Dietrich

And the Vietnam-era military service of a certain presidency aspirant pertinent to this discussion because...? But is track tension more important than the exaggerated, almost comical rocking back and forth of vehicles (especially tracked ones) as they accelerate/deccelerate and negotiate difficult terrain? Also, tanks (in CM:SF) rock at least a little too much when their fire their cannon.

So says grizzled Sergeant Wierzbowski to fresh-faced blond Private Nox: "Just keep your head down and your eyes peeled." =P

Yes, but what about motorcycle- or bicycle-borne troops? Truthfully, I can see why simulating Kradschützen even at the squad level would be a PITA or just impractical. In the case of individual (or two-man groups of) Kradschützen, motorcycles (optionally with sidecars) would work like Humvees do in CM:SF. [rhetorical]But in the case of a squad, since the men aren't simulated individually, how would simulating their eight or nine motorcycles work?[/rhetorical]

Demonstration of "Sturmfeuer" by reenactor Kurt Suleski: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vp0FbdrsIGM This is not especially pertinent to CM:SF, considering that 7.62mm weapons are platoon/company weapons and are intended for medium to long-range supporting fire. This will be pertinent to CM:N, since similar weapons (MG-42, Bren) were issued to squads as well as to "heavy machine-gun" teams. Presumably MG-Schützen will be able to fire their MG-42s from standing/kneeling positions; whether they do so from the shoulder or from the waist (probably not both) will depend on what animation BFC creates for on-the-move fire by the corresponding soldiers.

And there has to be one guy whose name ends in "-ski". "Guter Schuss" = good shot. Sorry, no umlauts until you get to the plural: "gute Schüsse", good shots.

According to Wikipedia, Patton called the M1 "the finest battle implement ever devised". According to World War II Infantry Tactics: Squad and Platoon by Stephen Bull (Osprey), in the section on squad-level offensive tactics: Compare that to the same book's description (in the same section) of the tactics described in the German Ausbildungsvorschrift:

This thread just goes to show how emotional folks are about WW2, especially when it comes to CM. One thing (one of many things) I'm looking forward to with CM:N is the much greater number and variety of mods. (This in no reflects any lack of appreciation to those who have created all the mods and 3rd-party scenarios for CM:SF! The game is an even more enjoyable experience thanks to your great mods and scenarios!) Not a few times while playing CM:SF I've thought to myself: "Man, if this were a WW2 game, there would be a dozen skin mods to choose from just for that particular model of that particular tank...." Granted, I'm mod-obsessed. Seems to me that when CM progressed to CMx2, a lot of folks simply refused to join the party, if for no other reason than it wasn't WW2. Now that it's soon to be WW2 again, a lot of folks are going to come sauntering back to the party.

Was that particular T-72 stationary at the time?

I use cover arcs a lot, mainly to keep my infantry from opening fire prematurely or at the limits of effective range (and secondarily to conserve ammo for when it's needed most), but also to help ensure that my vehicles and tanks spot the enemy first and get the first shot off. Assigning close-range (handgrenade-range) cover arcs to recon infantry (as opposed to vehicles) is key to ensuring that they survive long enough to do their job because it ensures that they keep a low profile and open fire only on nearby threats. Click on the appropriate waypoint, then give a Face order; that will cancel the cover arc. Try assigning a cover arc that is very wide and ranged out to beyond the opposite map edge. That keeps the turret pointed in the right direction and will not inadvertently overlook enemy units that appear.

I'm willing to reckon that it's more than likely that I missed the point. However, perhaps you miss my point. My point wasn't whether or not Inglorious Basterds was a smart and well-made film, nor was my point to accuse Tarantino of anything. My point is simply this: I don't like this film insofar as it encourages the killing and mutilation of POWs and makes it look like the cool/manly thing to do. That's all. But since pretty much anything goes in the movies, I guess it actually doesn't matter what the supposed good guys do or don't do. *shrug* So then my basis for dislike of the film is moot, especially since these are the days of protagonists who often are just as violent and vicious as the bad guys were in generations past (and sometimes even as violent and vicious as their antagonists). Similarly, the "killing POWs is wrong" argument could be obviated simply by the perception of the various characters in the film which the typical audience member is likely to have. The film indeed has a "lawless no-man's-land" vibe, and what with the pretty much definite spaghetti-western sense of it, the protagonists and antagonists -- whether GI or Landser, French cinema proprietress or Nazi war hero -- come across more akin to their Old West forebears than to the "occupied France in spring 1944" archetypes their clothing and accents proclaim them to be. In other words, the typical audience member likely doesn't see the Basterds as US Army soldiers or the "Nazis" as Heeressoldaten. I concede that I don't "get" Tarantino. I likewise concede that my analogy of Uwe Boll making a film about Dirlewanger's mob was a poor one. Elsewhere I've also read the assessment that Inglorious Basterds could be likened to an allegory for how Tarantino himself "uses film as a weapon". (On reading that, I thought: "Certainly sounds hip... but what does it mean?") That said, I bow out of this thread.

