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Lethaface

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Everything posted by Lethaface

  1. Yeah for the hq that is probably what happened . Objectives turned off as the only goal is destruction of enemies.
  2. That could indeed be the case for the AA HQ now that I think of it (can't check at the moment), but not for the dismounted FDC vehicle as I can't move that one. Or did it spawn in the exit zone?
  3. @BFCElvis I noticed something strange, during the battle my USSR AA HQ (which had an Igla which is why I remembered) has disappeared. No casualty to be seen, plus there was no artillery / air / scouts in play yet when they did disappear. I ordered them (HQ + 2x Igla troopers) to dismount the BMP and later I couldn't find the HQ. On the US side there was an FDC vehicle, arriving dismounted. That has also disappeared, fwiw the FDC crew had perished by the time I noticed the vehicle disappeared. Fortunately these have zero to none impact on the game played, but still strange so thought to mention it here.
  4. I agree this battle isn't ideal for non-blind tournament play; it's relatively open and most reinforcements come in the map at a fixed position/time, which is in view of the enemy. My opponent wisely chose to use the information available to him and I followed the example :D. However it's not really a tactical game now, more like a game of 'order area fire where reinforcements spawn'. Of course the specific made scenario's are best for a tournament, but for existing maps I think it's good to choose a scenario (or QB?) which don't need 'houserules' or playing blind to shine.
  5. I personally find the casualty ratio a less interesting subject, mainly because we just don't know the casualties and we haven't known about them. The delta between two unknowns is probably something like unknown2. The bean-counting machine don't like computing that one though ;-). Maybe Ukraine casualties have always been 'high' or higher than some had assumed, I mean what is even 'high'? The facts which were assertable showed that Bakhmut has been, for quite a while, the only significant offensive pressure Russia was able to mount (apart from long range (terror) strikes). Progress, as we all know here, has been slow. Bakhmut was were Wagner was making a real name for itself (by keeping up the only offensive) and built up influence, subsequently losing it after months of fighting without much to show for. Even the presumed 'anniversary offensive' turned out to be a form of continuation of the already ongoing Bakhmut offensive, without much to show for yet. Without travelling to Bakhmut one could imagine that over time defenses would be degraded / 'the defensive puzzle' as it was called here, more and more solved. So less favorable conditions for Ukraine compared to earlier in the battle. It doesn't, at least imho, change the general outlook of the proceedings of the war. Nor does it necessarily require to adjust ones 'best case vs worst case scenarios' on the subject of overall casualty ratios. I'd say that overall the ratio for Ukraine is 'good enough', given that they dialed back the offensive 'prongs', forced Russia to mobilize a bunch of extra troops to throw in the grinder and we haven't seen Ukraine being forced to abandon positions without fighting. On another subject, yesterday I read something about Nova Kakhovka being taken by Ukraine but that might have been just rumors; didn't see much about it today although I haven't really done much digging yet. If/when the UKR spring/summer offensive materializes it will be interesting to see how well Russia can defend against those. Of course there are no guarantees but if I had to gamble money on an outcome I'd put it on a successful Ukraine offensive (operational victory not yet strategic collapse, although I hope I'm wrong on this one), some 'gestures of good will' and perhaps a push towards negotiations (not necessarily formally originating from Russia).
  6. Done properly I don't see a cultural barrier for medieval history fiction. Of course references to all kind of unknown persons or events don't help. Also the subject is probably quite a niche here now, probably more than in Eastern Europe.
  7. As a European I don't agree. Sure US has found a better way to incorporate varies cultures and still be 'American', which 'we' in Europe struggle with still; some more than others. It is also logical when looking at the founding of the US, it was a mixed culture society to start with. Other than that my experiences differ, but it's rather of topic here so I'll digress.
  8. Try the demo, I don't think windows will be problem but hardware might be close.
  9. Isn't it just a 'glass is half full vs half empty' type of consideration? I mean to who is it a surprise that Ukraine, after a year long war against a vastly larger invader which has itself mobilized a big number of extra troops, is also seen requiring pressing men into frontline service quickly? Be it because they need more men for the rotation pool, plug potential gaps allowing offensive units to be concentrated for offensive ops, or because they are behind the curve? I prefer my glass half full and going on the proceedings of the war until now I'd say that is warranted. But of course not all is well and there are always risks. With regard to 'Time is on Ukraine's side', I'd say that depends on what happens during 'time'. On the long run a stalemate might be in Russia's relative favor. Russia is probably able to keep up some form of offensive pressure (although not like Bakhmut I'd say) for a long time, while building up more forces. That's a risk. But here time has already been on Ukraine's side, because Russia has had to dial down it's ambitions and scale of offensives during the course of the war. A year ago today's status quo would have been considered as a Major Russian defeat. The expected anniversary offensive has turned out to be only the continuation of Bakhmut. Russia seems to be running out of it's escalation options. But Ukraine isn't played out afaik, they still have 'options' and some of those include letting the Russians run out of steam while looking for the next opportunity to do profitable business. As such they have the time and can wait for Russia to make a mistake. They don't need to be in a rush for a 'breakthrough offensive'. Without evidence of the contrary I'd say Ukraine was/is deliberately holding onto Bakhmut while keeping their cards close to their chests. It's not pretty, but I guess war is hell and Russia even with all of it's flaws still has a lot of firepower and 'meat' to throw in the grinder and that's always going to be a 'difficult situation' to be in contact with.
