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Dandelion

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  1. Well, I remember you all the same Steve Actually I was notably involved in a debate on tattooed bikers in bars, though not topless and not in Manhattan, thus Jon's and Michaels memories remain excellent. I scarcely think that solidly off-topic debate ever made it out of the inglorious General Forum, but it was rather amusing nonetheless. I seem to recall a Mr Dorosh being a partner in crime here. But I might be mistaken - as Jon pointed out it's been six years. What I actualy wrote to say was - Thanks for sending me my original Dandelion profile, I really appreciate it. The only thing I have from that year that will still fit me Regards Dandelion
  2. JoM67 Seriously, do you think we're all linguering here to write endless posts on matters we are all already well familiar with? This forum is all about the exchange of knowledge. It always was. You might want to reconsider your presence here, if this offends you. Sinceriously Dandelion
  3. Not familiar with hardcoded statistics concerning the spotting of mines, I seem to achieve satisfying success spotting mines using infantry scouting ahead, making a point of having them stationary every once in a while. Stationary meaning lingering for at least one minute, or they will not spot properly. Ordinary infantry, not engineers. Unfailingly doing this, I have actually only once ever (!) driven a vehicle into any minefield in the game. And in that scenario, there was no infantry, only tanks and desert. Then again, I have marched scouts into minefields, and more importantly perhaps I have lost scenarios beceause of elapsing timelimits. Some scenarios press the attacker for time to such an extent that he is compelled, coerced even, to victimise his armour, having no other real option but to charge full speed along roads, using tanks as point. They wil linevitably hit mines, and charge straight into various other ambushes otherwise easily brushed aside by scout infantry, such as single Panzerschreck teams or snipers taking out unbuttoned commanders. While my foes frequently suffer this, I usually scout ahead instead, avoiding the ambushes but not reaching the objective in time. Can't recall ever having spotted any minefield with a tank. Once spotted, I cannot recall a minefield ever disappearing from view again (unless of course there is nobody around with a LOS to it). Cheers D
  4. Horrible news indeed. So we've now been hanging around here for so long that we're starting to die off of old age.
  5. One of those authors used to be a frequent poster here at the forum. If I were you, I might try using the name Rexford in the thread name (rather than lost book) and he just might find you. He'll know. You know, something like "Looking for Mr Rexford" or the like. Cheers Dandelion
  6. There is a command exactly the way Dook describes. It will appear whenever relevant (infantry (not exclusively engineers) equipped with Demo charges (not grenade bundles, as these are treated as antitank (antitrack) weapons in the game) within 29 meters of any enemy, and issued with a "fire" order). The range of the use of explosives is, according to previous announcements by the BFC, to reflect the men actually applying explosives. Seeing as the squad actually is supposed to disperse over an area much larger than the dot-on-the-map that it appears in the game (and within which it can be affected by firepower). The men are not meant to throw explosives at all. It certainly looks like they are throwing them, raising arms and the DC flying through the air, But no. It is applied. It is quite a challenge imagining these men applying explosives upon moving individual infantymen, but there you have it. Of course. With this function, the entire Raison Daitre of the flamethrower entirely vanishes. There is absolutely no point wahtsoever in buying any FT in any battle, when you can instead use the 29 meter ranged... applyable, DC. The sole exception being mines. Only DC will remove mines, FTs won't cut the mustard. Of course, if encountering mines, you will not be given the command option "use explosives" but simply have to wait for the men to use it on their own initative. Which might take up to five minutes or so. Chop chop D.
  7. How about Kraut Calamity? or Bothersome Boardwalk Boche? or Fritz has a fit? or Merry Jerries assault our ferry? or Brandenburger with fries? or U-137 strikes again - the prequel? or Failed integration of heavily armed immigrant groups in the municipality of Eastport, july 1942, a US Justice Dpt Survey? or How we almost made it to Canada - a German account? or Seven Years in Maine, by Heinrich Harrer? or One Eastport too far? or The hitherto unknown second air assault landing by Rudolf Hess behind enemy lines? or This aint Kansas, Dorothy? or "The special-operations forces are capable of doing things that other forces aren't", an evaluation by Generalfeldmarschall Rumsfeld on the successful German invasion and pacification of the USA with 1500 übersupertroopers? or And Then There Were None? or I'm shooting in the rain? Seriously though, any chance of seeing the map? Never seen one using tracing. What kind of tracing? Cheers D
  8. How did German squadlevel tactical behaviour differ from, say, US, in june 1944? And what marked consequences did the German frame of mind create? Cheers D.
