Dandelion

Hi Hans, No don't send any money. In just a few days, maybe tops 14 days, I'll be able to scan this with no effort at all. It must be really frustrating to be in the Emirates and not have access to "normal" sources, when so fond of designing. And I usually like your scenarios, so this is a reciprocal affaire. Wouldn't say there is nothing on Midtskogen. With the desciption given in the text, it is quite possible to do an exact depiction. Taken from the book: 1. The Midtskogen position was in a valley, with a corridor about 150 meters wide of fairly open ground (scattered groves) surrounded on both sides by dense pineforest (the Midtskogen, which means middle forest). It ran roughly SW to NE. Snow was rather deep but both road and rail were cleared. 2. Through the valley ran a railway line and a road, same axis. Rail ran south of the road. 3. Also running through was a frozen river, south of the rail. At a point it turned sharply to the north, cutting both rail and road. It was crossed by two bridges. 4. By the northern bridge (i.e. the roadbridge) on the East side of the frozen river, was a large farm, apparently quite near the bridge. The dense forest almost reached the farm from the North. 5. The Norwegian defenders blocked the roadbridge by placing vehicles on it. The railbridge could not carry a vehicle. 6. The Norwegians deployed in three positions, one by the railbridge to the South and two by the roadbridge. They deployed their two HMG in the farm near the roadbridge, overlooking the road to the SE. 7. They were exactly 93 men. The men were recruits from the Guards, members of local rifle associations, participants in a NBC Protection course and about twenty professionals (officers and NCOs, most from the Guards). They had 40 cartridges each, and one rifle. Plus the two HMGs. 8. By 0130, as the Germans arrived, the defensive position was somewhat defunct. Vehicle-borne refugees had arrived through the night. They had been forced to abandon their vehicles and continue on foot. As a consequence, a que of abandoned Vehicles stretched SE along the road, from the blocked bridge. A consequence was that the two HMGs no longer had visual on the rear end of the vehicle column. Another that the end tail was now too far off to create the crossfire intended, between the main positions and the one further south by the railbridge. 9. The Germans arrived, and stopped their vehicles (buses). They were exactly 96 men. Paras and Schiller. Plus Shanghaied Norwegian drivers from the Oslo public transport. 10. Shots were fired and the headlight on the lead German vehicle went out. The other switched off and there was total darkness, intense firing commenced. The Germans discharged flares over the Norwegian positions. 11. The Germans were able to use smg's and handgrenades to suppress the defenders, who were not supported by the machineguns. The Norwegians eventually pulled back from their positions, including the barricade on the bridge, trying to fade into the forest. Germans pursue cautiously and for a short while there was silence. 12. As the Germans advanced on the bridge, order to fire was given to the HMGs, now with visuals on the enemy. The grease (you know, used for maintanence of weapons) had however frozen, so no sound came after the order to fire. The Germans were able to cross the bridge (some ran over the ice) and close in on the farm. Then one of the machineguns start, and at the same time fire starts from the southern position. The Germans go for cover and are pinned. Crawling forward, hurling grenades, the Germans manage to close in. The Machinegun crews dismantled their weapons and pulled out. But only to the edge of the forest, which was pretty close to the North, from where they again started to fire. The Germans did not pursue. Instead, the Germans let out the animals from a barn that had caught fire, and then faded away into the darkness. 13. Nine Norwegians were injured. On the German side a corporal died and Spiller himself was mortally wounded. Lighter wounds not known. From the description (all of it stolen from the book) it ought to be possible to depict the battle even without a tacmap of it. But I'll see to your receiving the maps as well. Cheerio Dandelion