  10. Prigozhin looking to get some credit to his name again?
  11. Thanks for this. After reading the first paragraph in the article I looked up the author and he's a US journalist with imo, a political agenda, using selective sources to project a framing he wants to put forward. So I stopped reading it Not that I'm saying all is going as fast as possible in Germany, I don't really know to be honest but probably nor does he. How to wisely spend 100 Billion Euro out of the blue is not an easy task. Last few days I did hear rather clear language from Scholz / Germany and I understand he is on his way for a private meeting with Biden as we speak. So things are happening at least.
  12. Agreed. Interestingly NL is quite high in those lists considering our size/population. I haven't heard our Defense ministry saying we aren't ready to defend our country, but then again only Germany or Belgium could invade our country by land and given their readiness that should be doable But there have been plenty of reports of ammo shortages and other issues hindering readiness. And personnel shortages across the line. I have read about actual NATO capability shortcomings, about 'heavy infantry' although I'm not sure / can't remember what exactly the shortcomings are. I guess the issue for at least NL partly is, what to invest/focus upon? In the cold war our 'role' was more clear, we had our sector in the defense plan for Germany and the required capability was to field a full Corps to keep it short. What should we invest in now? Double our F-35s? Focus on light infantry (KCT, Marines, airmobile, recon, etc), go wild on new (to be developed) lethal-drone-enabled light infantry? Or just get a bit of all of the stuff (not best idea imo). etc. The politicians don't really have a clue imo and the military is probably largely of the opinion that we should first restore our 'current capabilities' to acceptable levels. Than come the bureaucratic issues, geopolitical interests and how to weigh those, etc. Anyway Indeed Putin did more for effective NATO spending than anything else, while I think it's good to stay critical/skeptical but there is at least serious attention for the subject now. It will take some years obviously but in the end I expect we and others in Europe will get their ****e together at least better than the last 20-30 years.
  13. I think I've read something about it in patch notes (?) of changes made to the various T-72 models from CMSF1 -> CMSF2. Don't know where though. I do think it was mentioned that the Turms-T variants and the T-90SA have better ammo compared to the other T-72 models in CMSF2. That would correspond to your experience.
  14. Indeed we are also lacking. Although I think 'specializing' wouldn't be a bad thing necessarily. We don't need a full corps with armored/mechanized brigades and all bells and whistles, but can focus on capabilities less available in NATO/EU. I think the integration with German army is a good idea. Hopefully the funding will be improved in sustained fashion and put someone with actual military experience in charge of the modernization/restoration instead of it becoming a political toy and much of the money going to 'advisors' while nothing gets done.
  15. Well not really news, I guess it's good it's now formally 'konstatiert'. It will at least become more difficult to sweep it under the rug again.
  16. I tried translating the words from the telegram link via Google and that gave the same result, but DeepL made some more sense of it, FWIW:
  17. Seems that the BP-540 is a HEAT-T projectile so could be that the 'issue' is that HE rounds are/were in short supply (or just because incompetence) and artillery are getting issued HEAT-T instead. https://inertproducts.com/product/bp-540-152mm-russian-heat-t-projectile/
  18. I guess it is necessary, but it also makes some sense even though perhaps 'harsh': riflemen need less training for manning the frontline trenches compared to mechanized combined arms brigades and other specialisms. Especially because those will be crucial for making the difference in offensive operations, so extra training pays out extra. So yes unfortunate if your 'lottery ticket' comes up for infantry duty in trench warfare :|. But it's also a job someone needs to do.
  19. I read that the UKR infantry trained by our marines also only have 30days training. But the marine who was interviewee stood in for the quality, even though he agreed it was short. He said the intrinsic motivation among the Ukrainians, who where civilian just before, helped for training and also inspired/learned something to the marines. So it's better than 7day symbolic training but also short.
  20. Ukraine can always claim it was 'extraordinary spezial operation'
  21. I don't know of any other explanation than the one you provided :D.
  22. That's why he's not phased by mere 30mm and RPG (?) fires at his position, he has his buddy the 'trench keeper' with plenty of loaded weapons and ammo.
  23. I expected scarier clothing lol. But at least the store owner knows who are the 'baddies'
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