Considering that no one has yet posted that they didn't really like it, I reckon my observations may well seem out of place. Besides, it's plausible that my perceptions could be dismissed by a mere "lighten up, it's just a movie!". For the record, I'm not dissing Tarantino, nor am I saying that Inglorious Basterds isn't a well-made film. Has it not occurred to anyone to wonder at how the Basterds -- by killing (and then mutilating) pretty much every German they encounter and mutilating every one they don't kill -- are actually worse than those German troops whose actions are universally decried (as at Malmedy)? Raine specifically says "every man under my command owes me one hundred Nazi scalps"; that means he expects the eight men in his team to kill (at least) 800 German soldiers. Even at Malmedy -- the most famous atrocity on the Western Front, and widely regarded as the most heinous -- the Waffen-SS troops killed not more than 90 men. I disagree with the film simply because it perpetuates the militarily stupid idea that "take no prisoners" is acceptable (let alone tactically/strategically advantageous) SOP. It's perfectly understandable for front-line troops to want to wreak lethal vengeance on any enemy troops who surrender to them, especially when the general consensus is that said enemy troops would do likewise anyway. But does it never occur to anyone that when you kill enemy POWs, that not only makes the enemy less likely to surrender (thus making future battles tougher and more costly) but also makes the enemy more like to massacre friendly troops who surrender? When the bad guys commits atrocity, though, the good guys have the green light to do at least as bad in return from then on. Overall, it strikes me as not unlike if Uwe Boll were to direct a film about the men of Sonderkommando Dirlewanger and make them seem like the good guys. But if such a film were to be made, it would probably be banned and the director fined and/or blacklisted, whereas Tarantino enjoys praise and commercial success. As I said, however, pretty much any critical assessment of the film can be easily dismissed by pointing out that the film was obviously in no way intended to be historically accurate or militarily realistic. On a positive note, I was pleasantly surprised by the subtlety of the bar-room scene, as well as the inclusion of German actors and of German-speaking in the film.

My two bits (two cents adjusted for inflation): I imagine that one of the reasons why many CM[x1] fans never got into CMSF (aside from the more obvious reason of it being not a WW2 game) in the first place was the likeness of the game's premise to the widely unpopular wars currently being waged by the United States. When I play CMSF, I purposely disregard (at least to a certain extent) the reason why my pixeltruppen are there (whether in Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan) in the first place -- that's something for the politicians to worry about. I focus on the mission of each scenario/campaign and on how best to achieve success. I strive to maintain the outlook of a professional soldier. Conversely, if I were to state outright that I play Blue 98% of the time, some would see that as proof that deep down I just want to "shoot 'towelheads'". I understand how that might seem to be the case, but I can understand where the "terrorists" are coming from. I prefer to play as Blue because I dig Blue equipment and because I like to command forces which are not (in real life) hindered by outmoded tactics. And then there's the plausible but not-necessarily-the-case possibility that some who play Red more or less exclusively do so out of a desire to give vent to their disgust with the wars being waged in Iraq and Afghanistan, a sort of military equivalent to "sticking it to The Man". War makes criminals and victims out of all who engage in it.

As with all armed vehicles, even tanks, the trick is to minimize their exposure while not minimizing their ability to contribute to the battle. If you're facing ATGMs or AFVs or tanks, it's best to keep your AAVs in cover. If the most significant anti-armor threat is RPGs, just keep your AAVs 300 meters or more from suspected enemy positions when possible; if you keep your AAVs out of RPG range, they can give suspected enemy positions a good dose of 40mm HEDP to pave the way for your dismounts. Good hunting!

