption is not that large. While not saying so exactly, the writer is concluding that those Russians with the most to gain by regime change can not overcome those that have the most to lose in the foreseeable future. The writer sees the elites as resilient in the face of a horrible war. They have no choice and are unwilling to yield their life styes to better Russia a generation from now. With WMDs and mounting Ukrainian casualties, it can't surprise too many that Milley is tapping the breaks. The West has its elites too. And even at a million to one, a nuke would upset their morning latte and investment positions. God forbid. The West can't figure out how to live without the region's grain and oil. Asking its populace to risk Armageddon is not going to fly. So Ukraine bleeds head to toe, while elites in Russia are largely OK. And those with most to gain in Russia are being hunted down and killed off at the front. They are too busy staying alive to revolt. I don't even think a successful version of Claus von Stauffenberg would matter right now. Is Putin the puppet or the puppeteer of the elites? If the West is not going to cross a self imposed red line and provide more lethal assistance, a strategy of long term conventional military pressure causing Russian society to slowly evaporate might be the only option. Both sides think time is on their side which makes for more death and destruction. The West can't budge and neither can Ukraine. 
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/case-against-negotiations-russia
From the article above:
The West should help Ukraine liberate the areas that are strategically vital to its security and economic well-being and then build up the Ukrainian military and economy to a point that deters future Russian invasions. Moscow will continue to pursue means short of invasion to undermine pro-Western Ukrainian governments and coerce Ukrainians to surrender their independence. Success for Ukraine and the West lies in turning this hot war into a cold war on terms that leave Ukraine strong enough to survive and ultimately win it. 
Been thinking along those lines for a while now. Win it without any long term term threat to day to day life in the US and the rest of western democracies. This can be achieved with the precious commodity  - time. Milley knows more than anyone outside Ukraine its manpower. Maybe that's why he seems hesitant. He know Russia is screwed but wants to leave Ukraine intact and a give it a start on rebuilding.