Hi there Michael The visibility ratings used were I-X (Arabic numbers 1-10 used by the Navy, and in fact also often by the army artillery) corresponding to the standard Meteorological scale in use at the time. And maybe still is in use? Anyway it's measured in nautical miles (seemeile or sm in German) and the scale goes: X. 25sm (about 50 kilometers) IX. 10 sm (about 20 km) VIII. 5sm (about 10 kilometers) VII. 2sm (about 4 kilometers) VI. 1sm (about 2 kilometers) V. 0,5sm (about a kilometer) IV. 500 meters III. 200 meters II. 50 meters I. Anything less than 50 meters. Thus the officer has been informed by the VM (Verbindungsmeteorolog) that visibility will probably be about the kilometer. Or more probably he just read it on the Wetterlage sheet at Battallion hq. It was supposed to be spread on a wall there at all times. Rumor has it, the really interested would go to the artillery regimental Hq instead, for better weathermaps. It's not a pointless anecdote, recon groups often really needed to know. The Gustav device will be a radio. Gustav is used for G, you know as in Anton, Berta, Cäsar, Dora, Emil, Friedrich, Gustav. In this case it will be the letter of a a model. Normal line from battallion to company would be a doublet of wire and wireless, i.e. two of each. The normal wireless connection would be established by two teams with "Tornisterfunkgerät d" - called "Dora". Or "Dora Gerät". Apparently, these guys have been able to come by a later model of radio, "Tornisterfunkgerät g". And this officer either does not trust wires will be intact after the battle is engaged, or he presumes his unit will be too mobile to use stationary communication posts. A note of particularly esoteric character on the article footnote 2; Common practice was in fact to write "J" for both "I" and "J", when handwriting on overlays and maps. This was only partially due to the German handwriting fonts used at the time, according to which these two did not differ in shape but in position. You'll find it here in a site I found just now. (It was taught in schools until the fifties. As all handwritten German WWII documents are written in this, I had to learn it too). Motive was also to not confuse roman letters, using the "I" pretty frequently. So, it would normally read "JR1" on a map, for both I.R.1 and J.R.1... This can be a bit frustrating. The Wehrmacht management doctrine forbad detailed orders. The prime initial reason being time. More precisely, shortening the time between decision and action. Not just time to write and read orders, but also the leaving out of enough detail to allow local command to act on events and adapt to circumstance. In order for it to work, lower command had to display quite a degree of initiative and imagination. Thus the emphasis on training junior officers and NCOs in the Wehrmacht, often mentioned in literature. The orders of this officer strikes me as somewhat modern, insofar that they are a bit talkative and vague - orders were usually just a series of laconic imperatives - but that's reasonable as he is writing to people he knows well and will probably have adapted to the specific needs of his subordinates. The order style adopted by the Bundeswehr was copied from the US Armed forces and adapted to NATO standards. Thus bear only some resemblance to former German such. Interesting thread Michael. Are you part of a reenacting team? Cheerio Dandelion

Hans, It's the Norwegian fights. Two Danish fights are mentioned, outlining the units involved, but all of it on one page and no tactical maps. The other 319 pages concern Norway. The interesting bits with this work are - Qualified comparative study between German and Norwegian data, including captured such released only recently from Russian archives. This way, the authors have been able to puncture quite a few old truths. I see they've found some microfilms in the BA on this topic that I had no idea existed. - Attention to detail. While losing some in the operational and strategic department, the authors make a (s far as I know) unprecedented effort on pinpointing participating units in every skirmish. Down to the last man so to speak. The invasion is a tad bit difficult to research effectively, since so many nations were involved. The Authors seem to manage German and Norwegian sources very handsomely, and UK sources adequately, but French and Polish seem somewhat absent. Tactical maps display heightcurves with painstaking accuracy, as well as writing out heights in meters. They include individual houses. However, for some reason, they do not include terrain. Forest, marsh etc. All white. Maybe to not mess the maps up. Unit movements are marked with unit name and arrows, only operational maps use NATO tactical symbols. Thus, the maps rely heavily on the text for understanding. The book includes following tactical maps: The Björnfell battle April 16 The Balberkamp battle April 22 The Vardekampen battle April 23 The Kvam battle April 25-6 The Otta battle April 28 The fighting around Ankenesfjellet April 29-May 2 The Landing at Bjerkvik May 13 The Stien battle May 17 The Pothus battle May 25-6 The fighting around Ankenesfjellet May 28 Plus a number of operational and strategical maps. Names used are those used in Norwegian tradition, and might differ from UK names. E.g. the "Otta" battles above are often called the "Dombås" or "Gudbrandsdal" battles in UK sources. And so forth. Of course, all above battles are covered in text. Numerous other skirmishes, such as Midtskogen as we have discussed above, are described in detail in text, but no map. The book also focus on naval battles and the fight for air supremacy, but this will be of limited interest here. Of course, I have no scanner as of yet. Planning to get myself one, but am waiting for a shipload of upgrades (CPU, motherboard etc) and will have to install all of that first. Might crash the system you know. But tactical maps was the lack preventing progress. I'll think of some way of scanning and sending you the ones you want. Which ones would be interesting from the above? Cheerio Dandelion