  9. Infantry training in WWII did not differ much from modern training. The components you mention were all there, and you do see a lot of it, especially fire-manoever, even in the series BoB. Of course training varied. Within Easy company, there were men with 12 months of training, others with just a few weeks. Status was the same with the opposition, German training looked much the same. Training is overrated. In peacetime professional armies, everybody tends do undergo endless series of courses, usually labelled Advanced or Modern. This - much like Red Tape - is a peacetime phenonema. Speaking the above mentioned facts in evidence, concerning line infantry, it does appear as if the wartime standards (6, 12 and 18 weeks generally speaking) are quite sufficient. Tactical behaviour is not necessarily evidence of training. Even among elite light infantry such as these paras (indeed German and US alike) the tendency to bunch up was epidemic. Guys huddle up when threatened. You read it in all accounts, of all nations. You see it on documentary reels from the war, the Korean war, the Vietnam war, always the men are bunching up and always the NCOs bark at them to spread out. Seems international and inevitable. The scene on the road in operation Market Garden was dominated by the simultaneous insight of every man in the column, that their Lt was about to get himself shot, walking in the middle of the road. It is not unreasonable to assume they might have lost focus on spacing. I for one was surprised to see how spread out the men were in the Bastogne patrol in another episode, seeing as the book clearly describes them as totally bunched up. Easy company, which at all times contained a core of very thoroughly trained men, indeed bunches up on a number of occasions during their brief war (by German standards), even under enemy fire, and make a series of other tactical blunders. Like bayoneting eachother. Some mistakes due to pressure, others due to bad leadership, and some simply because of the combat endemic confusion, or combat fatigue. I like the BoB series, though I don't think the main motive producing it was to display combat or behaviour in combat. Or even depict real events (the series diverges from the book on quite a few occasions). MHO is that you're partially correct in your assumption that the Silver Screen requires another reality than ours (thus far shooting from the hip etc). But perhaps partially also wrong, insofar that the men - or rather, the kids - of Easy company, according to themselves, very often did not behave tactically correct. Or even tactically sound. They did bunch up. They did chat and even smoke during patrols and excercised other reckless, dangerous behaviours. Cheers D
  10. King's idea is good. Too bad you can't pit US vs US, since that would allow you to create a german Special Forces unit in US uniforms, fluent in (US) english, connecting the story to several actual german operations during the war. At any rate, you can use any of a large number of commando raids actually performed during the war, for OOB. If you want it larger scale, just simulate an invasion. You can use the landings and paradrops in and around Narvik, and adjoining archipelago, as a model. The area is not entirely unsimilar. Cheers D.
