wokelly

The .50 cal on the Sherman is on a factory built mount, the Marauder had no mount for the MG34/42 except possible field mounts, thus it is hardly an apt comparison. I have seen photos of 76mm Shermans with a 30 cal mount for the gunner, but we won't see that in game because it was a rare field mod. Close quarters self defense would be nice for all vehicles (M10 is in a similar predicament to the Marauder), I wonder if the engine can handle it?

The Russians inflicted far more casualties on the Germans in the initial weeks than they lost. The problem was the Allies were ashore in the west and the race was on to stake out the post-war spheres of influence. Bagration was kept going far longer than it should have been, and as the operation dragged on soviet losses increased exponentially as wear and tear reduced equipment numbers, supplies failed to keep up and be concentrated on the scale to generate overwhelming firepower needed to disloge the fresh German units. As operations go on the sharp end of the army is blunted and casualties increase dramatically. When enemy resistance hardens and the advance slows, most armies call off the operation. The Soviets routinely did not during WWII, they ruthlessly kept the operation going until every last meter of territory was taken. Stalin was not going to be kept contained in his 1941, or worse, 1939 boarders by a rapid allied victory in the west. This is why you never see such an extensive deception operation as Bagration again, even though the Soviets were capable of it, they would not waste the time on it now that the race was on for post-war europe. Stalin would spill blood for land, where as most other armies would forsake additional land to preserve their mens blood. Stalin simply did not care about kill death ratio's, but the mediocre soviet k/d in bagration is not an indication of tactical inferiority, more a simple result of Soviet offensive policy which sought to gain every inch of territory possible. Men were replaceable in a country a large as Russia.

The M3s and early M4s lacked armoured bins for ammunition, which explains the high burnup rate. On top of that the British had a poor ammunition resupply setup for units in combat zones (used trucks) which meant if the area was hot the ammo did not show up. This meant many units carried extra ammunition within the tanks, which also made things bad. Case in point- the interior of the Grant tank: Notice the exposed ammunition. Poor ammunition protection was the root cause of Allied burn ups in the desert, not some mythical catastrophic explosion from a 10 gram burster charge. Thanks JonS, yes No.2 ORS, Report No.17, Analysis of German Tank Casualties in France, 6 June to 31 August 1944 was the report I was refering to. German burnup rates are put at 80% for the Tiger, 63% for the Panther, and 80% for the Mark IV. Now the Tiger and Mark IV sample is pretty small (only like 4 tigers and less than 10 Mark IVs examined), however the Panther size was pretty large, above 60 vehicles which constituted some 10% of all Panthers committed to the battle. A 63% burn up rate is comparable to dry storage Sherman burn up rates which range from 60-80%. Though the Mark IV sample is pretty small, the burn up rate is also consistent with the Sherman. This report was focused on the British sector where unfuzed rounds were exclusively used, yet we see similar burnout rates compared to British tanks being hit with fuzed rounds. Mikey seems to feel the same as well.

Oh jeeze not this again. The burster charge on a German tank shell does not cause catastrophic damage. I think we have this debate previously but the thread got lost and I had no interest revisiting it at that point. Anyways you are referring to Jarrett's test in North Africa which is cited by Jentz. Here is the thing, neither Jarrett or Jentz knew a thing about penetration and APHE. Jarrett was an ordinance guy but his experience was in manufacturing and practical application, and not in penetration mechanics. His big contribution was capping British 75mm rounds so they could counter German FHA, something he could do because his specialty was int he manufacture of tank rounds. But his observations on the effectiveness of burster charges are flawed, especially his comment that partial penetrations would result in the destruction of a tank. Buster charges are not shaped charges, they are not directed through a small hole, they fracture like a Grenade so much of the blast would go outwards. Jentz citing Jarrett does not give credibility to the claim, it reflects Jentz lack of knowledge on the issue (Jentz knows a lot but not on this subject). In comparison to Jarretts questionable observations we have British Operational Research reports which show Panther and Mark IVs burning up at similar rates to the Sherman despite the British using unfuzed rounds and the Germans using fuzed rounds. The British and US found Sherman burned at 60-80%, compared to the Panther rated in one report at 60% and the Mark IV at 80%. Hardly a testament to the superiority of buster charges, and far more extensive in examined hulks than Jarretts limited test. Yeah have to think of those photos of hung German soldiers with signs around their neck used to stiffen the resolve of German soldiers. Also particularly like the "kith and kin" law which results in a surrendered soldier's family being branded traitors to Germany. Oh and the 15,000 executions as part of Germany's draconian military justice system.