Hans, are you still working on this? I just picked up this recently published book the other day - well today in fact. Updated facts and research. Very interesting - for those esoterically inclined. Cheerio Dandelion

Patience. If people have downloaded your scenario, they still need to play it. So, if a pair download it and play it, we have some 2.5 email exchanges per turn. Say its a 25 turn scenario. That means 60 or so e-mails back and forth. And say these are two working guys, sending a mail every other day at most. That's about 120 days, or 4 months, before reaching end of the scenario. It could easily reach lower intensity levels, with two e-mails per week, making it 30 weeks, or 7 months. So you see we're easily talking significant amounts of IRL time. And of course, of all games kicked off, a fair number will never be concluded for various reasons, and of those concluded, only few players will take the time writing a review, normally those exceptionally happy or unhappy about the design. If nobody says anything, in spite of credible numbers of downloads, it's probably average That's how it works. Cheerio Dandelion

The SOMUAs must have come from the 3rd Cuirassiers. I can't find any other active S-35 unit at the relevant dates and (approx) places. All other S-35 units were either destroyed, captured in the Dunkerque pocket or in units forming. The 3rd was pressed into service by De Gaulle on May 15th, though it was also still in the process of forming. May 15th it had only one (of four) squadrons, with 24 S-35. By May 28 it had an additional two squadrons (Hotchkiss). It fought along the Somme, in pursuit of the task of the 4e DCR, namely reducing the bridgeheads of Abbeville and Amiens. I see you opened a new thread on the Germans, and that Andreas posted there, so I believe you will be amply aided on that issue. Cheeri Dandelion

Ah yes, the expression red thread being unfortunately continental European and would translate to either connecting thought or indeed main thread but more often the Anglosaxons simply write runs (rather than goes, walks or jumps) all through the [study of tanks of WWII]. You know, just like they never say speedblind, but the more prolix fails to adjust to a slower speed. Reinforcing your point is Mr Senger und Etterling, in a book I borrowed. He states that ...which freely translated means something like Apparently then, according to the good General, moving from outright designtheft to attempts at pirate copies, and only after failing there, to semi-independent design using the T-34 performance stats as yardstick. So. Any reviews coming anytime soon in my alarmingly empty e-mailbox? Cheers (hic) Dandelion

Thats what I did, a search. Searching for someone to show me the way. Always works Thanks Dandelion

Sorry for being ignorant, but where can I find this converter, that we now have? Cheers Dandelion

