panzermartin

I don't consider myself the most pro russian guy but I can see why Russia feels threatened. Its not irrational, lets be honest.
On paper NATO is a defensive organization but its members have conducted and have been involved in the most wars and invasions since the end of WW2. Mainly US. NATO offcially has also intervened violently, bombing in the Balkans, Libya and waged war on Afghanistan for 20 years. So not a strictly defensive pact per se. The other most important member of NATO, (once Great) Britain, has been a colonial force for centuries, occupying and looting countries at will, and only recently has withdrawn from most of its distant colonized lands. Not a great record to be honest. France is not lagging that far behind on that matter and Germany has the most dark recent past of all of them and a special wound with Russia. So, yes not that aggressive anymore, but not a great criminal record if you want them for neighbours.   
US, the flagship and mastermind of NATO,  has bypassed UN council to invade sovereign states like Iraq with false pretext of WMD and has 750 military bases around the globe, thousands of miles beyond its borders. Its military spending is 10x times more than the second on the list. An alien observer coming from space would argue that these guys with the stars and stripes are everywhere, how can they complain of expansionism of others?   Russia is not nervous of NATO but of US army presence so close to its vital routes. Imagine a US base in Sevastopol (again distance from home:  
https://www.google.com/search?q=sevastopol+distance+from+US&oq=sevastopol+distance+from+US&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i160l2.9435j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 )
completly blocking Russia way out to Bosporus and Mediterranean Sea. 
In this story Russians might seem the bad guys and we would probably not want to see them reaching the polish borders but from their POV and as an entity , they have probably sound reasons to not want NATO(US) presence that close to their home. This regardless of what we feel is moral or not.    
 

I don't consider myself the most pro russian guy but I can see why Russia feels threatened. Its not irrational, lets be honest.
On paper NATO is a defensive organization but its members have conducted and have been involved in the most wars and invasions since the end of WW2. Mainly US. NATO offcially has also intervened violently, bombing in the Balkans, Libya and waged war on Afghanistan for 20 years. So not a strictly defensive pact per se. The other most important member of NATO, (once Great) Britain, has been a colonial force for centuries, occupying and looting countries at will, and only recently has withdrawn from most of its distant colonized lands. Not a great record to be honest. France is not lagging that far behind on that matter and Germany has the most dark recent past of all of them and a special wound with Russia. So, yes not that aggressive anymore, but not a great criminal record if you want them for neighbours.   
US, the flagship and mastermind of NATO,  has bypassed UN council to invade sovereign states like Iraq with false pretext of WMD and has 750 military bases around the globe, thousands of miles beyond its borders. Its military spending is 10x times more than the second on the list. An alien observer coming from space would argue that these guys with the stars and stripes are everywhere, how can they complain of expansionism of others?   Russia is not nervous of NATO but of US army presence so close to its vital routes. Imagine a US base in Sevastopol (again distance from home:  
https://www.google.com/search?q=sevastopol+distance+from+US&oq=sevastopol+distance+from+US&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i160l2.9435j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 )
completly blocking Russia way out to Bosporus and Mediterranean Sea. 
In this story Russians might seem the bad guys and we would probably not want to see them reaching the polish borders but from their POV and as an entity , they have probably sound reasons to not want NATO(US) presence that close to their home. This regardless of what we feel is moral or not.    
 

You see, here is where I disagree with your whole post. NATO is not United Nations . NATO serves a post modern colonialism in disguise. It's a defensive pact only in paper. But it actually serves the interests of the big players. Energy, strategic, weapons sales etc.
We think world has changed but the time frame is miniscule, it's only a generation since the colonial era. We are driven by capitalism and not values. Otherwise we wouldn't allow Turkey in, we wouldn't equip Saudi Arabia and all those countries that violate basic human rights. 
NATO is like the NRA that claims we will stop shootings by arming the lawful citizens. 
 
