Wicky

TAKODA,
 
It's not PC. To the contrary, it's pretty bloody, with considerable exsanguination occurring. No beanbag rounds or Tasers used. Wonder whether either's been used in Iraq or Afghanistan? Hm. The GIQ does exist also in Mac, on our already overused mobile devices and on overheated water, but no matter how you slice it, you'll never see blood or gore on CM. Wasn't done before with the very first CM game ever: CMx1's CMBO. Isn't done now. Nor shall ever be in the future. CM is about tactics and the terrible price paid for screwing them up. I hear the problem's even worse in the campaigns, but embarking on them would take having some level of competence in a single fight. Let's just say it sucks to be under my command and let it go at that. Even when I win there's no rejoicing, for my troops are in shreds or dead. Happily for all concerned, I don't do this for a living.
 
At the rate BFC's going, I suspect that the games will soon come with a discount card for one's first PTSD therapy session. This may sound droll, but after managing to practically annihilate my entire command in CMBN's 18 Platoon, I'm only half joking. If that. Very few here exult in the slaughter of their men (so long as they're attacking) as does c3k, but few of us operate with his approach or the bloodymindedness of Grant or Zhukov. We, as it were, are like those sorrowful company COs in the 50s war movies who know each man by name, as a real person, and take the time after a harrowing fight to write a personal letter to the family of each of the slain.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

We know. Steve said. They don't.
 
Imagine all you like. It's not there.

Baneman,
 
While I certainly take your point that a minefield still takes up the space a squad occupies, my point is that for mine warfare, it's all about frontage covered per minefield. IN CMx2, it now takes three minefields and change to cover the frontage one did before. That hurts when trying to create barriers.
 
womble,
 
I object strongly to your statement that I knowingly stated rubbish, for I did no such thing. Recommend you go back and add "IMO" to that sentence, since you've stated an opinion, not a fact.
 
Vanir Ausf B,
 
While it's true there are more points available for purchases in an absolute sense, I find your logic highly questionable. Why? Because it now costs a fortune to field a formation, even a cut down one. I did a 6K and change QB buy, huge by my standards, and my resultant force looked badly dinged up in consequence. To make the limit, I dropped an  entire Bradley platoon, staff units, FS teams (fortunately, I had several), dumped my JTAC, two Hummers and more and had only one Bradley platoon at full strength, with another missing many Bradleys. What I wound up with was the sort of thing I'd expect to see in a unit that had been through a fair amount of combat, a formation anything but full strength and especially hurting in the fighting power department. People think of the American Way of War as being based on artillery and tacair, but I couldn't afford much artillery (bought in sections because I needed ability to cover multiple axes of attack), and tacair was astronomic in cost, which meant I bought none. Since I had to worry about Putin's tacair and rotary wing capabilities, I also got to eat the costs of fielding the Stingers I might need, too.
 
My only CMx2 QB experience is in CMBS, so I can't speak to how things stack up there, relatively speaking. I strongly suspect, though, that it's much easier to field, say, a full Armored Infantry company, for the points allocated in a given QB category for the CMx2 WW II titles. The point allocation in CMBS for defending in Probe is 6802, but an Armored Mech company is 6903 at typical settings. It may be more than that with rarity, but I'm too tired to be sure. If I'm right, even if I slightly blow my entire budget by tweaking a setting a bit, all I get is one company. No tacair, no Stingers, no artillery, no barded wire, no mines, no TRPs, no foxholes, no entrenchments.  Consequently, since I can't afford anything like what the US typically brings to a fight, I find your idea of trebling mine costs to be ill advised at best, and I'm being kind. 
 
