fireship4

Long thread on Kharkiv, nothing not gone over by others on this thread but hey, it's nice to see emerging agreement. Gonna quote some interesting stuff. One, as Grigb has gone over, the Russian forces in Ukraine are divided into LPR and DPR, the National Guard (Chechen and non Chechen Rosgvardiya), the army, and Wagner. Wagner can get support, it's seen separatists, army, Rosgvardiya support it's units, even has airplanes but is pretty small, 4-5k, answers only to Putin thanks to Prigozhin.
Wagner is therefore uncontrollable. Same applies for the rest of the factions, who jealously guard their power.
Wagner can recruit from anywhere, Putin's Chef is untouchable, but the rest of Russian bureaucracy remains, and the SMO means no one wants to join willingly, Russia is just dead on manpower. Mobilization will probably do nothing, cause Russians can smell the stink of the SMO and this defeat in Kharkiv will cement their decision to stay far away and Putin's control over Russia is nowhere near absolute.
As seen in the quote below, there were many saying Izyum contained a powerful set of units, the basis for the cauldron or trap for Ukraine to be lured into depended on the Izyum grouping to be a pincer. We know now they were as stripped as anything else in the area.
I strongly believe that the rot in the Russian military is so high that the General Staff can no longer have accurate data on their own units, neither men, supplies, capability, it's all equally suggestible to be false as true.
How is Russia supposed to defend any new defensive line when their officers are more afraid to say everything is going wrong than smoothly? When it's more important to lie about the capability of their unit than to ensure they can win the next battle?
One would hope that maybe this would be a proper wake up call but...I doubt it.
 
 

Mark Galeotti
How will Putin respond to his latest defeat?
11 September 2022, 9:20am

Russia is retreating at speed along the Kharkiv front, leaving behind burnt-out tanks and, even more tellingly, undamaged ones, too. There are television images of locals welcoming Ukrainian forces and accounts from eyewitnesses on the spot – but none of that has made it into Russian state media. As the Kremlin struggles to find some way of spinning the unspinnable, this will affect not just its public credibility but also elite unity.
The Russian defence ministry is talking about a 'regrouping' of its units. State TV is extolling the 'exploits' of its gallant soldiers. Government newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta, recounting an alleged victory, trips itself up by placing the action deep into formerly Russian-held territory. The tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda’s war correspondent – sorry, ‘special military operation’ correspondent – files gung-ho tales from the front describing not a rout, but an orderly retreat under assault by 'foreign mercenaries' and 'Nato-trained troops.'
The official media is either trying to ignore the collapse of the Russian lines or looking for some ways of excusing or sugar-coating it, but either way the effect is incoherent and unconvincing. In the process, this is demonstrating the key problem of a state-controlled propaganda machine: it all depends on a line coming from above.
Instead, the Kremlin seems to be in disarray at best, crisis at worst. Caught by surprise, unsure how to respond, it is not giving the media a steer, and in a system like this, no one dares show initiative lest they get it wrong. This is, after all, the same Soviet-style defensive thinking that is bedevilling the military, and it’s proving every bit as counter-productive.
The Kremlin has two immediate problems. The first is how to manufacture any kind of positive narrative without resorting to the most egregious of lies. This was the same dilemma it encountered in both Chechen wars and during the Soviet war in Afghanistan: how to lie enough, but not too much.
There is, after all, a strange kind of moral balancing act that obtains in totalitarian regimes. It is not so much that most Russians necessarily believe the official line – though many do – so much as that they are unwilling to put the effort into disbelieving it. It’s too dangerous, both morally and ethically.
Back in the late 1980s, I remember one parent of a Soviet Afghan war veteran telling me 'I didn't want to believe what people were saying about the war, because if I did, then I would either have to act or be a part of it.'

