wokelly

Because Finland was a co-belligerent of Nazi Germany and at war with the UK by 1944. What exactly did the west owe Finland exactly on this issue? Maybe in 1939/40 I could see an argument being made if the west had condoned Soviet actions, they were not at war at the time. At the Terhan conference the west did separate Finland from the Axis, did not impose the unconditional surrender ultimatum on them and did press the USSR to acknowledge Finish independence. Yep everyone it entitled to their opinion.

Yes words mean things, here is the definition of shortage: The US has a "lack in the amount needed, expected, or due; deficit" of Sherman's. There was a shortage, regardless of if you feel it constitutes one. Was it a severe shortage, as you have pointed out no. Was there a shortage, yes. In fact enough of a shortage to dictate US policy on Sherman, for example causing the US to reconsider having some Sherman converted to 17 pounder armed fireflies since an additional 150 tanks would be unavailable. Your issue seems to be that the US shortage of Shermans was not anything atypical of say the Germans who were in a worse situation. Fair enough, that still means the US was suffering a shortage and units could not be brought up to full strength. In regards to the context I brought up the shortage in, I severely doubt the 3rd AD would have been more liberal in writing off tanks than other units given there was a lack of fresh shermans to make up the losses throughout much of the ETO fighting. You do not throw away reusable tanks when there is a lack of replacements.

That is more of an issue of speed. Good mobility, poor speed is how to characterize the Churchill. The British during the Rhineland Campaign actually managed to push a regiment of Churchills through the waterlogged forest with infantry to come out behind the main German defensive line.

The western allies did not give their pledge to the Russian land grab of Finland, given this is your history you should know better. The Allies opposed Russia's actions in the Winter war in 1939 and were ever pondering intervention (more so to cut off the iron ore from Sweden to Germany than anything else). In 1944 Finland, regardless of reasons, was fighting on Germany's side and thus was an enemy nation, few were going to speak out on the issue when more pressing issues in regards to the future of Allied countries in Soviet liberated territories (ie Poland). Relations between Finland and the west were kept open initially, the relations with the UK was kept open until the Fins closed the British Legation (nor quite an embassy) which resulted in a termination of relations which eventually led to a declaration of war in December 1941. Again on Czechoslovakia, the allies didn't "let" Stalin occupy any lands. In fact Czechoslovakia was not occupied after the war by the Soviets, held a democratic election but a communist coup in 1948 brought it under the iron curtain. The only land ceded to the Soviet Union was the Subcarpathian Ruthenia, a territory that was frankly in despute long before WWII, having been granted to the new country Czechoslovakia at Versailles because: 1) Hungary, one of the claimant nations, had been an enemy nation and thus was given nothing. 2) The Soviet Union, another potential claimant nation, was not liked by the west either at this time so got nothing. 3) So that left only Czechoslovakia, which had to give the region autonomy anyways since most people didn't care to be part of it. For starters, this is a D-day thread so the Fins, the Russians and whatnot in the east has little to do with what I said. You are making an issue out of stuff that was not even referenced by me. As far as I am concerned the Soviets are not much better, but I give the soldiers more credit because they were legitimately fighting for the existence of their people. As for Allies ignoring Soviet crimes, at best you can point to Katyn, which was basically the Soviets words against the Germans and the Germans were the bad guys. While Churchill may have assumed the Soviets were to blame, they had no evidence either way. And I doubt your average allied soldier knew a thing about what was occuring in the east, let alone about red army crimes so trying to make a moral issue out of it is futile. This is my problem, saying that one recruit has no say demeans those spoke out and suffered because of it. It excuses those who did not have the morale courage to speak out against a government that engaged in clearly morally dubious actions (racial laws, illegal pogroms, removal of citizens rights etc during the 30's). A small portion of the population stood against what Nazism stood for, many ended up murdered or in camps because other were willing to go along and support the government. 130,000 German Political prisoners perished under Nazi rule. Because people went along with it, the war occurred, not because the Nazi's said so. Because they allowed for the preconditions to be created by waging wars of aggression, tens of millions died. People did have a choice, many Germans made the right choice but more made the wrong choice to go along with the Nazi's.