(goes off and sets up a CMBN Probe buy with Americans defending)
 
Probe budget is 3445. I don't know why this is the case, but "A" Company is 1525, "B" Company is 1809, and "C" Company is 1856, again, at Typical. So, the Probe budget in CMBN buys me a complete Armored Infantry Company at the very least. I can buy two "A" Company units if I wish. Let's say I don't. I take my remaining budget and buy the very pieces I couldn't afford in CMBS. A full battery of 105s, the basic American howitzer of the war (155 is the go to now), leaving me with 1188 points. I buy an FO section for 147 points (lets me control artillery and use tacair). 1041 left. Next, I buy a TRP for 150, 5 x Foxhole at 250, leaving 641. I then buy 1 x AT mine for 250, leaving 491, 2 x barbed wire for 200, and still have 191 left. Then follow two sniper teams for 46 points, a .30 HMG for 36 and medium mortar (81 mm) team for 49. 60 points remaining. I then buy a light mortar section (60 mm) for 48. 12 points left. These I'd spend tweaking unit capabilities. This force has 3 x 57 mm ATG organic to it and, if modeled correctly, every single squad should have a bazooka, too. This is a Company (+), and a very heavily armed one at that and is provided with protective holes and several barrier types, too. As noted above, the entire budget for the Americans in a CMBS Probe would buy only the Mech I Company and nothing else. Not exactly a fun situation if defending in place, right?
 
Seems to me that if mines are too cheap anywhere, it's in the WW II CMx2 titles, not CMBS! And the WW II titles have bunkers, hedgehogs, AP mines and mixed mines, too.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

sburke,
 
I'm well aware and have long been of the terrain granularity improving size change in the AS. Duh! I was not aware of the drastic downsizing in minefield coverage, which has very real tactical impact. 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

ikalugin,
 
In this case, an eminently reasonable response. I don't read Russian, but your second link is either extremely terse or isn't showing what it should. Judging from you what said over in Strategic and Tactical Realities of CMBS, you are a native Russian, and are not presently serving. I would still greatly appreciate it if you sourced such goodies as your discourse on Russian MANPADS and who has what. I recognize you may not be able to reveal such things directly, lest you wind up being interrogated in the "box,"  as we say here in the States, but were you to say "Through my time in the service I learned..." that would be fine with me. Unless even that would put you in a pickle. 
 
BTR,
 
Both of the links in your #8 return Error 404 and are therefore useless in making your case.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Ok, the voice from the peanut gallery shuts up now

Huh? What?  As far as I can tell you were the one acting haughty and raging.  Yeah, I suppose it is a bit of "he hit me back first" but it takes two t tango.  You said you wanted blood and other said they don't. If you are allowed to express your opinion then aren't others? 
 
On the subject of newcomers, if you really are a newcomer then I hope you can let this slide and contribute to the community...  I worry a little when I see someone 'new' on the scene who arrives all hot and bothered and right away down votes posts that are not harsh or out of line and at the same time up vote their own posts it makes me wonder just a bit.

Could easily be black propganda from Russia/rebels similar to rumours UK put out about 'Burning Seas' from a small acorn of truth in 1940 that bounced around Europe and ended up getting published as consequences of any invasion attempt across the Channel.
 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum_Warfare_Department#Burning_seas
 
All JK is doing is regurgitating disinfo from some quarter

It looks like this story broke some time ago, but got picked up only recently in certain channels. Newsweek, for example, had not only already published the story, but updated it July 31, 2015. The piece contains a wealth of information far eclipsing what IB Times and The times (to the extent I could read it online) published.
 
http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-says-rebels-are-building-dirty-bomb-358885
 
InformNapalm, which does some very good OSINT, as seen here, in an analysis of the who, what, when and where of the movement of the Buk TELAR thought to be involved in the MH-17 shootdown, put out a short piece with very specific information on the storage site, including the street address, the name of the concern formerly operating there, a Google Earth overhead, a statement the area is not controlled and a discussion (with a rather alarming pic) showing the factory being shelled, with what appears to be a large secondary explosion resulting.

https://en.informnapalm.org/nuclear-terrorism-and-the-dirty-bomb/
 
On the other end of things, SOTT.net published a withering piece on what IB, The Times and Newsweek had to say. the writer of it is not only not buying the story, but has blasted it as Western propaganda and specifically invokes warmongering.
 
http://www.sott.net/article/299772-SOTT-Exclusive-Dirty-bomb-in-the-making-SBU-uncovers-yet-another-sinister-Russian-plot
 
And, yes, the Russians have repeatedly shown they can be remarkably inept when conducting black propaganda ops. In the case cited, it's clear they didn't watch "Wag the Dog" to gain the proper appreciation for how to do this sort of stuff. 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Sublime,
 