Likewise, today, many Russians would rather leave the box closed and not know whether Schrödinger’s cat is dead or alive. However, the greater the gap between propaganda and reality, the harder it is to avoid the truth.
The Kremlin’s second challenge is how to manage the elite, those who have most to lose but also the best knowledge of what is going on.
A sign of the times is that Ramzan Kadyrov, warlord of Chechnya, has taken to social media openly to complain that 'it’s a hell of a situation' and warning that 'if today or tomorrow there are no changes in the strategy for conducting the special military operation, I will have to go to the leadership of the Ministry of Defence and the country to explain the situation to them.'
One cannot take his posturing at face value, as he has a track record of empty rhetorical threats and flourishes. (Just as Russian troops have become exasperated that the Chechen forces seem more interested in posting videos of themselves on TikTok than fighting.)
However, when Kadyrov is admitting that things are going badly, and trying to distance himself from the conduct of the invasion, it is a sign of deeper, tectonic pressures. The technocrats have long been unhappy with the war, but unable to do anything about it. As hawks and opportunists also begin to be willing publicly to signal their dismay, it signals a growing isolation of the president.
Putin is not seriously under threat, at least not yet. But if he feels he may be, then that arguably takes us into even more dangerous territory. It may be that he will find ways to reframe the narrative and try and make peace while calling it a victory. But it may also be that he feels he has no alternative but to find some way of escalating, lest defeat abroad lead to defenestration at home.

WRITTEN BY
Mark Galeotti
Professor Mark Galeotti is the author of 24 books about Russia. The latest is ‘A Short History of Russia’ (2021).

What's interesting to me is how much both strategies are designed to subvert the supports that maintain US hegemony and how badly they perform at it:
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/22/ratings-for-russia-drop-to-record-lows/
The danger for both Russia and China...that's fast becoming the reality...is that they don't provide a model that is more attractive than the US/EU because their aims are simply to install a cruder, more restrictive hegemony for themselves.  Therefore, their interactions with likeminded nations don't turn into countervailing coalitions but simply accommodations based on mutual and typically short term interest. You can see that, not all surprisingly, mostly clearly in their relations with each other.
Perforce, they must act like insurgents on the state scale. They act as spoilers, subvert the order of things, put grit in the machinery and try to inhabit (in China's case) parts of the global economy that allow them to exert control. But this has limits. Western oriented states have resilient systems, they are easy to influence but generally hard to subvert outright. And all the while, the clock ticks for China and Russia given the profound demographic problems they face.
I get your take and in many ways I'm sympathetic to it. But over all, I think the historical record comes down pretty heavily on the side of the socially and economically dynamic nations over the episodic pulses of authoritarian states.
 