I respectfully disagree, at least in terms of remembering German soldiers in the same esteem as Allied ones. I do feel bad that German soldiers fought and lost comrades for a cause that in hindsight turned out to be without honor or morality. However given the tens of thousands of Germans who were rewarded with death or time in a concentration camp for refusing to go along with the Nazi's (ie Sophie Scholl, Konrad Adenauer), I find it hard to hold the men who fought for the Nazi's in the same esteem as those who fought against them, be them men of the allied nations or German resistors. I have no doubt where I would stand if put in a similar situation, after thinking about it quite hard I do not think I would have the moral courage to stand up against an evil government widely accepted by my country. That is what makes me respect those Germans who did resist so much, because I know I probably would be unable to do so if put in the same situation. Those who went along with the show don't score well (regardless if they were really nazi's or not), even if I probably would have been one of them in similar circumstances. I'd go on but this thread is not about Nazi ideology and its acceptance to the German people (even if I have a strong view on the subject), so I do not want to hijack the thread about D-day. This rationale is however for why I will pay my respect to Allied soldiers of D-day, and probably even more respect for German resistors, but I will not give similar respect to the German soldiers. I do pass on my sympathy for those Germans who suffered and lost comrades or loved ones on this day, quite an unfair situation many of them found themselves in. Still I personally feel it demeans the sacrifice of those Germans who had the courage (and who often paid the ultimate price) to resist Hitler by commending those Germans who went along with the Nazi's (maybe not their crimes but still "fought for their country"). That's my opinion anyways.

Interesting video on the BESA machinegun in British tanks here at the Churchill Restoration Project website: http://www.churchilltank.com/Churchill_Tank/THE_BESA_MACHINE_GUN_film_and_picures_of_Besa_firing.html

What is with the imbalanced killed/wounded ratio for this game? I know with buddy aid you can keep the ratio pretty sane on your side, but for the enemy to suffer 2x as many dead as wounded, this isnt the Russian front.

Given the United States Government had to ask the British to lend back lend-lease shermans to help make up for the shortfall, I would hardly consider the issue laughable for the men at the time did not seem to feel it was a joke. I'm not exactly sure what the you are trying to prove with your responses. If it is to make a point the US sherman shortages were never as bad as German shortages than frankly that had nothing to do with what I was talking about when I first mentioned the Sherman shortages.

Problem was not Sherman production, it was reserves. The US went into Normandy expecting a wastage rate of 7% per month and with reserves to match that. They ended up getting more like 15% in June and July, and 21% in August. By September 1944 the US forces in France were short 335 Sherman's, almost two entire Armor divisions worth of tanks. As a result of losses during the Battle of the Bulge, this deficit grew to 865 Medium tanks as of January 1945. The US actually had to borrow back Sherman tanks from the British as the British had expected higher monthly loss rate (up to 50%!) and thus had adequate reserves. This is why I don't think the 3rd ADs armor losses were due to a more liberal interpretation of what constituted a destroyed or damaged tank. With a shortage of shermans you would not be picky with what wrecks you recycled. Zaloga puts Sherman losses at 4,300 in the ETO. Since he gives 3rd ADs losses as 630 and Cooper claims that around that number were permanent losses, than I think Zaloga's figures give 4,300 permanent losses, probably double that number to include those repaired and put back into service.

The only thing I have read about troops not firing (beyond Marshalls questionable conclusion) is that troops tended not to fire unless they saw a target. Too much training on the range and the idea of not wasting ammo except on a clearly seen target, troops were reluctant to blast away at a target which would at least suppress the enemy. I remember reading one Veterans response to Marshall's conclusion was something like 'How the hell did he think we killed the Germans? Beat them with our rifles?'