It seems it was the 24th or 16th. I failed to find any note on the battle itself in any source. But I was able to confirm that the 4e DIC was transferred, by rail and road, to the Amiens sector, arriving around May 20th, latest units arriving may 22nd it seems. It is then engaged in combat until june 4th. It deploys there covering 20 km of frontage, linking up to its east (direction Abbeville) with 5 DIC and to the west with 7 DINA. And I reason that if it was there on may 20th-22nd, covering most of the frontage of the bridgehead, and enetered combat immediately, it will reasonably have participated in any attack carried out there. Furthermore, the only other Colonial forces containing senegalese in the area at the time were 5e DIC, which might have participated, and 7e DIC which could not have, as it is stated to have engaged in battle only in june. Apart from them, the closest Senegalese were fighting around Lyon by may 20th. All Colonial Divisions (I take the opportunity of correcting myself, I write above there were 3, typo, should say 8) were made up of two senegalese regiments (RTS or RICMS) and one white regiment (RIC). Except 3e DIC which was all-white (1, 21, 23 RIC). Plus a GRDI. They had two artillery regiments, one medium and one heavy, both consisting of black troops (or Malgache). The 4e DIC, our prime suspect for the Amiens bridgehead counterattacks, included 24e RTS (Lt.Col. Fabre), 16e RTS, 2eme RIC 12e RAC (Col.Arty Rgt) 212e RACL (Col.Heavy Arty Rgt.). 74e GRDI. Plus divisionals. The regiments were all to have three battallions, but the 24th had donated its second battallion to the 5e DIC. The secondary suspect, 5e DIC, consisted of 44e RICM 53e RICM 22e RIC 75e GRDI 2 Artillery regiments (Names unknown) The RICM were mixed regiments about 80-20 blacks and whites. The 22 RIC was odd insofar that it consisted almost entirely of Catalan troops. And the RICM were odd insofar as containing unusual amounts of indigenous (black) officers. Both were first rate divisions. 4e and 5e DIC suffered casualties at the rate of 30-50% during the Somme battles may 20 to june 4. As with the 25 RTS in Chalessy, and 24 RICMS in Hangest, POWs of he 24 RTS were murdered by the Germans. (These murders were punished by the German army during the war, court martialling perpetrators, so details are well known). Note - The whites of the RIC were Frenchmen recruited in metropolitan France by the Colonial Department for service overseas, on long term contracts, i.e. they filled the function of marines. 4e DIC was supposed to contain a reserve such regiment, 4e RIC. I don't know why they instead included the veteran 2eme RIC. Cheerio Dandelion

Hi there Hans, I have long had an interest in French troops. Though "Grog" is a overstatement. "Senegalais" was the French generic term for black troops, and so they needn't actually be from Senegal. Black troops served in Senegalese regiments proper (RTS) but also in a variety of other forces, sometimes mixed with other "colours". You'll find the RTS proper on this informative page. Its in French but most words are such you use as loanwords in English. The senegalese were numerous enough, and employed in such a variety of duties, as to present a very heterogenous picture (spelling?). Some regiments, such as 24th, 7th and others, were outright legendary, acquiring their fame in WWI (Chemin des Dames) and retaining very high standards in WWII. The French held them in very high regard indeed, and some were permanently stationed in France. Others still were mere barefoot, halftrained colonial police forces. So it would all boil down to regiment. Of course, in France 1940 you'd only find Senegalese that formed part of either the Colonial army, or the North African army. Both being bodies of professional long-term soldiers, they displayed quite another quality than the average French conscript or reserve units. We actually see these guys - I mean colonial forces black or white - in most successful undertakings made by the French in 1940. Come to think of it, throughout the war, and in the postwar era as well. The Senegalese served in the Colonial forces, but were included in the French North African army as well, for practical reasons. The Colonial army had the same function as marines have (and are now called marines) and consisted of only 3 regular divisions, plus numerous garrisons. The North African army included the Foreign Legion, Spahis, Chasseurs d'Afrique et cetera and could form 12 regular divisions, again plus garrisons and Sahara companies. The regular elements of both armies were considered first rate troops. Generally speaking the French (much like the British I find) tended to hold in highest regard those that had given them a beating most recently. In WWII these were the berber and the Tonkinese. Berber tribesmen served in the North African army and appeared primarily in Moroccan units, but also in Algerian and, later on, Tunisian. Also just like the British, they trusted to 100% only minority groups dependent on them, such as said Berbers, and indeed Khmers and Senegalese etc. Both factors limited their scope. It being a fave topic, I can babble on forever here. But you were actually only interested in the Senegalese right? Cheerio Dandelion Edited: So many typos and outright rotten English that even I was embarrassed. [ August 22, 2004, 03:49 PM: Message edited by: Dandelion ]