I could probably write a book:
Forcing function - The US and west have been the the worlds hyperpower for at least 30 years.  Any conventional matchups come with so many caveats that only non-state networks have really been dumb enough to take them on in the CT/VEO space.  In fact the last time a nation state fell out of line the Gulf War happened and any great power outside of the US/western sphere took note.  So a revisionist state was trapped between the devil of nuclear warfare they could not win, and the deep blue see of being vastly overpowered in the conventional space.
Our History.  We understood our power early.  While interventions and CT work kept us busy in reality the west has not faced an existential state-based threat since the fall of the USSR.  As such, we let things slide in the famous "peace dividend days".  Everyone was counting mothballed tanks and ships, but we also mothballed the NS architecture capable of waging global scale political warfare.  Sure we kept intelligence and the like but funding went way down as we all figured "well who would mess with us".  It got a major boost after 9/11 but it was built to hunt humans in and amongst other humans, not deal with larger scale nation states.  So our ability to actually conduct counter-subversive and pre-emptive political warfare campaigns has atrophied over the last three decades.
Our reality.  Unlike autocratic societies, we lay our internal social divisions and friction-points out for everyone to see, we celebrate and fund them.  Further we have laws that enshrine freedoms and an open society based on the value of each and every citizen.  We doubled down on all of that after the Cold War ended.  What makes our nations strong a great are also some of our biggest vulnerabilities in this arena - not advocating for anything different here, this is just our reality.  Free press, free enterprise, free academia and freedoms "from and to" are what makes us the most powerful versions of humanity that ever existed; also leaves us very open to asymmetric strategies.
Their reality.  The revisionist power states, like China and Russia, were largely left out, or at least feel like they were left out of the re-writing of the global order.  They understand where they stand in the pecking order, and while it took awhile, they figured out that they 1) did not like it, and 2) had to start moving the needle to change it.  Direct confrontation with the west was impossible, so they went sideways.  They all have long histories in the subversive space, hell one could argue the Chinese invented it.  So they renewed old doctrines that leveraged energy resident within our systems to work for them - classic reflexive control.  This was done with long above-water campaigns of influence as they picked up steam.  Cyber and information space meant that societies became connected, but they also became "seeable" in extremely high resolution.  Like the invention of the microscope, this opened up new observable phenomenon, which we could not see in the Cold War.  States and corporations - often overlapping - went to town on this.  They collected data and developed theories of how humanity worked at micro-social scales that did not exists 30 years ago.  They could map those spaces and that could gauge cause and effect.  We used to sell stuff and collect "likes and subscribes", they, the other lost powers, used it to create "options".  Ones that are very hard to attribute and are aimed at what is both our greatest strengths and vulnerabilities - our open society.  These options were not legal acts of war, responses lay outside of our legalities and policies, and they were designed to hit us where they knew we would never even be able to agree at what happened - classic negative and null decision space.
Russia out front.  Russia has a very long history of playing these games and decided to flex first.  China has always been quietly waiting and watching in the background - stealing IP, buying off politicians and power brokers, colleting information and re-drawing maps.  Russia is not that nuanced, never has been really.  They were far more blunt and began act on their new theories - Gerasimov Doctrine/Russian Hybrid Warfare - whatever.  It was an ability to exercise strategic options outside of what we understood as war or peace.  Russia tried things out in Georgia and Chechnya - learned some hard lessons and then went prime time in 2014 in Ukraine.  No big conventional war, they just undecided Donbass and Crimea, and then made it too hard for us to really decide anything about it.  They pulled off wins in Syria and Africa (that no one really noticed) and kept getting free lunches while we in the west sat back and scratched our heads "how did they do that?"  Seriously, as I have told some senior people, "I am tired of admiring the other team".  China was doing all the same stuff, just much more nuanced and quietly - they called it unrestricted warfare/systems warfare but it basically amounts to the same thing; however, China appears much more adept at leveraging the rules and laws of the international order, while at the same time playing outside of them.
Unprepared and paralysis.  We really were in a kind of strategic shock in the west.  Both Russia and China had worked hard to make sure that they played out internal divisions and that groups in our own societies became indirectly invested (ignorantly in some cases) in their interests.  Our national security and defence architecture was too busy chasing "snakes" and was dislocated in dealing with state-based threats.  In many cases we had no policy or legal frameworks for what these new threat theories could do, and we sure as hell did not have counters/pushbacks.  So while we were basically strategically dislocated both Russia and China made great gains while we dithered and argued with each other - and I do not mean solely in the US.  North America, Europe and Pacific partners, all yelling and divided.  NATO was on the ropes, many nations had grown tired of GWOT, and we saw (are seeing) the rise of nationalism and isolationism.
Russia poops the bed - and modern war is in the wind.  For reasons I still do not understand Russia decides to drop its A-Game and fall back on an open conventional military power approach in Ukraine.  I have never heard a good reason why this is, and why they took this risk but here we are.  So China is sitting back watching, again as all this unfolds and what does it see?  Well first thing is that modern conventional warfare is upside down.  By our old metrics/doctrine Ukraine should have lost this, even in the face of Russian crappiness.  The war was going to be longer and grinding but eventually Ukraine would fold under the weight of a military machine that was an order of magnitude larger by some metrics. And then "boop"!  So what the hell happened? - well personally I think the 3rd offset (out of favor now) actually came into it age (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offset_strategy) in doing so it is re-writing conventional war as we know it.  Russia is running into a brick wall but China is watching and noting it. China was feeling strong, by old metrics it was catching up and rising to challenge the West - particularly when one considers our aversion to sacrifice.  Unless China is a complete idiot, and nothing I have seen suggests they are, then this war completely blew up their pre-war estimates.  Modern warfare just got insanely more lethal and expensive - harder not easier.  And once again western warfare looks like it leaped ahead, this was not the plan.
So What?  Well, despite all the sabre rattling with China over Taiwan, I suspect the Chinese are conducting a serious re-think (they should be).  Everyone in the bar is armed and sizing each other out.  A big guy draped with guns and ammo, looking like Rambo, picked a fight with a little guy who just punched Rambo's teeth in with his own ammo belts. A conventional conflict with China just got less likely, if China has been paying attention and I suspect they have.  The metrics by which China was gauging things just shifted and they are not going to pull "a Russia" blindly.
So, So what?  Well China is likely going to do a few things 1) re-set its conventional military power metrics, likely better than we will - we are going to bask in "well there you go, we win!", 2) Keep to its A-game longer and double down and what has been working - it saw what happened to Russia.  We on the other hand are likely to go back to arguing and losing the bubble, making us even more vulnerable.  That is the biggest unknown and question "how do we re-gain internal integrity in our systems, without breaking them ourselves?"  All the while China and very likely what is left of Russia will work in helping us to break us.  We are likely to see a lot more proxy actions done this way because invading is a dumb idea.  China has a decades head start on us, so we face major challenges getting better in this space - it is the one area that China's options are expanding and ours remain stagnant. 
Cold War, Hot Peace, Tepid Status Quo, it all really ends the same; more political warfare happening where the terrain favours the opponent - we need to get over ourselves and agree that in this area we are all of one mind: create equilibrium and expand options, while compressing our opponents.  And this is not all on the US, which has its own problems, we have seen pressures and threats here in Canada in ways that we do not have any response to other than "togetherness and resilience".  Every western country has a micro-social space, and it is largely lying wide open to direct influence, which in a democracy is incredibly powerful and dangerous.  I strongly suspect that this war will be a watershed moment for whatever comes next - likely a Coldish War but one where the lines are far more blurry and a significant continuing of the trend of the re-emergence of political warfare as a primary theater in pursuing national interests while blunting an opponents.     
Finally, my instincts tell me, "don't think 1960", they are telling me "think 1900".  There are a lot of similarities between now and pre WWI with respect to great power competition/conflict.  Accept now we have nukes and cyberspace - and the history of WWI to learn from.  Regardless, we need to win this war, put Russia back in a box and then everyone sit down and have  a serious conversation on how we let this happen and how we need to close the spaces between us or someone is going to use that: one second to midnight at a time.