Yeah if any noob is interested let me know. Have never played a multiplayer match in CM series, so I am a total noob seeking a total noob.

The failure of German tanks in the west to inflict hugely disproportionate casualties on Sherman was due to a number of issues, mainly related to German doctrine which stressed immediate counter attacks against Allied penetrations. The Germans were predictable, and the allies always prepared for the counter attack. The Panther on the attack was not much more survivable than the SHerman due to its weak side armor. Invariably the defender seeks to attack the flanks of the enemy tanks, regardless of its type. For example most Sherman casualties were from side shots, and we know the Panther had pretty weak side armor so when roles were reversed the Panther came to grief as often as the Sherman. If the Panther had remained on the defensive in the west it would have come out with a good kill ratio, but it was often committed to attacks and counter attacks where they came to grief like any other tank when attacking into a well prepared defense. Plus Allied doctrine was much better than people give it credit for.

The Germans (well all countries for that matter) tended to reinforce garrisoned buildings with sandbags to increase protection. Those Norman farmhouses likely had several layers of sandbags within to increase resistance. The houses we fight in in game are simply average homes, not reinforced at all.

I wrote the article quoted (wiki article on the Firefly), there was some contradictory info on the specific action (three books I own mention the action), but from what I could gather I believe the Firefly broke off from the other tanks and opened fire before the others. If you read the first hand account from one of the German commanders (don't remember the name), his tank is hit first but the lack of gunfire causes him to think he ran over a mine until he looks over an sees a second panther hit which causes the turret to be blown off. This suggests in my mind Henry's firefly opened fire first and got a few shots off (and thus few kills) before the other sherman's opened fire. Another book I read said the SHerman 75's opened fire with HE rounds on the Panthers (due to the weakness of the 75mm gun) while the Fireflies hit them with AP, but I have no clue as to why they would do that. This was the first clash between Panthers and Canadian tanks and the crews would not have known at this point about the lackluster power of their 75mms against the Panther (they had faced nothing but Mark IVs and had little trouble with them), so I don't see why they would not have used AP rounds. A third book stated there were several fireflies in the group that ambushed the Panther (it was a composite squadron due to losses), so many tanks could potentially have nailed the Panthers. I think in all likelihood Henry got the first few shots off (due to German testimony) and some of his later kills (maybe the last 2 or 3) were shared with the other tanks. It would prove incredibly difficult to discern a side penetration by a 76.2mm round and a 75mm round (1.2mm difference), and in general British/Commonwealth units did not really make aces out of tank crews like the Germans did. Tank kills were troop, squadron or even regimental accomplishments. For example Major Sydney Walters of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers, 2nd Canadian Armour Brigade was the western Allied aces of aces with 18 panzer kills, but he was never made an hero out of within his unit or the Canadian Army for his kill count. Still wikipedia is not big on primary research so I merely quoted one of the works rather than going into the action in detail. This statement gets tossed around a lot, usually its the Tiger required 4-5 shermans to knock out. Most people ignore this (myself included), the problem is battles are not conducted within a bubble, there are no single enemy tigers or Panthers to ambush with 4-5 Shermans. Battles are combined arms affairs, often with combat occurring across a frontage of several kilometers and variety terrain. The above scenario is too simplistic to be taken seriously. Overall I have never seen the tank losses on such a scale to suggest the above ratio was plausible in the west. In Normandy, about 650 Panthers and 120 Tigers saw action, almost all were lost one way or another. According to the 5-1 myth (which included German losses from breakdowns/self-destruction), those tanks would have claimed 3850 Allied tanks, which is more than the Allies actually lost to all causes (around 3000, but probably only 2/3rds of that were to gunfire). That would also demand no other German tank or ATG achieve a kill. In short a 5-1 ratio for the Panther is hugely unlikely, Allied tank losses were never so catastrophic as to seriously allow such a setup compared to German losses (If you look at permanent losses from the British, US and Germans on a monthly basis, you are looking at a ratio of around 1.5 Allied tanks lost per German tank loss during the "static" phase of the battle). I think the 5-1 myth may have come from a British report which stated the Tiger required 4.21 hits on average to be knocked out (they only examined 5 though). Theoretically five allied tanks all firing at the same time could deliver the necessary amounts of hits needed to knock out a Tiger with minimal losses.