Hmm, you may be right. Looking through the report nothing states its Canadian losses, now I am wondering how I came to think it only examined Canadian losses. Forum wont let me go back and edit the post though Anyways this was the qualifier the report included that Jarymowycz neglected to put in: 1. The proportion of brewed up tanks is high and it is therefore important to know whether or not this must always be the case. A more recent examination of later battles, which is not yet complete, has shown that the 1st Bn Coldstream Gds (5 Gds Armd Div) have suffered fewer brew ups than other units, e.g., during operation "BLUECOAT" only 1 in 20 casualties, of which casualties at least 12 were due to penetrations. The unit concerned attributes this to the fact that they carry no extra ammunition outside the armoured bins. It should be recognized that in no recorded case in our sample has the extra outside applique armour resisted any hit, and therefore the protection afforded by keeping all ammunition in the bins is almost certainly due solely to the internal flying fragments failing to penetrate the ammunition. Would be interesting to find that report. EDIT: here is the rest of the report not quoted by Jarymowycz: 2. The small number of A.P. hits failing to penetrate is noticeable. This small number has been confirmed by the opinions of technical adjutants, etc., who agree that the proportion was probably not above 5%. This opinion is in keeping with the calculated expectations of failures based upon penetration figures for 75 mm and 88 mm guns at the ranges of engagement estimated by tank crews. There have also been complaints at the apparently low resisting power of the present Sherman armour. REME, 5 Gds Armd Div state that an AP.300 and an AP.500 Browning both fired at 100 yds range, penetrated 1/2 and 1 1/2 inches respectively into the turret armour' Added to this, it is at present the practice to recondition for service partially brewed-up tanks whose quality of armour might often be low. 3. From the data collected, it will be seen that the proportion of hits on the sides and front of the 75 mm Sherman tank is more or less equal and therefore, for up-armouring to be effective a large area would need to be strengthened. For instance, up-armouring the front of the tank so that in the cases considered it would have given 50% protection on this face, would only have decreased penetrations by 15%. In consequence, if changes are required it would appear wiser to use the extra weight-carrying of the 75 mm Sherman to take a better gun; ie., to make German tanks more vulnerable rather than to attempt to decrease our own vulnerability. This suggestion would appear to be in keeping with present policy. 4. Requests have been made by DTD for any additional battlefield data to assist decide [sic] on the optimum thickness of individual armour plates and on their optimum distribution On the evidence of this report, where tanks are expected to attack in country as, or more, enclosed than Normandy, it is recommended that an almost homogenous defence be assumed (a homogenous defence being defined as a defence where the enemy are able to hold their fire so long, they are as likely to hit from the side or rear as from the front: for the use of this convenient term see DTD armour reports). Therefore, for optimum armour distribution, etc., a "p.d.v." (probability directional value) for an almost homogenous defence should also be used. It is considered that present homogenous German defence is due to ease of concealment and that, until better methods of spotting tanks and A/T are found, such a form of defence will continue and can safely be assumed for similar terrain. It should be carefully noted however that the present sample of tanks has been taken from a series of battles where our forces were nearly always attacking, and it may well be that, in defence, more frontal hits will be recorded. http://www.wlu.ca/lcmsds/cmh/back%20issues/CMH/volume%207/Issue%201/%28OR%20Report%29%20Analysis%20of%2075%20mm%20Sherman%20Tank%20Casualties%20Between%206th%20June%20and%2010th%20July%201944.pdf

From my understanding the US suffered a severe shortage of Sherman tanks throughout much of the ETO fighting. If anything such a loose policy of what could be written off and what could be repaired would compound the issue, especially for a heavy armored division which requires so many tanks. I wonder if the 3rd could really have gotten away with tossing away Shermans like that given the shortage that existed, those numbers must have raised eyebrows further up the chain of command.

The M6 was a poorly designed tank which would not have increased survivability or firepower over your upgunned Sherman. It had 83mm of frontal armor, not that much more than the Sherman actually had. Not to mention it only mounted a 76mm gun which proved ineffective against the frontal armor of a Panther or Tiger. The US military made the right decision not to waste space shipping those over, but the wrong decision with Sherman armament. The big British/Commonwealth report on the Sherman was an examination of Canadian Shermans KOed from June 6th to July 10th. This is a partial copy of that report from Jarymowycz's book Tank Tactics: From Normandy to the Lorraine: Of interest is the huge number of penetrations to the side and rear armor vs the frontal armor (46 vs 19). The British OR men felt that increasing the frontal armor to withstand half the hits would only result in a negligible increase in survivability as most shots were going through the side armor, and that the extra weight should got to a better gun. From the report, 33 penetrated shermans brewed up from the 40 penetrated shermans examined, so about 82% brewup rate. I do not have a copy of the German report but I have read it (Copp's Montgomery's Scientists. The 60 panthers examined had a brew up rate of about 62%. It would appear the Sherman was 20% more likely to burn, but there is a problem with stating this conclusion (as some authors have). Many tankers carried extra ammunition within their tanks outside the armoured bins, which increased brewup rates. The OR report is rather selective in its examination, there was only ONE Canadian armoured unit in action from June 6th to July 10th, and that was 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade. Perhaps as many as 2/3rds of 2CAB's lossed from June 6th ot July 10th occured during June 6-11th (With the disastrous attack on Le Mesnil-Patry on June 11th alone costing some 50 tanks). 2CAB did not see action again until 4-5 July for Operation Windsor and 8-9 July for Charnwood, but they only suffered some 40 losses over that period compared to well over 80 from June 6th to 11th. Its a rather selective time period and we don't know the extra ammunition policy for 2CAB was during that time. The same report on Canadian losses state that during Operaiton Bluecoat, a British unit with a strict no extra ammunition policy had a much lower brewup rate than 2CAB. The Panthers were KOed from June 6th to August 11th, and 60 Panthers represents around 10% of all Panthers deployed to Normandy during the battle. IMO it is a good representation of Panther losses and brewup rates, unlike the Sherman report. What I am saying is that a definite conclusion should not be drawn from these reports in terms of individual percentages. It can not be really argued the Sherman was 20% more likely to burn because of the selective nature of the report. It is safe to say through that Allied and German tanks brewed up more often than not (above 50%). The 3rd Armoured Division had the highest loss rate of ANY US armored division in WWII by far. For example 2nd AD (also a "Heavy" Amoured Division), which was in combat for a month longer in Normandy (landed June 9th vs July 9th for 3rd AD), suffered some 276 permanent losses from 1944-1945 compared to the 3rds 632. The second worst casualties for a US AD in the ETO was 7th AD with 360 permanent. I don't mean to demean the men of the 3rd, but frankly it may just have been a poorly run unit. None of the other US ADs come close to the 3rds losses, even those which were in combat longer. The 3rd had about a 270% turnover in permanent losses alone, compared to the 2nd with had the same TOE but only had maybe 120% turnover in permanent losses. I don't think the Pershing would have changed things dramatically for the 3rd, Coopers book come off a bit to me as the workman blaming his tools. The Sherman was not a stellar tank by this time, but no unit comes close to the holocaust that was 3rd ADs losses. A few units (one AD and two Tank battalions) hover at or above the 200% permanent turnover rate, but no one near 3rd ADs losses both as a percent of its unit strength or in actual losses.