One, Germany got itself in this position due to bad PR. Sucks but if Macron who still sticks his foot in the mouth regarding Putin skates pass you somehow, you know you screwed up.
Two, again, Scholz's coalition partners are actively stabbing him in the back (or more the front at this point). His opposition is as well.
Three, as the largest European economy and mainstay of the EU alongside France, it must lead the EU, and lead Europe. Up until now, Europe has been in crisis and stagnation, and still is, but this crisis may be a valuable turning point for Europe. Certainly this represents a point where Russian influence can be cast out for a decade.
I mentioned this earlier, a ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian forces monitored with what? UN mission? (Not NATO lol)(OSCE?) I highly doubt any monitoring mission is gonna occur, but if there isn't, Ukraine will have to regain control over customs and border control and station forces inside separatist areas to monitor the withdrawal. Once LPR and DPR lose the ability to defend their territory, even if Ukraine holds to the ceasefire (which it certainly might not), there isn't a lot for the LPR and DPR leadership to feel safe anymore from a visit by SBU.
Also...what constitutes LPR and DPR forces? Russia flooded the Donbas with personnel. Russian MoD has control over large sections of the forces of the LPR and DPR. Ukraine itself declares that all separatist forces are Russian.
I could see a ceasefire where Russian forces must leave, but Ukraine declares all armed personnel in the LPR and DPR are Russian and kicks them out. 🙈
Imo, if the LPR and DPR leadership have any sense, they will attempt to one, retain armed forces, two, establish legitimacy of separatist government, three, and most importantly, keep the borders with Russia open for resupply and personnel reinforcement.
Also, a situation where Russia can still flood in arms, supplies, personnel into the Donbas without being at war with Ukraine is absolutely a win. (Why Ukraine must regain customs and border control and alongside it, armed forces inside the Donbas)
I could totally see a situation where what I've laid out above occurs, a ceasefire with Russia is declared, Russia withdraws but the LPR and DPR can regroup, rearm and defend the remaining Donbas with Russia retaining the unique ability of having its borders and territorial control to be completely undiminished (nukes, etc) and Ukraine forced to deal with international sentiment being "ehhh". No, this is not viable. And again, any conditions where Ukrainian demands are met, are going to likely result in the LPR and DPR leadership fleeing or doubling down and holding out anyway.
Steve, I'm not sure you understand that the 2022 invasion changes everything. Pre-invasion, I would think everything you suggested is viable. Having Donbas be carved out from influencing Ukraine, (imo, carving the Donbas from influencing Ukraine is separatism btw, as the Donbas will influence Ukraine naturally as a response to Ukraine administrating the region, what your suggesting is legitimating their separatism) sure, entirely possible, something Zelensky promised to find a resolution towards.
Post-invasion, things have changed. I don't think it can be understated that Russia sought to conquer the entire country and wipe out all pro-Ukrainian sentiment with genocide. Every report we have indicates civilians in the occupied territories being "filtrated" for pro-Ukrainian sentiment and those identified being either killed, deported, or tortured or if lucky, just monitored. I'm exceedingly surprised the Ukrainians don't line up every Russian soldier and collaborator and shoot them. Everything we have in terms of evidence indicates Russia fully intended (and is carrying out in occupied regions) on lining up and executing their opposition, peaceful and violent. They fully intended on cleaning Ukraine of opposition, civilian and military in a manner that is clearly targeted towards the Ukrainian nationality. 
This is not a clean war. War is never clean, and this war has not been clean at all since 2014 but certainly 2022 marks a huge escalation in Russia attempting to seize all of Ukraine, and in attempting the same "separatist republics" filtration in Kherson as in the Donbas.
Maybe Ukraine opts along your lines, it's entirely possible. I think it's much more likely Ukraine cleanses their society, in order to safeguard from this occurring again.
Now, obviously aside from whatever I stated, the Donbas is a important economic part of Ukraine, there are millions of people who probably wish to return to their homes in the Donbas, etc, etc.
But it really comes down to whether Ukraine considers the Donbas theirs, and whether the cost in blood is worth retaking it all. I think certainly after facing their near destruction, the amount of blood Ukraine is willing to shed for regaining their land and people has certainly gone way up. Let Crimea and Lugansk and Donetsk remain free to cleanse the Ukrainians still there and sit back? Doubtful.
(Reminder, they are still there. The massive human intel, partisan action indicates this)