Martin By "normal" I simply meant the full range of frontages used in training. The difference in frontages given, if such are found, will surely be accountable to the fact that the Germans did not count in meters, but in "steps", when it came to training squads in formations. Actual length of a "step" was not standardised, but should be about 70-80 centimeters or so. The default, thus really normal, frontage was some 50 meters per squad, obtained by the "Schützenreihe mit 8 Schritt Abstand!" command as used only in training - a command I dare say every armed man in the army (and Waffen SS) knew by reflex, or at least was supposed to. Post-training, that particular distance needed no mentioning, as it was default. I am sure you also used default commands in the army in which you served - e.g. when you made the arm signal for line, the men would know what distance to default to. In the German army, if a commander screamed "Schützenreihe!" and mentioned no distances - or gave the arm signal - 8 steps or about a total of 50 meters was what all squads in the entire armed forces were supposed to default to. If Panzergrenadiers were ordered to disembark under combat conditions, and given no specifics, they would default to deploying on a line facing the same direction as the vehicle, using the vehicle as... well what you call it in English, the point from which you measure, with half squad on each side and 8 steps distance between each man. The men counted the steps as they ran from the vehicle during training to get their individual count, and to learn the distances by eyesight. As John points out, crewed weapons narrowed the frontage, but then again the men placed in the command squads in CM were normally dispersed among the squads in IRL, increasing frontages. The German squad frontages had been drastically increased during WWI, when modern high rpm weapons and grenades made previous default frontages suicidal. But I don't think it changed much between the wars. Nor do I know of changes during the war, but then again I have no 1945 edition of the manual. I'm not sure what you mean by open terrain nullifying need for wide frontages (in terms of firepower projection). As I had understood things, the need of wide frontage is constant, both for protection and firepower projection, and open terrain allows it. Whereas constrictive terrain, low visibility or poor troop quality are the classic variables that reduce frontages by not allowing them to be very wide. Sincerely Dandelion

Agreeing with Andreases post and re-emphasising what I have already written above. However, returning to Harry and writing with a designer hat on, reality cannot be converted indiscriminately to CM scenarios. IRL, the advancing squad in line (abreast) would spread out to a "normal" (i.e. textbook normal) some 25-70 meters frontage depending on terrain. For comparison, a church in CM is 20 meters wide. The CM squad frontage is roughly 2 meters or so. The issue not being capacity to receive fire, as squads can get hit even if incoming does not actually hit the squad graphics. Problem is outgoing fire, and LOS. I.e. capacity of controlling the environment with projected firepower. E.g. if you pout your squad right behind said church, it will not be able to spot or fire straight ahead as if the line stretched out 2-25 meters on both sides of it. CM frontages are thus by necessity reduced, from squad and up. An attacking platoon can, IMHO, effectively control a 100 meter frontage if full strength, and ineffectively (but still to some extent) control a 200 meter frontage. Quite regardless of nationality or weaponry. Adding a squad to create 4 squad platoons, as some are, does not really alter the frontage maximum, as the "in command" function dictates maximum distances. And so all the way up the unit hierarchy, frontages must - for playability purpouses - be reduced in comparison with real ones. And consequently, the larger the unit, the larger the reduction. So, Harry, for design purpouses, I wouldn't look to realistic frontages, neither textbook nor actual historical realities. I'd do some testruns and see what works with the game. Let us know what conclusions you reach. Cheerio Dandelion