Was the Xylophone even that common, I never heard of it before?

I really dislike foxholes in this game, the soldier simply do not stay in them, especially if they need to shift direction and engage a new target. Foxholes need to be designed like buildings where soldiers "enter" them.

Great concept work, I would love to see this setup. Just had for the fourth time the crew of a tank bail out when I wanted them to hunt, except this time there were enemies within range and they were gunned down as they bailed out. Seriously need to do away with those damn tabs.

Just completed the campaign as well, really enjoyed it. I quite enjoyed the last mission, though my defending force never really felt threatened (The mortar I got at the start my guy got over 50 casualties!), it was really awesome to have an entire company of paratroopers just show up behind the Germans with excellent cover to boot. Kinda felt like Band of Brothers episode 3 where the Armour comes to the rescue, except it was paras to the rescue.

Ugh I hate that line, its so damn untrue half the time. I remember on Turnballs stand map I got a bunch of Germans to surrender just in front of one of my squads position. Their own commander proceeded to drop an artillery barrage on them which resulted in a big LOL from me and 3-4 MIA being turned into 3-4 KIA/WIA. Makes me think of the SS in the Falaise pocket who fired on their less than resolute Wehrmacht brethren surrendering to Allied troops, though in game I am sure it was just a barrage that fell short.

That is assuming the round hit the engine block which we can't know from the picture. It may simply have gone through the drivers plate above the engine and would have only encountered other plates. The burster charge for German tanks was not even TNT, it was a mixture of cyclonite and wax. That will at best break up the shell, there will be no notable explosion from 16 grams of inferior explosive. A burster charge increases the lethality of the shell itself to a degree, it breaks it up into a few chunks which will bounce around inside rather than one large chunk which will bounce around inside. Still the biggest killer remains armor fragments thrown into the tank by the penetration. There is no explosion per say with a burster charge, no overpressure and whatnot that say a HE shell into an armoured car would create, it just makes the shell itself more of a threat. The British tanks for the longest time did not have armoured bins for their ammunition, which partially explains why British tanks went up in flames so often in the desert. The 37mm and 50mm rounds had very small burster charges due to their size, under 10 grams of cyclonite/wax mixture. That is not what was causing british tanks to burn up, exposed ammunition and exposed hydraulics were the cause. In Normandy the British did several studies on German and Allied tanks burning up, and despite the British using solid shot AP rounds the German brew up rates were not dissimilar from the Sherman tank. As for caps, that did not stop rounds from shattering though it improved performance against German FHA. If you watch the Koln Pershing vs Panther clip on youtube, you will notice the very first 90mm strike we observe under the mantle shatters. Solid shot rounds still offered better penetration and less chance of shattering than APHE rounds, especially given many of the rounds were striking armour much thicker than the shell was.

The German shells were set to detonate only if they encountered an impact equivalent to 30mm of armor or greater. The HTs don't have near 30mm of protection so the shell would act like a solid shot round. The British Army view was that the amount of explosives in a AP round was simply too minor to warrant the decreased penetration and increased chance of shatter a APHE round had over a AP shot. The british did tests with solid shot 40mm rounds and APHE 40mm rounds and found almost no difference in shrapnel created. As shells got bigger and they hit thicker armor, more and more spall was created which limited the need for a burster charge. Anyways German explosive filler for a 75mm round was in the realm of 16 grams of inferior HE (in comparison the HE shell for a 75mm had 640 grams of good quality HE), enough to make the round fragment into several large chunks but nothing notably more lethal. A solid shot AP round is structurally stronger and gives you more penetration and less chance of shatter, which was seen as more important. Also the Germans tried out spaced armor on their tanks in Africa (30mm plates spaced 6 inches from the front armor) which would cause fuzed shells to detonate, thus the British were wary of US fuzed rounds as if they ever encountered German tanks with such armor as their AP shot would become useless. As it was US fuzes were unpredictable and did not always detonate, so it was questionable if using US fuzed rounds would have increased lethality that much. The one nice thing about US burster charge was it was pretty big, 67 grams for the American 75mm compared to 16 grams for the German 75mm.