I highly, highly doubt autonomy will be granted to the Donbas, nothing will be given that provides cover to separatist claims of special status to the Donbas or minority rights of Russians.
Crimea is more likely but I'm pretty doubtful there as well.
And I fully doubt Ukraine will allow a special carve out for the Donbas like a ceasefire for extended negotiations, nothing will be done to legitimatize the separatists, mark my words.
Sure, Ukraine may find the cost in blood to be hard. But it would be even more costly to allow the Donbas the special status now that one day Russia will take advantage of to meddle in Ukraine once again.

He got a bit carried away in few points:
- US sends a lot of cutting edge stuff too ( GMLRS, Javelins, M777)
- all that went in up to this point was donated. Lend lease deal should only be finalized that month (and hopefully will allow UA to get the good stuff like AFVs, F16 and ATACMS)

I  must confess to not knowing a thing about who @gummibear737 is but whoever they are, this is about as clear eyed a thread as it gets on how ruthlessly the US is going to benefit from the war in Ukraine. 

Roberto Benigni from Night on Earth.  First time I saw this I nearly asphyxiated.  Jump to 3:25 for his confession on pumpkins
 

Long thread, but it basically boils down to lying at every level of the Armed Forces, such that the picture is so distorted by the time it gets to Putin, it is not reality whatsoever. It is so distorted, that any action, whether it be artillery fire, air support, a push by infantry or armor, anything whatsoever, is marred by lying, and so despite it being reported a successful strike opened the war for a advance, the infantry and armor that move out get a boatload of lead and retreat, except the commander reported his units are intact, succeeded and have more fighting strength than true so then a supporting attack goes underway with the same poor result....
There is a real possibility the Russian General Staff supposed their Izyum and Kharkiv front was perfectly manned, when in reality, everyone was just lying and covering their own behind. 
 
 

State of RU defense just before the of UKR offensive
 

Actually, UKR plan consisted of two pincers toward Izum - North one and South one.

North consisted of two main pushes:
From Balaklya through Vesele From Kupyanks + forces that reaches Oskil at Senkove/Borova (I made mistake - Borova should be yellow) along the Oskil. These forces also supposed to cut the road from Kupyanks to Izum on the other side of Oskil. Leaving RU Izum grouping with only one path out - Izum-Lyman-Kremenna corridor. When North Pincer got RU attention UKR activated Souther pincer. They pushed:
From directly south toward Izum  Near Dolyna and toward Svyatohirsk  Near Stary Karavan and Ozerne toward Lyman to completely seal the road From some reports I got the impression that UKR did not stop at Oskil but pushed further. It was clear that after closing Izum pocket they were planning to roll the RU flank at Oskil river striking North toward their Bridgehead at Senkove-Borova. Once Ru defenses collapsed at Oski RU would recoil toward Svatove.
UKR were very close achieving it - RU regulars abandoned Lyman and there were reports that they were running even from Svatove. However, LPR and volunteer units present as South did not panic and south front line buckled but did not collapse.  
But you do not need to belive me - look at the Rybar maps

As soon as UKR reached Oskil they started to push at Lyman as well.