  11. 1. You write posts on this forum. 2. You are reading a book using correct foreign abbreviations for handheld automatic weapon systems more than 50 years old. 3. You're an engineer. Plus of course you have a very masculine approach to written expression. You use no capital letter att he beginning of sentences, nor dots at the end, and you get straight to your point, delivering it with absolute minimum keyboard strokes. Seriously, there are no females in here, nor has there ever been any, ever, throughout all these years. A Grognard who has Outed is 100% female repellant. You can relax, put your feet up, and be yourself in here. Cheers D
  12. Maschinepistole. In text correctly abbreviated MPi, as Mr Sudowudo points out. The term "Schmeisser" stems from the first world war. As with so many nicknames. Actually the MPi 40 had quite a few ties to the Schmeisser brothers. Making the international (rather than specifically American) pseudonym "Schmeisser" rather reasonable. First of all, the MPi 18 of the Great War was widely internationally known and recognised (in spite of it appearing in very few numbers). Although called "Bergmann" (it being produced at the Bergman weapons factory, the employers of the Schmeisser brothers at the time) it was - for reasons eluding me - nonetheless known to a wide public as a Hugo Schmeisser design, and sometimes also referred as a "Schmeisser". The MPi 38 and following designs - being a ERMA (Erfurt Maschinefabrik) design - all used the characteristic stick magazine of the Mpi 18, which indeed was a Schmeisser design. Be it most unwilling, as he had initially insisted on the (then) more conventional box magazine. And Luis Schmeisser did design the MPi 41. Both "Bergmann" and "Schmeisser" could pass as international colloquial terms for german SMGs between and during the wars. Because of the weapon used in WWI. Same goes for MG34/42. Both were internationally referred to as "Spandau" machineguns. It was however a Rheinmetall design. Spandau was the international (the Brits started it I think) nickname for the German "08" in the Great War. It simply passed on to the next generation machineguns. And as with MG34/42, the 08 had absolutely nothing to do with Spandau. Same goes for the german aircraftmounted MGs, and so on and so on. I suspect the British to be behind most of these catchy nicknames. And faulty or not per se, they are all quite evocative. Which must have been the point. Cheers Dandelion
  13. Yes, same animal, the biggest of the tigers. And you can say "Bengaltiger" or in German as well. But it doesn't have quite the same ring to it. "King Tiger" is quite understandable. "Royal Tiger", another common translation of Königstiger, is a bit further down the road isn't it? Cheers D
  14. Thanks everybody, the little ones name is Sibel but I usually call her Decibel as she's quite a loud little demon I must say She's quieting down tho, get's better every week. She's just 7 weeks so far. The original Carentan CMBO operation had many virtues as playable (not all would agree) but made quite extensive compromises with historical accuracy. I found that every step back in that compromise led to a corresponding degree of lack of playability. This not just referring to correct sizes of formations, armament, terrain and distances - even the landscape as such in a topographical sense (as far as you can come using the CM terrain of course - you can never actually recreate the claustrophobic nature of the terrain in question, nor is it in any ay possible to recreate Norman villages or towns). The Elephantiasis is quite inherent, if starting with the same ambition as the original Operation it will rapidly grow quite beyond control in all asepcts. You know Carentan herself, as I found out, looks humble enough in life, as it does on a postcard or a wartime map, but projected unto a CM map it turns out to be quite a large town. Of course, there was very little fighting to speak of within the urban area itself IRL, but what is a Carentan Operation without a visible Carentan... The workable alternatives would be to either choose hotspots for scenarios, or narrow down the Operation idea. Perhaps focus the Operation on following the progress of a particular participating battallion or company. It gets easier with time. At first your scenario situation is a handful of Paras of both nationalities acting rather confused and having a number of small clashes, many of which revolve around a German machinegun blocking a road. This makes for challening designs as you'll only have a bunch of lightly armed infantry on both sides, in a sluggish and difficult terrain (and machineguns are not quite as deadly and dominant as they were IRL, are they now). Given the normal absence of support and the mutually high quality infantry, I found it extremely challenging to create anything that would not wind up in a rather boring static shootout, all ending a few minútes into battle when all infantry have emptied their magazines - or be equally boring onesided affairs. You can of course introduce tanks in their actual order of appearance in the battle but as the German paras had scarcely any antitank weaponry at all this hardly makes the design situaton any easier. As the relatively heavily armed SS arrive, and the fight moves to the semi-open landscape of