 

I don't consider myself the most pro russian guy but I can see why Russia feels threatened. Its not irrational, lets be honest.
On paper NATO is a defensive organization but its members have conducted and have been involved in the most wars and invasions since the end of WW2. Mainly US. NATO offcially has also intervened violently, bombing in the Balkans, Libya and waged war on Afghanistan for 20 years. So not a strictly defensive pact per se. The other most important member of NATO, (once Great) Britain, has been a colonial force for centuries, occupying and looting countries at will, and only recently has withdrawn from most of its distant colonized lands. Not a great record to be honest. France is not lagging that far behind on that matter and Germany has the most dark recent past of all of them and a special wound with Russia. So, yes not that aggressive anymore, but not a great criminal record if you want them for neighbours.   
US, the flagship and mastermind of NATO,  has bypassed UN council to invade sovereign states like Iraq with false pretext of WMD and has 750 military bases around the globe, thousands of miles beyond its borders. Its military spending is 10x times more than the second on the list. An alien observer coming from space would argue that these guys with the stars and stripes are everywhere, how can they complain of expansionism of others?   Russia is not nervous of NATO but of US army presence so close to its vital routes. Imagine a US base in Sevastopol (again distance from home:  
https://www.google.com/search?q=sevastopol+distance+from+US&oq=sevastopol+distance+from+US&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i160l2.9435j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 )
completly blocking Russia way out to Bosporus and Mediterranean Sea. 
In this story Russians might seem the bad guys and we would probably not want to see them reaching the polish borders but from their POV and as an entity , they have probably sound reasons to not want NATO(US) presence that close to their home. This regardless of what we feel is moral or not.    
 

I have always felt the Soviet/Russian paranoia is based on the facts that the French (Napoleon), the Germans (through the Middle Ages and WWI and WWII), the Swedes, the Finns, the British, and the U.S. have all invaded them (joint British/U.S. expeditionary force at Arcangel in support of the “White” Russians, and is probably just as justified as the fears of all their neighbors and the rest of Europe. However, Putin’s statements that he’s looking to rebuild the former Russian Empire and that Sweden and Finland were part of Russia lends credence to the concerns of all the countries that at any time were ruled by Russia. Of course he conveniently fails to note that the name of his country is derived from the name of the Swedish tribe (the Rus) that settled Kyiv and Novograd. 

I don't consider myself the most pro russian guy but I can see why Russia feels threatened. Its not irrational, lets be honest.
On paper NATO is a defensive organization but its members have conducted and have been involved in the most wars and invasions since the end of WW2. Mainly US. NATO offcially has also intervened violently, bombing in the Balkans, Libya and waged war on Afghanistan for 20 years. So not a strictly defensive pact per se. The other most important member of NATO, (once Great) Britain, has been a colonial force for centuries, occupying and looting countries at will, and only recently has withdrawn from most of its distant colonized lands. Not a great record to be honest. France is not lagging that far behind on that matter and Germany has the most dark recent past of all of them and a special wound with Russia. So, yes not that aggressive anymore, but not a great criminal record if you want them for neighbours.   
US, the flagship and mastermind of NATO,  has bypassed UN council to invade sovereign states like Iraq with false pretext of WMD and has 750 military bases around the globe, thousands of miles beyond its borders. Its military spending is 10x times more than the second on the list. An alien observer coming from space would argue that these guys with the stars and stripes are everywhere, how can they complain of expansionism of others?   Russia is not nervous of NATO but of US army presence so close to its vital routes. Imagine a US base in Sevastopol (again distance from home:  
https://www.google.com/search?q=sevastopol+distance+from+US&oq=sevastopol+distance+from+US&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i160l2.9435j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 )
completly blocking Russia way out to Bosporus and Mediterranean Sea. 
In this story Russians might seem the bad guys and we would probably not want to see them reaching the polish borders but from their POV and as an entity , they have probably sound reasons to not want NATO(US) presence that close to their home. This regardless of what we feel is moral or not.    
 