Ukraine is asking for more tanks, specifically from Germany. Predictably, the answer so far is "nein".
WaPo (probably paywalled)
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/13/ukraine-tanks-russia-germany-offensive/

Here's a really cool tool for tracking all the railway lines in the world, I can't recommend it enough if anybody want's to familiarize himself with the rail logistics in Ukraine: https://openrailwaymap.org/
You are absolutely right here, to support Donbas, Russia will have to redirect all the traffic to south of Luhansk, or to Rostov. The closest big city that could serve as a main supply base is Volgograd. It really takes a moment to comprehend how screwed they are, even without any UA strikes on the rail infrastructure. 
And regarding ATACMS, I wonder how soldiers of the western grouping would deal with Crimean bridge going down...

Hey it is ok to disagree.  So how many troops are we about here?  You mention that they are better equipped etc but how many are we talking about?
Honestly, though, once the RA scuttles a back to wherever they wind up, this force is going to be holding out on its own and UA can give these guys their full concentration.  Unless this Prigo fella has a magic shield that will make these guys HIMAR proof I think the best they can hope for is to die later. 
But this has been a weird war, so I won’t bet the mortgage on my predictions just yet.

Ok, one follow up and then maybe it is best we agree to disagree because this is really going no where.  I will take your map as gospel.  So we have a pretty hard rock in the ol shoe there, some real toughies in a box. Looks like they have a river in front of them so positioning is nasty.  Looks like they are holding about a 50 km frontage in that bubble - a citadel of nasty. 
This is a tactical problem.  For example, who is securing their LOCs - which are about 100kms long back to Russia?  These guys are tough but without ammo they become a hilarious nuisance.  How is that logistical system doing?  Is it robust, multi-corridor, dynamic and self-healing?  Do these guys have any Deep Strike capability to threaten UA supply lines?  What ISR do they have beyond tactical?  I will give them the benefit of the doubt that they have decent tactical.
So what we really have is a really tough, well motivated tactical set of units (maybe a formation?) that cannot secure its LOCs north. Its ISR is limited by range, while the UA can see them from space.  I am sure they will die bravely, or better yet, if they are that switched on they should be able to see how untenable their situation is and pull back.

And that exactly underestimation of their capabilities. But do not listen to me - let's look at the map

FYI the LPR and Volunteers there prevented RU front collapse east of  Oskil river by holding UKR advance in Lyman area. Do they still look like dangerous but small terror groups? 
 
What if I tell you they are planning to fortify L-DPR territory making any assault on it extremely costly. And then they will start smashing UKR infrastructure to force humanitarian catastrophe phe there - winter is coming. 
What is NATO going to do? Invade fortified L-DPR? How many boys are you ready to sacrifice to take norther Fallujahs? And what is your plan on possibility of getting a nuke in the face once you cleared these Fallujahs?  
Everything depends on UKR forcing collapse at Lyman. If they will force collapse, then L-PR and volunters are weaker than I believe and I will agree that they are mostly beaten.
If not, then they are not beaten yet and e should expect they and Prigozhin are preparing some nasty things for UKR and us.