Magpie Oz has pretty much touched on the issue. While the Regimental system may have caused problems, its a very simplistic explanation. More modern scholarly studies on the British Army (which Buckley collects and combines in his book) have shown the issues to be far more complex than simple 'Allied tanks were poorly designed' and 'the regimental system prevented infantry-tank cooperation.' Hastings and other 80's revisionists did not have access to these recent studies so I don't fault them for falling back on the only explanations that would have been around for Allied failings. However in the post-revisionist period (late 90s to present) a lot more detailed works have emerged which explain things much better than those 80's works could have. Hastings and others did not really touch on doctrine or training, issues of how the war office structured Armoured Divisions and Amroured Brigades, Montgomery's personal views on the role of the tank and of Armoured Divisions/Brigades, and his own firepower doctrine he brought to 21st Army group. I did a fourth year University historiography paper on 21st Army Group Armoured Formations, so I read a lot of the stuff written over the past 30 years. I agree an overall picture of campaign totals does not perfectly translate into showing the reader what the Allies faced on the average day, but it does show that many more German tanks were not Panthers and Tigers than were. Buckley's book is a synthesis of previous works, and is aimed at a more broad base of readers than the studies he synthesizes (I have read those books he relies on, they are pretty dry reads). Many of these people are likely to think the Germans had millions of Tigers and Panthers, so that comment is there to show that in fact there were fewer panthers, and even less tigers, compared to other types. I don't think for most people here the "Tank Gap" chapter will be all that surprising and we may in fact have issues with certain points. The book has about eight other chapters focusing on doctrine, training, command, morale and so on, stuff I doubt many of us really know that much about. Primarily for those chapters I recommend the book, it is a very good first read for those who do not know much about conflicts between montgomery and the war office about doctrine, how Monty's views combined with units structured on the war office's TO&Es and designed for different purposes led to complications in Normandy, how and why british tanks developed as they did and so on. If you like that stuff on doctrine and training, purchase two of the scholarly works Buckley uses a lot: Place, Timothy. Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000. Hart, Stephen. Colossal Crack: Montgomery’s 21st Army Group in North West Europe, 1944-1945. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000.

Yeah personally I would avoid Hastings work. His book contains a number of questionable conclusions, such as the Regimental system in the British Army hindering inter-divisional cooperation, or that the Allies possessing tanks like the Panther would have made things significantly better (given most shermans were being knocked out from side shots the Panther would not have proved that much safer), and many other myths about the Allies and Germans that were promoted during the 1980's revisionism period. 30 years of subsequent research has produced much better books. Hastings and other revisionists (D'Este, Ellis) should get credit for getting the ball rolling on objective analysis of the Allies performance in the ETO, the problem is their works were too simplistic with their analysis (though previous work really had no analysis). In many ways the newer the book on the subject, the better (though there are still plenty of trash books coming out).

You will have to find Zitterling's book if you want an answer, Buckley cites the book but doesn't give a detailed note explaining what you want answered. Buckley, citing Zitterling puts numbers at: 900 Mark IVs 650 Panthers 550 StuGs 120-30 Tigers (I and II) 300 "Others" If you have Zitterling's Normandy book, look around pages 65-68.

Buckley cites Zitterling on tank numbers, which are for the campaign as a whole rather than during individual periods. Zitterling puts Mark IV numbers at around 900 Mark IVs, plus throw in 600 StuG's and 300 other AFV (Jadgpanthers, Marauders etc) not cited by Jentz. Totals come out to around 2400 tanks, of which 750 are Tigers/Panthers, thus 30% campaign wide. Buckley's book is reliant on a lot of secondary sources, and thus their errors become his errors. Buckley like most historians are weak in the technical department, that is where I noticed most of his errors (well he relies on others but he has little self knowledge to double check). The best aspect IMO is him bringing together several important recent works on British doctrine and training into one book (ie Collosal Cracks, British Military Training 1940-1944, Raising Churchills Army etc) and using primary source research to fill in any missing pieces specifically on British Armour doctrine. Most of the book is about doctrine, leaders, tactics, tank development etc and he does that stuff quite well. I won't lose sleep over the fact he doesn't specify churchill variants in his engagement charts and so on in the tank gap chapter, the jist of the chapter is correct (most german tanks not superior to allied design, many more factors than just tank design determined outcome of battles etc) and his stuff everywhere else is excellent.