It remains to be seen for me just how precise precision artillery really is. Also, I'm wrestling with a bunch of issues related to drones and precision attack in general. I understand, for example, your house rule about Zalas, but to me, that's an own goal the Americans scored on themselves by their, to me, insane air defense choices. The Americans have all sorts of capabilities others don't in the game, to include Excalibur. They have more drones than the proverbial dog has fleas. Ukraine has no drones in CMBS, yet has them IRL and when last seen, was doing serious shopping for the kind sold at arms expos. There's also crowd funding for a new drone called PD -1 (People's Drone 1) Nor is it some pipe dream, for it's already been in combat, taken a hit and still RTBed. And what assuredly isn't depicted in the game is the tremendous scale of issue of laser guided shells for Russian artillery.
 
http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/krasnopol.htm
 
"Employment There are many variations in the number of equipment sets related to the employment of Krasnopol-equipped firing units. Various tactical situations and firing systems will dictate the overall employment of the Krasnopol. FM 100-60, Armor- and Mechanized-Based Opposing Force: Organization Guide list a typical opposing force (OPFOR) 152-mm SP howitzer battalion as equipped with four sets of the Krasnopol-M. Each set is composed of the LTD (1D22, 1D20, 1D15), the 1A35 shot synchronization system, and 50 projectiles per LTD. Thus, a total of 200 Krasnopol projectiles are fielded to each 152-mm SP howitzer battalion. One battery of the battalion is designated as the special-weapons or Krasnopol battery. The Krasnopol battery commander designates one platoon (possibly on a rotating basis to maintain crew proficiency) as the principal Krasnopol firing unit. A Krasnopol platoon basic load consists of the Krasnopol, smoke, and illuminating rounds. The Krasnopol firing platoon retains 140 Krasnopol projectiles, while the sixty remaining projectiles are distributed throughout the battalion at a rate of four Krasnopols per tube. One LTD is distributed to each battery COP (three per battalion) and the battalion's mobile reconnaissance post. The LTD operator uses a concealed location to position the LTD within a 15 arc left or right of the gun target line and no more than seven kilometers (preferably five kilomteres) from the target. During engagement, each gun (within the Krasnopol platoon) fires one Krasnopol projectile in succession either on command of the LTD operator or on a predetermined time sequence with less than thirty seconds between projectiles per designator. Upon destruction of the initial target, the LTD operator shifts the designator to subsequent targets downwind (from the previous engagement) to reduce smoke and dust interference with the designator."
 
 Am pretty certain the Russians can't do that sort of thing in CMBS using one LTD. And is offset lasing in the game?
 
"The LTD operator can counter this countermeasure by using an initial laser offset procedure. The laser offset procedure requires the LTD operator to first determine a land feature or easily referenced landmark within the kill zone. The operator surveys the kill zone for background conditions that may cause sufficient backscatter (from other reflecting surfaces) to provide the target early warning of the LTD laser beam. The LTD operator lases at the predetermined offset point (fifteen to twenty meters from the target) at the beginning of the fire mission. The LTD operator or his assistant is alerted to the Krasnopol's acquisition of the laser beam either by a "munition approach" light-emitting diode on the 1A35 shot synchronization equipment or a blinking signal light in the optics of the LTD. The LTD operator begins shifting the laser target designator crosshairs to the center of the target four to five seconds after the signal prompt. The shifting of the laser beam from the offset point to the target is two to three seconds prior to the terminal phase of projectile flight. The offset procedure process takes a total of six to eight seconds. Thus, the Krasnopol is able hit and destroy the target prior to employment of laser countermeasures. The offset procedure requires a skilled LTD operator due to the requirement for increased hand and eye coordination during the laser beam-shifting process."
 
What I'm trying to say is that there are very real force asymmetries in the game, and I have real doubts about the wisdom of depriving one nation of an existing tactical edge as a result. I remember very well the horror and nauseous felling I got in 1985 when in a SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL Soviet Threat Technology Conference the CIA gave us the skinny on Russian artillery, mortar and rocket delivered PGMs. At a time when the US had a handful of 155 mm Copperhead rounds, the Russians had laser guided FS weapons, in incredible abundance, on a breathtaking range of platforms.
 