Its hard to know really how much of a problem this really was. The PIAT is much like the sten, its really hard to separate truths from rumors about its effectiveness. The PIAT would not recock if you did not hold on to it tightly, it needed to recoil of the charge on the PIAT round to recock, if you did not hold it tightly it would not recock (and potentially break your shoulder as well).

The Sherman gun sight did not have a wider field, however the gunner had access to a Periscope as well as his gun sight which make tracking targets, especially at close range, much easier. The Loader also had access to a periscope which meant you have three sets of eyes potentially searching for targets. German tanks did not have periscopes for the gunner (or loader for that matter), but the gunisight tended to have a better field of view than their allied counterparts, almost double the FOV with German 2.4x and 2.5x magnified optics compared to the standard 3x magnified for Allied tanks. Frankly I would generally give the more accurate first shot to the Germans, given their guns tend to be a higher velocity and the German could be used to estimate the range to a target quite accurately since it was a mil sight (kinda hard to explain without pictures)

Massive preliminary bombardments can be simulated by broken buildings and craters on the map when you start, but rolling barrages can't. Rolling barrages are not even meant to really kill and destroy, its suppressive effect and concealment which are key. You can't simulate that with a pre-map barrage, the suppressive effect will wear off within a minute before your troops have moved more than 20-30 yards. You basically simulate what did happen when troops missed their barrages or fell behind, the enemy recovers and inflicts heavy losses. The barrage only works if the troops are on its heels. The barrage hits the Germans for 4 minutes while the infantry move up behind it, it lifts and the infantry move in and occupy the ground while the defenders are still dazed and confused (ideally). You need the barrage present during the battle for the effect to work. I understand battlefront has limited resources, but rolling barrages were a big part of CW arty doctrine. You have rolling barrages leading the Canadian Scottish's counterattack on Putot-en-Bessin on June 9th against the 12th SS, you have rolling barrages in the British battles around Tilly vs the Panzer Lehr, you have rolling barrages leading the infantry attacks during Epsom, you have rolling barrages covering the Canadian attack on Carpiquet airfield and town as they crossed a mile of flat open ground, you have rolling barrages covering the advance of the armoured units for Goodwood and Totalize. This was a common tactic in major operations for company and regimental sized attacks, depending on the map size and battle size it should be available for use. Again the user should not get unlimited rolling barrages, only one and they plan it during the setup phase and lose control over it after like in real life for the most part. The CW module is not finished obviously, hopefully something can be done.

Using 5 to 100 FOs to create a like effect is kinda placing the burden on the player to go out of his way to represent a common tactic among CW forces IMO. Some kind of option to dictate the width of the barrage, direction, speed per 100 yards (ie barrage moves 100m after 4 minutes) and where it should pause, would be the more user friendly option. Personally I would hope for the Devs to do something for the CW module.