Hill 30 with surroundings, your odds creating a fluent interesting Operation improve. But the battle for Hill 30 is of course merely the final chapter of this interesting operation. It is normally the fate of v.d. Heydte and his illoustrous crew rather than the somewhat anonymous 17th that catches peoples attention, and all of that'd be lost. Were I to have another go at it, I would have probably narrowed it down to an operation following the (mis)fortunes of one of the German para battallions. That'd take the battle about the same stretch as the original Operation, but using a much narrower corridor of actual terrain and, unfortunately perhaps, a much thinner list of participating units and weapon systems. And this time I'd draw the bloody map by hand first... Operation Crusader, right. I'll have a dig. Cheers D
  15. Hi Jon Yes I certainly did, and the article did actually alter my understanding of the UK-Empire-Commonwealth relation on this issue quite considerably. The fundamental issue of white dominance conspired against the UK use of "black" troops as I had believed, but I had not quite understood how the issue of dominance had become a separate interest of the (white dominated) dominions alone, and that the UK herself seems to have displayed no such concerns at all. The sole inhibiting factor in UK policy of deploying "black" troops seems to have been the ferocious protests of South Africa and Rhodesia et al. Strikes me as strange. But in a positive way. All the best D
  16. Sure thing. It's in yar ebox. Cheers D </font>
  17. Lurking in the shadows for sure! Nicknames was not the norm in the German army. It might seem to have been, given the widely known Ofenrohr, Möbelwagen and what have you. But it wasn't, and I don't know of any popularly conceived nicknames for german tanks used by Germans during the war. Nor do I recall any female names or other colourful, romantic names. I am challenged to find any German tanks wearing US-type Pinup girls or cartoonish figures on them. If colourful at all, German tanks would be decorated with colourful unit emblems, not individual such. In contemporary sources, in particular war diaries, one will often find individual tanks refered to by their call-name (radio call, such as "Sun One" or "Red Two" etc). When tank types were still mixed (II, II and IV) the Pzkpfw IV can be referred to as Heavy (Heavies). Tiger, Panther, Lynx - these names were all quite dedicated PR efforts, projected from top down, thus not popularly conceived nicknames in any sense. A success they were too, as these names stuck real quick among friend and foe alike. Incidentally, wouldn't the Panther be a "Mark Five" to a Brit/CW soldier? Or did they stick with "Panther"? Regards Dandelion
  18. Oh Hi Matt, sorry about the late reply there, vacation and the birth of a daughter got in the way As for directions to sources I'm probably the most boring bloke on the forum to ask, as I am using almost exclusively archive data copied from BA/MA rolls, and whatever war diaries I can come across (and by no I've got a hold of quite a few, but they are of infinitely variable quality I fear - the indomitable 12th SS wardiary, now available in English too I believe(?), acully covers Carentan in surprising detail). Not really easily accessible sources unless you happen to be German, living in Germany (or have access to the US archives, which contain copies of a lot of the stuff in the BA-MA, and unlike the BA-MA they'll serve it to you with a smile, and much of it for free!). I also use Tessin a lot, with dr Niehorster errata (published by himself on the internet), but this is largely a compilation of facts available at the BA-MA, relieving you of much of the tedious work finding it all by yourself. Got some other general works here as well, about the German Paras and so forth, that would be useful here. As for more easily accessible literature I am guessing you've worked your way through them by now. There is the widely read "Band of Brothers" book by this American researcher whose name is ghastly well known and yet keep forgetting it (but most people the Forum know him - who is he guys?). I know Kingfish - another ardent Forum member, designer and student of the Normandy campaign (including the most obscure clashes you can ever imagine, and I mean it) - makes frequent use of this homepage written by... er, what's his name King? I forget, but the page is really extensive (!) and detailed, and unless actually proven wrong I settle for any fact I find there. There are the two prime sites of German Order of Battle, Lexikon der Wehrmacht and die deutsche Wehrmacht - and also Feldgrau actually, but these will not be delivering any battle records, merely tables of organisation and rarely below battallion level. There are I believe a number of published articles, perhaps more extensive works too, on the US military History web (the official, Gvt one). But you'll be chasing what all designers are chasing. Authentic AARs or battle records of platoon or company sized clashes, complete with detailed maps and OOBs. Unfortunately, it would seem such records are incredibly difficult to come by. Are you American? King is an American and I get the feeling as I write this that he would be able to help you more with this than I. Am I right King? As for questions (about