Which precludes even a single full USMC rifle platoon versus an equivalent PLA infantry platoon. No wonder I usually think "wait... shouldn't there be more of us?" while playing that game, even during the non-MARSOC missions. For all the touting of the game as being representative of the typical infantryman's experience in modern combat, one is pretty much always the leader of a four- or five-man heavily-armed (in one mission the player carries a SMAW and an M4A1 with 4x ACOG and an MEU M1911 and grenades and a combat knife...) fireteam tasked with missions which are relatively SOF in character, even when the player is in the role of a more or less regular Marine sergeant. Imagine if no scenario in CMSF had more than a one platoon of troops (including infantry and vehicles) per side...

Or even just an official statement from BFC regarding which ammo bar represents which type of ordinance. However, the ammo bar display isn't across-the-board consistent. The AH-64 (normally) shows four types of ordinance, whereas most fast movers show only two (different sizes of JDAMs, I reckon). I've heard tell that the Apache (in-game, at least) has two types of cannon ammo (hence the four ammo bars; the other two stand for rockets and ATGMs). If this is correct, then a consistent ammo bar arrangement may not work. Some rules of thumb which I've learned from trial and error: - If a helo has only one ammo bar, that means it has no missiles or rockets. - USMC Harriers have cannons, whereas British Harriers don't. - Fast movers loaded up for anti-armor sorties (i.e., with ATGMs rather than just JDAMs) are -- in my experience -- rare enough that for the most part one can assume that any given F-15, F-16, F/A-18, etc., has just JDAMs.

Steve, All I'm worried about is that my rifle squads (especially the German, and to a lesser extent the British/Commonwealth ones) will lose the most significant component of their firepower (and thus come close to combat ineffectiveness) simply because the LMG-wielder became WIA/KIA. In CM:SF, when a SAW gunner goes down, more often than not his M249 is not retained. This doesn't lessen the squad's firepower that much, since pretty much every man in the squad has a rifle which can fire semi-auto and in bursts. (And, not to put too fine a point on it, SAW gunners virtually never fire anything more than very short bursts anyway.) But since BFC has consistently proven itself, I suppose my worry is ill-founded. I trust y'all will furnish a groggishly realistic yet fun-to-play simulation. =) Sincerely, Dietrich

This article on German squad organization in 1944 includes the following interview excerpt: Such squad reorganizing is outside the scope of the game, but it seems clear to me that the LMG was more important to the German Gruppe than it was to the US rifle squad, though the difference would be less pronounced as regard the British rifle squad. It would be odd for the men of a BAR-less rifle squad to get reincorporated into other, more intact squads. If the grunts in a US squad had 1903 Springfield rifles instead of Garands, I think they would be all the more keen to keep their BAR in action. However, if any increased likelihood of retaining an LMG in the event of loss of the gunner would fall under "national differences" and would thus be omitted, then I respect and accept BFC's decision.

More like gargling in Klingon.

I concur. In the German infantry squad, the MG was the most important weapon; it provided more firepower than all the squad's other weapons combined. However, because BFC has stated... ...I'm inclined to think that such non-outliers as how important the MG was to the German infantry squad and the manner in which German infantry squads used their MGs will not be simulated, since such TacAI behavior would be not the same as the TacAI behavior for the infantry squads of other forces. So at the risk of sounding like a pessimist (though I'm sure I will thoroughly enjoy CM:N and will be pleasantly surprised by the inclusion of things I hadn't thought of), I reckon German riflemen will be firing pretty much the same as Garand-wielders and there will be no provision for bringing leichte MG34s and 42s back into action as quickly as possible (i.e., before buddy aid is performed).

According to German Squad Tactics in WWII by Matthew Gajkowski (which includes a translation of H.Dv.299/4a from May 25, 1942), the Panzergrenadiergruppe's equipment includes: "3 light machine guns, one is mounted in the front of the halftrack, the others are kept with the squad (when the squad is in the vehicle the machine gun of the second MG-Schütze 1 is mounted in the rear, in the anti-aircraft mount)". My point is simply that a fully equipped Panzergrenadier squad had roughly twice the firepower of a regular Gruppe and about three times the firepower if the squad was able to employ the "bord MG" of their accompanying SdKfz 251. I certainly hope they make it so if a Gruppe's MG-Schütze gets WIA/KIA, one of his squadmates picks up the MG. (By comparison, if a SAW gunner gets WIA/KIA, only rarely does the buddy-aid-performing squadmate pick up the M249.)