1. I agree with a lot of planning, in my mind the rolling barrage would be something your organize during the setup phase of the battle. For example in CMA there was an option to drop artillery in a rectangle shape, with the user being able to dictate how wide that rectangle was. A similar system, dictate the width of the barrage and the direction it should go, input when pauses should take place for it to resume. Rolling barrages were not flexible, so once the setup phase is over your control over it would be non-existent, if you can't keep to the schedule you are boned like in real life. 2. Lots of arty and ammo was not something the Allies had problems with. It depends on what the battles are. Major operations saw huge stockpiles of arty ammo available for use, while minor attacks were often affected by arty rationing for larger attacks. If the battles we face in game are major attacks, arty ammunition should not be a major factor in limiting the use of artillery. For example I recently read a great account of a single day battle by an British infantry regiment at Rauray at the end of the Epsom battles. Over 10,000 rounds of Artillery ammunition was spent during the defense against 2nd and 9th SS attacks over a 12 hour period, including 3000 rounds by the regimental mortars (5 guns each firing 600 rounds). CMO and CMAK had scenarios which represented this with lots of craters and understrength units which simulated this without actually doing it. Well I disagree its outside the scope of the game, especially for the CW forces which used rolling barrages extensively for their set piece operations, your answer tells me it is not on the drawing board. For the CW module I would hope the devs at battlefront may reconsider. If the game focuses on platoon combat it is outside the scope, but if we are doing company and regimental sized attacks (stuff which CMAK and CMO had) it is within the scope.

Rolling barrage is not something that happened on the operational scale or strategic scale, rolling barrages were tactical level artillery plans. The CW forces regularly shot company and regimental sized attacks onto objective with rolling barrages, which based on CMAK and CMO are not battle sizes that were uncommon. If this game is only going to do platoon level battles than yeah rolling barrages may be out of the question, but I was expecting CMBN was going to have larger scale battles than previous CM2 titles had.

I always found artillery to be modeled poorly in previous WWII CMs, to the point where I rarely used it with any flexibility other than pounding a town. It was especially annoying when playing with CW forces which were generally the lightest on squad firepower of all countries, artillery always played a major role in compensating for weak squad firepower in real life but rarely in game. So I have a few questions: -Will we see rolling barrages for soldiers to advance behind? This was certainly not something that could be repeated several times, it usually led the solders into an objective but if they fell behind they had to make due with their small arms or they fell back and organized a second barrage. -Will we have the ability to lay smokescreens on the flanks of the barrages as well as use rolling barrages with a mix of smoke and arty? Both were oft used tactics for the CW forces, often a continuous smoke screen was laid on an open flank to keep the Germans away who did not know what was on the other side. -Can we expect decent ammo for the artillery, because it was rarely there in CMO or CMAK. I know the devs dont want people arty spamming but the Allies stockpiled great amounts of arty ammo for their forces prior to major attacks, enough that artillery requests were rarely refused due to ammo being exhausted. I have been reading a great book about a single days battle at Rauray on 1 July 1944 where a single regiment saw tens of thousands of artillery rounds fired in its support including over 3000 rounds from the regiments five 3 inch mortars (that is 600 rounds per gun). Most CMO or CMAK missions you get maybe 300-400 rounds total in support fire for scenarios which represent major allied attacks which is quite limited. Artillery played a major role in Allied doctrine, and even the Germans unleashed at times very heavy barrages on the Allied lines during counterattacks. Yet in the previous CM games artillery has generally taken on a pretty secondary role which I think ignores its actual significance. I am really hoping the new CMBN will properly represent artillery and make it flexible enough to use as it was at the time.

Mission is fairly straight forward, wait until enemy are withing kill zone than open up. Issues is the Muj keep seeing my guys despite them hiding. Essentially what happens is they get within 200 yards of my guys near the T intersection, and just open up on my men. Heck when I first spot them they seem to know what is going the way they are making leaps and bounds forwards. Now it would not be a terrible thing except my MMG's have balls ammo (seriously an ambush and they bring 250 rounds per gun? Thats like a single belt) and in nor short order my guys are out and the Muj are overrunning my guys. Artillery is once again feeble in power as well as ammo so no salvation there. I am at a loss on how to do this mission right with the AI apparently possessing superhuman sight and my lack of ammo, because right now the mission is broken, or at least the Devs never intended the Ambush to work out and never made any mention of it.

Nevermind, I just saw the run as admin thing if you run vista, and once I tried that I was able to make a profile.

Before I install uber patch I can make profiles, but after I am unable to. I type in a name for a profile I want, click okay, but nothing pops up. Have uninstalled and reinstalled the game and patch a few times, still there. Would rather not have to redownload the patch to see if something got corrupted simply because it takes so freaking long to download it.

Okay so I bought the game when it first came out, both an online version and a mail order version. Now I put the game away for a few months, some glaring issues with the game made me do so. Now with the Uber patch I want to try the game again. Only problem is I have no idea where the License is. As it was not a mail only order, I got nothing on the box or manual to tell me the code, and the e-mail with it has long since been lost. So what am I suppose to do at this point?

Okay got it. Great thanks for helping.