German OOB and TOE), just hit me with your best shot. I can take it I will at least, amidst these diapers, this barrage of squirting poo and fearsome Stalinorganish yelling, make a tremendous effort at not disappointing anyone. I never finished my own Carentan operation. Well I haven't yet anyway It seems to always turn out the same with my such attempts. I work feverishly for about half a year, or a year even. Map just grows and grows and turns out tremendous in the end, and OOB includes a regiment on both sides, and the whole thing becomes absolutely beautiful and glorious and completely unplayable. I seem to be seriously challenged by the fact that one has to focus on a critical event, at the most battalion sized (but preferrably company), to actually create a scenario that anyone beyond your family will agree to play. I used a lot of aerial photos. Found them extremely helpful in design. For all the heavy and distinguished sources I could list here, you know what source provided the most useful photos? Pics I ripped from the Brothers in Arms PC game. They use gorgeous detailed aerial photos and can be found in the data files. I can only recommend them. The game - unlike my attempts - does manage to focus on some key events in the extended battle. So how far is it? The Carentan or What-If Carentan op I mean. Cheers Dandelion
  19. On another note - being as ever completely incapable of sticking to a subject - this reminds me of the situation in Indochina in the 1950's. The French army was a fantastic construction, perhaps the most drastic organisational chaos I have ever seen, even worse than the Third Reich (no other comparison intended). - There was the French Metropolitan army, i.e. French regular troops. These were beefed up by scores of locally recruited native Vietnamese. - There was the French Colonial Army, i.e. frenchmen recruited in France for service overseas. These were beefed substantially by the same type of local recruits, plus a large number of similarly locally recruited men from all corners of the world where the colonial army served, including primarily Senegalsese and Micronesians. - There was the French North African Army, i.e. a mix of Frenchmen recruited in France or in North Africa for service in North Africa (many of the "French" in North Africa in fact being Italian, or native Jewish minorities at the time), with a (majority) body of North Africans recruited for service in North Africa, but doing service in Indochina. This Army was beefed by local Vietnamese, plus a number of Senegalese troops (who should rightfully belong to the Colonial department). - There was the French Union Army, composed of troops from all of Indochina, largely officered by the French and consisting of men from the Indochinese nations of the time. - There was a small contingent of Marines (nowadays the Colonial Army is wholly incorporated into the marines and they are one, but not in those days), also beefing numbers by locally recruited Vietnamese. - Finally, there were the local national armies (Vietnamese, Latian and Cambodian), largely officered by the French as well. - On a final note, there were eventually UN troops as well, a French battallion formally belonging to the UN forces. Also using local recruits to beef numbers. And whenever "local recruits" are mentioned, one must consider the bewildering ethnic composition of Indochina to realise just how confusing this mix was. That's ground forces. I'll leave the sea and air forces aside. Now that is chaos. Having studied the subject, one cannot help to wonder how on earth they managed the supply system. I mean, there's no way of using a stabdardised C-ration here... Chop chop D
  20. I am (quite genuinely) interested in these troops. Simply because they are unknown. We had a thread a few years ago here at BFC trying to unearth any facts about black British British troops (i.e. not merely black troops in British service), but we weren't able to find much (not from lack of serious attempt). Even had some help at the time from an expert on the topic of black US troops but still we couldn't come up with much. As you use quotation marks around "black", I am starting to suspect I am insulting somebody by referring to people as such? What I mean is of course people with some sort of visible origin in Africa, however near or far in time. Well no it isn't. In the sense relevant here. Your not understanding this is because you are not racist, which can only serve to further your honour. Myself I am regrettably now familiar enough with this line of thought (from study, not from practice) and to me it makes perfect sense that they opted to not use troops conceived as black against troops conceived as white. It is not a matter of being worthy. Fighting (all white, largely Saxon) Germans is conceptually the same as fighting the (all white, largely Saxon) British themslves, and what colonial power would encourage surpressed natives to slay whites? In an age when every colonial power did everything and anything it could to further the notion of white superiority and invincibility? Hence the huge, not to say revolutionary, effects of the Japanese victories at Mukden and later Singapore and Indochina etc. The Vichy French troops in the Levant as indeed the Italian army in East Africa were both colonial armies. Structured