Hi there.
I have been a CMx1 player since CMBO beta and have all CMx2 WW2 titles. This thread is exciting and a lot of the arguments are very interesting. But I wonder if there is not sometimes an ethnocentric tropism in many of the analyzes presented. Let me share with you, not a structured argumentation, but just some thoughts from a guy who is far to be an expert.
Among the western allies, and unlike the Americans and the British, the German (WW2) and French (WW1) people know the price to pay for a war on their territory. Perhaps this difference explains a certain caution on the part of France and Germany to commit themselves too far in aid to Ukraine. When President Macron said that we should not humiliate Russia, we can see here an admission of weakness but we must not forget that for many Europeans the 2nd World War is partly the fruit of humiliation « diktat » of Versailles treaty of 1919.  These people know that humiliate an adversary is also to take the risk that he capitalizes on resentment and a desire for revenge. A Russian friend from Moscow told me that they (the Russians) were ready to fight to the last Siberian… From the point of view of western military logic (the 10 points developed by Steve), the Russians have already lost the war. But, this is only a western reading grid. Is there a Russian reading grid that would be different ? (For example, I have the impression that losses are hardly a factor to take into account for the Russians. See previous thought). Thank you.

Interview with Oberst Reisner, the Austrian guy that does regular videos about this war on Youtube. He is slightly more negative than the general consensus here. His predictions are that Russia will occupy Donezk, the war will be fought to a standstill in winter and continued next spring.
Interview in German:
https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Interview-mit-Markus-Reisner-zum-Krieg-in-der-Ukraine-Vier-Raketenwerfer-das-ist-reine-Symbolik-article23377155.html

As I think you know, this guy has been pretty much discredited by now as a fabulist and fantasist, driving traffic to himself cuz social media.
It doesn't make everything he breathlessly retweets wrong of course, but when I see his stuff, I generally seek confirmation.

I haven't seen any content posted by Haiduk lately, I hope he is doing OK. His updates were most enlightening. 

I haven't seen any content posted by Haiduk lately, I hope he is doing OK. His updates were most enlightening. 

I haven't seen any content posted by Haiduk lately, I hope he is doing OK. His updates were most enlightening. 

I haven't seen any content posted by Haiduk lately, I hope he is doing OK. His updates were most enlightening. 

I haven't seen any content posted by Haiduk lately, I hope he is doing OK. His updates were most enlightening. 

I haven't seen any content posted by Haiduk lately, I hope he is doing OK. His updates were most enlightening. 

I haven't seen any content posted by Haiduk lately, I hope he is doing OK. His updates were most enlightening. 

I haven't seen any content posted by Haiduk lately, I hope he is doing OK. His updates were most enlightening. 

I haven't seen any content posted by Haiduk lately, I hope he is doing OK. His updates were most enlightening. 