Ok so this is better how?  Are you telling me they picked up on the UA planning a Kharkiv offensive weeks ahead of time...and did sweet FA to stop it?!  Aaand we are back to broken operational military system.  Look I am sure these RU Nat volunteers are true believers and really cagey tough guys; however, if they have been part of this debacle then I am a little less than concerned about them walking out of a phonebooth and becoming a super army.
If they can surprise...they had better start doing it.  If this clown show picks a fight with the EU, it will escalate to NATO and frankly from what I have seen we could cut thru what is left of the RA - RU Nat volunteers included like **** through a short goose in a long weekend.
The references you are making are making it look worse for them.  They saw but were unable to do anything about the UA taking back what is now being reported 6000 sq kms, in a week.  I don't care if these guys are each super-soldiers who can do one handed chin-ups with no hands - their operational level ISR, C2 and logistics suck well beyond repair in the timeframes of this war.  They are going to be living proof that dedication and belief comes second to hot steel in the right place and right time.
And what if they are really in league with the mole people and conduct a sub-terrainian flanking?!  Like I said these a$$hats are well positioned to pull of a nasty insurgency/guerilla war in the LNR-DPR - maybe, if local support holds.  Beyond that they are living in fragmented...and getting more fragmented by the day, military organization.  What is likely to stop the UA at this point...is the UA.  They are going to need to re-set logistical lines and consolidate but so far from what I have seen the RA is not part of this equation.
In reality these clowns have the making of a VEO network that will go underground and make everyone miserable once this thing is over.  Good thing we have about 20 years worth of experience hunting humans in this context.
I gotta be honest, I am really tired of the freakin "boogy man of the week" right now.  We are jumping out of our seats because everything is really dangerous and really scary:
- The Russian Army with all that hardware
- The Black Sea Fleet & the Russian Air Force
- Spetznaz and Wagner clowns
- Russian cruise and hypersonic missiles
- Russian cyber Pearl Harbour 
- Some General Jack-in-the-Box who was a jerk in Syria.
- Russians parked around a nuclear power plant.
- Nukes!!
- the Russian 3rd Corp
- Russian mobilization!! - the other hand coming out.
- Russian escalation dominance.
- RU Nats - whoever the hell they really are
- Ukraine is going to fall
- Ukraine is going to hold on but the war will still be on when my grandkids graduate from college
- Ukraine can't possible take in all this kit and hold on.
- Ukraine can defend but could never pull off an attack
I have to be missing something.  Every week in this war we find something be be scared of, and it has all turned out to be complete and utter BS.  How about we look at the situation, as it unfolded for what it is - a historic military debacle that is likely to break the current Russian regime.  It was doomed from the start, and has only gotten worse.  Sure things could still swing and will likely get uglier but the RA in Ukraine is in death throws - it is keeling over to die, not coiling like a steel spring.  All war is negotiation and right now the Russians are negotiation just how ugly this loss is going to be.
Unless these RU Nats come with an entirely revitalized equipment fleet and logistics backbone to support it, a competitive integrated ISR system, and a completely new military doctrine...you will excuse me if I am not worried.   
 
 

As funny as it is, it is from a TV/film set. Somewhere on Twitter someone posted a picture of him with a clapper board in front of his face but I can't find it now. But that is why the pedestrians aren't acting realistically.
EDIT: found it
 

That's because in Australia democracy is deeply rooted in the mentality of society - you treat people you elect as temporary managers, not as "strong leaders" you grant an absolute power to "lead" (e.g. do whatever they want with the country). So of course you are not mentally stuck with a familiar face, you want change.
In Ukraine we still have remnants of mental trauma from imperialism like that - like people electing the same mayor for 15+ years straight simply because... well... he's kinda a local feudal everybody knows - and the more he stays - the more he's treated as an inherent part of the land in question. Presidents are, thankfully, not so lucky.

seems the difference is that in the chucks map areas vacated by the Russians are presumed to be under Ukrainian control. While many other mark it as unknown or neutral.

Small Jomini update,
I wonder how every collaborator in the post invasion territory feels at this point? Can't be good watching Russia melt away.
 

"The sides share the understanding that democracy is a universal human value, rather than a privilege of a limited number of States, and that its promotion and protection is a common responsibility of the entire world community."
The quote is from the document billindc linked above. Ii would be hilarious if there wasn't a genocidal war under way in Ukraine, and a a mere genocide or three underway in China, conducted by the signatories. Pretty much tells you how much faith to put in the rest of it. 
We will know as much about that meeting as the Five Eyes intelligence services want to tell us. There is literally no point in even skimming what China and Russia put out.
EDIT: I mean some poor bleeps in various foreign ministries have to read it, but I suspect the need strong coffee and stronger stomachs...

Fanciful speculation:
Putin seeing that things are looking less likely to end well for himself, quietly transfers a portion of his personal wealth to China.  During his visit with Xi, he decides he enjoys China so much that he will stay there and step down pre-emptively thus vastly improving his life expectancy.  
I would imagine other Russian operatives would be reluctant to mess with him in China.  China benefits internationally  from assisting in regime change that offers a pathway to de-escalation.
 

Best advice I ever got:  strategy is not about good or bad, it is about bad and worse.
A “good enough” Tsar would be sufficient at this point.