Being a contemporary account, there is no doubt a certain lack of objectivity, if a small one. Even the die-hard pro-American R. Lee Ermey, in his hosting of a Mail Call episode which discussed the MG42, made note of a US War Department training film which compared the MG42 and MG34 to contemporary US machine guns and which came to the conclusion that while the German machine guns had higher rates of fire, they were less accurate; Ermey admitted: "I got a feeling that this experiment was stacked in our favor, and I'm not sure if it helped our boys get the job done or not." Regarding that contemporary assessment of German MG usage, I think a key statement therefrom is: "What ground the light machine guns cover is covered well, but it's a very limited area." I'm inclined to suspect that one thing this assessment failed to take into account is the number of MGs the Germans employed. Not only did the Germans employ a greater number of MGs than the army of any nation they faced, in certain cases they employed them in a much more concentrated way. For example, the TO&E of a Panzergrenadiergruppe included not only the two MGs which the soldiers carried with them but also the MG which was mounted on their SdKfz 251. Granted, any given PzG Gruppe in an actual tactical situation might be understrength or suboptimally equipped, but assuming that a full-strength PzG Gruppe came up against a regular US Army rifle squad (with only one BAR, but sometimes two), the difference in firepower would definitely be marked one. As for CM:N, I'm keen to find out how German infantry squads will behave. Based on what I've read about German tactical principles and practices, a reasonable outline for German infantry squad TacAI would look something like this: Assuming no specific orders are in effect (i.e., no cover arc, no "hide", etc.), if the Gruppe spots enemy infantry within effective range, the MG opens fire alone. If the Gruppe is issued a Target Light order on an enemy unit, the MG opens fire alone but fires longer and more frequent bursts. If the Gruppe is issued a Target order, the MG as well as the rifles open fire. Of course, that's just one concept for how German infantry would behave in terms of fire discipline. Then again, Steven has emphasized that there won't be "national differences" between forces, so I suppose no such distinction will be seen with German infantry.

For one contemporary assessment of German MG usage, see http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/firepower/index.html, in particular the final subheading: So even back then there were those who thought that any significant superiority of the MG34/42 was more supposed than actual. Permit me to play "devil's advocate" some more (and no snide comments about how the Catholic Church officially abolished the position of "devil's advocate years ago): I think that any greater effectiveness of the MG42 -- assuming that at least some albeit finite degree of superiority might be ascribed to it -- is psychological. To put it in perspective, hypothetically ask an M240B/G gunner if he feels secure behind his weapon, since it dishes out good firepower and is reliable and accurate, etc. Now put that same gunner at the controls of a Mk 44 minigun and ask him how he feels.

I wrote: "To correlate your observations to CMSF." In real life, as you noted, a technical's weapon is typically on a 360-degree mount. In CMSF, however, when a technical spots a target to its flank or rear, it will rotate on its axis to bring its weapon to bear. I believe this might be for no other reason than the absence of animations for a technical's gunner and/or loader moving to the front of the truck bed and facing rearward, to correspond to the approximately 180-degree rotation of the technical's weapon to face the rear quarter. I wrote: "The windshield would tend to protect the driver [etc.]." Obviously, the shorter the range, the greater any given 5.56mm round's penetration capability. At relatively close range (such as 100m, like you mentioned), 5.56mm NATO is more apt to punch through most parts of a truck, with minimal chance of deflection. But since engagement even with M4s sometimes happens at extreme range (for the ammunition involved), it isn't a given that the rounds would simply penetrate whatever part of a truck they happened to hit. In any case, my point wasn't to go all Mythbusters, but to simply point out some common features of engagements between Blue small arms (including M240s) and technicals in CMSF.

Blue AAA targeting the choppers or firing at insurgents in the valley and thus inadvertently firing in the vicinity of the choppers? Isn't Coalition AAA (Gatling-type systems rather than missiles) relatively rare in these days of virtually no OPFOR air threat?

He wrote "DOT", not "DoT".