Hi Harry, On the Germans then; The Germans used "Ausdehnung" (here; density) as a pivotal operational instrument. That basically meant manipulation of subunit frontages in order to increase or decrease firepower along a unit frontage during an attack (or defence). An attacking battallion could be assigned anything from 400 to 1000 meters, assuming it was full strength. A defending battallion anything from 800 meters to 2000 meters, again if full strength. Of course, terrain was a dominant factor in determining this as well. Frontage would be assigned according to task. A defending unit tasked with delaying action could well manage 2000 meter frontages, whereas the same unit tasked with stopping the enemy dead in his tracks would have to concentrate its firepower on much narrower frontages. The same goes for attacking units, with probe versus breakthrough in the above example. Along the frontage of an attack would be designated a "Schwerpunkt", point of main effort. Here frontages would be narrowed down to a minimum in order to increase pressure. An attack might well start with evenly divided and often wide frontages, changing to narrower when once a soft spot in the defence is detected. This was usually accomplished simply by inserting units along the frontage, e.g. halving a 1000 meters frontage to two 500 meter such and thus double the firepower there. The unit inserted would the the "one back" in the normal "two up front one back" constellation. In fact more often still, the "Keil" was used with one up and two rear, inserting the two rear to triple the pressure exactly where desired. Of course, units were not full strength, terrain was not pool-table and the enemy did not react as expected. Thus the figures given for frontages were guidelines. Hope it helps Cherio Dandelion

Those ID markings on the vehicles - I noticed it's quite possible to identify the exact company that the Sdkfz 11 belongs to e.g. - are they authentic or simply illustration? Anyone know? Cheerio Dandelion

If the objective is to exit, why would you need such forces and why would you want to pursuit the holding of flags? I don't get it. Whereras some tactical situations would warrant a holding force, others would simply not. Basically, if it is the battle of the holding force you wish to illustrate with your design, you don't really need to include a exitforce simply to bus it over the map and take no part. The exit force then just bogs down the game, its a little like taking a snapshot of a friend, who however appears only as a dot in the middle of the photo. Several designers try to illustrate the situation of a commander who is needed with his (entire) force somewhere else, and a knowing enemy who wants to obstruct his getting there. Its a fairly common situation in WWII. As far as I have experienced, the CM engine lends itself well to such designs. I find the Exit condition the most versatile and flexible design instrument available in the CM engine. Newer and more interesting designs will make the most of it. I don't really understand the problem I guess. But I am interested since I am involved with some of the designteams. Why don't designs with exclusively exit troops work, in your opinion? Cheerio Dandelion

Omitting flags entirely is usually not possible when designing scenarios. Normally, you need the flags as a designer in order to manipulate the AI. And you can use them as point equalisers (you can use the "bonus" function to the same effect tho). If only one side can exit for points, and it's a fighting withdrawal, meaning the defender is to withdraw across his own (rear) mapedge, there is no incitament for the exiting force to stop and fight at all unless there are either preset bonuspoints or flags enough to make sure victory for his opponent if he simply buggers out. Flags then have the additional value of steering the AI right. If flagvalue roughly equals or slightly excels exitpoint value, then the (withdrawing) defender is forced to kill off a number of (attacking) enemies before retiring if he is to win. And he needs to do it with minimum casualties, since every one of his men is worth roughly twice as much as every one of his enemies. Thats the basic logic of all fighting withdrawal scenarios. Even in breakthrough-type scenarios, when the enemy is between you and your exit edge, the designer still need flags to manipulate the AI to react, and not just sit tight and shoot at whatever he happends to see. Otherwise, a human player need only to open a small hole in the AI line, and pour through, all remaining AI units will do nothing. If a flag is lost, the AI will plug the hole by counterattacks. However the player should not be bothered with these maths, the design should solve it all by explicitly stating your mission. So if it says you should exit, then exit. If it says hold ground, hold the ground. If it says you need to kill some people first and then exit, then do it. If you do what it says, succeed, and still lose, its a misdesign. If you domething you're not supposed to do and still win, it is also a misdesign. Fighting withdrawal/delay action setups normally has a curve, in terms of points. If flags/bonuses and exitvalues equal eachother you (if defending) start at zero. As the enemy advances - he will be very superior, or your orders would have been to stop and defend proper - you will normally pick him off at no great cost to yourself. Your pointcurve rises. As he closes in, he will normally be able to start extracting a price, and as he need only take down half the amount he loses, he will rapidly gain on you. Your point curve flattens out, taking and losing about the same amounts. As your units are engaged, extraction becomes difficult. With rising casualties, your point curve drops. You have stayed too long, and will lose. This is the typical curve of any fighting withdrawal/delaying action setup. Your key decision then becomes when to quit and extract. Its a more complex decision than the "capture the flag" attack-defence scenario. You cannot normally see on the map exactly what the status (in points) is, nor do you have any explicit evidence of progress such as flags changing hands. Enemy casualtyrates will always be unclear. Decisions have to be made on meager basis and there is no aid. My experience is that not all players will enjoy such setups. But some get really hooked. Of course, the whole effect will be lost entirely if the player doesn't get it, because of insufficient briefing. Hope that helps some in understanding presence of flags in exit-scenario designs. Cheerio Dandelion