Intelligently contrarian article by David Johnson on WOTR - I will underline some parts for the sake of promoting discussion with TLDR folks:
"WOULD WE DO BETTER? HUBRIS AND VALIDATION IN UKRAINE"
https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/would-we-do-better-hubris-and-validation-in-ukraine/
First, a warning about Ukraine's control of the information sphere in the West:
"The Russians have, however, conducted several successful river crossings of the Siverskyi Donets River to position forces for offensive operations against Izyum. These crossings enabled the Russians to posture forces for offensive operations in the region south of the river.
These crossings, as well as other successful Russian operations, receive scant media attention. Nor do Ukrainian failures figure prominently in reporting from the war. This is likely the result of a sophisticated all-media Ukrainian information campaign, reinforced by positive stories from journalists whose access is carefully managed by the Ukrainian government. This control of information is reinforced by their military’s excellent operational security. Indeed, it was the Ukrainian government that distributed the video of the botched Siverskyi Donets River crossing."
Sizzling take on how Western militaries' prioritization of force protection [See all the folks bragging about protecting their pixeltruppen above 🙂 ] may well be counter-productive in a near-peer conflict like the war in Ukraine:
"Western militaries are also conditioned by what Jeffrey Record calls “casualty phobia.” He traces this phenomenon to the Vietnam War, but notes that its modern implications were manifested in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. His thesis is that U.S. policymakers and senior military officers believe that the “use of force in situations of optional intervention should be prepared to sacrifice even operational effectiveness for the sake of casualty avoidance” and that in the war against Serbia, “force protection was accorded priority over mission accomplishment.” To support this conclusion, Record cites then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton to support this conclusion: “The paramount lesson learned from Operation Allied Force is that the well-being of our people must remain our first priority.”
Consequently, Western militaries have focused heavily on force protection. This was possible because of the discretionary nature of most operations—the types of operations most serving military members have experienced almost exclusively during their careers. There also is an ever-present concern behind most operational decisions that the perceived public aversion to casualties could unhinge policy. This is not to say that the irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not brutal and deadly. They certainly were at the soldier, squad, platoon, and company levels. That said, operations rarely involved the employment of battalion or larger formations in combined arms operations.
In over 20 years of war in Afghanistan, not a single platoon position was lost in combat. Casualty levels were extraordinarily low by even Vietnam War standards and medical attention was prompt and comprehensive. Finally, combat was deadly only at the ground level; aircraft largely operated with impunity outside the range of limited adversary air defenses. Aviation losses were in low-altitude operations and almost exclusively helicopters.
The war in Ukraine has starkly demonstrated the high human costs of large-scale, high-intensity warfare. Russian casualties at the Siverskyi Donets River and in other battles show that these are wars where company, battalion, and even larger formations can be annihilated in the blink of an eye, resulting in large numbers of soldiers killed in action and wounded, as well as significant materiel losses.
Consequently, in Ukraine, we are seeing the return of the imperative for force preservation, rather than force protection. This is currently beyond the consciousness of Western militaries and current combat casualty care capacity.
Changing the mindset from “force protection” to “force preservation” borders on heresy in current Western military culture. In Ukraine, Russia is learning the necessity of force preservation the hard way — in the unforgiving crucible of combat. A reasonable question is whether or not Western governments have prepared themselves, much less their citizens, for a conflict that could result in thousands of deaths and many more casualties in just a few weeks. Would this butcher’s bill awaken the passion of the people described in Carl von Clausewitz’s On War trinity, even in countries with volunteer militaries? Could this level of casualties challenge, if not unhinge, policy?
The fact that the Russians are reconstituting units from fresh troops and remnants of units decimated in combat is the reality of protracted, high-intensity combat. Our own history from World War II shows the potential cost of peer warfare. The 1st Infantry Division, in 443 days of total combat in North Africa, Sicily, and Europe, suffered 20,659 casualties. This figure is greater than the authorized strength of 15,000 for a World War II U.S. infantry division.
Importantly, these levels of casualties in the Ukraine war also call into question the ability of Western armies to maintain adequate fighting strength in other than short wars with modest casualties. Much is being made of the Russians relying on hastily mobilized reserves to replace losses. Ironically, as has been demonstrated since the Napoleonic Wars, the levée en masse is a requirement for protracted state warfare at this level. The Russians and Ukrainians both have systems in place to conscript their citizens; the practice has been abandoned, along with its supporting infrastructure, in most Western countries. Perhaps this is a case of prudent preparation, rather than an act of desperation?"
He's with @The_Capt in arguing that there's nowhere to hide with modern ISR:
"While many aspects of the Ukraine war echo past major wars, such as World War II and, to a lesser degree, the Korean War, there are several new dimensions. One in particular, likely explains the Siverskyi Donets River crossing debacle: ubiquitous surveillance of the battlefield. The Ukrainians reported that they had discovered the Russian crossing operation via aerial reconnaissance. The potential sources of this information are much more diverse and numerous now than in even the most recent conflicts. They include a wide variety of drones, commercially available satellite imagery, intelligence from Western sources, and other means.