Just as I absolutely would not support toning down the Javelin because it's "unfair," neither would I support depriving the Russians of their astounding capabilities to deliver precision fires--primarily from a dedicated platoon holding no fewer than 140 Krasnopol projectiles, with another 60 in the battalion proper. If I'm understanding the Foreign Military Studies Office article correctly, the Russians have pretty much abandoned traditional blanketing of the target with dumb munition fires, now preferring the rapier stroke to the war hammer. To me, that's a major change in warfighting philosophy and technique.
 
Fade2Gray,   Think of it as a real test for your computer's ability to handle a very heavy computational and display load. Hundreds of small warhead detonations blanket the landscape, throwing up great gouts of earth, flame and smoke.
 
Since we know the Russians have already used their big MRLs (BM-27 Uragan and BM-30 Smerch) to attack Ukraine, what, exactly, did those mighty blows accomplish? Not much in terms of the levels of damage you seem to expect. While what Human Rights Watch documents ref cluster munition attacks from MRLs is grim for civilians, from a military standpoint, the casualties produced are not, IMO, really worth the weapon cost or the effort.  A 1.8 kg submunition can't even crater a street above the level of a veritable pavement scuff. The 100 kg unitary warhead for the BM-27 and its big brother 258 kg for the BM-30 are, of course, something else entirely.
 
But consider: The 16 tubes on the BM-27 amount to not even a tube artillery battalion volley--albeit from very large guns, and the BM-30 equates to only to a two battery volley, though the BM-30 is essentially hurling a  dozen 250 kg aerial bombs at the target. From what I can tell, the real grid remover isn't Smerch but Grad, which brought the pain with 40 tubes (two battalions and change) of a very hard hitting 122 mm 18.8 kg warhead capable of penetrating even a bunker.  The US MLRS is the real area blanketer, where each rocket of 12 has 644 DP submunitions. That said, these are tiny submunitions which are equivalent to a 40 mm grenade from a blast frag perspective and a very weak shaped charge if they hit something hard. On balance, I'd be a lot more concerned, all other things being equal, with a Grad salvo than I would be with a Smerch strike. Volume of fire tells. Just ask the Chinese. This then-secret weapon mauled them so badly in the 1968 border dispute with Russia that their troops broke and fled. So nasty was it the Chinese basically copied the weapon.
 
Regards,   John Kettler  
 
 

I hope you still have time to get the infantry Co HQ on a tank.  I like to match up my infantry HQs with their supporting tank HQs in CMRT.  It is one of the benefits of tank riders.  When possible, I will put the infantry Platoon HQ on the HQ tank of the supporting tank platoon.  (Same with Company level units.)  This facilitates the flow of intel between the infantry unit and tank unit.  Just have to be careful not to get the inf HQ shot off the back of the tank.  Good luck with that.    Infantry without radios can also use the tanks radio to stay in C2.  With the lack of Russian radios this is often useful.  The screenshot below demonstrates infantry/tank cooperation & C2.
 

Chazz,
 
I had to do a Search to find a post on which the missing CMRT Demo link was first reported by me--mid November 2014. Fortunately, a kind soul posted the BFC CMRT page which had the Demo link embedeed. After some hair pulling (likely my fractious ISP) I got the CMRT DLed and gave it a whirl. Tankodesantniki looks fabulous (default is full trees on) and, based on a sample size of three tanks moved, works great. Looks way better than my CMBN did out of the box, or even at 2.12 but am not sure I've tried it since upgrading and patching through 3.2. Have the actual renderings been improved over CMBN, or is this software wizardry at work?
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

c3k,
 
Only if Andre Rieu conducts! Not sure whether O Fortuna from Orff's "Carmina Burana" is the way to go (2:45)
 

 
or whether Holst's "Mars" from "The Planets" and conducted by Slatkin is the better choice?
 