A properly maintained traverse system for the Panther was supposedly quite able to lay the sights on target with the foot peddles alone (the less pressure exerted, the slower the turret moved regardless of max traverse at X rpm). How well that system could be maintained in the field is debatable, but people running restored functioning panthers are quite vocal in their praise for the accuracy of the hydraulic system. There were wheels there as backup, either if power was lost or if maintenance issues reduced the accuracy of the system.

The 2.5x sight has something like a 24 or 25 degree FOV, which is still pretty narrow all things considered. Still it was about twice the FOV of the Sherman 3x and 5x sights (depended on the model). Anyways having seen the Sherman turret setup I doubt it took more than a second to switch from the periscope to the gun sight, they are fairly close together.

Meyers book is kinda flawed in a number of regards. For example he tends to exclude the efforts of the 85th Infantry Division in blunting Totalize. The fresh 85th was also largely bled white during Totalize and Tractable, but it doesn't get its proper due from Meyer who portrays his Grenadiers as being the only force blunting the entire attack despite the 85th probably fielding more men. In regards to books, one of my personal favorites is John Buckleys "British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944" Below is a link to read a some of the book. http://books.google.ca/books?id=OaKMl8QFSA8C&dq=British+Armour+in+the+Normandy+Campaign+1944&pg=PP1&ots=7YigclfRFr&sig=yRwaP8Zgr5xBHUPi1shWhyj_1eQ&prev=http://www.google.ca/search%3Fhl%3Den%26safe%3Doff%26q%3DBritish%2BArmour%2Bin%2Bthe%2BNormandy%2BCampaign%2B1944%26btnG%3DSearch%26meta%3D&sa=X&oi=print&ct=title Anyways instead of writing a long review I am simply going to copy one from Amazon someone made which is very well written: ---------------------- John Buckley's British Armour in the Normandy Campaign is a first rate tour de force work of military history that challenges conventional accepted wisdom that the British (and Canadian) armored forces in western France were ineffective and contributed little to the over campaign from D-Day to the Breakout. What makes Buckley's truly spectacular is the fact that he not only challenges this wisdom but uses thorough and detailed research to leave the reader with a clear picture that British armor was in fact effective and made a significant contribution within the doctrine and contexts they were employed. British Armour in the Normandy Campaign is separated into nine logically distinct chapters: 1) Introduction - in this first chapter Buckley sets the stage of the book by introducing the aforementioned conventional wisdom and posing his thesis that this is an incorrect interpretation of the facts as told by the bigger picture. Brief discussions of several engagements are used as particular examples of how the believed ineffectiveness of British armor requires more detailed analysis. This is a very insightful chapter that sets the tone of the exceptional research and unbiased approach Buckley takes throughout the book. 2) Fighting the Campaign - In this chapter Buckley gives a lucid description of major engagements the British (and Commonwealth) armored forces took part in from June to Aug of 1944. There is also considerable discussion of the organization of the various armored forces employed and their Orders of Battle. Because Buckley's combat prose is presented from the standpoint of facts not the human component this chapter (and later battle discussions) is fairly dry reading. Yet, little is wasted on fluff and in many ways this is refreshing. 3) Operational Technique - Here Buckley presents a clear picture of the British operational doctrine and command structure. In the previous chapter combat was discussed, and in this chapter we get a sense of what British commanders were thinking and how they were trained doctrinally to think. In the following chapter these two pieces are put together. 4) Fighting the Battle - In this chapter Buckley discusses the engagements introduced in the second chapter within the context of doctrine and command (discussed in the previous chapter). In doing so Buckley paints a fuller and more critical picture of the British armor and their actions in Normandy. 5) The Tank Gap - Any discussion of armored actions are incomplete without a critical analysis of opponent capabilities. Again conventional wisdom is that the British (and Allies in general) were significantly out gunned, out armored, and tactically deficient when compared to the Germans. While the German armor had many features superior to those of the Allies this commonly held view is naïve. Buckley clears the air on this topic very well and thoroughly. As should be pointed out in ALL discussions of armored clashes in northwestern Europe in the first couple of months following the invasion, a phenomenon Buckley terms "Tiger-phobia" is probably most responsible for the prevailing wisdom of Allied armor inferiority. In particular, most accounts of armored battles in Normandy point to the overwhelming power of Tiger and Panther tanks when in fact the tank most often encountered by Allied armor was the similarly shaped (but much smaller) Panzer Mark IV. The fear of Tigers and Panthers created a mystique related to German armor that has survived 60 plus years! Certainly these latter two AFVs (armored fighting vehicles) were fearsome machines but they suffered from many shortcomings. Moreover, there were simply too few of them deployed. In addition to clearing the air on this important topic, Buckley does a fair and balanced job describing the strengths and weaknesses of Allied armor. Additionally he makes a clear case that a less than ideal and relatively weak AFV does not therefore make a machine unable to win battles if employed within proper doctrinal boundaries. This chapter is quite amazing! 6) Design and Planning - This chapter continues the discussion of the previous chapter but explores the issue of armor, less from a technical standpoint (e.g. who's gun was bigger, who's armor less protective, etc.) and more from a logistics and strategic one. This is essential information for the reader as it places the study within a doctrinal context and the mindset of the command staff. Without knowing how the British came to the decisions they did about armor design, employment and improvement one can not fully appreciate the bigger picture - the British armor was effective and significant to the Allied offensive. 7) Production and Supply - This chapter is a logical extension of the previous chapter and explains much about why particular AFVs (e.g., the M4 Sherman) was employed en masse when potentially superior machines (e.g., A27M Cromwell) were part of the Allied repertoire. This chapter, like the previous one, is essential to gain a fair picture of the British armor in Normandy. 8) Morale and Motivation - This chapter addresses the human factor that makes or breaks any military unit: the solider, or in this case tankers and AFV fighting troops (including armored infantry). Once again Buckley questions a conventional wisdom: namely that British armored troops in Normandy exhibited poor morale and little will to fight. While there are certainly cases of poor morale and a fair number of AWOL and desertions cases the picture is not as simple as the tail of numbers. Again Buckley provides the larger pool of facts necessary to draw fair conclusions. 9) Conclusion - In the final chapter Buckley provides a concise summary of the questions at hand and the answers presented. Very nice ending to a fabulous book. In the final analysis Buckley's British Armour in the Normandy Campaign is a wonderful read. Few historical works present a clear thesis that is followed through on in such a thorough fashion with fairness and virtual lack of bias. This book represents a guide for how this type of historical work should be approached. 5 HUGE stars!!! -------------------- I recommend this book to anyone here, as it is very good, though provoking and well researched. But for God sakes look for the soft cover verson. The Hard Cover is over $100.00 while the soft cover, which is actually somewhat hard to find online to buy, is only $20-$30. Here is a link for the soft cover book http://www.amazon.com/British-Normandy-Campaign-Military-History/dp/0415407737