This new reality essentially means that there is nowhere for a relatively large formation to hide. Surprise, particularly at a limited number of potential crossing points on a river, may not be possible. Thus, these types of physical deception operations may also be pointless. Finally, given the sophistication of many sensors, smoke screens may be less useful than in the past.
This new reality renders those criticizing the Russians not only wrong but dangerous. They are clinging to a doctrine that may be completely outdated in the current operational environment. That they persist in the view that Russian incompetence is mostly due to untrained and poorly motivated soldiers, led by corrupt and incompetent leaders, gives them a comfortable answer that does not invalidate their expertise or current practices."
And he follows up with a knock-out punch:
"The U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s looked to the World War II Wehrmacht for lessons about how to fight the Soviets outnumbered and win. After all, the Germans had actually fought the Red Army. Former Nazi officers, such as Gen. Hermann Balck and Gen. Friedrich von Mellenthin, explained their system and its importance during conferences and meetings with U.S. officers and officials. Americanized versions of German professional military education practices, officer professionalism, and encouraging subordinate initiative through Auftragstactik, which became U.S. mission command, were adopted in the U.S. Army as best practices. But we should well remember that the same type of Red Army destroyed the vaunted Nazi Wehrmacht during World War II in a long, grinding war of attrition supposedly suffered from the similar centralized leadership and hastily trained soldier maladies as today.
Furthermore, a revisionist history, not unlike that of the Lost Cause narrative about the Confederate defeat in the U.S. Civil War, was peddled by the Germans. Robert Cittino wrote that they
described the Soviet army as a faceless and mindless horde, with the officers terrorizing their men into obedience and dictator Josef Stalin terrorizing the officers. It had no finesse. Its idea of the military art was to smash everything in its path through numbers, brute force, and sheer size.
Thus, just like the Union Army, “‘quantity had triumphed over quality.’ The better army lost, in other words, and the elite force vanished beneath the superior numbers of the herd.”
These perceptions shaped U.S. views about Russian forces during the Cold War and, despite being disproven in the 1990s, are echoed in assessments today. As retired Army colonel and diplomat Joel Rayburn said in an interview with the New Yorker, “A bad army was ordered to do something stupid.” While officers are now promoted based on patronage, this is not all that dissimilar from the requirement for political reliability in the Russian military in World War II. What should have been considered then and now is why the German forces were crushed by such an inferior adversary? Perhaps enough people, materiel, and an indomitable will to fight despite privations and setbacks are exactly what are really necessary to endure and win in peer warfare."
In his conclusion, he questions the widespread notion that the Ukrainian military is doing well because it had been 'Westernized':
"These views are dangerous in Western assessments of the Ukrainian military. Currently, the prevailing narrative is that the Ukrainian edge is that they have evolved into a modern Western military, trained for over a decade in Western methods. They are professionals. Therefore, they will prevail. Just as we would. Again, nothing to learn here.
However, the actual evidence is unclear; the assessments of the prowess of Ukraine’s military may be wishful thinking and hubris. The title of a Wall Street Journal article epitomizes this view, saying it all came down to “years of NATO training.”
One should recall that Western initiatives to reform the Ukrainian military did not even begin until after the 2014 Russian invasion. Although they have progressed, many of the senior officers were raised in the Soviet system. When I visited the National Defense University in Kyiv in 1996 on an exchange visit as the director of academic affairs at our National University, all of the senior leaders were former Soviet officers. Some were also Russian citizens who chose to stay in Ukraine because there was nothing in Russia to go home to after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Consequently, a deeply entrenched Soviet-style bureaucracy and training model permeated the Ukrainian military. Thus, their rehabilitation is fundamentally a bottom-to-top institution rebuilding and culture-changing endeavor that will take time. In particular, initiatives to create a merit-based and proficient officer and noncommissioned officer corps are decades-long efforts that are just taking root at the lower- and mid-levels of the Ukrainian military. Consequently, many of the tactics above the small unit look more Russian than American, as does most of the equipment.
An indication that there is some way to go beyond the NATO training is that there is little evidence that the Ukrainians are executing joint and combined arms offensive operations. This capability will be important if the transition from the defense and attempt offensive operations to restore territory lost to Russia. Furthermore, Ukraine also appears to be ceding ground in the Donbas to a slow, grinding Russian advance.
Consequently, the analysis of the Ukraine war needs to address another unasked question: What if this view that quality people and leaders are the most important ingredient in modern warfare is wrong? What if Stalin was correct that quantity has a quality all of its own? If that is the case, then the Ukrainians may need much greater assistance if they are to survive a Russian-style grinding war of attrition.
Additionally, as the United States plans for how it will compete and potentially fight China and Russia in the future, the approach should be characterized by humility and an intense desire to challenge existing assumptions, concepts, and capabilities, rather than to validate current approaches.
As it did for Russia, it could happen to us, and we need to fully understand what “it” is."

Terriers are very skinny, only good enough for a side dish. And orcs are eating humans when available . I call this a hoax. 

Wow, I actually found a ton of info on the T-62, that was also meant to lob HE after all. 
Combined with the gunner's quadrant, the T-62 can conduct indirect fire
https://thesovietarmourblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/t-62.html?m=1
 

Yes, well put . And I can even see those T - 62 even used as indirect fire platforms firing from reverse slopes as Russians seem to be fixated with everything artillery, although precision will definitely suck. 
M48s, I think I served along those too in 2000s or M60s I don't really remember, I was a medic alongside a tank unit. It's a very tall tank, it's size can help with the morale yes, if you are a rookie. Good times though, no war fever in sight back then . Although you probably had a more intense experience. 
 
 

In the 2000s, I served in a foot company that had been assigned a single M48A2, complete with the original 90mm gun. The base we were defending had been overrun by the PKK in the 80s, when it was held by only a platoon, and the entire platoon beheaded, so me and many other conscripts were full of fear when we arrived there. When I started pulling guard duty along the base perimeter, I realized the M48 was the cornerstone of our defense: It was in an elevated overwatch position with an LOF over most of the base perimeter and beyond RPG range. It was great to have the 'Cadillac', as the M48 was affectionately called, covering our back.
Conceivably, the M48 could have been swapped for an AIFV, and I assume the AIFV's 25mm autocannon is deadlier for AP work than the 90mm, but I cannot imagine the AIFV acting as the same kind of morale booster. For the conscripts - excepting smart alecks like me - the M48 was a 'tank'; they didn't quite understand what the AIFV was, but they knew it wasn't a 'tank'. 'We have a tank' went a long way for morale. [That should be a W40K rule.] Therefore, fielding the T-62 with conscript formations, as Haiduk wrote, makes perfect sense.
 

Probably survivability of T 62 doesn't really make a world of difference to more modern tanks like T 72, when faced against javelins and modern AT weapons. Those can kill everything. So why not field an older tank for secondary support. It's better than a BMP in terms of protection and has a big gun. They only seem focused to gather as many gun barrels as possible to saturate infantry positions.
It's questionable at least though in what condition these tanks are. It will be bizarre to see them on the front line again. 
 
 

I mean the T-62 was considered terrible when they were expected to fight large scale, high tempo tank battles against NATO forces. In Ukraine, I don’t think any tank out there could be considered survivable against modern ATGMs and we aren’t exactly seeing tank on tank gunfights. If you’re going to throw a tank into an village to support infantry, it might as well be something you can afford to lose. The Stuart light tank wasn’t exactly survivable compared to even a Sherman but they still had their place. Something like an IFV would be preferred but if you’ve got a ton of T-62s you might as well use (lose) them.