 
Of course Megadeth has a song called "Symphony of Destruction," but that might ruin the high martial tone we've so carefully created and nurtured here. Also, I expect there'd be so much thundering cacophony, so many shrieks, as pnzrldr goes about his grisly work on Bil's troops it'd be superfluous!
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Bydax,
 
The reporter's willingness to potentially play Humpty Dumpty on that BTR--one bump away from terrible fall--is impressive, for he doesn't seem to skip a beat no matter what he's doing. The gun shield on the rooftop 12.7 Kords is new to me. I think, though the last bit is a put up job. Simple logic says that if the M16s are gray with pulverized oncrete dust, then so also should be the cartridges lying with them, yet they're not. They look as though they just came out of the ammo crate. 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

I recall a conversation with a playtester heavily involved in CM just as CMBB was being released, discussing the T-34 vs the Panzer III long (50L60).  He thought "the T-34 is a piece of crap" and that the Panzer III should and would smoke it like a cheap cigar, all day.  He was hopelessly wrong, and that opinion falsifies the whole history of the war in the east.  
 
Tanks are meant to accomplish a concrete combat task, which isn't cuddling the driver's backside.  The T-34, warts and all, pretty much won WWII.  Does that mean it was a superior tank, one for one, to the Panther, say?  Of course not.  It does mean that it was as good or better, in practice, as all other common main battle tanks of the war, and that properly used it fulfilled all the tactical and operational functions a main battle tank needed to perform in that war.  When revisionists try to tell us otherwise, they are engaged in an attempt to get us to believe them instead of our lying eyes, and its just hopeless.  T-26s wouldn't have retaken European Russia from the Germans in 30 months of high intensity combat.  T-34s did.  Not "could have", not "had some potential", DID.  And no amount of spin can detract from that.

Suits you sir...
 

Krasnoarmeyets,
 
I saw an analysis done in the 1980s that was reported out in a classified quarterly on the lofty end of US defense studies. It's all water under the bridge now, but it was a side by side comparison of like for like US and Russian weapon systems. One point which particularly stood out was how inexpensive Russian tanks were. The T-62, working from memory here, was ~250,000 dollars, while the equivalent US M60 was, I believe, roughly three times that. There was absolutely no comparison in terms of service life, for while the US tanks were designed and built to last for decades, the T-62s had very short service lives, as detailed by not just Suvorov/Rezun, but in any number of open source and classified documents from the period. What chilled me to the marrow, though, was the Russian reckoning of the combat life of a tank--24 hours.
 
While it sucks in terms of real training for war to have only a few tanks (rotated) on which the whole company must train, with most of the unit "playing tank" on foot, if the tanks have very short service lives and the budget won't permit enough training tanks, then the policy, horrifying as it would be to US soldiers, becomes essential if a large force, not synonymous with well trained force, must be fielded. Worse, the Russian tank troops might not even train on the much better tank in which they'd go to war, so in no way could be expected to extract anything like the true combat potential of such an advanced tank.
 
Tank for tank, assuming any sort of technical parity at all, the US would've mopped the floor with the Russians, for hard, realistic training, several 10s of times more live fire, professional soldiers and a thorough knowledge of their weapons and how to use them would've made the difference. The problem was that while the US held an undeniable advantage on the soldier end and performance squeezing side of the equation,  as well as a real edge in gunnery accuracy and sensors (T-62 gun good out to only 1500 meters, while US tank tables went clear out to 3000 meters) the force ratio was bad, our antitank weapons were shown to be woefully inadequate against Russian armor (forcing a multi billion dollar get well program), while US tanks were highly vulnerable to Russian weapons. "Quantity creates a quality all its own." And if you have quantity and quality...? Exactly.
 