Ah forgot the T.

I'd give the early marks were pretty good in relation to the Sherman. 101mm hull armor, 100mm mantle (which was unknown until recently when scotsman on the WWIIOL forum contact people restoring Churchills and asked them to measure the mantle), 86mm turret armor, side armor 76mm. Pretty well armored compared to the Sherman, especially in side armor which gets a lot more attention than most people realize. In 1943 the Brits put on additional armor, brought the Mark IIIs frontal armor up to a uniformed 12cm (though the mantle remained 10cm). Side armor was brought up to 95mm or so. The Mark IVs and VIs with the cast turret did not seem to get additional turret armor, probably because it is hard to weld plate onto a rounded cast turret (though not impossible looking at the ammunition bin armor added to cast hull shermans). Then of course in 1944 you get the heavy Mark VII with 15.2cm frontal armor.

All true but that had nothing to do with the context I brought up the shortage with. I brought up the Sherman shortage to argue against the idea that the 3rd Armor divisions high losses was due to a liberal interpretation of what constituted a write off. If you cannot guarantee the replacement of a tank, than I would not think the 3rd AD would throw away reusable tanks because they had different criteria than say 2nd AD which had a lower loss rate despite being in combat longer and possessing the same TOE as 3rd AD. This never had anything to do with if the shortage was severe (though I did incorrectly state it was a severe shortage and you showed that to be wrong), or if it handicapped US forces or anything.