as such, few whites to be found in either army and those to be found were "colonials", i.e. professionals. So they didn't count. It was not a matter of being worthy, many of these fought like h-ll - especially the French colonials displayed qualities second to drastically few European units. It is instead the matter of returning after the war, retaining a system of racially based discrimination and oppression in the colonies, and having those colonies filled with men who have slain whites, seen the cities and nations of the whites ruined and humiliated. Simply doesn't work. And indeed it didn't. Look at what happened in Indochina and Algeria (France arguably being the major power least hesitant to use colonial troops on European soil). The Japanese were not conceived as white and quite regardless of the extent of their achievements, they were not and would not be regarded as equals ("could not pass for white", to quote a US professor). The proximity of the Japanese forces to four million whites in Australia had quite a decisive influence on US and allied planning and strategy, whereas their actual presence among millions of non-white Chinese created no sense of urgency at all. The notion of Japanese soldiers in white societies, occupying a white nation, was simply intolerable, even to the US (which was not directly affected). I beg to differ. These were not white societies, there were no white cities. There was a white presence, but in all places you mention except India this presence was extremely scarce (in India, it was scarce). The typical colonial presence of a handful of civil servicemen, tradesmen, clergy, industrialists and exploiters, surrounded by a body of armed troops. Typically to be found in defined, limited areas of the host nations (larger port cities) while the vast majority of the population was unlikely to ever meet a European. They did not form a society as such, being far too few, merely living and acting within the native societies. It is simply not comparable to European soil, from a racist point of view. When the morroccans of the RMSM marched through the charred cities of Germany, witnessing the desperate fugutives, slain civilians and defeated and humiliated German troops, they knew, and could never be untaught, that Europeans were just like themselves, in every way. Don't get me wrong. I'm not trying to point my finger at the British in particular, nor would I in any sense call them fascist of totalitarian (the whole notion being rather amusing actually). Like so many Germans, I'm embarassingly anglophile. But the British of course were children of the times and racial biology was a widespread ideology, even among them. The British were stake-holders. They had in the short perspective a lot to loose. And they lost it all. Probably the best thing that ever happened to them too. You know how Machiavelli wrote that it is preferrable to be feared, rather than to be loved, since these two values are not compatible? Well he was wrong. Cheers D
  21. You must endure my ignorance, but were any of these units actually allowed to fight German troops, or allowed to enter European soil, or other soil with a white majority population? I know that Africans were fighting in East Africa, but rather thought they were subsequently shipped off either to garrison duties throughout the (non-white) empire or to the Far East (to fight non-whites), if left in armed service at all? Cheers Dandelion
  22. I align with the posters vainly attempting to reach out here, and grasp the inner meaning of this argument. Focus is the chivalric repute of the African campaign in WWII, and the point driven is that this is a myth, no? Your argument being a) The region fought in was harsh. - Certainly, that's why no people live there. It is either brutal drought or diseaseinfested swamps, or deserts of salt for that matter. The hostility of the terrain however has no bearing on the mentioned chivalric repute of this theatre of operations. The most beautiful paradise islands of the Pacific did not encourage the combatants there to display chivalric conduct of any degree whatsoever, so I really don't think terrain matters much. The use of modern weaponry made for a lethal battle environment. - No argument there. But the chivalric repute of the Desert war does not entail that soldiers did not die, in all the manners typical for soldiers. Burned, maimed, flattened, slashed, hacked and shot into little charred pieces. One can do all that and still be chivalric when going about it you know. You simply abstain fom doing this type of damage to person or persons who are obviously not combatants. It also helps being respectful towards defeated opponents, but this is optional. Neither French nor American troops in Africa where very respectful towards defeated Axis troops. They simply treated them quite correctly and this sufficed. Since the Waffen SS were ordinary soldiers, their absence had no effect on the conduct of German armed forces in the field. - You know this might be interpreted as an attempt at provoking the modern reader. No you probably don't because you would not have used the argument if you did but I am actually tempted to agree to a point. I'll troll along with you here a while (troll, stroll, you know - well, that's the exact amount of humor I can produce in