And compounding all of the above? Western leaders and analysts who kept making the same disastrous mistake of confusing the typically awful inept performance of Russian Arab allies, often in monkey model feature removed, worse armored than homeland tanks, with that of the Red Army. And every time there was another war in the Middle East, up would go the cry. "The Bear's a joke. We have nothing to worry about. Look what the Israelis did to them!" It was that way in 1956 and 1967, but things got so bad in the 1973 War, especially in Syria, that Israel very nearly went nuclear, but the US staved that off by replacing gigantic Israeli tank losses. The Egyptian Front was deeply disturbing, but Syria showed a pretty good glimpse of what a real clash with Russia might entail, and long and worried were the western faces now having to deal with the realization that combat was going to be around the clock. That--over and above the ATGM (and RPG) massacre of the 190th Armored Brigade at the Suez Canal-- was outright traumatic once it sank in. The Israelis very nearly lost the war on the Syrian Front and with it, the nation. What saved them were battle hardened tank pros, desperately fighting with the rapidly dwindling all they had, using far from modern tanks, from prepared positions with a substantial elevation advantage over their foes in the valley and using everything they could think of to stop huge Syrian tank forces--as Israel desperately mobilized reserves. For a look at that experience, please see Kahalani's (commanded the IDF's 77th Armored Brigade that defended the Golan) excellent The Heights of Courage. Had that battle been on open ground, Israel wouldn't exist today. That simple. And those were the students, not the teachers!  
You are most welcome for the information. If you don't mind my asking, given the handle you picked and an evidently considerable knowledge of the Russian military, are you Russian, formerly from there or in one of the countries which regained independence after the SU collapsed? Also, are you a military veteran and of what?
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler 

sburke,
 
I looked, but evidently in the wrong place. In any event I wasn't trying to spread incorrect info.
 
MikeyD,
 
I like that. When it comes to gift giving, bows are important!
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Splunkjamma,
 
Why not just give a BFC gift certificate in the amount of the game? Though I couldn't find it listed on the site, I'd imagine that could be arranged by contacting BFC. The way I've seen it is as a discount code to be applied at checkout. Am not quite sure how to do it if you wish to mask your outlay. In that case, Lethaface may have it right. Recommend you contact BFC's HelpDesk and submit a ticket. I looked in the canned answers under both "gift certificate" and "gift," but found nothing, which is why I suggest generating a ticket.
 
http://battlefront.mojohelpdesk.com
 
sburke,
 
In which case Splunkjamma will now have two separate CMx2 acquisition pipelines--but only if he gets his friend to buy something after the initial game and the friend doesn't change the PW! On a more serious note, it's always good to know that theory and results correlate perfectly when it comes to, wait for it, The Lethaface Implementation! Yes, I do watch "The Big Bang Theory," and the physicists' way of describing things has, to some degree, wormed its way into my brain. 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Mods,
 
Something is wonky here. Post No. 4, listed as being by Vergeltungswaffe, is, in fact, by me. 
 
ikalugin,
 
Did the CIA T-64B report melt your brain? If so, I certainly understand why you haven't replied!
 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Missed one
 

ikalugin,
 
You are absolutely correct. It is indeed a smoothbore weapon. The T-12/MT-12 wasn't something that directly concerned me, for NATO was defending, and the analyses at Hughes were geared toward the TOW ATGM, plus WASP and Assault Breaker for deep interdiction and strike, but I do find it fascinating that the T-62 got a 115 mm smoothbore cannon after the technology was first proven in the T-12/MT-12 100 mm ATG. Appreciate your information. And for a proper sense of what we're talking about for those unfamiliar with this beast (both in size and power), I believe the vid will prove most informative. And it's even shot in Ukraine.
 

 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

A major Russian academic has waded in, in the context of a piece on China-Russia economic cooperation by Professor Alexander Panov for the state-owned tech firm Rostec's site . What he has to say about the backward state of Russian electronics is most revealing and confirms the very points several of us have made in this regard. And who is Alexander Panov? A very big gun indeed. 
 
(Fair Use)
 
"By Alexander Panov
Distinguished Officer of the Russian Diplomatic Service
Senior Researcher at the US and Canada Research Institute with the Russian Academy of Science, MGIMO Professor"
 
I looked him up myself, and his accomplishments are most impressive and long term. See UL corner of linked page. He served in the Soviet Union's diplomatic corps and now serves in Russia's.
 
https://books.google.com/books?id=jn_GG55gKm8C&pg=PA1282#v=onepage&q&f=false
 
His titles as presented in an Executive Leadership Course held in Moscow at the Diplomatic Academy. As Rector, he is what here in the States we call Dean.
 
http://www.dipacademy.ru/elc/rector_message.shtml
 
"Electronics
 
The sector has very strong significance to date. However, I believe that we would mostly have to rely on our own designs. We have fallen very far behind advanced technologies in this sector. So we have to move fast to catch up. Our component manufacturing is very faar behind global leaders. This is a very big and complex problem."
 