The Bundeswehr paras wear a red beret, in German called Bordeauxrot and very similar to brand new maroon berets. First issued in the early 70s. The eagle is very similar to the original one. Most army insignias are. They changed the Panzer insignia tho, never did wear no Jolly Roger Its the infantrymen who wear green berets. We wore black. Engineers and artillery wear bright red. Supply guys wear blue. Those are the ones I recall. Ah yes, the GSG wear green berets too. Cheerio Dandelion

Have some brief facts on Nembo. All from German sources tho, very brief (basically OOBs and brief notes). Tessin. There will probably be more elucidating italian such. Raised october 1942 using cadre from the Folgore division, consisting of para regiments 183-5. Italian trained and equipped, no German "mission" at the "Nembo" paraschool. Anti partisan duty under German command in what was Yugoslavia during the first half of 1943. Then they briefly disappear entirely from German sources. Nembo appears again in Sicily, but only 185. Fought under German command, alongside German troops, arriving alongside the German paras (at least in the German lists). It remains under German command until the armistice, being part of the troops opposing the allied (Canadian mostly, as it was) advance. No idea where 183-4 were at this time but your note on Sardinia will probably close that case. 185 disappears again from the OOB as of the Armistice, never to reappear, thus reasonably dissolved as such. Units formed in the RSI included (in German, dunno correct Italian names) "Ital.Fallschirmjäger-Rgt" and a "Fallschirmjäger-Bataillon d'Abundo". Both listed under German combat commands, so no "security" or rear troops but line combat troops. The former of these was formed primarily from Folgore and Nembo personnel, plus some paramarines - my guess being most Nembo people will have been from 185 then, especially if the others were on Sardinia still. I have no breakdown on personnelldonor units on that latter battallion there. The regiment fought under German command in Italy until VE day, alongside German paras, for a while appear to be semi-attached to FJD 4 (alongside a Fsch.Jg.-Lehr battallion). Rome, Anzio, the various lines, the works. Well, like I said just short notes. We have some italians here haven't we? I'm sure htey will find more on the Italian para official hompages and so on. Cheerio Dandelion

Yes, but it is a bit confusing. The m36 Langhose (Kielhose) trousers are referred to as "Steingrau", "Neugrau" and "Perlgrau" depending on contemporary source. Most probably due to actual difference in shades of grey with various producers. Or simply faulty use of colour names. But it might also be confusion due to lack of proper standardisation of colours. To increase confusion, German standard "Perlgrau" is the same colour as the UK standard "stonegrey", and vice versa, "pearlgrey" is the same shade as "Steingrau". So I never know what word to use really. I say like the Londoners do y'no-wa'a'mean... Cheerio Dandlion

I quite agree, the italians display a tendency of finding successful compromises between the practical and the casually elegant, if given a fair chance. And they tend to make the most of a photo opportunity, if given a chance, don't they One can hardly imagine a British Sgt-Maj in this posture. This character is from the Nembo division, unlike the fellow above who is from Folgore. There was a tropical version of the beret, same colour and shade as the Sahariana. Cheers Dandelion.

I have to object there Michael. The paras actually wore fieldgrey pants in the field (and later a tropical version). I know they are often portrayed as wearing the bluegreys, but they didn't. I promise. The reason was that it was the Army that developed the initial Para gear, including the jumpsuit with loose fitting pants and olivegreen cotton duck smock. And boots, cutaway helmet, you know the gear. While changing to Luftwaffe uniforms in every other aspect after transfer, the paras kept the jumpsuit including the pants. They wore standard Army fieldgrey. Thus initially a rather handsome darkish tone, later to deteriorate quite noticably. Notably not the stonegrey (Perlgrau) trousers worn by the army at that time. They used the fieldgrey that the Army used for the blouse. The paras also never shifted to mousegrey like the Army did. This is a well publicised snapshot from Crete, displaying extremely well the palette of para uniform. Interesting to find such consensus on that. To quote Stephen Bull on the development of the Stalhelm; For good or ill, one of the most distinctive cultural icons and objects of villification of the 20th century had been born. About the nicknames - I have never been entirely convinced they were actually in use. I never did see any contemporary German reference to red devils, nor devils in baggy pants, nor the Dutch black devils. I'm not sure when a German would ever spot a paratrooper in a red beret unless a POW. And as I recall it Ryan writes in his book something "'Red Devils', which the British thought that the Germans called them", didn't he? I feel hesitant about these nicks. "Green Devils" is supposedly an American name for German Paras after the abortive Texan rivercrossing in Italy. By that time there is not much green about them, especially compared to US army palette, as most wore the tropical trousers and Flecktarn bonesacks. So I don't get it. --- And the No.5 - Yes they did. The beret was greygreen and had replaced the Bustina in Italian paratroop units by 1943. Looked like so much; Cheerio Dandelion

The statements are not mutually exclusive, though they appear to be. Rommel was an excellent company commander. Certainly with detailed planning, he even taught it at infantry officer cadet schools. Even as a Division and Corps commander, he'd make detailed plans for his company commanders and interfere in small unit operations. In fact, even as an army commander, he'd visit battallions and inspect planning. And most anecdotes about Rommel, true or untrue, will find him interfering in local combat, won't they. As commander of the DAK, he is not known to make any detailed plans. He largely made it up as he went along. Many of his decisions were brash, unreflected and without real basis in fact. Having made them, he was prone to regret and would spend sleepless nights pondering them. Or simply countermand them in a very confusing manner, a "90 degree turn commander" as Bayerlein calls him. He is also known to make sudden, unrealistic demands on units with complete disregard - or lack of understanding some say - of logistics. He'd also tend to forget about logistics in the most inopportune moments. He had brilliant Ia's and Ib's to fill his gaps. They are not very affectionate in their testimonies of how it was to work with Rommel. the few that have written about it (several died in the war). For most of the battles, they had no idea of where he was, or how to get in touch with him. Nor did they know what new orders he issued. Wherever he was. Being in the frontline, Rommel could observe (and act on) developments, at least locally, but would not normally bother relaying (either of) them to central command and communication functions. The battles had to be led in his absence, and in want of detailed plans to execute. The latter was just as well, as plans changed anyway. Rommel never really got the hang of big unit leadership. A bit like Model in that sense. But given a professional staff, he was able to act on instinct. Just like Model. The staff would do the detail planning and be the expeditors of all ideas.The German system of leadership was meant to handle this. Even the Firma Ludendorff-Hindenburg was structured like that. Speaking of structure, you will note that his book is in some want of it. Rommel was not the man to extract from his experience and his obvious talent any fundamental rules or basic principles. He'd just hand you practical, very concrete examples, one after the other, as he was a practical man. So yes, I agree his book on the infantry is very hands-on and detailed. But from his elevation to Divisional commander and up, planning (especially long term such) became too complex for him, reaching beyond his frame of competence, and grew out of his hands. Cheerio Dandelion

Good idea. I'll have a go at it. We had such a pack - although not as complete as an entire basic training course it was enough to get new guys going - years ago for the CMMC. Both lost and useless now, but I guess it couldn't be that hard to reproduce. I'll keep you posted on my progress. High explosives on top of a request? Sounds pretty brutal. An offer one can't refuse right? Cheerio Dandelion

Level 1 vision. Float across the screen. Discover the angles, the depressions, the hillocks. Will solve your problem. Cheerio Dandelion