a day). Large sections of the German armed forces were in fact highly ideological in their approach to the war and Rommel himself was Hitlers former bodyguard and remained his protege until his demise. Though most probably too thick to grasp politics, he did make himself noticed and appreciated by the Party. I have no doubt that scores of the Axis individuals present in Africa were every bit as devoted racist and totalitarian fascist as any Waffen SS or Blackshirt man. So sure, let's agree, the presence or absence of the Party had no decisive effect on the conduct of Axis troops. But I fear you might be missing a very vital ingredient here. There was a reason for the absence of the Party. The same reason that left the conduct of German rank and file reasonably civil. There was nobody around to murder Well, excepting as always the hapless Libyan people who actually lived in the place where half the world had decided to fight it out on an issue not remotely relating to any of their concerns, the casualties among whom we are all blissfully ignorant of. You see, not even devout Nazis had any real calibre racial hatred towards the (white) British or (white) Americans - that'd be rather difficult since they're mostly all a bunch of Saxons anyway. The ideological phobia against capitalism and liberalism had not remotely the same widespred fervor and scale of hysterical paranoia as that directed against socialism - in particular totalitarian socialism. The Third Reich did not go to Africa to exterminate the population there, to settle it's own population there and to forever annihilate her Nemesis. It was merely a peripheral military campaign. The Soviet Union on the other hand, and all of her subjects, were targeted for annihilation. Every German soldier at the Eastern Front was made fully aware of it. The brutality, savagery, that was the unavoidable result of this policy spites description. It is not a matter of going berserk and mowing down surrendered enemy personell in the heat of battle, nor of shooting a man caught in wire, or laying heavy artillery barrages. It is a matter of systematic murder, arson, looting and rape on an epic scale, making millions of men perpetrators or co-perpetrators, starting a chain of reprisal and counter-reprisal, creating a cataclysmic nullification of morale, the absolute declaration of uncivilisation, dragging tens of millions of civlian populatrion down into the downboud train to hell. In Africa, the (in wartime per se ridiculous) pretense of normality could be preserved. In fact the belligerents agreed on many central issues. None had plans to populate the desert. All reasoned in terms of races and superiority/inferiority and none of course much liked the conceived inferior races of humans - the South Africans and British alike refused to arm black Africans to fight the Germans (with some ridiculous scenes as a result, incluing spear armed garrisons of airfields under MG34 attacks). The Americans eventuallty arrived with far greater ideological conviction than the others present, and we see some interesting reactions of disgust when they find the British having tea with captured German counterparts. But not even they fielded any meaningful number of armed African-Americans and their ideological conviction apparently did not translate into the abandonment of founding principles of the USA in those days. Because as for allied brutality against Axis members of the armed forces in Africa (seeing as there hardly were any Axis civilians to abuse), I have never actually seen any record of anything of the kind, excepting heat of battle collapse of discipline (and I always except such incidents, since I do not find them reflecting anything but the very moment they occur). I feel I should have, had there been any, because I have plowed through such heaps of apologist dung and Nazi rhetoric that you will never imagine in a million years. A work hazard of sorts, there is no discovered limit to what one will endure in order to find out exactly how many machineguns there were in a given company a given day, so to speak. A point you might want to take up, that I at least find being of greater interest and that might stand a reasonable chance of success, is how this campaign was broadcasted in the respective belligerent nations during the war. Much of the image conveyed actually lives on in modern popular perception of it. But how close to reality is this conception in fact? You question the conceived chivalry of the campaign, one of the few matters rather undisputed because of the abundance of record confirming it, but there are many other conceptions that could not survive the insolence of closer scrutiny. By "popular conception" I of course exclude any and all conceptions of any and all Grognards, who by definition are nowhere very popular and who would at any rate never take part in such vulgar attributes of contemporary life as anything that might risk being equipped with the prefix popular-, including all types of media. In fact the word "modern" scarcely survives in the presence of any given Grognard, except in the meaning of "modern warfare" of course. Well, all that said, I have been quite able to amuse away yet another evening and I thank you all. Sincerely (well...) Dandelion
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