Mind, that isn't to say that Russia can't build high tech. It can and does, but this breaking story on a Russian microwave weapon on the Buk chassis, widely reported, even by one of the major networks here, is an exclusive from one state-owned firm to another. Russia is world class in this field, for it plays to Russia's tremendous depth and breadth in high energy physics.
 
http://www.ibtimes.com/russias-microwave-gun-can-disable-drones-warheads-6-miles-away-official-says-1967170
 
It so happens that I'm very well positioned to apply some sniff tests to the article, for Russian HPM (High Power Microwave) weaponry was not only part of my job, but I was one of the founders of the DEWWG (Directed Energy Weapon Working Group) at Rockwell International NAAO (North American Aerospace Operations) formed specifically to address the threats posed by Russian laser, particle beam and HPW weapons. The relativistic device referred to in the article is a vircator, which puts out microwave energy at breathtaking levels. That's without factoring in antenna gain, either.
 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vircator
 
"Power levels on the order of 1010 to 1012 watts are possible."
 
While classically the vircator is a one shot system, it is possible to build one which can fire shot after shot, as this military-technical paper points out. 
 
http://aimt.unob.cz/articles/07_02/07_02%20(8).pdf
 
As such, the HPM weapon Sputnik reports is almost certainly an added capability for the Buk SAM system, in the form of a weapon system on the same chassis as the Buk, but which offers unique capabilities the Buk doesn't have, capabilities which complement each other in a SAM-HPM mix. Not only can the HPM wreak all sorts of havoc on its own, but it could also improve SAM effectiveness by overloading, or even damaging and destroying the sensors of the planned aerial target, potentially stripping it of SA and possibly much more. How much more? How about ordnance or fuel  detonating? Nor does HPM weaponry have a Rmin, whereas a SAM does. Nor is an HPM shot limited! 
  Regards,
 
John Kettler

Having finished some 17 chapters in it, I can emphatically state Now It Can Be Told is a simply phenomenal book; a must read not just for WW I grogs or military history buffs, either, but for anyone with any interest at all in the human condition. I've read hundreds and hundreds of accounts of war, but I've never seen anything like this.
 
The author covered the war from before war correspondents were even officially allowed, knew everyone from the top commanders on down to some poor bloke just arrived in the trenches in the early days and knows nothing of the ways of war. Before his very eyes, he saw the professionals of the Regular Army wiped out, to be replaced with the New Army raised by Kitchener.
 
He talks about the sublimely ignorant keenness of the young men to get into battle, the generation annihilating losses, the pluses and minuses of the generals, who generally unimaginatively plot battles which do little than exsanguinate and rend asunder the British troops involved. He talks about those who actually do have brains, use them creatively and, when given rein by higher, actually accomplish something without wiping out the men wholesale in the doing.
 
He addresses the British Army's early lack of heavy artillery, MGs and the training to use them well (in the face of the Germans who invariably had the observational advantage) and what Regular Army rifle marksmanship did to the Germans at an open fire range of 800 yards (Mons, where the Germans thought they were being machine gunned). He rails at the British Government's and the Army's lack of understanding of the role and value of the press; he portrays the ins and outs of combat journalism and the mental dislocations occasioned by shuttling daily, by car no less, from a comfortable shared house where he and his fellows waged ceaseless combat to meet article deadlines to the squalor and terror of a frontline in which the ramparts are partially constructed of corpses, then back home again.
 
He details the immense frustration and, sometimes, guilty feelings of the REMFs going nuts because, try as they might to get to the front, they're needed in the rear to do logistics, push paper, conduct training and perform a thousand and one noncombat tasks necessary to arm, feed and support the relative handful (despite its apparent immensity) doing the fighting.  
 
Philip Gibbs is nothing short of a brilliant writer, and I'm of firm opinion that his book should be mandatory in Literature classes, for it is a masterwork in how to write beautifully, economically, effectively and with staggering emotional power. Moved me to the verge of tears repeatedly! 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler